DB106 - Political Science
1. “What is the responsibility of Christians with regards to geopolitics and the mandates of the Gospel?
Chapter 1
The New Era in World Politics
INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
On January 3, 1992, a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.
The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples’ identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.
On April 18, 1994, two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N., NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.
On October 16, 1994, in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath “a sea of Mexican flags” protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they “walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this country give them a free education?” observers asked. “They should be waving the American flag.” Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street carrying an American flag—upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.
In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.
One grim Weltanschauung for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Dibdin’s novel, Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.” The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations.
The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.
Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.
Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.
Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying,” the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.
Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.
A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD
In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West — Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others — constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).
In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.
Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those “imposed” on them by the West. The “international system of the twenty-first century,” Henry Kissinger has noted, “… will contain at least six major powers — the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India — as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries.”1 Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five very different civilizations, and in addition there are important Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and/or oil resources make them influential in world affairs. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.
Chapter 4
The Fading of the West: Power, Culture, and Indigenization
WESTERN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE
Two pictures exist of the power of the West in relation to other civilizations. The first is of overwhelming, triumphant, almost total Western dominance. The disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the only serious challenger to the West and as a result the world is and will be shaped by the goals, priorities, and interests of the principal Western nations, with perhaps an occasional assist from Japan. As the one remaining superpower, the United States together with Britain and France make the crucial decisions on political and security issues; the United States together with Germany and Japan make the crucial decisions on economic issues. The West is the only civilization which has substantial interests in every other civilization or region and has the ability to affect the politics, economics, and security of every other civilization or region. Societies from other civilizations usually need Western help to achieve their goals and protect their interests. Western nations, as one author summarized it:
• Own and operate the international banking system
• Control all hard currencies
• Are the world’s principal customer
• Provide the majority of the world’s finished goods
• Dominate international capital markets
• Exert considerable moral leadership within many societies
• Are capable of massive military intervention
• Control the sea lanes
• Conduct most advanced technical research and development
• Control leading edge technical education
• Dominate access to space
• Dominate the aerospace industry
• Dominate international communications
• Dominate the high-tech weapons industry1
The second picture of the West is very different. It is of a civilization in decline, its share of world political, economic, and military power going down relative to that of other civilizations. The West’s victory in the Cold War has produced not triumph but exhaustion. The West is increasingly concerned with its internal problems and needs, as it confronts slow economic growth, stagnating populations, unemployment, huge government deficits, a declining work ethic, low savings rates, and in many countries including the United States social disintegration, drugs, and crime. Economic power is rapidly shifting to East Asia, and military power and political influence are starting to follow. India is on the verge of economic takeoff and the Islamic world is increasingly hostile toward the West. The willingness of other societies to accept the West’s dictates or abide its sermons is rapidly evaporating, and so are the West’s self-confidence and will to dominate. The late 1980s witnessed much debate about the declinist thesis concerning the United States. In the mid-1990s, a balanced analysis came to a somewhat similar conclusion:
[I]n many important respects, its [the United States’] relative power will decline at an accelerating pace. In terms of its raw economic capabilities, the position of the United States in relation to Japan and eventually China is likely to erode still further. In the military realm, the balance of effective capabilities between the United States and a number of growing regional powers (including, perhaps, Iran, India, and China) will shift from the center toward the periphery. Some of America’s structural power will flow to other nations; some (and some of its soft power as well) will find its way into the hands of nonstate actors like multinational corporations.2
Which of these two contrasting pictures of the place of the West in the world describes reality? The answer, of course, is: they both do. The West is overwhelmingly dominant now and will remain number one in terms of power and influence well into the twenty-first century. Gradual, inexorable, and fundamental changes, however, are also occurring in the balances of power among civilizations, and the power of the West relative to that of other civilizations will continue to decline. As the West’s primacy erodes, much of its power will simply evaporate and the rest will be diffused on a regional basis among the several major civilizations and their core states. The most significant increases in power are accruing and will accrue to Asian civilizations, with China gradually emerging as the society most likely to challenge the West for global influence. These shifts in power among civilizations are leading and will lead to the revival and increased cultural assertiveness of non-Western societies and to their increasing rejection of Western culture.
The decline of the West has three major characteristics.
First, it is a slow process. The rise of Western power took four hundred years. Its recession could take as long. In the 1980s the distinguished British scholar Hedley Bull argued that “European or Western dominance of the universal international society may be said to have reached its apogee about the year 1900.”3 Spengler’s first volume appeared in 1918 and the “decline of the West” has been a central theme in twentieth-century history. The process itself has stretched out through most of the century. Conceivably, however, it could accelerate. Economic growth and other increases in a country’s capabilities often proceed along an S curve: a slow start then rapid acceleration followed by reduced rates of expansion and leveling off. The decline of countries may also occur along a reverse S curve, as it did with the Soviet Union: moderate at first then rapidly accelerating before bottoming out. The decline of the West is still in the slow first phase, but at some point it might speed up dramatically.
Second, decline does not proceed in a straight line. It is highly irregular with pauses, reversals, and reassertions of Western power following manifestations of Western weakness. The open democratic societies of the West have great capacities for renewal. In addition, unlike many civilizations, the West has had two major centers of power. The decline which Bull saw starting about 1900 was essentially the decline of the European component of Western civilization. From 1910 to 1945 Europe was divided against itself and preoccupied with its internal economic, social, and political problems. In the 1940s, however, the American phase of Western domination began, and in 1945 the United States briefly dominated the world to an extent almost comparable to the combined Allied Powers in 1918. Postwar decolonization further reduced European influence but not that of the United States, which substituted a new transnational imperialism for the traditional territorial empire. During the Cold War, however, American military power was matched by that of the Soviets and American economic power declined relative to that of Japan. Yet periodic efforts at military and economic renewal did occur. In 1991, indeed, another distinguished British scholar, Barry Buzan, argued that “The deeper reality is that the centre is now more dominant, and the periphery more subordinate, than at any time since decolonization began.”4 The accuracy of that perception, however, fades as the military victory that gave rise to it also fades into history.
Third, power is the ability of one person or group to change the behavior of another person or group. Behavior may be changed through inducement, coercion, or exhortation, which require the power-wielder to have economic, military, institutional, demographic, political, technological, social, or other resources. The power of a state or group is hence normally estimated by measuring the resources it has at its disposal against those of the other states or groups it is trying to influence. The West’s share of most, but not all, of the important power resources peaked early in the twentieth century and then began to decline relative to those of other civilizations.
TABLE 4.1
TERRITORY UNDER THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF CIVILIZATIONS, 1900–1993
Territory and Population. In 1490 Western societies controlled most of the European peninsula outside the Balkans or perhaps 1.5 million square miles out of a global land area (apart from Antarctica) of 52.5 million square miles. At the peak of its territorial expansion in 1920, the West directly ruled about 25.5 million square miles or close to half the earth’s earth. By 1993 this territorial control had been cut in half to about 12.7 million square miles. The West was back to its original European core plus its spacious settler-populated lands in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. The territory of independent Islamic societies, in contrast, rose from 1.8 million square miles in 1920 to over 11 million square miles in 1993. Similar changes occurred in the control of population. In 1900 Westerners composed roughly 30 percent of the world’s population and Western governments ruled almost 45 percent of that population then and 48 percent in 1920. In 1993, except for a few small imperial remnants like Hong Kong, Western governments ruled no one but Westerners. Westerners amounted to slightly over 13 percent of humanity and are due to drop to about 11 percent early in the next century and to 10 percent by 2025.5 In terms of total population, in 1993 the West ranked fourth behind Sinic, Islamic, and Hindu civilizations.
Quantitatively Westerners thus constitute a steadily decreasing minority of the world’s population. Qualitatively the balance between the West and other populations is also changing. Non-Western peoples are becoming healthier, more urban, more literate, better educated. By the early 1990s infant mortality rates in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia were one-third to one-half what they had been thirty years earlier. Life expectancy in these regions had increased significantly, with gains varying from eleven years in Africa to twenty-three years in East Asia. In the early 1960s in most of the Third World less than one-third of the adult population was literate. In the early 1990s, in very few countries apart from Africa was less than one-half the population literate. About fifty percent of Indians and 75 percent of Chinese could read and write. Literacy rates in developing countries in 1970 averaged 41 percent of those in developed countries; in 1992 they averaged 71 percent. By the early 1990s in every region except Africa virtually the entire age group was enrolled in primary education. Most significantly, in the early 1960s in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa less than one-third of the appropriate age group was enrolled in secondary education; by the early 1990s one-half of the age group was enrolled except in Africa. In 1960 urban residents made up less than one-quarter of the population of the less developed world. Between 1960 and 1992, however, the urban percentage of the population rose from 49 percent to 73 percent in Latin America, 34 percent to 55 percent in Arab countries, 14 percent to 29 percent in Africa, 18 percent to 27 percent in China, and 19 percent to 26 percent in India.6
TABLE 4.2
POPULATIONS OF COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE WORLD’S MAJOR CIVILIZATIONS, 1993 (in thousands)
TABLE 4.3
SHARES OF WORLD POPULATION UNDER THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF CIVILIZATIONS, 1900–2025 (in percentages)
These shifts in literacy, education, and urbanization created socially mobilized populations with enhanced capabilities and higher expectations who could be activated for political purposes in ways in which illiterate peasants could not. Socially mobilized societies are more powerful societies. In 1953, when less than 15 percent of Iranians were literate and less than 17 percent urban, Kermit Roosevelt and a few CIA operatives rather easily suppressed an insurgency and restored the Shah to his throne. In 1979, when 50 percent of Iranians were literate and 47 percent lived in cities, no amount of U.S. military power could have kept the Shah on his throne. A significant gap still separates Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Africans from Westerners, Japanese, and Russians. Yet the gap is narrowing rapidly. At the same time, a different gap is opening. The average ages of Westerners, Japanese, and Russians are increasingly steadily, and the larger proportion of the population that no longer works imposes a mounting burden on those still productively employed. Other civilizations are burdened by large numbers of children, but children are future workers and soldiers.
