Hi, I'm writing a paper on the culture of Saudi Arabia with a focus on the woman rights there. - Management
Hi, I'm writing a paper on the culture of Saudi Arabia with a focus on the woman rights there.
I would like you to please start the paper with a brief introduction to the history of Saudi Arabia. Then write a few sentences on the definition of culture. After that, write about woman's rights and equality in Saudi Arabia in the past and mention the significant changes happening in the present.
I'm attaching a first draft and a table of contents to help you start the paper and please follow the professor's notes
I'm attaching some helpful sources. Please don't forget to cite the information you take for the sources with the exact number of the pages
for more hopeful sources you can type in Women’s equality in Saudi Arabia on the google books search engine.
Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia
Author(s): Eleanor A. Doumato
Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992), pp. 31-47
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/195431
Accessed: 10-10-2019 05:03 UTC
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GENDER, MONARCHY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN SAUDI ARABIA
Eleanor A. Doumato
The heading on a broadside posted in public places in Riyadh read, 'here are
the names of the sluts who advocate vice and corruption on the earth'. The
broadside had been circulated by the mutawwi'in, the morals policemen of
Saudi Arabia, in the wake of the women's driving demonstration of 6
November 1990. Listed under the heading were the names and ages of 49
women from well-known families, and prominently displayed at the top were
the names of five women with the title 'doctor'.1
It was an inauspicious end to a demonstration which had begun at a time of
optimism among westward-looking circles in Saudi Arabia. In August, King
Fahd had invited American forces to defend the Kingdom after Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and American women military personnel were
becoming a highly visible-though controversial-presence in the Kingdom.
In September, the King had issued an edict calling for government agencies to
train women volunteers to work in civil defence and medical services. The
response was one of elation by women who hoped it would be the beginning of
a much larger role for women in the work force. Those who participated
included not only the western-educated, but also women of the royal family,
who organized and attended training sessions at Riyadh hospitals. By early
October, hundreds of women in every section of the country were volunteering
for these sessions, even in the arch-conservative town of Buraidah, the site of
rioting 30 years ago when the first elementary school for girls opened.
The King's alignment with the United States and his bold initiative for
women's civil defence work appeared to hold out the possibility of a decline in
religious-conservative influence and the further opening of Saudi society to the
West. Nowhere was this optimism more acutely felt than among the
Kingdom's western-educated women. The driving demonstration's organizers
were in fact encouraged by the King's apparent commitment to increasing
women's participation in public life. A letter requesting permission for women
to drive, reportedly sent to the Mayor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, on the day
the driving demonstration took place, began by praising the King's edict:
'Opening the door to the Saudi woman to volunteer to serve her country was
an act of great generosity by the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines, and
demonstrates his deep belief that women are an important asset to this
country.' The letter appealed to the Prince 'in the name of every ambitious
Saudi woman eager to serve her country under the leadership of the Servant of
the Two Holy Shrines and his wise government to open your paternal heart to
us and to look sympathetically on our humane demand, to drive in Riyadh.'2
1. Broadside headed 'The Names of the sluts who advocate vice and corruption on the earth',
translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated.
2. 'Letter addressed to Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Prince of Riyadh,' translated from Arabic
to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated.
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A sympathetic hearing is not what the women received. The demonstration
was stopped by mutawwi'Tn, who were angered that the women refused to
acknowledge their jurisdiction and insisted on being taken to police
headquarters instead.3 The Interior Ministry, headed by Prince Naif, came
down firmly on the side of the religious police, and made the previously
unofficial ban on women's driving official. The Ministry also issued a ban on
all political activity by women in the future. The state-funded Directorate of
Islamic Research, Ruling, Propaganda and Guidance, headed by Shaykh 'Abd
Allah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Baz, sanctioned the ministry's ruling by issuing a
fatwa which stated that 'women should not be allowed to drive motor vehicles,
as the SharV'a instructs that the things that degrade or harm the dignity of
women must be prevented.'4
Those who participated in the demonstration, and the husbands of those
who participated, were punished by having their passports confiscated and
those employed as teachers were suspended from their jobs. Some were
subsequently harassed by phone callers accusing the women of sexual
immorality and of being agents for Western vices. Moreover, the
demonstration became an occasion to inject fresh vigour into the image
projected in the public media of ideal Islamic womanhood as secluded wife and
mother: in December, while the American military build-up was at its height,
the state-funded media turned the demonstration into a moral object lesson for
children, when a television programme featured a group of little girls singing a
song with the words, 'I am a Saudi woman and I do not drive a car.'
The question of women's right to drive was not a new issue, but one which
had been publicly addressed many times in the past, through newspaper
articles, meetings at women's clubs, and private overtures to government
officials. With the preparations for war consuming public attention, the King
committed to women's participation in the war effort, and sympathetic
listeners within the royal family, the participants had reason to feel that the
time was at hand to press for the right to drive.
Why then was the government's response so focused on reaffirming
traditional attitudes about women's roles? Why did the government respond to
a convoy of women drivers as if the act were revolutionary? The reason is that
the demonstration brought to the surface the underlying tension in Saudi
Arabia between those who want a more liberal, evolutionary Islam and those
who want to retain the literal Islam of the country's WahhabT heritage.
Traditional roles for women have become a symbol of that heritage, and have
been co-opted by the monarchy as an emblem of its own Islamic character.
The demonstration, in making a public appeal to alter Saudi Arabia's unique
Islamic character, in effect represented a challenge to the stability of the
monarchy.
This paper discusses the construction of gender ideology in the political
culture of Saudi Arabia. It looks at the way gender constructions play into
3. 'From a report by a Mutawwi',' translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author,
unpublished, undated.
4. Arab News, 14 November 1990.
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myths of national identity which underpin the monarchy, and at the way these
constructions become a useful instrument of state policy and of state security.
Gender Ideology: the Ideal Islamic Woman
Gender ideology promoted within the political culture of Saudi Arabia
constructs an ideal type, one which may be called the 'ideal Islamic woman'. It
is an ideology that has been expressed in official government statements, state
policy decisions, and religious opinions issued by the state-supported 'ulama'
since the late 1950s, when women's roles first became a focus of contention
over the question of public education for girls. The idealized woman is a wife
and mother. Her place is within the family, 'the basic unit of society', and men
are her protectors. Women who remain at home are the educators of children
and the reproducers of traditional values. As the mother of future generations,
the idealized woman is in effect the partner of the Saudi state, which is
dedicated to protecting the family and guarding 'traditional values' and
'Islamic morality'.
The official version of the ideal woman tends to elevate the public
separation of women from men as the hallmark of Islamic society. It defines
the particular Muslim society of Saudi Arabia as something distinct from and
morally superior to the West, as well as being superior to other Muslim
countries where women are less rigidly separated. The ideal woman, therefore,
stands among other symbols which define a national identity that is uniquely
Saudi Arabian.
Within the Kingdom, this ideology emanates not only from religious
scholars and conservative writers, but is nurtured within state agencies and
incorporated into public policy, sometimes with the explicit objective of
correlating Saudi rule with the preservation of Islamic morality. For example,
when a newspaper article published in 'Ukaz criticized men in general for
considering themselves the guardians of women, the state-funded Department
of Religious Guidance responded by issuing a fatwa citing the Quranic verse,
'Men are guardians of women by what God has favoured some over the other
and by what they spend of their money', and stated that the author of the letter
and the publisher of the newspaper should be punished for suggesting
otherwise. The fatwd also explicitly credited the Saudi rulers for upholding
what it viewed as the Islamic moral value of protecting women within the
family under the guardianship of men:
'Our government, thank God, is known for its deference to the Shariah
law and its enforcement of it on its subjects and this is part of God's
favor on it and the reason for its survival, glory, and God's siding with it.
May God stay it on the right path, reform its men, and help it to protect
His religion, His Book, and the Sunnah of His Prophet from the mockery
of the mockers, the atheism of the atheists and the scorning of
criminals.'5
5. Al-Da'wa, 603 (19/6/1397 A.H. (1977)), quoted from Hamad Muhammad al-Baadi, 'Social
change, Education and the Roles of Women in Arabia', unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford
University, 1982, pp. 133-134.
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The language used to construct the 'ideal Islamic woman' is very similar to
'fundamentalist' or 'Islamist' language employed by the Muslim Brotherhood6
and others in Egypt,7 Hamas in Gaza,8 the Islamic Salvation Front in
Algeria,9 and by the ideologues of the Islamic revolution in Iran.10 In Saudi
Arabia, however, the relationship between the ideology of the ideal woman
and the reality of women's lives is closer than in most other places where
Islamist opinion attracts a following. In fact, in Saudi Arabia, values of sex-
segregation outside the private home remain practised to a degree that is
unknown in most of the Muslim world.
The reason is two-fold. First, Saudi Arabia's social fabric was not disturbed
by a colonial experience: western influence is of a very recent date and has
arrived, to some degree selectively, by the Saudis' own choosing. Second, social
conventions and religiously based attitudes supporting sex-segregation, female
domesticity and dependence on men have been incorporated into public policy.
These policies are well known, and thus only a few examples are cited here.
