Hi, I'm writing a paper on the culture of Saudi Arabia with a focus on the woman rights there. - Management
Hi, I'm writing a paper on the culture of Saudi Arabia with a focus on the woman rights there. I would like you to please start the paper with a brief introduction to the history of Saudi Arabia. Then write a few sentences on the definition of culture. After that, write about woman's rights and equality in Saudi Arabia in the past and mention the significant changes happening in the present. I'm attaching a first draft and a table of contents to help you start the paper and please follow the professor's notes I'm attaching some helpful sources. Please don't forget to cite the information you take for the sources with the exact number of the pages for more hopeful sources you can type in Women’s equality in Saudi Arabia on the google books search engine. Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia Author(s): Eleanor A. Doumato Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992), pp. 31-47 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/195431 Accessed: 10-10-2019 05:03 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms GENDER, MONARCHY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SAUDI ARABIA Eleanor A. Doumato The heading on a broadside posted in public places in Riyadh read, 'here are the names of the sluts who advocate vice and corruption on the earth'. The broadside had been circulated by the mutawwi'in, the morals policemen of Saudi Arabia, in the wake of the women's driving demonstration of 6 November 1990. Listed under the heading were the names and ages of 49 women from well-known families, and prominently displayed at the top were the names of five women with the title 'doctor'.1 It was an inauspicious end to a demonstration which had begun at a time of optimism among westward-looking circles in Saudi Arabia. In August, King Fahd had invited American forces to defend the Kingdom after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and American women military personnel were becoming a highly visible-though controversial-presence in the Kingdom. In September, the King had issued an edict calling for government agencies to train women volunteers to work in civil defence and medical services. The response was one of elation by women who hoped it would be the beginning of a much larger role for women in the work force. Those who participated included not only the western-educated, but also women of the royal family, who organized and attended training sessions at Riyadh hospitals. By early October, hundreds of women in every section of the country were volunteering for these sessions, even in the arch-conservative town of Buraidah, the site of rioting 30 years ago when the first elementary school for girls opened. The King's alignment with the United States and his bold initiative for women's civil defence work appeared to hold out the possibility of a decline in religious-conservative influence and the further opening of Saudi society to the West. Nowhere was this optimism more acutely felt than among the Kingdom's western-educated women. The driving demonstration's organizers were in fact encouraged by the King's apparent commitment to increasing women's participation in public life. A letter requesting permission for women to drive, reportedly sent to the Mayor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, on the day the driving demonstration took place, began by praising the King's edict: 'Opening the door to the Saudi woman to volunteer to serve her country was an act of great generosity by the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines, and demonstrates his deep belief that women are an important asset to this country.' The letter appealed to the Prince 'in the name of every ambitious Saudi woman eager to serve her country under the leadership of the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines and his wise government to open your paternal heart to us and to look sympathetically on our humane demand, to drive in Riyadh.'2 1. Broadside headed 'The Names of the sluts who advocate vice and corruption on the earth', translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated. 2. 'Letter addressed to Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Prince of Riyadh,' translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated. 31 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms A sympathetic hearing is not what the women received. The demonstration was stopped by mutawwi'Tn, who were angered that the women refused to acknowledge their jurisdiction and insisted on being taken to police headquarters instead.3 The Interior Ministry, headed by Prince Naif, came down firmly on the side of the religious police, and made the previously unofficial ban on women's driving official. The Ministry also issued a ban on all political activity by women in the future. The state-funded Directorate of Islamic Research, Ruling, Propaganda and Guidance, headed by Shaykh 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Baz, sanctioned the ministry's ruling by issuing a fatwa which stated that 'women should not be allowed to drive motor vehicles, as the SharV'a instructs that the things that degrade or harm the dignity of women must be prevented.'4 Those who participated in the demonstration, and the husbands of those who participated, were punished by having their passports confiscated and those employed as teachers were suspended from their jobs. Some were subsequently harassed by phone callers accusing the women of sexual immorality and of being agents for Western vices. Moreover, the demonstration became an occasion to inject fresh vigour into the image projected in the public media of ideal Islamic womanhood as secluded wife and mother: in December, while the American military build-up was at its height, the state-funded media turned the demonstration into a moral object lesson for children, when a television programme featured a group of little girls singing a song with the words, 'I am a Saudi woman and I do not drive a car.' The question of women's right to drive was not a new issue, but one which had been publicly addressed many times in the past, through newspaper articles, meetings at women's clubs, and private overtures to government officials. With the preparations for war consuming public attention, the King committed to women's participation in the war effort, and sympathetic listeners within the royal family, the participants had reason to feel that the time was at hand to press for the right to drive. Why then was the government's response so focused on reaffirming traditional attitudes about women's roles? Why did the government respond to a convoy of women drivers as if the act were revolutionary? The reason is that the demonstration brought to the surface the underlying tension in Saudi Arabia between those who want a more liberal, evolutionary Islam and those who want to retain the literal Islam of the country's WahhabT heritage. Traditional roles for women have become a symbol of that heritage, and have been co-opted by the monarchy as an emblem of its own Islamic character. The demonstration, in making a public appeal to alter Saudi Arabia's unique Islamic character, in effect represented a challenge to the stability of the monarchy. This paper discusses the construction of gender ideology in the political culture of Saudi Arabia. It looks at the way gender constructions play into 3. 