Economic Product The Western share of the global economic product also may have peaked in the 1920s and has clearly been declining since World War II. In 1750 China accounted for almost one-third, India for almost one-quarter, and the West for less than a fifth of the world’s manufacturing output. By 1830 the West had pulled slightly ahead of China. In the following decades, as Paul Bairoch points out, the industrialization of the West led to the deindustrialization of the rest of the world. In 1913 the manufacturing output of non-Western countries was roughly two-thirds what it had been in 1800. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century the Western share rose dramatically, peaking in 1928 at 84.2 percent of world manufacturing output. Thereafter the West’s share declined as its rate of growth remained modest and as less industrialized countries expanded their output rapidly after World War II. By 1980 the West accounted for 57.8 percent of global manufacturing output, roughly the share it had 120 years earlier in the 1860s.7
TABLE 4.4
SHARES OF WORLD MANUFACTURING OUTPUT BY CIVILIZATION OR COUNTRY, 1750–1980 (in percentages, World = 100%)
Reliable data on gross economic product are not available for the pre-World War II period. In 1950, however, the West accounted for roughly 64 percent of the gross world product; by the 1980s this proportion had dropped to 49 percent. (See Table 4.5.) By 2013, according to one estimate, the West will account for only 30% of the world product. In 1991, according to another estimate, four of the world’s seven largest economies belonged to non-Western nations: Japan (in second place), China (third), Russia (sixth), and India (seventh). In 1992 the United States had the largest economy in the world, and the top ten economies included those of five Western countries plus the leading states of five other civilizations: China, Japan, India, Russia, and Brazil. In 2020 plausible projections indicate that the top five economies will be in five different civilizations, and the top ten economies will include only three Western countries. This relative decline of the West is, of course, in large part a function of the rapid rise of East Asia.8
Gross figures on economic output partially obscure the West’s qualitative advantage. The West and Japan almost totally dominate advanced technology industries. Technologies are being disseminated, however, and if the West wishes to maintain its superiority it will do what it can to minimize that dissemination. Thanks to the interconnected world which the West has created, however, slowing the diffusion of technology to other civilizations is increasingly difficult. It is made all the more so in the absence of a single, overpowering, agreed-upon threat such as existed during the Cold War and gave measures of technology control some modest effectiveness.
TABLE 4.5
CIVILIZATION SHARES OF WORLD GROSS ECONOMIC PRODUCT, 1950–1992 (in percentages)
It appears probable that for most of history China had the world’s largest economy. The diffusion of technology and the economic development of non-Western societies in the second half of the twentieth century are now producing a return to the historical pattern. This will be a slow process, but by the middle of the twenty-first century, if not before, the distribution of economic product and manufacturing output among the leading civilizations is likely to resemble that of 1800. The two-hundred-year Western “blip” on the world economy will be over.
Military Capability. Military power has four dimensions: quantitative—the numbers of men, weapons, equipment, and resources; technological—the effectiveness and sophistication of weapons and equipment; organizational—the coherence, discipline, training, and morale of the troops and the effectiveness of command and control relationships; and societal—the ability and willingness of the society to apply military force effectively. In the 1920s the West was far ahead of everyone else in all these dimensions. In the years since, the military power of the West has declined relative to that of other civilizations, a decline reflected in the shifting balance in military personnel, one measure, although clearly not the most important one, of military capability. Modernization and economic development generate the resources and desire for states to develop their military capabilities, and few states fail to do so. In the 1930s Japan and the Soviet Union created very powerful military forces, as they demonstrated in World War II. During the Cold War the Soviet Union had one of the world’s two most powerful military forces. Currently the West monopolizes the ability to deploy substantial conventional military forces anywhere in the world. Whether it will continue to maintain that capability is uncertain. It seems reasonably certain, however, that no non-Western state or group of states will create a comparable capability during the coming decades.
TABLE 4.6
CIVILIZATION SHARES OF TOTAL WORLD MILITARY MANPOWER (in percentages)
Overall, the years after the Cold War have been dominated by five major trends in the evolution of global military capabilities.
First, the armed forces of the Soviet Union ceased to exist shortly after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Apart from Russia, only Ukraine inherited significant military capabilities. Russian forces were greatly reduced in size and were withdrawn from Central Europe and the Baltic states. The Warsaw Pact ended. The goal of challenging the U.S. Navy was abandoned. Military equipment was either disposed of or allowed to deteriorate and become nonoperational. Budget allocations for defense were drastically reduced. Demoralization pervaded the ranks of both officers and men. At the same time the Russian military were redefining their missions and doctrine and restructuring themselves for their new roles in protecting Russians and dealing with regional conflicts in the near abroad.
Second, the precipitous reduction in Russian military capabilities stimulated a slower but significant decline in Western military spending, forces, and capabilities. Under the plans of the Bush and Clinton administrations, U.S. military spending was due to drop by 35 percent from $342.3 billion (1994 dollars) in 1990 to $222.3 in 1998. The force structure that year would be half to two-thirds what it was at the end of the Cold War. Total military personnel would go down from 2.1 million to 1.4 million. Many major weapons programs have been and are being canceled. Between 1985 and 1995 annual purchases of major weapons went down from 29 to 6 ships, 943 to 127 aircraft, 720 to 0 tanks, and 48 to 18 strategic missiles. Beginning in the late 1980s, Britain, Germany, and, to a lesser degree, France went through similar reductions in defense spending and military capabilities. In the mid-1990s, the German armed forces were scheduled to decline from 370,000 to 340,000 and probably to 320,000; the French army was to drop from its strength of 290,000 in 1990 to 225,000 in 1997. British military personnel went down from 377,100 in 1985 to 274,800 in 1993. Continental members of NATO also shortened terms of conscripted service and debated the possible abandonment of conscription.
Third, the trends in East Asia differed significantly from those in Russia and the West. Increased military spending and force improvements were the order of the day; China was the pacesetter. Stimulated by both their increasing economic wealth and the Chinese buildup, other East Asian nations are modernizing and expanding their military forces. Japan has continued to improve its highly sophisticated military capability. Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia all are spending more on their military and purchasing planes, tanks, and ships from Russia, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other countries. While NATO defense expenditures declined by roughly 10 percent between 1985 and 1993 (from $539.6 billion to $485.0 billion) (constant 1993 dollars), expenditures in East Asia rose by 50 percent from $89.8 billion to $134.8 billion during the same period.9
Fourth, military capabilities including weapons of mass destruction are diffusing broadly across the world. As countries develop economically, they generate the capacity to produce weapons. Between the 1960s and 1980s, for instance, the number of Third World countries producing fighter aircraft increased from one to eight, tanks from one to six, helicopters from one to six, and tactical missiles from none to seven. The 1990s have seen a major trend toward the globalization of the defense industry, which is likely further to erode Western military advantages.10 Many non-Western societies either have nuclear weapons (Russia, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) or have been making strenuous efforts to acquire them (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and possibly Algeria) or are placing themselves in a position quickly to acquire them if they see the need to do so (Japan).
Finally, all those developments make regionalization the central trend in military strategy and power in the post-Cold War world. Regionalization provides the rationale for the reductions in Russian and Western military forces and for increases in the military forces of other states. Russia no longer has a global military capability but is focusing its strategy and forces on the near abroad. China has reoriented its strategy and forces to emphasize local power projection and the defense of Chinese interests in East Asia. European countries are similarly redirecting their forces, through both NATO and the Western European Union, to deal with instability on the periphery of Western Europe. The United States has explicitly shifted its military planning from deterring and fighting the Soviet Union on a global basis to preparing to deal simultaneously with regional contingencies in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. The United States, however, is not likely to have the military capability to meet these goals. To defeat Iraq, the United States deployed in the Persian Gulf 75 percent of its active tactical aircraft, 42 percent of its modern battle tanks, 46 percent of its aircraft carriers, 37 percent of its army personnel, and 46 percent of its marine personnel. With significantly reduced forces in the future, the United States will be hard put to carry out one intervention, much less two, against substantial regional powers outside the Western Hemisphere. Military security throughout the world increasingly depends not on the global distribution of power and the actions of superpowers but on the distribution of power within each region of the world and the actions of the core states of civilizations.
In sum, overall the West will remain the most powerful civilization well into the early decades of the twenty-first century. Beyond then it will probably continue to have a substantial lead in scientific talent, research and development capabilities, and civilian and military technological innovation. Control over the other power resources, however, is becoming increasingly dispersed among the core states and leading countries of non-Western civilizations. The West’s control of these resources peaked in the 1920s and has since been declining irregularly but significantly. In the 2020s, a hundred years after that peak, the West will probably control about 24 percent of the world’s territory (down from a peak of 49 percent), 10 percent of the total world population (down from 48 percent) and perhaps 15–20 percent of the socially mobilized population, about 30 percent of the world’s economic product (down from a peak of probably 70 percent), perhaps 25 percent of manufacturing output (down from a peak of 84 percent), and less than 10 percent of global military manpower (down from 45 percent).