Shar'a laws of personal status remain unmodified and are enforced through
the courts: men retain prerogatives in marriage, divorce, and child custody,
and also in the practice of polygyny, which has been modified in some Muslim
countries and outlawed in at least one. Women are not allowed to travel
without the permission of a mahram, a male guardian, a policy which is
enforced by the state at airline check-in counters, railway stations, and hotels,
where women travelling alone may not register for a room. Further, women
may not receive a commercial license unless a male manager has been hired,
and certain courses, such as engineering, are not open to female university
students because employment in engineering is viewed as incompatible with
sex-segregation practices.
The ideology of the ideal Islamic woman is reiterated in royal edicts, policy
statements and official regulations. In the Saudi labour law, for example, the
state recognizes its responsibility to protect the family according to Islamic
values, and women and children are cited together as individuals in special
need of government protection. Sex-segregation ('in no case may men and
women co-mingle in the place of work') is stated as the fundamental
requirement of women's being allowed to work in order to assure this
6. Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, 'An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-Ghazali', in Elizabeth Fernea, ed.,
Women and the Family in the Middle East. New Voices of Change (University of Texas Press,
Austin, 1985), pp.231-254.
7. A discussion of this literature may be seen in Yvonne Haddad, 'Traditional Affirmations
Concerning the Role of Women as Found in Contemporary Arab Islamic Literature', in Women in
Contemporary Muslim Societies, Jane Smith ed. (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 1980),
pp.61-86; see also Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, 'Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women in
Contemporary Egypt' International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19/1 (February, 1987), pp.23-
50.
8. Rema Hammami, 'Women, Hijab, and the Intifada', Middle East Report 164/165 (May-August
1990), pp.24-28; 'Gaza Journal: The Veiled Look, It's Enforced with a Vengeance', New York
Times, 22 August 1991.
9. 'Divided House: Algeria Conflict Pits Father Against Son', Wall Street Journal, 23 January
1992.
10. William Darrow, 'Women's Place and the Place of Women in the Iranian Revolution', in
Yvonne Haddad and Ellison Banks Findly, eds., Women, Religion and Social Change (State
University of New York Press, 1985), pp.307-319.
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protection. 1 Consequently, women are excluded from working in shops or in
offices where men are present, including most of the Ministries, the very place
where women in neighbouring countries, such as Kuwait, have most readily
found employment. The ideology of the ideal women is also inscribed on the
cornerstone of the official girls' education policy of the Kingdom: 'The
purpose of educating a girl is to bring her up in a proper Islamic way so as to
perform her duty in life, be an ideal and successful housewife and a good
mother, prepared to do things which suit her nature, like teaching, nursing and
giving medical treatment.'12 The same policy, which prescribes sex-segregation
at all levels of education, also justifies the closing of certain university courses
to women, such as engineering, geology and meteorology, which might lead to
employment in male-dominated fields.
However pervasive this ideology, it does not define policy. It is rather the
idiom through which policies regarding women's issues are articulated.
Sometimes the idiom is used to initiate what are for Saudi Arabia quite liberal
policies. For example, the leaders of the women's driving demonstration
employed the Islamist idiom in their petition for the right to drive: 'Since we
have noted your highness' spirit of understanding of the demands of this age
and of the working women's creative efforts which are undertaken in the light
of the teachings of our Islamic religion, we appeal to you ...'13
King Fahd's September 1990 edict on women's volunteer work is another
case in point. The language of the edict promised that the volunteer
programme would be carried out 'within the context of fully preserving Islamic
and social values',14 even though the rigid sex-segregation practised in Saudi
Arabia is incompatible with women's work for civil defence. Incorporating
Islamist language into the edict, however, cushioned its impact sufficiently to
preempt criticism of the sort that would have nullified the edict's intent. Had
the edict been implemented at a less politically stressful time, it might have
become the cornerstone of a new area of employment for women.
In effect, the volunteer work edict might have brought about radical change
for women in the same way that instituting women's education did thirty years
ago. The official girls' education policy cited above clearly limits education to
what is compatible with marriage and motherhood, but even so, this policy,
regularly reiterated, has been the means by which secular education for girls
has been able to grow into a nation-wide system of secondary schools, eleven
women's colleges, and five universities which accept female students. When it
was written in 1968, secular education for girls was still a revolutionary idea,
one which had been met in the early 1960s with considerable hostility from
those who saw secular education as incompatible with traditional Islamic
morality. It was the Islamist idiom, the assurance that education for girls
would be carried out in a sex-separated environment and only for the purpose
11. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Labor Regulations, 'Employment of Juveniles and Women',
Chapter X, section I, Article 160.
12. 'The Philosophy of Education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', in Dr. Abdulla Mohamed Al
Zaid, Education in Saudi Arabia (Jeddah, Tihama Publications, 1981), p.56.
13. 'Letter addressed to Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Prince of Riyadh', translated from Arabic
to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated.
14. Arab News, 5 September 1990.
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of making girls into better wives and mothers, which opened the door for
education to go forward.
By the same token, the Saudi labour law limits the kinds of places where
women may work by mandating sex-segregation, but at the same time these
labour restrictions open up a legitimate space for women in the workplace. For
example, women were not supposed to work in banks, and out of propriety,
could not comfortably patronize one, but the rubric of Islamic morality
justified the opening of banks operated by and for women, which have come
into being under government auspices without significant opposition.
Similarly, the separation and 'protection' of women clauses in the labour law
have provided the rationale for securing very progressive policies for the
benefit of women who do work. Women employees, for example, are entitled
to a ten-week maternity leave, in some cases with full pay, and daily time off
for nursing an infant when they return to work. Women employees are also
entitled to employer-paid medical coverage and cannot be fired during illness
or pregnancy leave. Official assurances of sex-segregation in the workplace,
furthermore, make it possible for many women professionals to work
unfettered by morals police in journalism, computers, utility companies, some
ministries and especially in health care where contact with men is unavoidable.
The idiom of the ideal woman is deployed not only for issues relating to
women. In order to defuse concerns about the harm imported western culture
may bring to Saudi society, nearly all development projects which require the
importation of foreign labour have been prefaced by the Saudis' promise that
such projects will be carried out within margins of Islamic values, values which
are symbolized most commonly by the separation of women.
The ideology of the ideal Islamic woman has thus been a useful instrument
in securing both progressive and restrictive policies. The idealization of
women's domesticity and the elevation of female separation to an Islamic
imperative has remained consistent on the level of official policy in Saudi
Arabia because idealized definitions of gender are intimately connected to the
ideologies which legitimate the monarchy.
The Legitimation of the Monarchy: Religion and Tribal Authority
As a political entity, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a collection of families
and diverse ethnic and religious groups which were united through conquest by
'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud during the first quarter of the century. In order to
establish the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy among its newly incorporated
constituencies, the ruling family did not attempt to undo these identities, but
tried to create overarching loyalties based on a common social and religious
community in which membership has its privileges, placing themselves as the
locus of these loyalties.
These loyalties are grounded in myths of identity which translate, with
varying degrees of success, into perceptions of Al Sa'iud leadership as
legitimate leadership to the present day. The first myth is that the Kingdom is
a cohesive national entity fused by a common loyalty to Islam as shaped by the
WahhabT tradition, and that the Al Sa'ud family are qualified-and uniquely
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so-to defend Islam and to ensure the moral well-being of the Muslim
community. The second is that the Saudi Arabian state is an extension of the
tribal family.
Islam and Al Sa 'ud leadership
The father of King Fahd, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, inherited from his
eighteenth-century forebears a political and religious ideology which he used to
legitimate his own rule and the expansion of his rule across the peninsula. This
ideology grew out of the teachings of the eighteenth-century scholar
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, whose philosophy effectually converted
political loyalty into a religious obligation. According to Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab's teachings, a Muslim must have presented a bay'a, or oath of
allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime in order to be redeemed after
his death,15 while the ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance so long as he leads
the community according to the laws of God. 6 According to his teachings, the
whole purpose of the Muslim community is to become the living embodiment
of God's laws: the responsibility of the legitimate ruler is to ensure that the
people know what are God's laws, and live in conformity with them.
In theory, to the WahhabTs of Najd, living according to God's laws means
following the Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet in all one's daily affairs,
adhering only to the interpretations of the early jurists of the first three
centuries of Islam and avoiding later interpretative readings. This has shaped
the WahhabT attitude about women's roles in two ways: first, the WahhabT
'ulamd' reject the kind of reformist interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith
which have been essential to bringing about changes in dress, education, sex-
segregation practices and Islamic personal status laws in other places; second,
sex-segregation, face-covering, and patriarchal control, which are
substantiated not so much in the literal word of the Qur'an and Hadith as in
local interpretations of religious doctrine and local established practices, are
continuously being re-inscribed back into society through religious decree and
state-supported policies as an essential component of leadership in the
community living in conformity with God's laws.
WahhabT doctrines have been promoted by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and his
descendants in the process of promoting religion as the glue which would hold
the Saudi kingdom together. 'Abd al-'Aziz, for example, subsidized Qur'an
memorization classes and sent missionaries to all the villages and towns. The
Qur'an was to be the constitution of the Kingdom. Universal male
participation in public prayer five times a day in the mosque was enforced,
with women encouraged to participate on holidays, and in some areas, on
Fridays. When public education for boys was instituted in 1953 and for girls in
15. Al-Baadi, p.30.
16. Obedience to the Muslim ruler is emphasized in literature produced by the Department of
Religious Guidance. 'Muslims should acknowledge to their ruler the rights of authority. They are
not allowed to disobey their rulers or leaders except in one case, when the ruler orders them to
commit a sin or an action contrary to the commandments of Allah'. Abdul Rahman bin Hammad
Al Omar, Islam, the Religion of Truth (Riyadh, 1401), p.45.