'From a report by a Mutawwi',' translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated. 4. Arab News, 14 November 1990. 32 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms myths of national identity which underpin the monarchy, and at the way these constructions become a useful instrument of state policy and of state security. Gender Ideology: the Ideal Islamic Woman Gender ideology promoted within the political culture of Saudi Arabia constructs an ideal type, one which may be called the 'ideal Islamic woman'. It is an ideology that has been expressed in official government statements, state policy decisions, and religious opinions issued by the state-supported 'ulama' since the late 1950s, when women's roles first became a focus of contention over the question of public education for girls. The idealized woman is a wife and mother. Her place is within the family, 'the basic unit of society', and men are her protectors. Women who remain at home are the educators of children and the reproducers of traditional values. As the mother of future generations, the idealized woman is in effect the partner of the Saudi state, which is dedicated to protecting the family and guarding 'traditional values' and 'Islamic morality'. The official version of the ideal woman tends to elevate the public separation of women from men as the hallmark of Islamic society. It defines the particular Muslim society of Saudi Arabia as something distinct from and morally superior to the West, as well as being superior to other Muslim countries where women are less rigidly separated. The ideal woman, therefore, stands among other symbols which define a national identity that is uniquely Saudi Arabian. Within the Kingdom, this ideology emanates not only from religious scholars and conservative writers, but is nurtured within state agencies and incorporated into public policy, sometimes with the explicit objective of correlating Saudi rule with the preservation of Islamic morality. For example, when a newspaper article published in 'Ukaz criticized men in general for considering themselves the guardians of women, the state-funded Department of Religious Guidance responded by issuing a fatwa citing the Quranic verse, 'Men are guardians of women by what God has favoured some over the other and by what they spend of their money', and stated that the author of the letter and the publisher of the newspaper should be punished for suggesting otherwise. The fatwd also explicitly credited the Saudi rulers for upholding what it viewed as the Islamic moral value of protecting women within the family under the guardianship of men: 'Our government, thank God, is known for its deference to the Shariah law and its enforcement of it on its subjects and this is part of God's favor on it and the reason for its survival, glory, and God's siding with it. May God stay it on the right path, reform its men, and help it to protect His religion, His Book, and the Sunnah of His Prophet from the mockery of the mockers, the atheism of the atheists and the scorning of criminals.'5 5. Al-Da'wa, 603 (19/6/1397 A.H. (1977)), quoted from Hamad Muhammad al-Baadi, 'Social change, Education and the Roles of Women in Arabia', unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1982, pp. 133-134. 33 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The language used to construct the 'ideal Islamic woman' is very similar to 'fundamentalist' or 'Islamist' language employed by the Muslim Brotherhood6 and others in Egypt,7 Hamas in Gaza,8 the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria,9 and by the ideologues of the Islamic revolution in Iran.10 In Saudi Arabia, however, the relationship between the ideology of the ideal woman and the reality of women's lives is closer than in most other places where Islamist opinion attracts a following. In fact, in Saudi Arabia, values of sex- segregation outside the private home remain practised to a degree that is unknown in most of the Muslim world. The reason is two-fold. First, Saudi Arabia's social fabric was not disturbed by a colonial experience: western influence is of a very recent date and has arrived, to some degree selectively, by the Saudis' own choosing. Second, social conventions and religiously based attitudes supporting sex-segregation, female domesticity and dependence on men have been incorporated into public policy. These policies are well known, and thus only a few examples are cited here. Shar'a laws of personal status remain unmodified and are enforced through the courts: men retain prerogatives in marriage, divorce, and child custody, and also in the practice of polygyny, which has been modified in some Muslim countries and outlawed in at least one. Women are not allowed to travel without the permission of a mahram, a male guardian, a policy which is enforced by the state at airline check-in counters, railway stations, and hotels, where women travelling alone may not register for a room. Further, women may not receive a commercial license unless a male manager has been hired, and certain courses, such as engineering, are not open to female university students because employment in engineering is viewed as incompatible with sex-segregation practices. The ideology of the ideal Islamic woman is reiterated in royal edicts, policy statements and official regulations. In the Saudi labour law, for example, the state recognizes its responsibility to protect the family according to Islamic values, and women and children are cited together as individuals in special need of government protection. Sex-segregation ('in no case may men and women co-mingle in the place of work') is stated as the fundamental requirement of women's being allowed to work in order to assure this 6. Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, 'An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-Ghazali', in Elizabeth Fernea, ed., Women and the Family in the Middle East. New Voices of Change (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1985), pp.231-254. 