In 1919 Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau together virtually controlled the world. Sitting in Paris, they determined what countries would exist and which would not, what new countries would be created, what their boundaries would be and who would rule them, and how the Middle East and other parts of the world would be divided up among the victorious powers. They also decided on military intervention in Russia and economic concessions to be extracted from China. A hundred years later, no small group of statesmen will be able to exercise comparable power; to the extent that any group does it will not consist of three Westerners but leaders of the core states of the world’s seven or eight major civilizations. The successors to Reagan, Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Kohl will be rivaled by those of Deng Xiaoping, Nakasone, Indira Gandhi, Yeltsin, Khomeini, and Suharto. The age of Western dominance will be over. In the meantime the fading of the West and the rise of other power centers is promoting the global processes of indigenization and the resurgence of non-Western cultures.
INDIGENIZATION: THE RESURGENCE OF NON-WESTERN CULTURES
The distribution of cultures in the world reflects the distribution of power. Trade may or may not follow the flag, but culture almost always follows power. Throughout history the expansion of the power of a civilization has usually occurred simultaneously with the flowering of its culture and has almost always involved its using that power to extend its values, practices, and institutions to other societies. A universal civilization requires universal power. Roman power created a near-universal civilization within the limited confines of the Classical world. Western power in the form of European colonialism in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the twentieth century extended Western culture throughout much of the contemporary world. European colonialism is over; American hegemony is receding. The erosion of Western culture follows, as indigenous, historically rooted mores, languages, beliefs, and institutions reassert themselves. The growing power of non-Western societies produced by modernization is generating the revival of non-Western cultures throughout the world.*
A distinction exists, Joseph Nye has argued, between “hard power,” which is the power to command resting on economic and military strength, and “soft power,” which is the ability of a state to get “other countries to want what it wants” through the appeal of its culture and ideology. As Nye recognizes, a broad diffusion of hard power is occurring in the world and the major nations “are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past.” Nye goes on to say that if a state’s “culture and ideology are attractive, others will be more willing to follow” its leadership, and hence soft power is “just as important as hard command power.”11 What, however, makes culture and ideology attractive? They become attractive when they are seen as rooted in material success and influence. Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success. As non-Western societies enhance their economic, military, and political capacity, they increasingly trumpet the virtues of their own values, institutions, and culture.
Communist ideology appealed to people throughout the world in the 1950s and 1960s when it was associated with the economic success and military force of the Soviet Union. That appeal evaporated when the Soviet economy stagnated and was unable to maintain Soviet military strength. Western values and institutions have appealed to people from other cultures because they were seen as the source of Western power and wealth. This process has been going on for centuries. Between 1000 and 1300, as William McNeill points out, Christianity, Roman law, and other elements of Western culture were adopted by Hungarians, Poles, and Lithuanians, and this “acceptance of Western civilization was stimulated by mingled fear and admiration of the military prowess of Western princes.”12 As Western power declines, the ability of the West to impose Western concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy on other civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to other civilizations.
It already has. For several centuries non-Western peoples envied the economic prosperity, technological sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western societies. They sought the secret of this success in Western values and institutions, and when they identified what they thought might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies. To become rich and powerful, they would have to become like the West. Now, however, these Kemalist attitudes have disappeared in East Asia. East Asians attribute their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but rather to their adherence to their own culture. They are succeeding, they argue, because they are different from the West. Similarly, when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, they invoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western domination. Now that they are no longer weak but increasingly powerful, they do not hesitate to attack those same values which they previously used to promote their interests. The revolt against the West was originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values; it is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values.
The rise of these attitudes is a manifestation of what Ronald Dore has termed the “second-generation indigenization phenomenon.” In both former Western colonies and independent countries like China and Japan, “The first ‘modernizer’ or ‘post-independence’ generation has often received its training in foreign (Western) universities in a Western cosmopolitan language. Partly because they first go abroad as impressionable teenagers, their absorption of Western values and life-styles may well be profound.” Most of the much larger second generation, in contrast, gets its education at home in universities created by the first generation, and the local rather than the colonial language is increasingly used for instruction. These universities “provide a much more diluted contact with metropolitan world culture” and “knowledge is indigenized by means of translations—usually of limited range and of poor quality.” The graduates of these universities resent the dominance of the earlier Western-trained generation and hence often “succumb to the appeals of nativist opposition movements.”13 As Western influence recedes, young aspiring leaders cannot look to the West to provide them with power and wealth. They have to find the means of success within their own society, and hence they have to accommodate to the values and culture of that society.
The process of indigenization need not wait for the second generation. Able, perceptive, and adaptive first generation leaders indigenize themselves. Three notable cases are Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Harry Lee, and Solomon Bandaranaike. They were brilliant graduates of Oxford, Cambridge, and Lincoln’s Inn, respectively, superb lawyers, and thoroughly Westernized members of the elites of their societies. Jinnah was a committed secularist. Lee was, in the words of one British cabinet minister, “the best bloody Englishman east of Suez.” Bandaranaike was raised a Christian. Yet to lead their nations to and after independence they had to indigenize. They reverted to their ancestral cultures, and in the process at times changed identities, names, dress, and beliefs. The English lawyer M. A. Jinnah became Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azam, Harry Lee became Lee Kuan Yew. The secularist Jinnah became the fervent apostle of Islam as the basis for the Pakistani state. The Anglofied Lee learned Mandarin and became an articulate promoter of Confucianism. The Christian Bandaranaike converted to Buddhism and appealed to Sinhalese nationalism.
Indigenization has been the order of the day throughout the non-Western world in the 1980s and 1990s. The resurgence of Islam and “re-Islamization” are the central themes in Muslim societies. In India the prevailing trend is the rejection of Western forms and values and the “Hinduization” of politics and society. In East Asia, governments are promoting Confucianism, and political and intellectual leaders speak of the “Asianization” of their countries. In the mid-1980s Japan became obsessed with “Nihonjinron or the theory of Japan and the Japanese.” Subsequently a leading Japanese intellectual argued that historically Japan has gone through “cycles of importation of external cultures” and “ ‘indigenization’ of those cultures through replication and refinement, inevitable turmoil resulting from exhausting the imported and creative impulse, and eventual reopening to the outside world.” At present Japan is “embarking on the second phase of this cycle.”14 With the end of the Cold War, Russia again became a “torn” country with the reemergence of the classic struggle between Westernizers and Slavophiles. For a decade, however, the trend was from the former to the latter, as the Westernized Gorbachev gave way to Yeltsin, Russian in style, Western in articulated beliefs, who, in turn, was threatened by nationalists epitomizing Russian Orthodox indigenization.
Indigenization is furthered by the democracy paradox: adoption by non-Western societies of Western democratic institutions encourages and gives access to power to nativist and anti-Western political movements. In the 1960s and 1970s Westernized and pro-Western governments in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they are increasingly in danger of being ousted by elections. Democratization conflicts with Westernization, and democracy is inherently a parochializing not a cosmopolitanizing process. Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are. Electoral competition instead stimulates them to fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeals, and those are usually ethnic, nationalist, and religious in character.
The result is popular mobilization against Western-educated and Western-oriented elites. Islamic fundamentalist groups have done well in the few elections that have occurred in Muslim countries and would have come to national power in Algeria if the military had not canceled the 1992 election. In India competition for electoral support has arguably encouraged communal appeals and communal violence.15 Democracy in Sri Lanka enabled the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to throw out the Western-oriented, elitist United National Party in 1956 and provided opportunity for the rise of the Pathika Chintanaya Sinhalese nationalist movement in the 1980s. Prior to 1949 both South African and Western elites viewed South Africa as a Western state. After the apartheid regime took shape, Western elites gradually read South Africa out of the Western camp, while white South Africans continued to think of themselves as Westerners. In order to resume their place in the Western international order, however, they had to introduce Western democratic institutions, which resulted in the coming to power of a highly Westernized black elite. If the second generation indigenization factor operates, however, their successors will be much more Xhosa, Zulu, and African in outlook and South Africa will increasingly define itself as an African state.
At various times before the nineteenth century, Byzantines, Arabs, Chinese, Ottomans, Moguls, and Russians were highly confident of their strength and achievements compared to those of the West. At these times they also were contemptuous of the cultural inferiority, institutional backwardness, corruption, and decadence of the West. As the success of the West fades relatively, such attitudes reappear. People feel “they don’t have to take it anymore.” Iran is an extreme case, but, as one observer noted, “Western values are rejected in different ways, but no less firmly, in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, China, and Japan.”16 We are witnessing “the end of the progressive era” dominated by Western ideologies and are moving into an era in which multiple and diverse civilizations will interact, compete, coexist, and accommodate each other.17 This global process of indigenization is manifest broadly in the revivals of religion occurring in so many parts of the world and most notably in the cultural resurgence in Asian and Islamic countries generated in large part by their economic and demographic dynamism.