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1960, religious education became mandatory, constituting to this day the
largest block of school hours in the elementary curriculum.
Ibn Sa'ud's campaign to evangelize Bedouin as a means of encouraging
them to settle on the land also became a medium for re-inscribing WahhabT
attitudes about women's roles. Beginning in 1912, Ibn Sa'ud subsidized
agricultural communities known as hijra, meaning 'the move from the land of
polytheism to the land of Islam',17 where newly settled Bedouin would apply
Islamic law and Sunna to daily life. In these settlements some of the most rigid
sex-separation practices were instituted in the name of religion, practices which
have been observed among descendants of hijra settlers in the present day, such
as forbidding women to enter the public market place, or to speak when
attempting to get a merchant's attention. 8
During his lifetime, Ibn Sa'ud also revived religious institutions which
would symbolize the continuing partnership of his regime with the scholars of
religion: these were a body of state-funded 'ulama', and the Society for the
Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, whose task is to enforce
compliance with Islamic law and practice as interpreted by the 'ulamd'. These
institutions have an interest in maintaining WahhabT interpretations of Islamic
rulings about women, and they have been in fact on the front-line of shaping
the ideology for the ideal Islamic woman.
The Directorate of Islamic Research, Ruling, Propaganda and Guidance is
the definitive guide in religious matters, and issues fatwds (religious opinions)
about social and political issues, including correct public behaviour such as
personal dress and deportment. The Directorate also offers opinions on issues
submitted for religious approval by the King,19 and at times, in effect, the
'ulama' provide Islamic sanction for policy decisions already taken by the
government. Another body of state-funded 'ulamd', the General Presidency for
Girls' Education, is the designated overseer for the programmes and policies of
girls' public education.
The function of the mutawwi'Tn, the patrolmen of the morality society, is to
demonstrate the government's readiness to enforce standards of behaviour
approved by the 'ulamd'. In the past, the mutawwi'n have been responsible for
supervising the closing of shops at prayer time and the attendance of men in
the mosque for prayers, and for preventing infractions of public morality such
as playing music, smoking, drinking alcohol, men and women mingling in
public places, and immodest dress for both men and women. In the 1920s, these
mutawwi'Tn obtained extraordinary powers of enforcement ranging from
personal embarrassment to trial, imprisonment and corporal punishment.
Since then, however, the power of the mutawwi'Tn has declined. In 1976 the
Director of the Society was assigned ministerial status, and the Society now
exists as one of a number of independent departments in the state
administration which report directly to the King.20
The jurisdiction of the mutawwi'Tn is usually limited to overseeing the
17. John Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of 'slam (Leiden, Brill, 1978), p. 17.
18. Ibid., pp.54-55.
19. al-Yassini, p.71.
20. Ibid., p.67.
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closing of shops at prayer time, public decorum, and proper dress, especially
for women. The mutawwi'n have often worked alone on their patrols, and
have been drawn from among the least educated. Without the …
Arabia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Author(s): DAVE EGGERS, MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY, HASAN HATRASH and HAIFAA AL-
MANSOUR
Source: World Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (SPRING 2013), pp. 78-85
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43290398
Accessed: 09-10-2019 06:30 UTC
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range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
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World Policy Journal
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^ ROUND TA BLE
Arabia Yesterday,
Today, and
Tomorrow
AUTHOR DAVE EGGERS
SPEAKS WITH PRODUCER
MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY,
JOURNALIST HASAN HATRASH,AND
DIRECTOR HAIFA A AL-MANSOUR
DAVE EGGERS MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY HASAN HATRASH HAIFAA AL-MANSOUR
Last Hologram Dave year, Eggers the for San the published King Francisco-based , a vision his book, of author Saudi A
Dave Eggers published his book, A
Hologram for the King , a vision of Saudi
Arabia where the Western world of holograms
and the Internet comes up against the hard re-
alities of today s Saudi Arabia. Eggers, whose
novel was nominated for a National Book
Award, spent weeks in the Kingdom research-
ing, meeting an extraordinary Saudi film-
maker whose first feature, Wadjda , premiered
at the Venice Film Festival to considerable
acclaim, and two Saudis who inspired key
characters. World Policy Journal assembled
Haifaa al-Mansour, Saudi Arabia's first fe-
male film director; Mamdouh al-Harthy,
a brilliant journalist and documentary
producer, cast in Hologram as a driver who
leads the narrator into the depths of the
Saudi mind and spirit; and Hasan Hatrash,
journalist, filmmaker, and musician, with
a similar role in the novel, who in real life
produced the Portfolio in the Winter 2012-
78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL
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SAUDI ARABIA
2013 issue of World Policy Journal. Eggers
served as the moderator for this 90-minute
roundtable discussion on art, freedom, and
politics in Saudi Arabia and the post- Arab
Spring Middle East.
DAVE EGGERS: We thought it would be
most interesting to talk about issues of cul-
ture and the state of the youth in Saudi Ara-
bia. To start off, we can see where you think
the situation is for artists in Saudi Arabia
now versus 10 years ago. Haifaa, having
made your first feature film there, then
making the rounds with your films depict-
ing Saudi Arabia in a very honest, unflinch-
ing light, you had the cooperation - or at
least the blessing or lack of interference -
from the government. So now you're able to
export your film, which has a warts-and-all
depiction of the Kingdom. Let me have you
take it from there.
HAIFAA AL-MANSOUR: Of course, Sau-
di Arabia opened up tremendously com-
pared to 10 years ago. For me, as a wom-
an, I can walk in the mall. Before, I used
to be really reluctant to go to the mall if I
wasn't completely veiled. I would always
take care, if there is something showing,
otherwise the police would come. But
now I feel a lot more at ease going out.
The changes in Saudi enabled me to shoot
the film in Saudi Arabia. There is more
acceptance for a woman doing something
different, and there is a lot of official sup-
port. We've seen two Saudi girls going
to the Olympics. Changes are still slow,
maybe not as fast as we wish. Women in
Saudi are still not allowed to drive, and
there's the issue of guardianship, like
a woman can't open a business without
having male supervision. But, still, Saudi
Arabia has changed a lot. I feel there is
room for women to assert themselves.
There is room for women to push bound-
aries, but they have to trust themselves.
EGGERS: Hasan, I chose 10 years as a
very arbitrary marker, but you may have
an alternate one in terms of looser restric-
tions on artists. I know you - as a musi-
cian, a filmmaker, and you've worked in
television, and you write - I wonder if you
might give us your perspective. I know
that when we met three and a half years
ago you had just worked on a documentary
that was broadcast in Saudi Arabia and was
somewhat controversial. I don't know if
things have changed.
HASAN HATRASH: First of all, there's
been a significant awareness and open-
ness to art in general. Keep in mind that
Saudi Arabia is basically an Islamic-ruled
country. And in this country, the problem
is that culture and religion mix - a dan-
gerous concoction that created a society of
religious non-believers, so to speak. You
can see people acting in a religious fash-
ion, but inside they are not really acting
religious in the sense of humanity.
Certainly the Internet and satellite TV
have played a massive role. Ten years ago,
if someone knew I played the guitar, it
would 've been a heretical move for me.
I would've been prosecuted. I would've
been jailed. Now I can go and sit by the
beach and play my guitar, and no one
even looks at me. Second of all, cameras
and videos. The Internet and satellite TV
gave people submerged in their religion
and culture the eyes to see that it is okay
to see a camera. Now I can go out easily
playing the guitar or shooting a documen-
tary. I shot two or three documentaries in
the last two years, which I didn't have any
problem with - versus seven or eight years
ago when I would've probably been jailed.
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ROUNDTABLE
NOW SAUDI IS
PART OF A GLOBAL
MOVEMENT. WE
HAVE INTERNET;
WE HAVE YOUNG
PEOPLE. IT WON'T
BE EASY TO
CONTAIN.
EGGERS: Have there been any policy
movements toward openness of the arts and
filmmaking, or has it been more of an un-
derstood evolution?
HASAN: It is mostly
an urban, social move-
ment. There is noth-
ing on paper, except
four or five years ago
when the King is-
sued a decree allowing
people to use cameras
to have the liberty to
shoot anywhere in the
Kingdom - except,
of course, on military
bases. So that was the
seed that pushed the youth toward video
cameras and other art forms - graffiti, hip-
hop, rapping, playing music.
EGGERS: Let s back up and talk about the
advent of widespread Internet access. When
did that happen, and what effect has it had?
MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY: Of course, after
September 11, the whole world changed.
The great impact, I believe, was seen in
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. In the U.S., in
terms of politics, in Saudi Arabia, in terms
of openness. Before that, in Islam, they used
to say taking pictures is haram [forbidden],
listening to music is haram. After Septem-
ber 11, things changed, people became more
open, and now, they are even more open
thanks to the Internet and the new social
media. I remember when we used to go film
in the streets, the religious police would ask,
"What are you doing?" and "What for?"
They would do an investigation about this
filming. The Internet definitely made a huge
change. Everybody can now make their own
show on YouTube or other websites.
EGGERS: Can you explain the connection
between this openness and 9/11?