7. A discussion of this literature may be seen in Yvonne Haddad, 'Traditional Affirmations Concerning the Role of Women as Found in Contemporary Arab Islamic Literature', in Women in Contemporary Muslim Societies, Jane Smith ed. (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 1980), pp.61-86; see also Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, 'Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women in Contemporary Egypt' International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19/1 (February, 1987), pp.23- 50. 8. Rema Hammami, 'Women, Hijab, and the Intifada', Middle East Report 164/165 (May-August 1990), pp.24-28; 'Gaza Journal: The Veiled Look, It's Enforced with a Vengeance', New York Times, 22 August 1991. 9. 'Divided House: Algeria Conflict Pits Father Against Son', Wall Street Journal, 23 January 1992. 10. William Darrow, 'Women's Place and the Place of Women in the Iranian Revolution', in Yvonne Haddad and Ellison Banks Findly, eds., Women, Religion and Social Change (State University of New York Press, 1985), pp.307-319. 34 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms protection. 1 Consequently, women are excluded from working in shops or in offices where men are present, including most of the Ministries, the very place where women in neighbouring countries, such as Kuwait, have most readily found employment. The ideology of the ideal women is also inscribed on the cornerstone of the official girls' education policy of the Kingdom: 'The purpose of educating a girl is to bring her up in a proper Islamic way so as to perform her duty in life, be an ideal and successful housewife and a good mother, prepared to do things which suit her nature, like teaching, nursing and giving medical treatment.'12 The same policy, which prescribes sex-segregation at all levels of education, also justifies the closing of certain university courses to women, such as engineering, geology and meteorology, which might lead to employment in male-dominated fields. However pervasive this ideology, it does not define policy. It is rather the idiom through which policies regarding women's issues are articulated. Sometimes the idiom is used to initiate what are for Saudi Arabia quite liberal policies. For example, the leaders of the women's driving demonstration employed the Islamist idiom in their petition for the right to drive: 'Since we have noted your highness' spirit of understanding of the demands of this age and of the working women's creative efforts which are undertaken in the light of the teachings of our Islamic religion, we appeal to you ...'13 King Fahd's September 1990 edict on women's volunteer work is another case in point. The language of the edict promised that the volunteer programme would be carried out 'within the context of fully preserving Islamic and social values',14 even though the rigid sex-segregation practised in Saudi Arabia is incompatible with women's work for civil defence. Incorporating Islamist language into the edict, however, cushioned its impact sufficiently to preempt criticism of the sort that would have nullified the edict's intent. Had the edict been implemented at a less politically stressful time, it might have become the cornerstone of a new area of employment for women. In effect, the volunteer work edict might have brought about radical change for women in the same way that instituting women's education did thirty years ago. The official girls' education policy cited above clearly limits education to what is compatible with marriage and motherhood, but even so, this policy, regularly reiterated, has been the means by which secular education for girls has been able to grow into a nation-wide system of secondary schools, eleven women's colleges, and five universities which accept female students. When it was written in 1968, secular education for girls was still a revolutionary idea, one which had been met in the early 1960s with considerable hostility from those who saw secular education as incompatible with traditional Islamic morality. It was the Islamist idiom, the assurance that education for girls would be carried out in a sex-separated environment and only for the purpose 11. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Labor Regulations, 'Employment of Juveniles and Women', Chapter X, section I, Article 160. 12. 'The Philosophy of Education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', in Dr. Abdulla Mohamed Al Zaid, Education in Saudi Arabia (Jeddah, Tihama Publications, 1981), p.56. 13. 'Letter addressed to Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Prince of Riyadh', translated from Arabic to English, in possession of author, unpublished, undated. 14. Arab News, 5 September 1990. 35 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms of making girls into better wives and mothers, which opened the door for education to go forward. By the same token, the Saudi labour law limits the kinds of places where women may work by mandating sex-segregation, but at the same time these labour restrictions open up a legitimate space for women in the workplace. For example, women were not supposed to work in banks, and out of propriety, could not comfortably patronize one, but the rubric of Islamic morality justified the opening of banks operated by and for women, which have come into being under government auspices without significant opposition. Similarly, the separation and 'protection' of women clauses in the labour law have provided the rationale for securing very progressive policies for the benefit of women who do work. Women employees, for example, are entitled to a ten-week maternity leave, in some cases with full pay, and daily time off for nursing an infant when they return to work. Women employees are also entitled to employer-paid medical coverage and cannot be fired during illness or pregnancy leave. Official assurances of sex-segregation in the workplace, furthermore, make it possible for many women professionals to work unfettered by morals police in journalism, computers, utility companies, some ministries and especially in health care where contact with men is unavoidable. The idiom of the ideal woman is deployed not only for issues relating to women. In order to defuse concerns about the harm imported western culture may bring to Saudi society, nearly all development projects which require the importation of foreign labour have been prefaced by the Saudis' promise that such projects will be carried out within margins of Islamic values, values which are symbolized most commonly by the separation of women. The ideology of the ideal Islamic woman has thus been a useful instrument in securing both progressive and restrictive policies. The