LA REVANCHE DE DIEU
In the first half of the twentieth century intellectual elites generally assumed that economic and social modernization was leading to the withering away of religion as a significant element in human existence. This assumption was shared by both those who welcomed and those who deplored this trend. Modernizing secularists hailed the extent to which science, rationalism, and pragmatism were eliminating the superstitions, myths, irrationalities, and rituals that formed the core of existing religions. The emerging society would be tolerant, rational, pragmatic, progressive, humanistic, and secular. Worried conservatives, on the other hand, warned of the dire consequences of the disappearance of religious beliefs, religious institutions, and the moral guidance religion provided for individual and collective human behavior. The end result would be anarchy, depravity, the undermining of civilized life. “If you will not have God (and He is a jealous God),” T. S. Eliot said, “you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin.”18
The second half of the twentieth century proved these hopes and fears unfounded. Economic and social modernization became global in scope, and at the same time a global revival of religion occurred. This revival, la revanche de Dieu, Gilles Kepel termed it, has pervaded every continent, every civilization, and virtually every country. In the mid-1970s, as Kepel observes, the trend to secularization and toward the accommodation of religion with secularism “went into reverse. A new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society —by changing society if necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this approach advocated moving on from a modernism that had failed, attributing its setbacks and dead ends to separation from God. The theme was no longer aggiornamento but a ‘second evangelization of Europe,’ the aim was no longer to modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize modernity.’ ”19
This religious revival has in part involved expansion by some religions, which gained new recruits in societies where they had previously not had them. To a much larger extent, however, the religious resurgence involved people returning to, reinvigorating, and giving new meaning to the traditional religions of their communities. Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Orthodoxy, all experienced new surges in commitment, relevance, and practice by erstwhile casual believers. In all of them fundamentalist movements arose committed to the militant purification of religious doctrines and institutions and the reshaping of personal, social, and public behavior in accordance with religious tenets. The fundamentalist movements are dramatic and can have significant political impact. They are, however, only the surface waves of the much broader and more fundamental religious tide that is giving a different cast to human life at the end of the twentieth century. The renewal of religion throughout the world far transcends the activities of fundamentalist extremists. In society after society it manifests itself in the daily lives and work of people and the concerns and projects of governments. The cultural resurgence in the secular Confucian culture takes the form of the affirmation of Asian values but in the rest of the world manifests itself in the affirmation of religious values. The “unsecularization of the world,” as George Weigel remarked “is one of the dominant social facts in the late twentieth century.”20
The ubiquity and relevance of religion has been dramatically evident in former communist states. Filling the vacuum left by the collapse of ideology, religious revivals have swept through these countries from Albania to Vietnam. In Russia, Orthodoxy has gone through a major resurgence. In 1994, 30 percent of Russians below the age of twenty-five said they had switched from atheism to a belief in God. The number of active churches in the Moscow area grew from 50 in 1988 to 250 in 1993. Political leaders became uniformly respectful of religion and the government supportive of it. In Russian cities, as one acute observer reported in 1993, “The sound of church bells once again fills the air. Newly gilded cupolas gleam in the sun. Churches only recently in ruins reverberate again with magnificent song. Churches are the busiest place in town.”21 Simultaneously with the revival of Orthodoxy in the Slavic republics, an Islamic revival swept through Central Asia. In 1989, 160 functioning mosques and one medressah (Islamic seminary) existed in Central Asia; by early 1993 there were about 10,000 mosques and ten medressahs. While this revival involved some fundamentalist political movements and was encouraged from the outside by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan, it was basically an extremely broad-based, mainstream, cultural movement.22
How can this global religious resurgence be explained? Particular causes obviously operated in individual countries and civilizations. Yet it is too much to expect that a large number of different causes would have produced simultaneous and similar developments in most parts of the world. A global phenomenon demands a global explanation. However much events in particular countries may have been influenced by unique factors, some general causes must have been at work. What were they?
The most obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Longstanding sources of identity and systems of authority are disrupted. People move from the countryside into the city, become separated from their roots, and take new jobs or no job. They interact with large numbers of strangers and are exposed to new sets of relationships. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs. As Lee Kuan Yew explained for East Asia:
We are agricultural societies that have industrialized within one or two generations. What happened in the West over 200 years or more is happening here in about 50 years or less. It is all crammed and crushed into a very tight time frame, so there are bound to be dislocations and malfunctions. If you look at the fast-growing countries —Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore—there’s been one remarkable phenomenon: the rise of religion. … The old customs and religions —ancestor worship, shamanism —no longer completely satisfy. There is a quest for some higher explanations about man’s purpose, about why we are here. This is associated with periods of great stress in society.23
People do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self. Interest politics presupposes identity. In times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created. For people facing the need to determine Who am I? Where do I belong? religion provides compelling answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through urbanization. All religions, as Hassan al-Turabi said, furnish “people with a sense of identity and a direction in life.” In this process, people rediscover or create new historical identities. Whatever universalist goals they may have, religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group.24
In the Muslim world, Bernard Lewis argues, there has been “a recurring tendency, in times of emergency, for Muslims to find their basic identity and loyalty in the religious community —that is to say, in an entity defined by Islam rather than by ethnic or territorial criteria.” Gilles Kepel similarly highlights the centrality of the search for identity: “Re-Islamization ‘from below’ is first and foremost a way of rebuilding an identity in a world that has lost its meaning and become amorphous and alienating.”25 In India, “a new Hindu identity is under construction” as a response to tensions and alienation generated by modernization.26 In Russia the religious revival is the result “of a passionate desire for identity which only the Orthodox church, the sole unbroken link with the Russians’ 1000-year past, can provide,” while in the Islamic republics the revival similarly stems “from the Central Asians’ most powerful aspiration: to assert the identities that Moscow suppressed for decades.”27 Fundamentalist movements, in particular, are “a way of coping with the experience of chaos, the loss of identity, meaning and secure social structures created by the rapid introduction of modern social and political patterns, secularism, scientific culture and economic development.” The fundamentalist “movements that matter,” agrees William H. McNeill, “… are those that recruit from society at large and spread because they answer, or seem to answer, newly felt human needs. … It is no accident that these movements are all based in countries where population pressure on the land is making continuation of old village ways impossible for a majority of the population, and where urban-based mass communications, by penetrating the villages, have begun to erode an age-old framework of peasant life.”28
More broadly, the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity. Religious groups meet social needs left untended by state bureaucracies. These include the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergartens and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare and social support during periods of economic deprivation. The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist, groups.29
If traditionally dominant religions do not meet the emotional and social needs of the uprooted, other religious groups move in to do so and in the process greatly expand their memberships and the saliency of religion in social and political life. South Korea historically was an overwhelmingly Buddhist country, with Christians numbering in 1950 perhaps 1 percent to 3 percent of the population. As South Korea took off into rapid economic development, with massive urbanization and occupational differentiation, Buddhism was found wanting. “For the millions who poured into the cities and for many who stayed behind in the altered countryside, the quiescent Buddhism of Korea’s agrarian age lost its appeal. Christianity with its message of personal salvation and individual destiny offered a surer comfort in a time of confusion and change.”30 By the 1980s Christians, largely Presbyterians and Catholics, were at least 30 percent of South Korea’s population.
A similar and parallel shift occurred in Latin America. The number of Protestants in Latin America increased from roughly 7 million in 1960 to about 50 million in 1990. The reasons for this success, the Latin American Catholic bishops recognized in 1989, included the Catholic Church’s “slowness in coming to terms with the technicalities of urban life” and “its structure that occasionally makes it incapable of responding to the psychological needs of present-day people.” Unlike the Catholic Church, one Brazilian priest observed, the Protestant churches meet “the basic needs of the person—human warmth, healing, a deep spiritual experience.” The spread of Protestantism among the poor in Latin America is not primarily the replacement of one religion by another but rather a major net increase in religious commitment and participation as nominal and passive Catholics become active and devout Evangelicals. In Brazil in the early 1990s, for instance, 20 percent of the population identified themselves as Protestant and 73 percent as Catholic, yet on Sundays 20 million people were in Protestant churches and about 12 million were in Catholic ones.31 Like the other world religions, Christianity is going through a resurgence connected to modernization, and in Latin America it has taken a Protestant rather than a Catholic form.
These changes in South Korea and Latin America reflect the inability of Buddhism and established Catholicism to meet the psychological, emotional, and social needs of people caught in the traumas of modernization. Whether additional significant shifts in religious adherence occur elsewhere depends on the extent to which the prevailing religion is able to meet these needs. Given its emotional aridity, Confucianism appears particularly vulnerable. In Confucian countries, Protestantism and Catholicism could have an appeal similar to those of evangelical Protestantism to Latin Americans, Christianity to South Koreans, and fundamentalism to Muslims and Hindus. In China in the late 1980s, as economic growth was in full swing, Christianity also spread “particularly among young people.” Perhaps 50 million Chinese are Christian. The government has attempted to prevent their increase by jailing ministers, missionaries, and evangelists, prohibiting and suppressing religious ceremonies and activities, and in 1994 passing a law that prohibits foreigners from proselytizing or setting up religious schools or other religious organizations and prohibits religious groups from engaging in independent or overseas-financed activities. In Singapore, as in China, about 5 percent of the population is Christian. In the late 1980s and early 1990s government ministers warned evangelists against upsetting the country’s “delicate religious balance,” detained religious workers including officials of Catholic organizations, and harassed in various ways Christian groups and individuals.32 With the end of the Cold War and the political openings that followed, Western churches also moved into the Orthodox former Soviet republics, competing with the revived Orthodox churches. Here too, as in China, an effort was made to curb their proselytizing. In 1993, at the urging of the Orthodox Church, the Russian parliament passed legislation requiring foreign religious groups to be accredited by the state or to be affiliated with a Russian religious organization if they were going to engage in missionary or educational work. President Yeltsin, however, refused to sign this bill into law.33 Overall, the record suggests that where they conflict, la revanche de Dieu trumps indigenization: if the religious needs of modernization cannot be met by their traditional faiths people turn to emotionally satisfying religious imports.