MAMDOUH: The government is more
aware that we live in a restricted society,
that we are not living a healthy life in terms
of culture, or the way we think, or even the
religion that is suffocating people. They are
aware now that they should let the people
breathe. Let's stay away from extremism
and radicalism. Lets open the society
slowly, gradually, and yeah, it works for us,
as artists. We are benefiting from this.
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL: I would like
to look broadly beyond Saudi Arabia in the
region. Where do you see Saudi Arabia in
terms of these kinds of freedoms compared
with neighboring countries, especially those
that have gone through the Arab Spring?
MAMDOUH: I believe that the Arab
Spring did not affect Saudi Arabia. But I
believe - I heartily, strongly believe - that
change is coming. When do I expect it?
Five years, or, maximum, 10 years. The
change will come.
EGGERS: In what form?
MAMDOUH: In all forms. Its a wave, a
huge wave that will change Saudi Arabia.
HASAN: Exactly. What is happening in
Saudi Arabia right now is exactly what
happened in the U.S. in the 1950s. We are
facing the same cultural and social change.
Now, women are rebelling, youth are re-
belling, and I can see, in the course of time,
taking us to the 60s and 70s - where the
U.S. used to be. Okay, it shows that we are
about 40 years backward from where you
are now, but it shows that we are taking
the same steps. Its only a matter of time.
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Ali alfahal
SAUDI ARABIA
WPJ: As Dave suggests in his book, it is
really in a Saudi manner that these changes
are happening, right?
HASAN: It s not a Saudi-tailored change. Its
a global change. We're just part of it. We're
going with the flow. Luckily, 60 percent of
our society is below 25 years of age, with
nearly half of them studying abroad right
now. So imagine, all of this collected youth
coming back five to 10 years from now. It's
going to be a different Saudi Arabia.
EGGERS: That was one of my main ques-
tions, and we talked about it when we all
met in Saudi, and that is the effect of the
nationwide brain drain from the well-edu-
cated youth who find that there are limited
opportunities in the Kingdom. They choose
to study and stay abroad. Is that changing
now? Are you finding more young people
returning and choosing to start careers
there, or do you find that it is still a sig-
nificant problem, where people find more
opportunities elsewhere so you lose some
of the young's best and brightest? Haifaa,
maybe you would like to answer.
HAIFAA: I think a lot of Saudis go back
home, because Saudi is very tribal. People
have very strong ties to their homes, their
tribe. And honestly, Saudis have a lot of
opportunities for young people too. There
are more opportunities for them to have a
better career in Saudi. But regarding what
you said about the freedom and evolution
around Saudi Arabia, I think, compared to
the neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia
has the least censorship. Like when I tried
to apply for funding for my film, I was re-
jected by lots of sources, because they were
very reluctant to support a film of that
kind. Even if you notice in the press, we
have lots of writers who try to push the
boundaries. We are not an Egypt. We are
going in the right direction. By contrast,
the fundamentalism in Egypt and Tunisia,
for example, is taking the country back-
ward, while we still are moving forward.
Here, more freedoms are opening up. They
are trying to stabilize the country by giv-
ing opportunities for young people so it
has affected the country. Maybe people are
not revolting, but the country is trying to
make sure that things are taken care of -
and that is really for our benefit.
EGGERS: How much of this openness has
to do with King Abdullah? He is getting
on in years. If he were no longer with us,
would there be a regression, or do you think
this is a movement with no turning back?
MAMDOUH: It is really hard to project,
because we don't know how the system
will go in Saudi. But it is very hard to
control. Now Saudi is part of a global
movement. We have Internet; we have
young people. It won't be easy to contain
and close the society as in the 90s or the
80s. Saudi Arabia is moving toward re-
form and opening up, because it is the
natural course now. It would be really hard
to fight that.
HASAN: You cannot predict what will hap-
pen in the future, but you can look around
in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Syria. The Mus-
lim Brotherhood are taking over, plus the
Salafis. So, if those guys succeed in their
countries, if we join the Brotherhood and
the Salafis, the country will return to the
80s again and just be as closed up as pos-
sible. The other scenario is the failure of the
Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Syria. Then, we will witness
a great openness and more liberation from
within. Those are the two scenarios.
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ROUNDTABLE
MAMDOUH: Take into consideration that
when we talk about openness in Saudi Ara-
bia, we always portray Saudi Arabia as Jid-
dah, Riyadh, and Dammam. They are the
only three big, open cities, and they repre-
sent not more than 1 5 percent of Saudi Ara-
bia, which has a large number of illiterates.
We in Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam are
the minority.
EGGERS: Mamdouh and I met when he
was helping me go to the King Abdullah
Economic City, and one day we tried to go
to the King Abdullah University of Science
and Technology, and we were not allowed in
there without it being agreed upon. But we
talked a lot then about these experiments in
the university where men and women were
mixed more freely and shared classrooms. I
was attributing this policy to King Abdul-
lah's experiments in having more freedoms
and openness in these experimental mini-
cities outside of Jiddah, so that you can ease
your way and experiment with these kinds
of progressive policies outside of the city
centers. Do you think this is an important
aspect of progress, and do you think it will '
continue? Some were suggesting that there
will be quicker progress away from Jiddah,
away from other cities. This is where these
sorts of incremental movements toward
more openness and rights for women will
be enacted. Is that your sense of it, Haifaa,
or do you think that - now that things are
moving quicker generally - that these ex-
periments are still necessary?
HAIFAA: I come from a very small city, and
my father comes from the most conserva-
tive place on earth. But now I see it is open-
ing up. I see it in my own family. My fam-
ily is very Saudi, traditional to the core, and
I see them changing. My brother sent his
daughter to study in America and that is
considered a revolution in their house. They
are small town people, yet they are opening
up to the world. They are trying to find
opportunities for them. They are not rich,
because jobs are not as accessible for those
small towns. They want to have a better life,
so they are more and more tolerant. They are
more relaxed. We must provide an alterna-
tive voice to what is happening, because the
mosques are dominated by individuals who
are always telling people to be conservative.
We need to have alternative places where
people can say different things. It is very
important to provoke, to bring debate, and
to make people think and reconsider. So it s
very important to have those places.
MAMDOUH: The new economic cities are
there to bring change. There's a high rate
of unemployment in Saudi Arabia for a lot
of youth, so those cities are supposed to
take those young Saudis, train them, and
try and find them jobs. The economic cities
are made to bring cultural change and to
take on the employment problem in Saudi
Arabia. Throughout history, if you want to
v bring about change, either in a company, or
in a country, it should be bottom-up. Suc-
cessful change should be bottom-up.
EGGERS: Could you talk about turning
around perceptions the rest of the world
has wrong or outdated about life in Saudi
Arabia? What work do you feel you have to
do as an artist to change minds and educate
people about contemporary Saudi society?
HASAN: I found a lot of opportunities
abroad, but as Saudis, we linger in the past
with our faith, with our families. Still, I've
found the challenge of changing our society
appealing. One of the many challenges here
is the backward mentality of the religious
non-believers, in which they mix every-
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SAUDI ARABIA
thing, including art, and suddenly things
become unwanted. Haifaa and others like
us, who are open-minded and bring artistic
views into our lives, faced a lot of problems.
We became very isolated in the beginning.
We followed literally what Gandhi said, "Be
the change you want to see in the world."
I personally became the change. I had the
guts to look different, to have long hair, to
hold my guitar and play, to take my camera
and go out. I faced a lot of problems. Once,
I got jailed just for playing guitar. But even-
tually, things worked out. Now I look at the
allies that I have - people who know me,
look to me as a role model for the new gen-
eration. It makes me feel that everything is
worth it, and we re going to still keep doing
it, keep pushing the boundaries. Like Haifaa
said, the media here is much more liberated
than in the Gulf States. As a writer for an
Arab newspaper, I have seen that personally.
We've pushed the barrier much more than
any of the Gulf States.
EGGERS: Haifaa, you've been traveling ev-
erywhere with your film. We met in Colo-
rado. I know you were just at the Venice
Film Festival. Can you tell us where else
have you brought the film and your experi-
ence with how the film has been a window
on contemporary Saudi life, and what sort
of perceptions you have challenged and up-
ended here in the U.S., Europe, and else-
where? I'm assuming it's very satisfying to
educate people about the full spectrum of
Saudi life instead of the more limited per-
ceptions or assumptions people may have
that are probably outdated.
HAIFAA: As an artist, I wanted to put a hu-
man face on Saudis. We struggle with con-
servative ideologies. We come from a world
that has created its own existence because it
has been closed for so long. And that makes
it an exciting place to do a story as a film-
maker. But I'm not in a position to defend
or educate as much as tell human stories,
like opening a window and letting people
discover for themselves. It's safer for me as
an artist to step away.
EGGERS: To the rest of the world, the po-
sition of women in Saudi has always been
of interest. I wonder if you can offer pre-
dictions of where women might be in five
years in terms of their place in Saudi society.
HAIFAA: Definitely
women will partici-
pate in politics. They
will vote, and after
that, with the limited
place we have within
democracy, it is hard
to predict now. The
Arab world is so un-
predictable. We never
thought of the [Arab
Spring] revolutions
until they happened.
No one predicted
them. But women, es-
pecially younger wom-
en, are not passive.
Women will definitely
have more rights, espe-
cially in politics.
MAMDOUH: I'll be optimistic. Within five
years, I think we will have a minister who
is a woman. I hope so. Otherwise, if we get
more extreme, and we become more con-
servative, then I think we'll go back to the
Stone Age.