idealization of women's domesticity and the elevation of female separation to an Islamic imperative has remained consistent on the level of official policy in Saudi Arabia because idealized definitions of gender are intimately connected to the ideologies which legitimate the monarchy. The Legitimation of the Monarchy: Religion and Tribal Authority As a political entity, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a collection of families and diverse ethnic and religious groups which were united through conquest by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud during the first quarter of the century. In order to establish the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy among its newly incorporated constituencies, the ruling family did not attempt to undo these identities, but tried to create overarching loyalties based on a common social and religious community in which membership has its privileges, placing themselves as the locus of these loyalties. These loyalties are grounded in myths of identity which translate, with varying degrees of success, into perceptions of Al Sa'iud leadership as legitimate leadership to the present day. The first myth is that the Kingdom is a cohesive national entity fused by a common loyalty to Islam as shaped by the WahhabT tradition, and that the Al Sa'ud family are qualified-and uniquely 36 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms so-to defend Islam and to ensure the moral well-being of the Muslim community. The second is that the Saudi Arabian state is an extension of the tribal family. Islam and Al Sa 'ud leadership The father of King Fahd, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, inherited from his eighteenth-century forebears a political and religious ideology which he used to legitimate his own rule and the expansion of his rule across the peninsula. This ideology grew out of the teachings of the eighteenth-century scholar Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, whose philosophy effectually converted political loyalty into a religious obligation. According to Ibn 'Abd al- Wahhab's teachings, a Muslim must have presented a bay'a, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime in order to be redeemed after his death,15 while the ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God. 6 According to his teachings, the whole purpose of the Muslim community is to become the living embodiment of God's laws: the responsibility of the legitimate ruler is to ensure that the people know what are God's laws, and live in conformity with them. In theory, to the WahhabTs of Najd, living according to God's laws means following the Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet in all one's daily affairs, adhering only to the interpretations of the early jurists of the first three centuries of Islam and avoiding later interpretative readings. This has shaped the WahhabT attitude about women's roles in two ways: first, the WahhabT 'ulamd' reject the kind of reformist interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith which have been essential to bringing about changes in dress, education, sex- segregation practices and Islamic personal status laws in other places; second, sex-segregation, face-covering, and patriarchal control, which are substantiated not so much in the literal word of the Qur'an and Hadith as in local interpretations of religious doctrine and local established practices, are continuously being re-inscribed back into society through religious decree and state-supported policies as an essential component of leadership in the community living in conformity with God's laws. WahhabT doctrines have been promoted by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and his descendants in the process of promoting religion as the glue which would hold the Saudi kingdom together. 'Abd al-'Aziz, for example, subsidized Qur'an memorization classes and sent missionaries to all the villages and towns. The Qur'an was to be the constitution of the Kingdom. Universal male participation in public prayer five times a day in the mosque was enforced, with women encouraged to participate on holidays, and in some areas, on Fridays. When public education for boys was instituted in 1953 and for girls in 15. Al-Baadi, p.30. 16. Obedience to the Muslim ruler is emphasized in literature produced by the Department of Religious Guidance. 'Muslims should acknowledge to their ruler the rights of authority. They are not allowed to disobey their rulers or leaders except in one case, when the ruler orders them to commit a sin or an action contrary to the commandments of Allah'. Abdul Rahman bin Hammad Al Omar, Islam, the Religion of Truth (Riyadh, 1401), p.45. 37 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1960, religious education became mandatory, constituting to this day the largest block of school hours in the elementary curriculum. Ibn Sa'ud's campaign to evangelize Bedouin as a means of encouraging them to settle on the land also became a medium for re-inscribing WahhabT attitudes about women's roles. Beginning in 1912, Ibn Sa'ud subsidized agricultural communities known as hijra, meaning 'the move from the land of polytheism to the land of Islam',17 where newly settled Bedouin would apply Islamic law and Sunna to daily life. In these settlements some of the most rigid sex-separation practices were instituted in the name of religion, practices which have been observed among descendants of hijra settlers in the present day, such as forbidding women to enter the public market place, or to speak when attempting to get a merchant's attention. 8 During his lifetime, Ibn Sa'ud also revived religious institutions which would symbolize the continuing partnership of his regime with the scholars of religion: these were a body of state-funded 'ulama', and the Society for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, whose task is to enforce compliance with Islamic law and practice as interpreted by the 'ulamd'. These institutions have an interest in maintaining WahhabT interpretations of Islamic rulings about women, and they have been in fact on the front-line of shaping the ideology for the ideal Islamic woman. The Directorate of Islamic Research, Ruling, Propaganda and Guidance is the definitive guide in religious matters, and issues fatwds (religious opinions) about social and political issues, including correct public behaviour such as personal dress and deportment. The Directorate also offers opinions on issues submitted for religious approval by the King,19 and at times, in effect, the 'ulama' provide Islamic sanction for policy decisions already taken by the government. Another body of state-funded 'ulamd', the General Presidency for