In addition to the psychological, emotional, and social traumas of modernization, other stimulants to religious revival included the retreat of the West and the end of the Cold War. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the responses of non-Western civilizations to the West generally moved through a progression of ideologies imported from the West. In the nineteenth century non-Western elites imbibed Western liberal values, and their first expressions of opposition to the West took the form of liberal nationalism. In the twentieth century Russian, Asian, Arab, African, and Latin American elites imported socialist and Marxist ideologies and combined them with nationalism in opposition to Western capitalism and Western imperialism. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, its severe modification in China, and the failure of socialist economies to achieve sustained development have now created an ideological vacuum. Western governments, groups, and international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, have attempted to fill this vacuum with the doctrines of neo-orthodox economics and democratic politics. The extent to which these doctrines will have a lasting impact in non-Western cultures is uncertain. Meanwhile, however, people see communism as only the latest secular god to have failed, and in the absence of compelling new secular deities they turn with relief and passion to the real thing. Religion takes over from ideology, and religious nationalism replaces secular nationalism.34
The movements for religious revival are antisecular, antiuniversal, and, except in their Christian manifestations, anti-Western. They also are opposed to the relativism, egotism, and consumerism associated with what Bruce B. Lawrence has termed “modernism” as distinct from “modernity.” By and large they do not reject urbanization, industrialization, development, capitalism, science, and technology, and what these imply for the organization of society. In this sense, they are not antimodern. They accept modernization, as Lee Kuan Yew observes, and “the inevitability of science and technology and the change in the life-styles they bring,” but they are “unreceptive to the idea that they be Westernized.” Neither nationalism nor socialism, al-Turabi argues, produced development in the Islamic world. “Religion is the motor of development,” and a purified Islam will play a role in the contemporary era comparable to that of the Protestant ethic in the history of the West. Nor is religion incompatible with the development of a modern state.35 Islamic fundamentalist movements have been strong in the more advanced and seemingly more secular Muslim societies, such as Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia.36 Religious movements, including particularly fundamentalist ones, are highly adept at using modern communications and organizational techniques to spread their message, illustrated most dramatically by the success of Protestant televangelism in Central America.
Participants in the religious resurgence come from all walks of life but overwhelmingly from two constituencies, both urban and both mobile. Recent migrants to the cities generally need emotional, social, and material support and guidance, which religious groups provide more than any other source. Religion for them, as Régis Debray put it, is not “the opium of the people, but the vitamin of the weak.”37 The other principal constituency is the new middle class embodying Dore’s “second-generation indigenization phenomenon.” The activists in Islamic fundamentalist groups are not, as Kepel points out, “aging conservatives or illiterate peasants.” With Muslims as with others, the religious revival is an urban phenomenon and appeals to people who are modern-oriented, well-educated, and pursue careers in the professions, government, and commerce.38 Among Muslims, the young are religious, their parents secular. Much the same is the case with Hinduism, where the leaders of revivalist movements again come from the indigenized second generation and are often “successful businessmen and administrators” labeled in the Indian press “Scuppies”—saffron-clad yuppies. Their supporters in the early 1990s were increasingly from “India’s solid middle class Hindus —its merchants and accountants, its lawyers and engineers” and from its “senior civil servants, intellectuals, and journalists.”39 In South Korea, the same types of people increasingly filled Catholic and Presbyterian churches during the 1960s and 1970s.
Religion, indigenous or imported, provides meaning and direction for the rising elites in modernizing societies. “The attribution of value to a traditional religion,” Ronald Dore noted, “is a claim to parity of respect asserted against ‘dominant other’ nations, and often, simultaneously and more proximately, against a local ruling class which has embraced the values and life-styles of those dominant other nations.” “More than anything else,” William McNeill observes, “reaffirmation of Islam, whatever its specific sectarian form, means the repudiation of European and American influence upon local society, politics, and morals.”40 In this sense, the revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies. That revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It is a rejection of what has been termed the “Westoxification” of non-Western societies. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that: “We will be modern but we won’t be you.”
Introduction
EMPLOYED FROM 1899, GEOPOLITICS IS AN AMORPHOUS concept, both efficacious and misfiring, and a plastic or malleable (as well as controversial) term. Different working definitions have been advanced, and there is no universally accepted definition and, indeed, no agreed definition in English. All definitions of geopolitics focus on the relationship between politics and geographical factors, although that relationship has been very differently considered and presented. In this context, politics is approached principally in terms of the composition and use of power. The geographical factors that are treated vary, but space, location, distance, and resources are all important. Geopolitics is commonly understood as an alternative term for all or part of political geography
and, more specifically, as the spatial dynamics of power. In practice, there is a persistent lack of clarity about whether geopolitics—however defined—and, more particularly these dynamics, should be understood in a descriptive or normative sense. Moreover, what in 2002 the American geopolitical commentator Harvey Sicherman termed “the facts of geopolitics—the resources and locations of various peoples and states”
—involves subjective as well as objective considerations, and the significance of the former is commonly downplayed. This is true across the varied dimensions of geopolitics.
Four levels of assessment can be differentiated although, in both theory and practice, they interact to a considerable degree. At the first level, geopolitics can be considered as both concept and practice, each of which can, in turn, be classified. At the second level, it can be approached as a malleable doctrine heavily dependent upon the casuistries of leaders and politicians conducting statecraft. At the third level, the roles and approaches of professional intellectuals and commentators command attention—roles and approaches that have been, and are, very different. Whereas a geographer has a formal qualification, usually a university degree, anyone can be a geopolitician, including ardent polemicists without any in-depth knowledge. This situation can be related to the dynamic between political geography, which seeks scientific-style precision, and geopolitics which is, in part, political practice and journalism—both based on concepts in political geography. At the fourth level, geopolitics has emerged as a durable mindset and a set of doctrines that have outlasted major changes in ideology and international power. This durability reflects the plasticity of geopolitical doctrines and the extent to which fundamental concepts have remained intact, even though they are changeable, not least with major shifts in the understanding of spatiality—these concepts even bridging the large differences separating certain geopolitical doctrines from one another.
Varying definitions, contrasting usage, and the extent of subjectivity involved in the assessment of power do not mean that there is no objective reality or, indeed, no useful concept. As far as reality and perception are concerned, a human environment may be defined in terms of the human needs, desires and capabilities for satisfying them from the materials at hand (or, rather, apparently at hand). This definition depends in part on the conscious awareness of the situation and, thereby, on perception. However, no amount of desire and will can enable the production of steel from coal and iron deposits if those deposits do not exist, or if it is impossible to transport the raw materials, and at a reasonable cost.
Nevertheless, any subjective appreciation of what is objectively available lends itself to historicizing.
Coal deposits exist in France and Germany, but from 1870 to 1945 the location and real significance of coal and iron deposits played a role in the territorial aspirations and strategic planning of those nations. From a different angle, responses to, say, the possibility of nuclear power or to France’s interests at any time, involved, involve, and will involve ideological, cultural, and political assumptions.
Politics has, indeed, played a role throughout human geography. For example, in France during the early decades of the nineteenth century there were initial ideas for creating an integrated rail network based on grandiose economic needs, but a more political rationale came to prevail, with a national plan, imposed in 1842, that led to a rail system radiating from Paris and linking it to all parts of the country, especially the frontier regions. Transverse links that did not focus on Paris were not part of the Second Empire (1852–1870), but in 1879 the need to consider parliamentary constituencies under the Third Republic (1870–1940) produced the Freycinet Plan, which led to the building of what were termed “lines of local interest.” This designation was, in turn, a clear sign of the hierarchy and usage of political space.
To take another example, the US government has recently found the notion of “ungoverned spaces” useful as a way to classify the world. This notion was centrally linked to discussion in the 2000s about so-called failed states, notably Afghanistan—discussion that was linked to an alleged need to intervene in them. The Pentagon’s “National Defense Strategy,” issued in 2008, referred to “ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned and contested areas.” Yet, in practice, definitions on this point are difficult. Failure as a state occurs in different ways, and with varied consequences. There are contrasts between domestic and international perception and different mechanisms at play that might help us in understanding something called “state failure.” There may be a failure at the level of national government, but effectiveness at the level of some, or all, regional governments within a particular state. Moreover, as an instance of the role of perception, a murder rate that in Denmark would be seen as a sign of societal collapse is not perceived the same way in Brazil or South Africa. Not all the supposedly weak states are centers for terrorism. Indeed, this issue underlines the problem of thinking geopolitically in terms of states, as the key spaces in terms of instability are often parts of states, for example, dissident regions and communities. Since the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, instability and opposition have been more pronounced in eastern and southern Afghanistan than in the north. This point demonstrates a concomitant need to think of geopolitics, at least in part, in terms of the spatial imprint and geographical shaping of ideologies, an imprint and shaping that may not reflect national boundaries. Geopolitics reflects the extent to which space is a reality, a process, and a perception, with a dynamic and contested character to each.
Geoffrey Sloan, a student of classical geopolitics, drew attention to different approaches in 2007 by considering geopolitics as a policy science and as an appendage of political propaganda.
This is not, however, a clear classification. In practice, such a use of geography for propaganda is long-standing. For example, Augustin Fitzhugh’s map of Newfoundland in about 1700 makes a political point, with the small area for “English fishing boats” appearing to be entirely shut in by the huge part of the sea controlled by their French counterparts.
The 1930s Nazi map that showed Germany to be threatened by Czechoslovakian air power was a piece of propaganda, as there was no such threat. However, not all maps are easy to define. A map depicting the utility of the Suez Canal for British shipping might be propaganda or mere description, depending on the use to which the map is put, how it is drawn, and the accuracy of the data on which it is based.
Moreover, the criteria for propaganda and description cannot always be readily distinguished.
In the longer timescale, alongside the objective criteria discussed above—criteria that play a key role in military, political, and economic strategy—geopolitics, like other forms of geographical analysis and expression, can, in part, be seen as a belief system. This is not least due to the symbolic weight attached to methods of depiction, whether symbols on maps or geopolitical phrases, such as “natural interests.” Furthermore, as a more general point, the perception of power, as of success, is centrally involved in issues of power.
Even place, its constraints and relationships, is a matter of perception, as much as an element that can be objectively measured and displayed in terms of coordinates. As geography is a means by which political entities, including their populations, make sense of their situation, specifically (but not only) their territorial setting and interests, so are these perceptions of key importance. As a related point, it is troubling to see the extent to which there is limited, or no, formal discussion of geopolitics in some of the synoptic literature produced by major experts in politics and international relations.