EGGERS: Do you think that's a possibility?
I wonder if there will be a backlash, or a
reversion. Here in the U.S. we go through
WOMEN DRIVING
IS SUCH A
POLARIZING
ISSUE IN SAUDI
NOW. BUT MORE
WOMEN ARE NOW
DRIVING, SO IT
WILL HAPPEN
REGARDLESS
OF WHETHER
THE TRAFFIC
SITUATION IN
SAUDI CHANGES.
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ROUNDTABLE
more progressive times and then we reverse
course, and we have a more conservative
four to eight years, which we recently did.
Is there a fear that the changes that are al-
ready going on might provoke a backlash
among the more conservative elements of
society and say, "This is moving too fast,"
and there would be a crackdown and, like
you say, a going back to the Stone Age? Are
you worried about that?
MAMDOUH: Its a possibility depending
on neighboring countries. If the Muslim
Brotherhood takes over Syria and Egypt and
Tunisia, then we'll go in the same direction.
HASAN: From what I see, we have a major-
ity of youth in the Arab world, in general,
and all of them are quite open-minded,
educated, if not academically, then by the
Internet. I see a backlash not really happen-
ing. We have a majority of youth studying
abroad. Most of them love art, and I can see
a lot of movement in the world of art hap-
pening, and I think they will have a a lot to
say against any backlash.
WPJ: Do you think women will be able to
drive in five years? That seems like a touch-
stone of women's rights there.
HASAN: In Saudi Arabia, the issue of driv-
ing is not a religious issue, it's a cultural
issue. The traffic police system in Saudi
Arabia is extremely bad. It's bad for male
drivers. Did you know that we have the
highest rate of accidents in the world -
HAIFAA: Come on, Hasan, don't use this
excuse.
HASAN: I m explaining. I want women to
drive yesterday. I'm sick and tired of driv-
ing my sister and my mother, but I'm being
logical. What I'm saying is that the system
is bad. Before women will be able to drive,
first let's see a good, strict traffic system.
Then, I will say, "Yes, maybe in five years
or in 10 years." But if women drove now,
with this kind of system, there's going to be
a massacre. I would love to see them drive,
but first I would like to see solid, strict rules
and regulations.
HAIFAA: Women driving is such a po-
larizing issue in Saudi now. But more
women are now driving, so it will happen
regardless of whether the traffic situation
in Saudi changes or not. There will be
backlashes, and women will have to face a
very conservative society. But we will see
more change.
EGG E RS: Maybe we can talk about what
everyone is doing next. Haifaa, are you
working on a new film? Will your next film
be set in Saudi?
HAIFAA: We'll definitely work on another
film in Saudi. Saudi is such an exciting place
to tell stories because it's so interesting, so
complex. It has religion; it has politics.
EGGERS: You have all become impor-
tant ambassadors from Saudi, and you've
all had significant roles in bringing art
from Saudi to the rest of the world. So is
that a good responsibility, something you
take on willingly and that you cherish and
relish, or do you feel a weight of having
to represent the nation to the rest of the
world? Haifaa - would you prefer to di-
rect a murder mystery set in Italy that had
nothing to do with Saudi society, or would
you feel like you were abdicating your re-
sponsibility as an artist from the Kingdom
in a position where you had the attention
of the world?
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SAUDI ARABIA
HAIFAA: As an artist, I would love to do
things in Italy. Why not? If I get an offer
from Hollywood, I'm not going to turn it
down. No way. Of course, Saudi Arabia is the
place where I can produce more. I know the
place. I feel like I belong here. I know how
to tell a story from that place. There are few
people who can do that, so I have a unique
perspective. I don't feel like its a burden. I
feel like its an honor to go and represent the
country and to speak about Saudi. Yeah, it s
conservative, and there are radical ideologies
with very religious people, but beneath that,
there are really nice people. It was nice to
hear about Hasan growing his hair long and
playing guitar. Saudis are fun. Beneath all of
the politics and conservative cover, you'll find
lots of humor. It's a great place to tell a story.
EGGERS: Exactly. When I met Mamdouh,
in Jiddah, he showed me around while I was
in the country. Mamdouh is one of the funni-
est guys I know, and we instantly had a rap-
port, and his sort of looseness and irreverence
surprised me right away. It was one of the rea-
sons we got along so well. We had an unusual
situation where we had planned a couple of
events. I was supposed to go to a dinner and
to go to a reading in Jiddah and talk to local
writers, and then we realized that my flight
wasn't leaving from Jiddah but was leaving
from Riyadh that night. So Mamdouh got
me a ride. We found a guy who would drive
me to Riyadh that day and I got in the car.
We didn't know this guy. You just put me in
some random car.
MAMDOUH: I just told him that this is a
gift of the King.
EGGERS: Here I was thinking my good
friend Mamdouh, of course he'll be put-
ting me in a safe car with somebody that
he knows. But we were desperate, and I
had a six-hour drive, so we had to leave
immediately. Then in about 10 minutes
of driving, this young man was on the
phone, and he looked over at me. While
he was talking to his friend on the phone,
he looked over at me and said to his friend,
"American: BOOM BOOM!" sort of in
this kind of scary way. I didn't know what
he meant. It got me a little nervous. Just
the words "BOOM BOOM" were discon-
certing while I was alone in the car with
him driving at 140 kilometers per hour.
So we got to be friends during that drive,
even though we had a significant language
barrier. By the end, it was just indicative
of perceptions on both sides, and we had to
build trust and understanding during the
drive even through gestures, looks, smiles
at photos I showed him, and the few words
we could exchange.
HASAN: I'm thankful I'm here in Saudi
Arabia because with oppression comes in-
spiration. I mean for me, living and suffer-
ing made me who I am today. For that, I'm
very thankful.
EGGERS: Thank you all so much for being
with us. •
SPRING 2013 85
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Contents
p. 78
p. 79
p. 80
p. 81
p. 82
p. 83
p. 84
p. 85
Issue Table of Contents
World Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (SPRING 2013) pp. 1-123
Front Matter
EDITORS' NOTE: Beyond Borders [pp. 1-2]
UPFRONT
THE BIG QUESTION: Setting Boundaries: HOW SHOULD BORDERS BE DRAWN? [pp. 3-8]
Embracing Diversity [pp. 9-13]
Map Room: BORDERS ON TOP OF THE WORLD [pp. 14-17]
Throwing Down the Gauntlet [pp. 19-21]
ANATOMY: World's Most Isolated Countries [pp. 22-23]
BEYOND BORDERS
Making a State a State [pp. 24-32]
Moving On: Iberia's New Muslims [pp. 33-42]
CONVERSATION
Linking People, Crossing Borders: A CONVERSATION WITH TELECOM PIONEER AND PHILANTHROPIST MO IBRAHIM [pp. 43-48]
PORTFOLIO
Hunger: The Price of Rebellion [pp. 50-61]
FEATURES
Notes from the Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki and the New Islamists [pp. 63-76]
Arabia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow [pp. 78-85]
The Euro Crisis: Mission Accomplished? [pp. 87-94]
Russians Go West [pp. 95-103]
Nearer, My God, to Thee [pp. 105-114]
CODA
Global Libra [pp. 115-123]
Back Matter
SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN QATAR AND SAUDI
ARABIA
Author(s): Birol Baskan and Steven Wright
Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 96-111
Published by: Pluto Journals
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Accessed: 09-10-2019 09:24 UTC
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Studies Quarterly
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SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING
STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN
QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA
Birol Baskan and Steven Wright
Qatar presents an interesting case study on the nature of state-religion relations
as despite being of the same Wahhabi and Hanbali branch as neighboring Saudi
Arabia, there are stark differences in the role of religion at a political level within
the two countries. Indeed, this article argues that at a political level, Qatar has a
secular character more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. The main reason
for such differences will be shown through field research to be the lack of an
indigenous Ulama class within Qatar. The reasons for this are explained through
not only a historical pedigree, which ties in with the role of Britain in the Gulf, but
also through a political economy perspective. Indeed, this research sheds new light
on the importance of a native Ulama class in explaining how and why religion is
promoted by the state and thus has implications for understanding contemporary
religiosity and pressures on governmental decision-making. Yet with evidence of
an emerging Ulama class within Qatar, the article suggests that there is reason to
believe that a more vocal, organized and influential section of society is in the
process of developing capacity to press for a greater role of religion at a political
and societal level.
State and Religion in Qatar and Saudi Arabia
Qatar and Saudi Arabia present a fascinating insight into both how and why
state-religion relations can differ so markedly within the Arabian Gulf. Whilst
both are Wahhabi states, which apply the Hanbali School, the impact this has
had on a political level, and society in general, demonstrates strikingly different
examples of application. This is in spite of them having a great deal in common
on cultural, tribal and linguistic levels. Such commonalities are after all reinforced
through the intermarrying of branches of tribes located in both countries. Yet several
important differences exist: The Qatari State does not have a religious police force
Birol Baskan is Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at the Georgetown University School
of Foreign Service in Qatar. Dr Steven Wright is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at
Qatar University.
arabstudiesquarterly.plutojournals.org
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SEEDS OF CHANGE 97
that scrutinizes and enforces morality in public. In contrast, the Saudi Arabian
mutawwa ' in (religious police) are tasked with making sure that men and women
comply with Islamic dress code, behave morally in public, and close all businesses
during prayer times. These and other examples raise a number of important questions:
Why does such a broad range of differences exist? Why is Qatar apparently "more
liberal" than Saudi Arabia? Why is there then, a marked difference in state-religion
relations within these countries? Are determinants of change identifiable and what
are the implications for the future?