Girls' Education, is the designated overseer for the programmes and policies of girls' public education. The function of the mutawwi'Tn, the patrolmen of the morality society, is to demonstrate the government's readiness to enforce standards of behaviour approved by the 'ulamd'. In the past, the mutawwi'n have been responsible for supervising the closing of shops at prayer time and the attendance of men in the mosque for prayers, and for preventing infractions of public morality such as playing music, smoking, drinking alcohol, men and women mingling in public places, and immodest dress for both men and women. In the 1920s, these mutawwi'Tn obtained extraordinary powers of enforcement ranging from personal embarrassment to trial, imprisonment and corporal punishment. Since then, however, the power of the mutawwi'Tn has declined. In 1976 the Director of the Society was assigned ministerial status, and the Society now exists as one of a number of independent departments in the state administration which report directly to the King.20 The jurisdiction of the mutawwi'Tn is usually limited to overseeing the 17. John Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of 'slam (Leiden, Brill, 1978), p. 17. 18. Ibid., pp.54-55. 19. al-Yassini, p.71. 20. Ibid., p.67. 38 This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Thu, 10 Oct 2019 05:03:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms closing of shops at prayer time, public decorum, and proper dress, especially for women. The mutawwi'n have often worked alone on their patrols, and have been drawn from among the least educated. Without the … Arabia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow Author(s): DAVE EGGERS, MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY, HASAN HATRASH and HAIFAA AL- MANSOUR Source: World Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (SPRING 2013), pp. 78-85 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43290398 Accessed: 09-10-2019 06:30 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Policy Journal This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms ^ ROUND TA BLE Arabia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow AUTHOR DAVE EGGERS SPEAKS WITH PRODUCER MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY, JOURNALIST HASAN HATRASH,AND DIRECTOR HAIFA A AL-MANSOUR DAVE EGGERS MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY HASAN HATRASH HAIFAA AL-MANSOUR Last Hologram Dave year, Eggers the for San the published King Francisco-based , a vision his book, of author Saudi A Dave Eggers published his book, A Hologram for the King , a vision of Saudi Arabia where the Western world of holograms and the Internet comes up against the hard re- alities of today s Saudi Arabia. Eggers, whose novel was nominated for a National Book Award, spent weeks in the Kingdom research- ing, meeting an extraordinary Saudi film- maker whose first feature, Wadjda , premiered at the Venice Film Festival to considerable acclaim, and two Saudis who inspired key characters. World Policy Journal assembled Haifaa al-Mansour, Saudi Arabia's first fe- male film director; Mamdouh al-Harthy, a brilliant journalist and documentary producer, cast in Hologram as a driver who leads the narrator into the depths of the Saudi mind and spirit; and Hasan Hatrash, journalist, filmmaker, and musician, with a similar role in the novel, who in real life produced the Portfolio in the Winter 2012- 78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SAUDI ARABIA 2013 issue of World Policy Journal. Eggers served as the moderator for this 90-minute roundtable discussion on art, freedom, and politics in Saudi Arabia and the post- Arab Spring Middle East. DAVE EGGERS: We thought it would be most interesting to talk about issues of cul- ture and the state of the youth in Saudi Ara- bia. To start off, we can see where you think the situation is for artists in Saudi Arabia now versus 10 years ago. Haifaa, having made your first feature film there, then making the rounds with your films depict- ing Saudi Arabia in a very honest, unflinch- ing light, you had the cooperation - or at least the blessing or lack of interference - from the government. So now you're able to export your film, which has a warts-and-all depiction of the Kingdom. Let me have you take it from there. HAIFAA AL-MANSOUR: Of course, Sau- di Arabia opened up tremendously com- pared to 10 years ago. For me, as a wom- an, I can walk in the mall. Before, I used to be really reluctant to go to the mall if I wasn't completely veiled. I would always take care, if there is something showing, otherwise the police would come. But now I feel a lot more at ease going out. The changes in Saudi enabled me to shoot the film in Saudi Arabia. There is more acceptance for a woman doing something different, and there is a lot of official sup- port. We've seen two Saudi girls going to the Olympics. Changes are still slow, maybe not as fast as we wish. Women in Saudi are still not allowed to drive, and there's the issue of guardianship, like a woman can't open a business without having male supervision. But, still, Saudi Arabia has changed a lot. I feel there is room for women to assert themselves. There is room for women to push bound- aries, but they have to trust themselves. EGGERS: Hasan, I chose 10 years as a very arbitrary marker, but you may have an alternate one in terms of looser restric- tions on artists. I know you - as a musi- cian, a filmmaker, and you've worked in television, and you write - I wonder if you might give us your perspective. I know that when we met three and a half years ago you had just worked on a documentary that was broadcast in Saudi Arabia and was somewhat controversial. I don't know if things have changed. HASAN HATRASH: First of all, there's been a significant awareness and open- ness to art in general. Keep in mind that Saudi Arabia is basically an Islamic-ruled country. And in this country, the problem is that culture and religion mix - a dan- gerous concoction that created a society of religious non-believers, so to speak. You can see people acting in a religious fash- ion, but inside they are not really acting religious in the sense of humanity. Certainly the Internet and satellite TV have played a massive role. Ten years ago, if someone knew I played the guitar, it would 've been a heretical move for me. I would've been prosecuted. I would've been jailed. Now I can go and sit by the beach and play my guitar, and no one even looks at me. Second of all, cameras and videos. The Internet and satellite TV gave people submerged in their religion and culture the eyes to see that it is okay to see a camera. Now I can go out easily playing the guitar or shooting a documen- tary. I shot