Perceptions of space are particularly significant for new states as they seek to define their interests. This point can be readily illustrated from history. For example, alongside “realist” issues of the inherent strength of the Brazilian state, perceptions of the space necessary for the state to operate, its real geographical identity, play a role. Alongside contingent political circumstances, this can be seen in the contrast between Brazil’s ability to retain cohesion after the Portuguese link was broken in the 1820s and the strongly fissiparous character of former Spanish America in the same period. The definition and perception of space took place in a highly competitive fashion. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, the definition of the interests of the newly unified states of Germany and Italy was complicated by assumptions that derived from readings of the past, not least those of vulnerability to hostile neighbors that had allegedly prevented earlier unification, notably France and Austria. There was, and is, a broad social dimension to this issue of perception and to consequent attitudes and actions. For example, in the newly independent United States geographical literacy played an important cognitive, symbolic, and pedagogic role.
Yet, to indicate the variety of directions in which geopolitics can be taken, the question of making sense of the spatial setting of states (whether or not this “sense” is discussed in terms of realism, perception, or both) is made more complex when the understanding of geopolitics is expanded. This is the case in particular when geopolitics is expanded from a simple notion of debating military strategy (now often termed geostrategy) to consider, in addition, domestic policy and its multiple locations as key aspects of geopolitics and strategy. Indeed, part of the value of “critical geopolitics,” a significant development in the subject over the last two decades, is that discussion of practical and popular geopolitical culture plays a prominent role in some of the literature.
DEFINITIONS
It is the very drive of the political system that is at question when domestic policies, the processes of identity, and the pressures for obedience and order, are all considered; and these factors all have spatial dimensions. Moreover, to take the political aspect further, geopolitics and strategy can be understood in terms of a process of policy formulation, execution, and evaluation, to which military purposes are frequently both instrumental and secondary. In part, the definition and discussion in recent decades of a separate operational dimension to war and policy—a dimension very much understood in military terms and with reference to military organizations and goals—provide, in contrast, a key opportunity for emphasizing a political approach to strategy, one in which geopolitics plays a major role.
An emphasis on the significance of domestic political issues and drives offers a possibility of dispensing with analytical models of international state and military development that assume, at that level, some mechanistic search for efficiency and for a maximization of effectiveness. One traditional strand of geopolitical argument can be located in this context by seeing it as designed to help secure such effectiveness and efficiency, and such claims are at least implicit in much of the conventional discussion of geopolitics. Such ideas, however, can do violence to the inherently controversial nature of efficiency and effectiveness, and to the complex processes by which interest in new ideas and methods interact with powerful elements of continuity.
Thus, replicating, and overlapping with, the situation in which geography, geographical relationships, and maps can all be variously defined and presented, geopolitics has a range of meanings and can be understood in different terms. These meanings can be grouped in terms of the geography of politics and, as significant, the politics of geography. These meanings, moreover, relate as much to how each is discussed as to what is being considered. In part, this range reflects the porosity of geography as a subject, especially once the public discussion of geographical factors is also considered. Analysis of the range of meanings of geopolitics in terms of a typology of meanings would not be terribly helpful, as there is a sliding and elision between them. Furthermore, what to a practitioner may be an objective geopolitical analysis may be a subjective, rhetorical, politicized use of geopolitical ideas to commentators or other practitioners. Such a contrasting understanding of geopolitics is well-grounded.
However overlapping, conditional, and contested, definitions are still valuable. As a field upon which policymakers rest (or even unthinkingly base) their decisions, and in which they seek to implement them, geopolitics most frequently calls attention to the context in which national security decisions are made and issues of war and peace are decided and, more particularly, calls attention to the relationship between strategy and geography. Thus, classical geopolitics discusses the key importance of geography for statecraft.
In doing so, classical geopolitics defines the relevant relationships between, and among, the exercise of power, notably the changing geographical constraints and opportunities for success and failure. Classical geopolitics does so as those constraints and opportunities are perceived by actors engaged in conflict, as well as with reference to the capabilities of adversaries, such as population and critical resources, their perception of their interests, the available technology for war (and now also terrorism) and economic competition.
Geography is deployed by commentators in a number of respects. In particular, power in geopolitics is frequently positional, often focusing on a particular location or pivot (real or apparent) that may lend itself to weakness or strength, such as the possession of “choke points”—for example, the straits of Hormuz and of Malacca. Similarly, the idea of a drive for warm-water ports and for access to the oceans is an established theme in geopolitical literature, the former in the case of Russian history and the latter in that of modern Chinese politics.
Moreover, geographical factors are deployed in particular conceptual and methodological ways. For example, whereas both realism (as an approach in international relations) and geopolitics contain balance-of-power theories, their descriptions and use vary by subject. For realism, the relative physical strengths of nations and coalitions are measured in terms of physical-balance relationships. In contrast, for geopolitics, balance-of-power relationships come, in part, in terms of spatial positions or patterns.
At the same time, what these and other relationships meant to contemporaries—and what they also can be said to mean to subsequent commentators—varied greatly. These variations need to be borne in mind. This point provides a vital role for the historian, reflecting, as it does, the tension between a desire on the part of many social scientists to look for universal entities that can then be analyzed and, on the other hand, historical reservations about such an approach.
These reservations tend to focus on the nature of changing meanings and of altering implementation, not least as a consequence of the specific discursive contexts within which entities and concepts exist and are to be understood. In the latter approach, geopolitics is historicized.
A historical placing of geopolitics as a subject throws a valuable critical light on some of the geopolitical analysis that has been produced across time. At present, geopolitics viewed as an academic sub-discipline reveals the problems created by the recent turn toward “critical” social sciences as well as by the nature of much contemporary social theory. Indeed, geopolitics offers a valuable case study, precisely because it is a field where history ought to be deployed but rarely is, except in a crude way. Moreover, in some of the literature, determinism is often favored over freedom in explanations, changing values and understandings of terrain and other physical factors are too rarely considered, and the ambiguous and uncertain nexus of power, violence, and strategy is (or ought to be) revealed, but is often obscured in a rush to judgment on political terms.
Nevertheless, it is important not to criticize geographers in general when critiquing “critical geopolitics.” Indeed, skepticism about the latter has been expressed by geographers.
Some regard writings on “critical geopolitics” as trying to reinterpret recent history from a contemporary left-wing viewpoint. More generally, the term critical is misused by academics, and not only in the veiled polemical sense. No academic would want an audience to read an uncritical text, and the term is redundant if applied in its literal meaning.
However expressed, an a historical approach is unhelpful because, across time, there is a general tendency to adopt a politically partisan approach to the present rather than to attempt to engage with the complexities of a long-term historical dimension. There is the related but different risk in the replacement of common sense by a particular jargon or discourse, as well as of self-referential and self-reverential patterns of verification and endorsement within their own fields. Such a replacement can be seen to undermine common action based on fear, interest, and glory, the triad of motives taken from the history of the Peloponnesian War (ca. 460–400 BCE), written by Thucydides, a major founder of the subject of history. This triad can be noted across history, and these motives condition attitudes toward spatial factors.
In practice, whatever the weight to be given to perception, objective reality cannot be wished away. Political and cultural contexts are both crucial (as this book seeks to demonstrate), as are subjective assessments, but alongside these assessments objective factors counted and count: for example, the nearby presence of coal really mattered for industrialization, as did the availability of rail links to move that coal. Industrialization had a clear spatial component linked to resources, and this was true not only of the classic British Industrial Revolution, but also of the earlier location of water-powered industry, a topic that interested Ellen Churchill Semple, a key figure in the development of American geographical thought in the early twentieth century. Resources have repeatedly affected military capacity. For example, on December 18, 1861, in the early stages of the American Civil War, Richmond’s Daily Dispatch lamented the lack of involvement on the part of the Confederate government in the development of full industrial production: “[L]ook after these interests, for the question of independence [for the South] may soon become no other than the question of an abundant supply of iron and coal.” Moreover, across the world, the later shift to oil and gas has had key consequences for power politics. These points affect, and thus underline, the capacity for action on the world stage—although they do not necessarily determine the decision to act or not.
Geopolitics can historically be seen as a way to help clarify assumptions—for example, the imperialist creed of many policymakers in the late nineteenth century—while assumptions also help clarify geopolitics. This process offers an argument for employing geopolitics today to discuss international relations. Yet, in doing so, it is necessary to employ the appropriate caution if such decoding is to be successful in throwing light on the spatial aspects of power.
HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS
Moving from a geographical perspective, it is instructive to consider the very writing of history from a geopolitical angle. The geopolitics of historical study includes the extent to which there is writing for national audiences and, indeed, in particular languages. This approach, with its stress on the contingent spatial character of historical approaches, is inherently problematic, if not political, when addressing the histories or present situations of once-contested or contested lands, such as those of Silesia, Lithuania, Israel, and Sri Lanka. National identity was, and is, asserted and contested through historical works, as are territorial claims.
While drawing attention to the role of perception in geographical terms, and of politics in geopolitical discussion, it is appropriate to note that there are similar issues for historical works. History, historical consciousness, historical relationships and the periodization of events can be variously defined and presented, also ensuring a range of meanings.
The historicism of geopolitics can turn in two different directions. It is conventional to focus on the period since 1899, in which geopolitics was discussed as a distinct subject. This is the approach taken here in
to
. However, geopolitics can also be considered both as an issue throughout the history of organized human society and moreover as a means of analysis that is highly pertinent across time, irrespective of the lack of a formal language for the subject. These are themes pursued in
to
. To do so moving boldly across time poses risks, but does not necessarily entail a failure to note the specificities of particular contexts. These specificities cover both very different relationships between power and space and the need to vary the means of analysis in order to take note of the cultural dimensions of these relationships.
THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTS
For example, although not employing the term, a good illustration of geopolitical thought is provided by one of the great successes of eighteenth-century political theory, L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws) by Charles-Louis Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755). Published in 1748 and reprinted 22 times in its first 18 months, this book, which was to have a considerable impact on contemporaries, was a comprehensive account of government systems. Montesquieu had a strong sense of the constant changes brought about by time in the fortunes of states. He also believed that human society, far from being constant, was affected by environmental circumstances such as climate, as well as by social forces: for example, education and religion. Montesquieu therefore proposed an interaction of geography and peoples.
The sense that a tropical climate affected, if not determined, society with heat-inducing torpor and lasciviousness was a key aspect of Western triumphalism, as well as of differentiation within the West, notably with the Protestant rejection of Mediterranean culture and society from the sixteenth century. In the case of general Western attitudes, this analysis of the impact of climate was closely linked to the slave trade. Montesquieu, Georges-Louis, Count of Buffon (1707–1788), the author of Histoire Naturelle (1748–1804), and others explained skin color as a function of exposure to the tropical sun, but the ability of Africans to cope better than Europeans with disease in the tropics was believed to exemplify an inherent difference between the races, a difference that was alleged to be the result of a closeness to the animals of Africa. Thus, crude geographical determinism was related to a form of anthropology, and both served to justify slavery.
Without going to this extent, there were also firm and persistent beliefs that particular environments, such as mountainous regions, had clear consequences in terms of their social organization and political control.
Halford Mackinder, the leading British political geographer (he did not call himself a geopolitician) of the early twentieth century, was to contrast the “rooted provincialism” of island or peninsular provinces with the attitudes allegedly found on the vast plains.
The notion of provincialism is inherently bound up with the cultural and political consequences of spatial relationships. Modern counterparts include discussion of Afghanistan and the mountainous northwest of Pakistan in terms of the physical context of their societies and the recurrent problems these pose for attempts to control them. Indeed, political geography has played a key role in defining the parameters and contours of society, as with borderlands (on which there is extensive literature in geography) and their very different characters.
Moreover, as a variant on “provincialism” or, rather, as an instance of geographical specificity, the external policies of states have often been traced to geographical concerns and interests, and these have been emphasized alongside, or instead of, ideological factors. This approach is not only the case for small states. For example, much Cold War geopolitics rested on the attempt to make sense of Soviet policy. Arguing a pronounced continuity with pre-Soviet Russian expansionism, and thus emphasizing political geography at the expense of ideology, was a frequent theme, and one that has been continued in subsequent scholarship.
Similarly, while allowing for frequent “tectonic, apparently nonlinear, shifts in the geopolitical context,” a distinctive geopolitical pattern to American national security has been discerned, with a focus since the 1940s on an anti-hegemonic policy toward Eurasia.
The value of geopolitical concepts can also be seen in the discussion of Chinese policy. This is markedly the case with the relationship between East China, which can be presented as part of the “rimland” (a term used by Nicholas Spykman in the early 1940s
) and Chinese Central Asia which, in contrast, can be discussed as part of Mackinder’s “heartland.” Thus, Hsiao-Ting Lin argued that China’s reassertion of its sovereignty over part of Central Asia in 1937–1945 was in part a response to Japan’s success in overrunning much of China’s coastal rimland, a challenge that also led to the reshaping of relations between the Nationalist (Kuomintang) central government and regional power-brokers in West and Southwest China. In turn, this process was seen by Lin as altering the geopolitical context by transforming modern China from a maritime economy rooted in East Asian trade, to a continental one based on overland trade routes through Asia.
Thus, Japan’s ability to take much further the maritime-based territorial pressure applied by Western powers from the 1830s changed Chinese geopolitics, with political and cultural consequences that subsequently were to be seen, from 1949, under Communist rule. At the same time, ideology played a key role alongside geography. The ideological drive of Chinese Communism was against a commercial engagement with free-market maritime economies, while alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s further enhanced a continental approach.
Thanks in large part to political factors, however, the “Heartland” as well as China was changed. Opposition to the Soviet Union from the 1960s and, in addition (after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976) economic liberalization from the 1980s each greatly reduced the continental draw on Chinese policy and, instead, led to closer political and economic relations with the United States. In the 1990s, however, as a cross-current or additional factor, the Chinese geopolitical drive into Central Asia was renewed, as Russia ceased to dominate the region.
Partly as a result, the ideas of Mackinder and Spykman have been reconsidered in the context of present-day Central Asian affairs.
Alongside such parallels, however, the geopolitical characterization of analysis for one period is likely to be challenged, if not negated, by a characterization adopted in the period following. Politics has played a key role in this changing characterization and in the resulting analyses. China, for example, shifted from a continental strategy to an autarchic one, and then to a global one. These strategies also had important regional implications within China.
Some of the geopolitical literature (for example, the Lin article) while arresting and …
Hello, my name is Ed Smith and I teach at church history and Global Studies here at Liberty. And my task this week is to offer a biblical perspective on the rise and fall of nations. Now throughout the ages, a number of philosophers and historians have struggled to get at the idea of a universal notion of history. What is a philosophy of history? Especially as it pertains to the rise and fall of civilizations. We go back to the Greek historian Herodotus, who's considered the father of history, who sought to interpret and get an understanding of world history. Are we fast-forwarding to the middle Ages? And the Arab philosopher called June in North Africa struggled to interpret the history of the rise and fall of civilizations in the African context or from a Christian perspective. One of the most interesting attempts to understand universal history was from the fourth, fifth century African church father and Christian theologian, Augustine of Hippo.
Augustine was born in the year 354, died in 430, and lived most of his life in what is now the country of Algeria. And as the Roman Empire was crumbling, he set out in the early fifth century to write a Christian philosophy of history. In his magisterial work on the city of guide. Let me just set the scene for that. On August the 24th, the year 410, the General Eric lead the Vandal armies into the city of Rome set it on fire. They starve the inhabitants. And really what they did was they wrecked the confidence of the Roman civilization. Rome was considered at that time to be the eternal city. It couldn't be conquered. And so the historian Peter Brown has said it would be just like an army marching into Paris, into the luca, or into Westminster Abbey in London, or perhaps to the White House in the United States and overtaking it and conquering it. Now, the reaction to the conquest of Rome was very different from two different groups. On one hand, you had the, the traditional pagans of Rome that, that worship the deities of Rome, the Roman gods. And they were outraged that the, that the gods had not protected Rome. In fact, they blamed the Christians in the Roman Empire for causing the gods to be angry at Rome and not protecting them. And so they were, they were angered. They were outraged. On the other hand, you had Christians in the Roman Empire that this was the only civilization they had ever known. And what was to become of them as Roman Christians?
Well, when Augustine wrote his work on the City of God, he dedicated the first 10 books or chapters to his pagan audience, and he set out to ultimately dismantle a pagan world view to show that the Roman gods had never really protected Rome, that they didn't exist. And so a Roman pagan worldview wasn't legitimate. But in the second half of the book, Books 11 to 20 to, he directed his thoughts to the Christians of Rome. How do we understand our existence, our identity, when the only civilization that we have known? His falling really asked the question, what is home? Eugene give on, says that what Augustine did in this book is he went beyond Herodotus. And he says that what the City of God is, it is a world history, like Herodotus's work. Yet he doesn't eliminate the relationship of guide telling the story. So for August in the, the exile and the decline of a civilization didn't actually begin with the fall of Rome. It actually began with the fall of man in the Garden of Eden. And it, and it separated out these two groups, what he called the City of guide and the earthly city. His famous work, the interiority and Augustan said that when Adam fell into sin, Adam became an exile from the presence of God. So in Books 11 to 14 of City of God, Augustine shows the origin of the two cities. He says that the earthly city is represented by Caine and the heavenly city, or the CEO of God is represented by Abel. And those two affections. In later books, books 15 to 18, he will chart the history of scripture and the history of biblical revelation, citing figures like Abraham and David and show this duality of the two cities. Conflict and in the final books of City of God.
Augustine speaks of the end of the two cities; the earthly city will end ultimately. And how, apart from the presence of guide and members of the heavenly city will of course, spend eternity with God in heaven. So how Augustine did described these two cities as they were in space and time history? He described the earthly city is being symbolized by Babylon, guided by self-love and independence and self-sufficiency. Its values were, were antithetical to the humility of being a follower of Christ. He said that it makes sense that in the earthly cities will have disasters and we'll have wars. On the other hand, he said that the heavenly city is symbolized by Jerusalem. It's characterized by justice and peace with, with neighbor preferring love for others and for guide. And virtue is achieved and following the model of Christ and throughout the City of God, Augustine will use the term heavenly city and you'll use that the church interchangeably. So that is that people enter the heavenly city or the city of guide, their faith and their allegiance to Christ. What council or encouragement did Augustan give to Christians who were citizens of the heavenly city? But so journeying in the earthly city, what did he say to them? There are three areas.
First is, he said that he wanted to give them an eternal perspective. That is, they sojourn in the earthly city that they were chess temporary pilgrims. They were longing for the heavenly city in this gave them hope to continue on. At the same time, it helped them not to become satisfied by what they could find in the earthly city. Secondly, the earthly city was a place to, to, to train and to, and to exercise by faith of being members of the heavenly city. It was a place to spiritually grow. And then thirdly, he said that being a part of the heavenly city did mean that we escaped from the earthly city. Rather, we sought to, to be agents of light and transformation, bringing the values of the heavenly city to the earthly city, link inclusion for August. In 20 years after they conquered Rome, they actually made their way into North Africa. And the besieged his city of Hippo Regis. Augustine lay dying at the age of 76. Actually, he died from a fever while the Vandal armies were besieging his own city. As Augustine was dying. His disciple and, and biographer for city has said this about him that in his last days, Augustan found strength in the slayings of a wise man. Probably the philosopher Plotinus, who said that no one is great, who was amazed that wood and stone collapse and mortals die. Now while Augustine was encouraged by the words of the Egyptian philosopher Plotinus. In this, he had also share these ideas himself because earlier in his own confessions he wrote, we need not fear to find no home again because we have a fall and we have fallen away from it. We are absent while we are apps that are home falls not to ruin, ruins. Forgot our home is in your eternity. So just a little bit on August in the city of guide and a perspective on eternity. When nations rise and fall.