It is true that the manner in which the Saudi state came into being is an explanation
which scholarship on this issue would naturally gravitate to. Personal choices, peer
and/or family pressure, societal expectations and reputational concerns are also valid
factors. Despite the role of the Ulama within Saudi Arabia having been extensively
documented, no such research has been conducted on the situation in Qatar let
alone a comparative study. Therefore in explaining this analytical divide between
Qatar and Saudi Arabia this article focuses on the nature of Qatar's Ulama. The
importance of this group of people is that they should be seen as the force behind the
adoption of Islamic principles within public policy and by society in general. The
reality is that understanding their composition and role in public policy formation
actually gives us an insight into Qatari state-religion relations and consequently
the manner in which Qatar is able to follow its own unique social, political and
economic developmental model.
Through conducting qualitative interviews with a range of Qatari based religious
scholars, it soon becomes clear that an Ulama class comprised of Qatari nationals
has historically not existed and only recently has a latent Qatari class of religious
scholars begun to emerge. Indeed, it is worth recognizing that unlike Saudi Arabia,
families known for producing religious scholars do not exist within Qatar. When
asked who have been the most influential religious scholars within Qatar, a mere
three names would uniformly be provided: firstly, Abd al Allah bin Zeyd bin
Mahmoud; secondly, Abd al Allah al Ansari, and finally Yusuf al Qaradawi. Of
these three, only Yusuf al Qaradawi is alive. It is striking however that none of these
influential Ulama are originally from Qatar. Both Bin Mahmoud and Al Ansari were
actually from Saudi Arabia whilst Al Qaradawi is from Egypt.1 It seems that the
children of these religious scholars did not necessarily follow in the paths of their
prominent fathers, which brings into question the development of a true religious
class as exists in Saudi Arabia.
A second important aspect of Qatar's Ulama concerns the dominance of foreigners
in Qatar's religious education. This is interesting as it underscores a surprisingly
limited role for the Ulama. The Qatari school system departs markedly from the
model followed in Saudi Arabia as religious scholars have no input on textbooks,
curriculum and administration. Unlike the situation in Saudi Arabia, the Qatari
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98 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY
Ministry of Education has the exclusive authority over all state schools. The Ministry
also runs a Religious Institute that opened in 1 96 1 and was actually founded by Yusuf
al Qaradawi. The Religious Institute is different from other state schools only in
that it has four additional courses in religion added to the curriculum. The teachers
are directly employed by the Ministry; and the content of courses and textbooks are
all prepared and monitored by the Ministry. Therefore, this school has a character
comparable with the Imam Hatip Schools in Turkey, which are similarly run by the
Ministry of Education. Qatar's Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations has
no involvement in the preparation of the classes or recruitment of the personnel
teaching religious courses in both normal state schools and the Religious Institute.2
The Religious Institute is the sole example of its kind out of a total of 1 38 schools
within Qatar.3 During the 2008-09 academic year, the school had 257 students out
of just under 50,000 students within Qatar. However, it is interesting that only 24
of those 257 students are native Qataris; the others being international students.4
Given the absence of an established Qatari Ulama class, it is not surprising that
there is such a low enrollment rate by Qatari nationals at the Religious Institute.
Yet it is not only the enrollment statistics which are illuminating, as its teaching
faculty are generally not Qatari nationals. For example, the Director of the Religious
Institute, himself a graduate of the school in 1978, did not recall any Qataris among
the teachers or staff when he was a student. This role of foreign religious scholars
is pertinent as the same pattern can also be observed throughout Qatar's education
system under the Ministry of Education.
A similar picture can also be seen in higher education. There is only one national
university in Qatar in addition to several branches of some prominent American
universities, including Georgetown, Northwestern, Texas A&M, which are part of
the broader Education City under the Qatar Foundation. The national university,
Qatar University, has seven colleges and is the sole provider of higher religious
education under the College of Sharia and Islamic Studies. This college enjoys no
special status or privilege over any other college, which underscores an important
difference with Saudi Arabia. Qatar's model for higher religious education is
actually more similar to that being applied in Turkey or Tunisia during Habib
Bourguiba's rule as independent religious institutions were absorbed by a national
university and granted no special status. For example, under Ataturk, Turkey did not
just abolish the religious seminaries, which had historically provided the backbone
of its Ulama class, but rather converted them into a Faculty of Theology under
Istanbul University. Similarly in Tunisia, members of the historic Al Zaitounia
Institute of Religious Higher Education became faculty members within the
University of Tunis as a part of Bourguiba's broader educational reforms.5 Such
models limit institutional autonomy and influence from which an indigenous Ulama
class may develop.
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SEEDS OF CHANGE 99
In terms of the nationality of religious scholars within the College of Shariah
and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, a similar picture exists to that described
about the Religious Institute. The college was established in 1977, as one of the
four colleges of Qatar University by its first Dean, Yusuf al Qaradawi. A number
of male and female Qataris who graduated from the College of Shariah in the early
1980s have been interviewed and none of them recalled a single Qatari faculty
member; all faculty members were foreigners, mostly Egyptian. In fact, the first
Qatari funded by the state of Qatar to pursue higher religious education abroad
was Amina Muhammad al Jabor, who is now professor of jurisprudence in the
College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University. After graduating from
the College in 1979, she went to Egypt in 1981 and got her Master's in 1984 and
then doctorate in 1987, both from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt.
She then came back to Qatar and became the first Qatari professor in the College of
Shariah and Islamic Studies. Apparently her example set the stage for other Qataris
going abroad for higher religious education. In fact the state of Qatar rented a house
in Egypt to accommodate female students in Egypt.6 As of now, both religious
education institutions in Qatar have since then graduated many Qataris, who are
now employed in a range of government ministries; but few actually pursued higher
education with the aim of becoming a religious scholar.7 Presently, there is thus an
emergent class of religious scholars in Qatar; however, it will take time to develop
a distinct class identity and consciousness.
On a governmental level however, it is interesting that Qatari religious scholars
do not have an institutionalized role in the political decision-making process. There
is no religious office, like the office of Grand Mufti, within the Qatari state system.
The role of the Ulama within Qatar is relegated to one of personal contacts or
informal influence.
By comparison, Saudi Arabia has a religious office to secure religious support
for its policies, which institutionalizes the active involvement of religious scholars
in political decision-making. Up until 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was the
institution via which the Saudi rulers had secured religious justification for their
rules. In 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was replaced by the Board of Senior
Religious Scholars, headed by the Grand Mufti. The Board has since then been
instrumental in securing religious support for governmental policies and has issued
fatwas (religious justification) for policies the Saudi state wanted to pursue. The
absence of a religious office, which formalizes the role of Islamic scholars in
decision-making, is particularly interesting in the case of Qatar as institutionalized
religious offices actually exist in countries generally perceived as "more secular"
than Qatar, such as: Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria.
In terms of the role of the leading religious scholars, an interesting comparative
analysis can be made through looking at: Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz (d. 1 999) and Yusuf
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100 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY
al Qaradawi. Both scholars remain widely respected throughout the Gulf region.
Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz was the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. His influence
came not only from his scholarly achievements, but also from the high positions he
held within the Saudi political system. He became the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia
in 1993, and hence the head of the Board of Senior Religious scholars. This was a
position he would serve in until his death in 1999. By comparison, Egyptian born
Yusuf al Qaradawi 's rise to prominence within Qatar was not through official state
backing.8 The highest public/official position he had held in Qatar was the Dean of
the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, through which he
influenced many Qataris. He also hosts a popular show, Shariah and Life , on the
Al Jazeera television network. He remains widely acknowledged as the leading
religious scholar within Qatar. The career path of Qatar's leading religious scholar
is illuminating as it shows the very limited, if any, role the state has played in
supporting the Ulama and granting them a formal role in policy formation through
an institutional setting.
At this stage, the conclusions that can be drawn from this are that state-religion
relations are fairly limited in scope within Qatar. Indeed, its education system closely
echoes the model followed in Turkey rather than neighboring Saudi Arabia. The
absence of a religious office akin to the Grand Mufti is also telling. Overall it is the
lack of a native Ulama class that has translated into the government being under little
if any organized pressure to give religious scholars a voice in public policymaking.
With the majority of religious scholars in Qatar being non-nationals and ultimately
under visa sponsorship, the state is able to effectively regulate them. A native Ulama
class, which has only just begun to emerge, would understandably have a different
dynamic, but it is worth highlighting that the trend since the late 1 970s has been for
women to constitute the majority Qatari nationals who become religious scholars.
The final analysis shows that in the case of Qatar, the role religion has within society
and government policy, can be largely explained though answering the question
of what are the characteristics, origins and institutional role of religious scholars
within the society. The lessons Qatar teaches us is that the historical reliance on
non-nationals for religious guidance has allowed for a great deal more autonomy on
behalf of the government, and ruling tribe in particular, in regard to state-religion
relations.