two or three documentaries in the last two years, which I didn't have any problem with - versus seven or eight years ago when I would've probably been jailed. SPRING 2013 79 This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms ROUNDTABLE NOW SAUDI IS PART OF A GLOBAL MOVEMENT. WE HAVE INTERNET; WE HAVE YOUNG PEOPLE. IT WON'T BE EASY TO CONTAIN. EGGERS: Have there been any policy movements toward openness of the arts and filmmaking, or has it been more of an un- derstood evolution? HASAN: It is mostly an urban, social move- ment. There is noth- ing on paper, except four or five years ago when the King is- sued a decree allowing people to use cameras to have the liberty to shoot anywhere in the Kingdom - except, of course, on military bases. So that was the seed that pushed the youth toward video cameras and other art forms - graffiti, hip- hop, rapping, playing music. EGGERS: Let s back up and talk about the advent of widespread Internet access. When did that happen, and what effect has it had? MAMDOUH AL-HARTHY: Of course, after September 11, the whole world changed. The great impact, I believe, was seen in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. In the U.S., in terms of politics, in Saudi Arabia, in terms of openness. Before that, in Islam, they used to say taking pictures is haram [forbidden], listening to music is haram. After Septem- ber 11, things changed, people became more open, and now, they are even more open thanks to the Internet and the new social media. I remember when we used to go film in the streets, the religious police would ask, "What are you doing?" and "What for?" They would do an investigation about this filming. The Internet definitely made a huge change. Everybody can now make their own show on YouTube or other websites. EGGERS: Can you explain the connection between this openness and 9/11? MAMDOUH: The government is more aware that we live in a restricted society, that we are not living a healthy life in terms of culture, or the way we think, or even the religion that is suffocating people. They are aware now that they should let the people breathe. Let's stay away from extremism and radicalism. Lets open the society slowly, gradually, and yeah, it works for us, as artists. We are benefiting from this. WORLD POLICY JOURNAL: I would like to look broadly beyond Saudi Arabia in the region. Where do you see Saudi Arabia in terms of these kinds of freedoms compared with neighboring countries, especially those that have gone through the Arab Spring? MAMDOUH: I believe that the Arab Spring did not affect Saudi Arabia. But I believe - I heartily, strongly believe - that change is coming. When do I expect it? Five years, or, maximum, 10 years. The change will come. EGGERS: In what form? MAMDOUH: In all forms. Its a wave, a huge wave that will change Saudi Arabia. HASAN: Exactly. What is happening in Saudi Arabia right now is exactly what happened in the U.S. in the 1950s. We are facing the same cultural and social change. Now, women are rebelling, youth are re- belling, and I can see, in the course of time, taking us to the 60s and 70s - where the U.S. used to be. Okay, it shows that we are about 40 years backward from where you are now, but it shows that we are taking the same steps. Its only a matter of time. 80 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Ali alfahal SAUDI ARABIA WPJ: As Dave suggests in his book, it is really in a Saudi manner that these changes are happening, right? HASAN: It s not a Saudi-tailored change. Its a global change. We're just part of it. We're going with the flow. Luckily, 60 percent of our society is below 25 years of age, with nearly half of them studying abroad right now. So imagine, all of this collected youth coming back five to 10 years from now. It's going to be a different Saudi Arabia. EGGERS: That was one of my main ques- tions, and we talked about it when we all met in Saudi, and that is the effect of the nationwide brain drain from the well-edu- cated youth who find that there are limited opportunities in the Kingdom. They choose to study and stay abroad. Is that changing now? Are you finding more young people returning and choosing to start careers there, or do you find that it is still a sig- nificant problem, where people find more opportunities elsewhere so you lose some of the young's best and brightest? Haifaa, maybe you would like to answer. HAIFAA: I think a lot of Saudis go back home, because Saudi is very tribal. People have very strong ties to their homes, their tribe. And honestly, Saudis have a lot of opportunities for young people too. There are more opportunities for them to have a better career in Saudi. But regarding what you said about the freedom and evolution around Saudi Arabia, I think, compared to the neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia has the least censorship. Like when I tried to apply for funding for my film, I was re- jected by lots of sources, because they were very reluctant to support a film of that kind. Even if you notice in the press, we have lots of writers who try to push the boundaries. We are not an Egypt. We are going in the right direction. By contrast, the fundamentalism in Egypt and Tunisia, for example, is taking the country back- ward, while we still are moving forward. Here, more freedoms are opening up. They are trying to stabilize the country by giv- ing opportunities for young people so it has affected the country. Maybe people are not revolting, but the country is trying to make sure that things are taken care of - and that is really for our benefit. EGGERS: How much of this openness has to do with King Abdullah? He is getting on in years. If he were no longer with us, would there be a regression, or do you think this is a movement with no turning back? MAMDOUH: It is really hard to project, because we don't know how the system will go in Saudi. But it is very hard to control. Now Saudi is part of a global movement. We have Internet; we have young people. It won't be easy to contain and close the society as in the 90s or the 80s. Saudi Arabia is moving toward re- form and opening up, because it is the natural course now. It would be really hard to fight that. HASAN: You cannot predict what will hap- pen in the future, but you can look around in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Syria. The Mus- lim Brotherhood are taking over, plus the Salafis. So, if those guys succeed in their countries, if we join the Brotherhood and the Salafis, the country will return to the 80s again and just be as closed up as pos- sible. The other scenario is the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. Then, we will witness a great openness and more liberation from within. Those are the two