CATEGORIES
Economics
Nursing
Applied Sciences
Psychology
Science
Management
Computer Science
Human Resource Management
Accounting
Information Systems
English
Anatomy
Operations Management
Sociology
Literature
Education
Business & Finance
Marketing
Engineering
Statistics
Biology
Political Science
Reading
History
Financial markets
Philosophy
Mathematics
Law
Criminal
Architecture and Design
Government
Social Science
World history
Chemistry
Humanities
Business Finance
Writing
Programming
Telecommunications Engineering
Geography
Physics
Spanish
ach
e. Embedded Entrepreneurship
f. Three Social Entrepreneurship Models
g. Social-Founder Identity
h. Micros-enterprise Development
Outcomes
Subset 2. Indigenous Entrepreneurship Approaches (Outside of Canada)
a. Indigenous Australian Entrepreneurs Exami
Calculus
(people influence of
others) processes that you perceived occurs in this specific Institution Select one of the forms of stratification highlighted (focus on inter the intersectionalities
of these three) to reflect and analyze the potential ways these (
American history
Pharmacology
Ancient history
. Also
Numerical analysis
Environmental science
Electrical Engineering
Precalculus
Physiology
Civil Engineering
Electronic Engineering
ness Horizons
Algebra
Geology
Physical chemistry
nt
When considering both O
lassrooms
Civil
Probability
ions
Identify a specific consumer product that you or your family have used for quite some time. This might be a branded smartphone (if you have used several versions over the years)
or the court to consider in its deliberations. Locard’s exchange principle argues that during the commission of a crime
Chemical Engineering
Ecology
aragraphs (meaning 25 sentences or more). Your assignment may be more than 5 paragraphs but not less.
INSTRUCTIONS:
To access the FNU Online Library for journals and articles you can go the FNU library link here:
https://www.fnu.edu/library/
In order to
n that draws upon the theoretical reading to explain and contextualize the design choices. Be sure to directly quote or paraphrase the reading
ce to the vaccine. Your campaign must educate and inform the audience on the benefits but also create for safe and open dialogue. A key metric of your campaign will be the direct increase in numbers.
Key outcomes: The approach that you take must be clear
Mechanical Engineering
Organic chemistry
Geometry
nment
Topic
You will need to pick one topic for your project (5 pts)
Literature search
You will need to perform a literature search for your topic
Geophysics
you been involved with a company doing a redesign of business processes
Communication on Customer Relations. Discuss how two-way communication on social media channels impacts businesses both positively and negatively. Provide any personal examples from your experience
od pressure and hypertension via a community-wide intervention that targets the problem across the lifespan (i.e. includes all ages).
Develop a community-wide intervention to reduce elevated blood pressure and hypertension in the State of Alabama that in
in body of the report
Conclusions
References (8 References Minimum)
*** Words count = 2000 words.
*** In-Text Citations and References using Harvard style.
*** In Task section I’ve chose (Economic issues in overseas contracting)"
Electromagnetism
w or quality improvement; it was just all part of good nursing care. The goal for quality improvement is to monitor patient outcomes using statistics for comparison to standards of care for different diseases
e a 1 to 2 slide Microsoft PowerPoint presentation on the different models of case management. Include speaker notes... .....Describe three different models of case management.
visual representations of information. They can include numbers
SSAY
ame workbook for all 3 milestones. You do not need to download a new copy for Milestones 2 or 3. When you submit Milestone 3
pages):
Provide a description of an existing intervention in Canada
making the appropriate buying decisions in an ethical and professional manner.
Topic: Purchasing and Technology
You read about blockchain ledger technology. Now do some additional research out on the Internet and share your URL with the rest of the class
be aware of which features their competitors are opting to include so the product development teams can design similar or enhanced features to attract more of the market. The more unique
low (The Top Health Industry Trends to Watch in 2015) to assist you with this discussion.
https://youtu.be/fRym_jyuBc0
Next year the $2.8 trillion U.S. healthcare industry will finally begin to look and feel more like the rest of the business wo
evidence-based primary care curriculum. Throughout your nurse practitioner program
Vignette
Understanding Gender Fluidity
Providing Inclusive Quality Care
Affirming Clinical Encounters
Conclusion
References
Nurse Practitioner Knowledge
Mechanics
and word limit is unit as a guide only.
The assessment may be re-attempted on two further occasions (maximum three attempts in total). All assessments must be resubmitted 3 days within receiving your unsatisfactory grade. You must clearly indicate “Re-su
Trigonometry
Article writing
Other
5. June 29
After the components sending to the manufacturing house
1. In 1972 the Furman v. Georgia case resulted in a decision that would put action into motion. Furman was originally sentenced to death because of a murder he committed in Georgia but the court debated whether or not this was a violation of his 8th amend
One of the first conflicts that would need to be investigated would be whether the human service professional followed the responsibility to client ethical standard. While developing a relationship with client it is important to clarify that if danger or
Ethical behavior is a critical topic in the workplace because the impact of it can make or break a business
No matter which type of health care organization
With a direct sale
During the pandemic
Computers are being used to monitor the spread of outbreaks in different areas of the world and with this record
3. Furman v. Georgia is a U.S Supreme Court case that resolves around the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unsual punishment in death penalty cases. The Furman v. Georgia case was based on Furman being convicted of murder in Georgia. Furman was caught i
One major ethical conflict that may arise in my investigation is the Responsibility to Client in both Standard 3 and Standard 4 of the Ethical Standards for Human Service Professionals (2015). Making sure we do not disclose information without consent ev
4. Identify two examples of real world problems that you have observed in your personal
Summary & Evaluation: Reference & 188. Academic Search Ultimate
Ethics
We can mention at least one example of how the violation of ethical standards can be prevented. Many organizations promote ethical self-regulation by creating moral codes to help direct their business activities
*DDB is used for the first three years
For example
The inbound logistics for William Instrument refer to purchase components from various electronic firms. During the purchase process William need to consider the quality and price of the components. In this case
4. A U.S. Supreme Court case known as Furman v. Georgia (1972) is a landmark case that involved Eighth Amendment’s ban of unusual and cruel punishment in death penalty cases (Furman v. Georgia (1972)
With covid coming into place
In my opinion
with
Not necessarily all home buyers are the same! When you choose to work with we buy ugly houses Baltimore & nationwide USA
The ability to view ourselves from an unbiased perspective allows us to critically assess our personal strengths and weaknesses. This is an important step in the process of finding the right resources for our personal learning style. Ego and pride can be
· By Day 1 of this week
While you must form your answers to the questions below from our assigned reading material
CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (2013)
5 The family dynamic is awkward at first since the most outgoing and straight forward person in the family in Linda
Urien
The most important benefit of my statistical analysis would be the accuracy with which I interpret the data. The greatest obstacle
From a similar but larger point of view
4 In order to get the entire family to come back for another session I would suggest coming in on a day the restaurant is not open
When seeking to identify a patient’s health condition
After viewing the you tube videos on prayer
Your paper must be at least two pages in length (not counting the title and reference pages)
The word assimilate is negative to me. I believe everyone should learn about a country that they are going to live in. It doesnt mean that they have to believe that everything in America is better than where they came from. It means that they care enough
Data collection
Single Subject Chris is a social worker in a geriatric case management program located in a midsize Northeastern town. She has an MSW and is part of a team of case managers that likes to continuously improve on its practice. The team is currently using an
I would start off with Linda on repeating her options for the child and going over what she is feeling with each option. I would want to find out what she is afraid of. I would avoid asking her any “why” questions because I want her to be in the here an
Summarize the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psychological research (Comp 2.1) 25.0\% Summarization of the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psych
Identify the type of research used in a chosen study
Compose a 1
Optics
effect relationship becomes more difficult—as the researcher cannot enact total control of another person even in an experimental environment. Social workers serve clients in highly complex real-world environments. Clients often implement recommended inte
I think knowing more about you will allow you to be able to choose the right resources
Be 4 pages in length
soft MB-920 dumps review and documentation and high-quality listing pdf MB-920 braindumps also recommended and approved by Microsoft experts. The practical test
g
One thing you will need to do in college is learn how to find and use references. References support your ideas. College-level work must be supported by research. You are expected to do that for this paper. You will research
Elaborate on any potential confounds or ethical concerns while participating in the psychological study 20.0\% Elaboration on any potential confounds or ethical concerns while participating in the psychological study is missing. Elaboration on any potenti
3 The first thing I would do in the family’s first session is develop a genogram of the family to get an idea of all the individuals who play a major role in Linda’s life. After establishing where each member is in relation to the family
A Health in All Policies approach
Note: The requirements outlined below correspond to the grading criteria in the scoring guide. At a minimum
Chen
Read Connecting Communities and Complexity: A Case Study in Creating the Conditions for Transformational Change
Read Reflections on Cultural Humility
Read A Basic Guide to ABCD Community Organizing
Use the bolded black section and sub-section titles below to organize your paper. For each section
Losinski forwarded the article on a priority basis to Mary Scott
Losinksi wanted details on use of the ED at CGH. He asked the administrative resident