Given these observations, the pressing question is why do state-religion
relations differ so markedly between Qatar and the Saudi state ? What is it that led
to the development of religious institutions within Qatar having such a different
character from those of its close neighbor? These questions not only have important
implications for society in general but also feed into questions on the wider debate on
political evolution within the Gulf. The difference can be explained by whether there
exists a historically entrenched class of religious scholars or not. Yet the question
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SEEDS OF CHANGE 101
this raised is why is there only now an emerging Ulama class within Qatar? Given
this, what follows in this article will aim to argue that two main reasons account
for the lack of such a class in Qatar. First, because of her geographically strategic
location, Qatar could not be incorporated into the Saudi- Wahhabi state. Second,
because of her weak economic background, Qatar could not support a class of
religious scholars. In order to prove such arguments, this article will provide an
examination of the historical relationship between Qatar and the Saudi- Wahhabi
state. It will do this by initially outlining the historical context in the birth of the
Wahhabi state before moving on to a specific discussion of the emergence of Qatar.
The Emergence of the Saudi-Wahhabi State
Following the devastating Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, spiritual
Sufi Orders of various types began to command the loyalty of the Muslim masses,
increasingly taking control in regulating and guiding their religious lives. They
became the agent spreading the Islamic message especially in frontier regions, such
as Africa, Central Asia, India and later in the Balkans. Sufi Orders' flexibility to
incorporate religious rituals and beliefs from other religions greatly increased their
appeal to the people, their rituals often involving music and poetry.
There occurred reactions from theologians to the supposedly un-Islamic rituals
and beliefs, whether associated with the Sufis or not, as early as the fourteenth
century, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1 328) and his student, Ibn al Qayyim al Tawziyah (d. 1350),
possibly being the most notorious cases of reaction. However, these reactions did
not change the fortune of Sufi Orders in the Islamic world mostly because state
rulers continued to protect and support them. The earliest example of a state going
against Sufi Orders occurred in a rather unexpected place: Iran. Starting in the
sixteenth century, the Safavids, originally a Sufi Order, set out to destroy all Sufi
Orders from the Iranian landscape in alliance with Shi' a Ulama. In the seventeenth
century, the Kadizadeli movement tried to move the Ottoman state rulers against
the Sufi Orders, but failed in bringing any decisive change in the Ottoman state
policy, which had remained supportive and protective of Sufi Orders more or less
until the end.9
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab personifies probably the most unrelenting
theological reaction to the rituals and beliefs deemed as un-Islamic and religious
innovations, for which he was seen as a strict follower of Ibn Taymiyya.10 He was
born in 1702-03 in Al Uyaynah, a town in the province of Najd in the Arabian
Peninsula, into a family of religious scholars. His grandfather, his father and his
uncle served as religious judges in Najd. He began his religious studies under his
father, and then moved to Medina and Basra to pursue further religious education. It
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102 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY
was probably in Medina where he developed most of his religious views, claiming to
restore "Islam to what it was in the time of the holy Prophet and the great caliphs."11
For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, practices such as visiting tombs and wish trees, venerating
saints and invoking them as intermediaries with God were clearly forbidden in
Islam, the essence of which was the unity of God. The title of his main work, Kitab
al-Tawhid (the book of unity), in fact summarizes his attitude toward these practices.
They constitute associating partners with God, or shirk in Islamic terminology, the
greatest sin one can commit in Islam: "they accord godlike status to created beings
and objects."12
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab went beyond simply criticizing some widespread practices
among the masses. He also attacked the class of religious scholars, the Ulama, on
many grounds. First and foremost, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab questioned the dependence
of ordinary Muslims on the Ulama in understanding the primary sources of Islam,
the Qur'an and the hadith. Every Muslim male and female should have read the
Qur'an and the hadith on his/her own. This call in fact questioned the whole reason
behind the existence of the Ulama in Muslim societies. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab even
questioned the Ulama class's knowledge of the Qur'an and the hadith for they knew
only the previous legal texts and exegesis, not the Qur'an and the hadith. Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab also criticized the Ulama for their corruption and nepotism,13 which had
been complained about by some others in the Ottoman Empire well before Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab: "Virtually every memorialist in the turbulent seventeenth century...
decried the state of the ulama" in the Ottoman Empire.14
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab naturally made sworn enemies, especially among
the Ulama. His views often attracted reactions from the local religious scholars,
including his own uncle, who was reported to have said "He claims... to follow
the Holy Quran and al-Sunna [the example of the Prophet and his companions
accepted by Sunnis] and dares to deduce from their teachings, paying no heed to
any opposition. Anyone who opposes him he calls a heretic, although he possesses
none of the qualifications of the mujtahedeen [those who exercise independent
reasoning]."15 He became an itinerant preacher, in fact being forced to be. For
example, he could not stay in Basra because he was forced to leave the town.
He could not even stay in Al Uyaynah, his hometown. He stopped preaching in
Huraymila, where his father was a religious judge, and had remained silent until the
latter 's death. Once he started preaching in Huraymila, he escaped an assassination
attempt after which he left Huraymila too.
The turning point in the life of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came in 1744, and this is
what made him different from Ibn Taymiyya. He found not only a protector, but
also a strong military ally in the personality of Muhammad ibn al-Saud, a local
ruler of Al Dir'iyah. This alliance was forged strong by an exchange of oath and
a marriage between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's daughter and Ibn al-Saud's son, Abd
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SEEDS OF CHANGE 103
al- Aziz. In Al-Saud, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab found a sword to implement his views
and eradicate rituals and beliefs he deemed un-Islamic. He could preach and train
students according to his own understanding of Islam. In Abd al-Wahhab, Al-Saud
found a religious banner, a powerful one indeed calling for the re-proselytizing of the
whole Arabian Peninsula, under which hitherto fragmented Arab tribes could unite.
As noted, before finally settling down in Al Dir'iyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had
preached in different towns. Hence, his message was not unknown to the inhabitants
and probably he made some converts. These new converts came and joined him in
Al Dir'iyah, adding further manpower to Al-Saud's military strength. In the first
two years of this alliance, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sent out letters inviting local rulers
and religious scholars to accept his vision of Islam. Not all accepted. However,
those who accepted joined the tribal confederation taking shape under Muhammad
ibn al-Saud.
Boosted by new recruits and driven by a religious zeal, Muhammad ibn al- Saud
embarked upon a series of military campaigns against other rulers. Al Uyaynah,
some 30 miles to the north-west of Al-Dir'iyah, became one of the first towns to
fall before Saudi- Wahhabi forces. The growing strength of Al-Saud also attracted
opposition: a coalition of tribes from the Hasa and the Nejd in the 1 750s and another
one from southwestern Arabia in 1765 attacked Al Dir'iyah with serious damages
inflicted on the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance.
In 1765, Muhammad ibn al-Saud died to be succeeded by his son, Abd al- Aziz
al-Saud, who was also the son-in-law of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Military expansion
accelerated under his leadership, Riyadh falling in 1773. By 1790, the Saudi state
consolidated its rule over central Arabia and turned its attention to the east, the oases
of Al Hasa and Qatif falling under Saudi-Wahhabi domination by 1 793 . Neither the
death of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1792 nor three punitive campaigns in the 1790s,
two by the ruler of the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula and another by the
Ottomans, failed to halt Saudi-Wahhabi expansion. The city of Karbala in Iraq
was sacked in 1802, holy shrines of the tomb of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet,
destroyed, thousands of its inhabitants killed. In revenge, a Shi'a killed Abd al- Aziz
in 1 803 in Al Dir'iyah. Saud ibn al-Saud continued his father's expansionist policy.
Mecca was occupied and looted in 1803, shrines and tombs destroyed, inhabitants
refusing to adhere to Wahhabism massacred. Madina fell into the hands of the
Wahhabis in 1804, even the tomb of the Prophet had faced the Wahhabi wrath.
The Ottoman response to the Saudi-Wahhabi threat came in 1811, sending the
semi-autonomous ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, into Arabia in 1 8 1 1 . It took seven
years to eradicate this threat though. In 1818, the son of Muhammad Ali, Ibrahim
Pasha entered Al Dir'iyah, destroyed the city and its fortifications and massacred
hundreds of Wahhabi Ulama. Thus came the end of the Saudi-Wahhabi state,16
"hoped never to rise again - the extraordinary sect of the Wahabees."17
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104 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY
The hope turned out to be too optimistic. The Ottoman-Egyptian blow to the
Saudi-Wahhabi state was fatal indeed. But, the Saudi-Wahhabi project was not
completely over. There were tribes especially from Central Arabia still loyal to the
Saudi-Wahhabi cause, possibly longing for the good days they had enjoyed. In the
rest of the nineteenth century, these tribes supported the Saudi leadership to regain
what was lost. In fact, as early as 1824, Turki bin Abdullah al-Saud captured Riyadh
and made it the capital of the second Saudi-Wahhabi state, re-establishing the Saudi
rule over the Central and Eastern Arabian Peninsula.
However, this time it did not go smoothly. First Muhammad Ali of Egypt and
then the Ottoman Empire re-asserted its rule over the Hejaz. In the Eastern Arabian
Peninsula, the British extended their sphere of influence without formally colonizing
the region. Later the Ottomans made incursions into the Eastern Arabian Peninsula
starting in the 1870s. Qatar, for example, accepted Ottoman sovereignty over the
peninsula in 1872. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire began to support the rival
Rashidis to counterbalance the Saudis. The Rashidis eventually ousted the Saudis
even from Central Arabia, occupying Riyadh in 1891. Abd al-Rahman bin Faisal
al-Saud found refuge in Kuwait, moving his family with him.
In the autumn of 1901, his son, Abd al- Aziz al-Saud, gathered some forty to
sixty men and left Kuwait. After several raids on nomad camps and trade caravans,
he reached the gate of Riyadh, his father's capital, with now close to 400 men in
January of 1902. In a surprising night attack, he killed the Rashidi governor of the
city and re-established the Saudi state. Immediately after this attack, Abd al- Aziz
organized a series of campaigns on small towns surrounding Riyadh, making them
a part of his new state. In 1 906, he captured Qasim, after which the Ottoman Empire
recognized him as the ruler of Qasim and southern Najd. In 1913, he turned to the
east, and captured Hafuf, which was in the hands of the Ottomans. Abd al- Aziz now
became the Abd al-Aziz Pasha of Najd according to the imperial order.
The …
Saudi Arabia's shifting sands
Author(s): Tom Phillips
Source: The World Today, Vol. 70, No. 1 (February & March 2014), pp. 34-35
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
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Saudi Arabia
Saudi
Arabia's
shifting
sands
The certainties that
underpin the Kingdom
need reappraisal,
Tom Phillips argues
What has got into the Saudis? Their
unprecedented decision in October not to
take up their Security Council seat, and
their angst over Western policy towards
Syria and what some in Riyadh perceive as
a mating dance between Washington and
Tehran, have sent a strong signal of unease.
Those worrying about what's going on in
the Kingdom also raise concerns on the
succession front; about the implications
of the changing shape of world energy
markets at a time when Saudi Arabia is
generally estimated to need an oil price of
at least $85 a barrel to sustain its social
and economic programmes and to support
its allies in the region; and whether a
frequently creaky government system
has the capacity to cope with the host of
problems the country is facing from within
and without.
Certainly, from the point of view of a
Saudi policy-maker, the country, the
region and the world look to be increas
ingly complex places.
On the internal front, Saudi Arabia faces
many of the pressures which prompted
Arab Spring uprisings in other parts of the
Middle East, with about half of the popula
tion under 25 and a high rate of youth un
employment, despite a determined 'Sau
dization' policy to encourage employers to
hire local staff rather than expatriates.
In the region, the Saudis used to be able
to rely on several factors that maintained
stability: Egypt as a reliable partner for
'moderation'; Iran's bad behaviour ensur
ing Saudi Arabia remained an indispensa
ble Western ally; and a Western - above all
American - assessment that it had a stake
in their region, even if on occasions it was
a role that they got badly wrong, as in Iraq
in 2003.
The Saudi world view should not be
over-simplified, however.
As Arab uprisings unfurled in Tunisia,
Libya and Egypt, I was struck during dis
cussions with senior Saudis by their recog
nition that what we were seeing represent
ed complex events with many causes and
consequences, much like the French or
Russian revolutions. Saudi policy-makers
warned from the start of the danger that
the winners of the Arab Spring would not
be the liberal youth in Tahrir Square and
elsewhere, but the deeper, darker, better
organized forces in such societies.
Their domestic response has included
social and economic moves easily inter
preted as attempts to buy off pressure
for political change. But Saudi decision
34 | THE WORLD TODAY | FEBRUARY & MARCH 2014
makers also feel that the West has yet to
understand the intricacies of Saudi society,
and that reform will take time.
Some traditional critics of the A1 Saud
inside Saudi Arabia are indeed looking
around their region and asking whether
the ruling family has not got it right with
its cautious steps forward — including the
appointment of women to the Shura
consultative council, and allowing women
to vote and stand in next year's municipal
elections. After all, ballot-box democracy
elsewhere in the region has not proved
the answer to every problem, and would
almost certainly mean a resurgence of
conservative and tribal forces in Saudi
Arabia itself.
Even before the first signs of unrest there
was a palpable sense of insecurity among
Saudis. The 'Shia Crescent' stretching
from Iran to Hizbollah, via Iraq and Syria,
was seen to be extending into new areas,
with the Iranians accused of stirring up
trouble in Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere,
including Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province.
There is much deep history here. But we
would be wrong to ignore the extent to
which the Saudis are feeling encircled and
Saudi
Arabia's
shifting
sands
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Ali alfahal
threatened, as well as their concerns about
whether the West, still under the shadow
of military adventures in Iraq and Afghan
istan, is as firmly committed as it was to
resist that threat.
They worry that Western (France apart)
eagerness to strike a deal with Iran and
avoid another unpopular military interven
tion will result in an agreement that gives
the Iranians more weight in the region —
and more scope for trouble-making. There
is indeed an underlying sense of insecurity
in some Saudi minds about whether the
West might even, as in the days of the
Shah, see Iran as a more natural longer
term partner, given the latter's burgeoning
middle class and electoral habit. The Saudi
voices I hear do not think that what they
see as the current lack of American resolve
is merely a short-term feature of the Oba
ma Presidency: they spot a deeper trend of
Western disengagement from their region,
and ask: 'Where does this leave us?'
When they try to answer that question,
they know that part of the answer has to be
more self-reliance, and greater coordina
tion among the six member states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council on defence.
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in discussions
with John Kerry, the US Secretary of State
They also know that, as regards the GCC,
this will remain work in progress, at least
in the short-term, given the fault-lines be
tween member states.
So, is it time for some fresh thinking by
Saudi Arabia?
Internally, many would argue that, while
there is no sign of immediate threat to
the Kingdom's stability and the A1 Saud's
rule, the government nevertheless needs
to move forward more boldly on the King's
reform programme. IfWestern-style de
mocracy is not the answer, the Saudis need
to come up with a clearer vision about how
their own system of consultation and con
sensus-seeking might evolve to meet the
aspirations of a youthful, globally-aware
population, and to articulate the extent to
which elections will play a part in this.
More needs to be done to modernize the
education system and to create a culture in
which young Saudis prefer to work in the
private sector. The public sector needs re
form and energizing. Thought needs to be
given to the shape of the current social con
tract, and to achieving greater transpar
ency. An element of direct personal taxa
tion would generate a political culture in
which citizens, rather than subjects, feel
they have a right to a certain level of ser
vice. The level of subsidies for domestic oil
is unsustainable. Consideration also needs
to be given to how the balance between
the political and religious establishments
should evolve so young Saudis do not feel
obliged to head to Dubai or Bahrain when
they want to relax.
Externally, it is difficult to avoid the im
pression that Saudi policy is more re-active
than pro-active, however understandable
their worries about Iran and their hesita
tions about President Rouhani and his grip
over the regime's hardliners. Just over 10
years ago, then Crown Prince Abdullah
was the source of what became the Arab
Peace Initiative that set out a vision of how
the people of Israel could expect normal
relations with the countries of the region if
they were ready to make the tough com
promises necessary for peace.
Is it not now time for the Saudis to take
the lead in setting out a positive vision of
how the wider region might look if could
resolve its current problems, and above all
if Iran were to drop its military nuclear am
bitions and play a responsible part in the
maintenance of regional security? This
would not mean the Kingdom dropping
its guard — only taking the lead in defining
a vision for a positive and peaceful future.
The Saudis also need to start talking
to their neighbours about sustainable
development, including climate change,
environmental degradation and resource
shortages, particularly water. The impact
of such factors is well known. In Syria,
for example, some assess that a climate
change-induced drought from 2006-10
prompted hundreds of thousands of Syrian
farmers to flee to the cities and towns, add
ing to the pressures behind the disturbanc
es there. The Saudis are well placed to take
the lead in focusing the world's attention
on the need for action.
One intriguing feature of current Saudi
society is the sense that the debate on all
these issues is at last underway, in a more
open manner than ever before. It is impor
tant for the Kingdom and the region that it
comes up with the right answers.
Sir Tom Phillips, British Ambassador
to Saudi Arabia 2010-12, is an Associate
Fellow at the Chatham House Middle
East and North Africa Programme
THE WORLD TODAY | FEBRUARY & MARCH 2014 | 35
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in discussions
with John Kerry, the US Secretary of State
Sir Tom Phillips,
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Contents
p. 34
p. 35
Issue Table of Contents
The World Today, Vol. 70, No. 1 (February & March 2014) pp. 1-50
Front Matter
From the editor [pp. 3-3]
Contributors [pp. 4-4]
Notebook
Creative righting of wrongs [pp. 5-5]
The world in brief [pp. 6-9]
Letters
Transparency in the Holy See [pp. 8-8]
Paying by visa [pp. 10-10]
The rage for change [pp. 11-11]
Africa resources
An extra strong MINT [pp. 12-18]
The big country [pp. 18-19]
Accounting for net losses [pp. 20-22]
Mangos are the future [pp. 22-24]
A relative advantage [pp. 25-25]
Interview
José Manuel Ramos-Horta [pp. 26-28]
Date with history
Politics and a French affair [pp. 29-29]
UK foreign policy
Vote that ties Britain's hands [pp. 30-33]
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's shifting sands [pp. 34-35]
Syria
The Syrian people have lost their voice [pp. 36-39]
'A helicopter came and dumped a barrel of TNT on to a building' [pp. 40-41]
Postcard from...
The good life in Kleitoria [pp. 42-42]
Review
Misinforming the masses [pp. 44-45]
Strategic rethinking [pp. 46-47]
Reading List: Mexico [pp. 47-47]
Wild cat strikes [pp. 48-49]
10 minutes with
Anas Aremeyaw Anas [pp. 50-50]
Back Matter
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