scenarios. SPRING 2013 81 This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms ROUNDTABLE MAMDOUH: Take into consideration that when we talk about openness in Saudi Ara- bia, we always portray Saudi Arabia as Jid- dah, Riyadh, and Dammam. They are the only three big, open cities, and they repre- sent not more than 1 5 percent of Saudi Ara- bia, which has a large number of illiterates. We in Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam are the minority. EGGERS: Mamdouh and I met when he was helping me go to the King Abdullah Economic City, and one day we tried to go to the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, and we were not allowed in there without it being agreed upon. But we talked a lot then about these experiments in the university where men and women were mixed more freely and shared classrooms. I was attributing this policy to King Abdul- lah's experiments in having more freedoms and openness in these experimental mini- cities outside of Jiddah, so that you can ease your way and experiment with these kinds of progressive policies outside of the city centers. Do you think this is an important aspect of progress, and do you think it will ' continue? Some were suggesting that there will be quicker progress away from Jiddah, away from other cities. This is where these sorts of incremental movements toward more openness and rights for women will be enacted. Is that your sense of it, Haifaa, or do you think that - now that things are moving quicker generally - that these ex- periments are still necessary? HAIFAA: I come from a very small city, and my father comes from the most conserva- tive place on earth. But now I see it is open- ing up. I see it in my own family. My fam- ily is very Saudi, traditional to the core, and I see them changing. My brother sent his daughter to study in America and that is considered a revolution in their house. They are small town people, yet they are opening up to the world. They are trying to find opportunities for them. They are not rich, because jobs are not as accessible for those small towns. They want to have a better life, so they are more and more tolerant. They are more relaxed. We must provide an alterna- tive voice to what is happening, because the mosques are dominated by individuals who are always telling people to be conservative. We need to have alternative places where people can say different things. It is very important to provoke, to bring debate, and to make people think and reconsider. So it s very important to have those places. MAMDOUH: The new economic cities are there to bring change. There's a high rate of unemployment in Saudi Arabia for a lot of youth, so those cities are supposed to take those young Saudis, train them, and try and find them jobs. The economic cities are made to bring cultural change and to take on the employment problem in Saudi Arabia. Throughout history, if you want to v bring about change, either in a company, or in a country, it should be bottom-up. Suc- cessful change should be bottom-up. EGGERS: Could you talk about turning around perceptions the rest of the world has wrong or outdated about life in Saudi Arabia? What work do you feel you have to do as an artist to change minds and educate people about contemporary Saudi society? HASAN: I found a lot of opportunities abroad, but as Saudis, we linger in the past with our faith, with our families. Still, I've found the challenge of changing our society appealing. One of the many challenges here is the backward mentality of the religious non-believers, in which they mix every- 82 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SAUDI ARABIA thing, including art, and suddenly things become unwanted. Haifaa and others like us, who are open-minded and bring artistic views into our lives, faced a lot of problems. We became very isolated in the beginning. We followed literally what Gandhi said, "Be the change you want to see in the world." I personally became the change. I had the guts to look different, to have long hair, to hold my guitar and play, to take my camera and go out. I faced a lot of problems. Once, I got jailed just for playing guitar. But even- tually, things worked out. Now I look at the allies that I have - people who know me, look to me as a role model for the new gen- eration. It makes me feel that everything is worth it, and we re going to still keep doing it, keep pushing the boundaries. Like Haifaa said, the media here is much more liberated than in the Gulf States. As a writer for an Arab newspaper, I have seen that personally. We've pushed the barrier much more than any of the Gulf States. EGGERS: Haifaa, you've been traveling ev- erywhere with your film. We met in Colo- rado. I know you were just at the Venice Film Festival. Can you tell us where else have you brought the film and your experi- ence with how the film has been a window on contemporary Saudi life, and what sort of perceptions you have challenged and up- ended here in the U.S., Europe, and else- where? I'm assuming it's very satisfying to educate people about the full spectrum of Saudi life instead of the more limited per- ceptions or assumptions people may have that are probably outdated. HAIFAA: As an artist, I wanted to put a hu- man face on Saudis. We struggle with con- servative ideologies. We come from a world that has created its own existence because it has been closed for so long. And that makes it an exciting place to do a story as a film- maker. But I'm not in a position to defend or educate as much as tell human stories, like opening a window and letting people discover for themselves. It's safer for me as an artist to step away. EGGERS: To the rest of the world, the po- sition of women in Saudi has always been of interest. I wonder if you can offer pre- dictions of where women might be in five years in terms of their place in Saudi society. HAIFAA: Definitely women will partici- pate in politics. They will vote, and after that, with the limited place we have within democracy, it is hard to predict now. The Arab world is so un- predictable. We never thought of the [Arab Spring] revolutions until they happened. No one predicted them. But women, es- pecially younger wom- en, are not passive. Women will definitely have more rights, espe- cially in politics. MAMDOUH: I'll be optimistic. Within five years, I think we will have a minister who is a woman. I hope so. Otherwise, if we get more extreme, and we become more con- servative, then I think we'll go back to the Stone Age. EGGERS: Do you think that's a possibility? I wonder if there will be a backlash, or a reversion. Here in the U.S. we go through WOMEN DRIVING IS SUCH A POLARIZING ISSUE IN SAUDI NOW. BUT MORE WOMEN ARE NOW DRIVING, SO IT WILL HAPPEN REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE TRAFFIC SITUATION IN SAUDI CHANGES. SPRING 2013 83 This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms ROUNDTABLE more progressive times and then we reverse course, and we have a more conservative four to eight years, which we recently did. Is there a fear that the changes that are al- ready going on might provoke a backlash among the more conservative elements of society and say, "This is moving too fast," and there would be a crackdown and, like you say, a going back to the Stone Age? Are you worried about that? MAMDOUH: Its a possibility depending on neighboring countries. If the Muslim Brotherhood takes over Syria and Egypt and Tunisia, then we'll go in the same direction. HASAN: From what I see, we have a major- ity of youth in the Arab world, in general, and all of them are quite open-minded, educated, if not academically, then by the Internet. I see a backlash not really happen- ing. We have a majority of youth studying abroad. Most of them love art, and I can see a lot of movement in the world of art hap- pening, and I think they will have a a lot to say against any backlash. WPJ: Do you think women will be able to drive in five years? That seems like a touch- stone of women's rights there. HASAN: In Saudi Arabia, the issue of driv- ing is not a religious issue, it's a cultural issue. The traffic police system in Saudi Arabia is extremely bad. It's bad for male drivers. Did you know that we have the highest rate of accidents in the world - HAIFAA: Come on, Hasan, don't use this excuse. HASAN: I m explaining. I want women to drive yesterday. I'm sick and tired of driv- ing my sister and my mother, but I'm being logical. What I'm saying is that the system is bad. Before women will be able to drive, first let's see a good, strict traffic system. Then, I will say, "Yes, maybe in five years or in 10 years." But if women drove now, with this kind of system, there's going to be a massacre. I would love to see them drive, but first I would like to see solid, strict rules and regulations. HAIFAA: Women driving is such a po- larizing issue in Saudi now. But more women are now driving, so it will happen regardless of whether the traffic situation in Saudi changes or not. There will be backlashes, and women will have to face a very conservative society. But we will see more change. EGG E RS: Maybe we can talk about what everyone is doing next. Haifaa, are you working on a new film? Will your next film be set in Saudi? HAIFAA: We'll definitely work on another film in Saudi. Saudi is such an exciting place to tell stories because it's so interesting, so complex. It has religion; it has politics. EGGERS: You have all become impor- tant ambassadors from Saudi, and you've all had significant roles in bringing art from Saudi to the rest of the world. So is that a good responsibility, something you take on willingly and that you cherish and relish, or do you feel a weight of having to represent the nation to the rest of the world? Haifaa - would you prefer to di- rect a murder mystery set in Italy that had nothing to do with Saudi society, or would you feel like you were abdicating your re- sponsibility as an artist from the Kingdom in a position where you had the attention of the world? 84 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SAUDI ARABIA HAIFAA: As an artist, I would love to do things in Italy. Why not? If I get an offer from Hollywood, I'm not going to turn it down. No way. Of course, Saudi Arabia is the place where I can produce more. I know the place. I feel like I belong here. I know how to tell a story from that place. There are few people who can do that, so I have a unique perspective. I don't feel like its a burden. I feel like its an honor to go and represent the country and to speak about Saudi. Yeah, it s conservative, and there are radical ideologies with very religious people, but beneath that, there are really nice people. It was nice to hear about Hasan growing his hair long and playing guitar. Saudis are fun. Beneath all of the politics and conservative cover, you'll find lots of humor. It's a great place to tell a story. EGGERS: Exactly. When I met Mamdouh, in Jiddah, he showed me around while I was in the country. Mamdouh is one of the funni- est guys I know, and we instantly had a rap- port, and his sort of looseness and irreverence surprised me right away. It was one of the rea- sons we got along so well. We had an unusual situation where we had planned a couple of events. I was supposed to go to a dinner and to go to a reading in Jiddah and talk to local writers, and then we realized that my flight wasn't leaving from Jiddah but was leaving from Riyadh that night. So Mamdouh got me a ride. We found a guy who would drive me to Riyadh that day and I got in the car. We didn't know this guy. You just put me in some random car. MAMDOUH: I just told him that this is a gift of the King. EGGERS: Here I was thinking my good friend Mamdouh, of course he'll be put- ting me in a safe car with somebody that he knows. But we were desperate, and I had a six-hour drive, so we had to leave immediately. Then in about 10 minutes of driving, this young man was on the phone, and he looked over at me. While he was talking to his friend on the phone, he looked over at me and said to his friend, "American: BOOM BOOM!" sort of in this kind of scary way. I didn't know what he meant. It got me a little nervous. Just the words "BOOM BOOM" were discon- certing while I was alone in the car with him driving at 140 kilometers per hour. So we got to be friends during that drive, even though we had a significant language barrier. By the end, it was just indicative of perceptions on both sides, and we had to build trust and understanding during the drive even through gestures, looks, smiles at photos I showed him, and the few words we could exchange. HASAN: I'm thankful I'm here in Saudi Arabia because with oppression comes in- spiration. I mean for me, living and suffer- ing made me who I am today. For that, I'm very thankful. EGGERS: Thank you all so much for being with us. • SPRING 2013 85 This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:30:42 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Contents p. 78 p. 79 p. 80 p. 81 p. 82 p. 83 p. 84 p. 85 Issue Table of Contents World Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (SPRING 2013) pp. 1-123 Front Matter EDITORS' NOTE: Beyond Borders [pp. 1-2] UPFRONT THE BIG QUESTION: Setting Boundaries: HOW SHOULD BORDERS BE DRAWN? [pp. 3-8] Embracing Diversity [pp. 9-13] Map Room: BORDERS ON TOP OF THE WORLD [pp. 14-17] Throwing Down the Gauntlet [pp. 19-21] ANATOMY: World's Most Isolated Countries [pp. 22-23] BEYOND BORDERS Making a State a State [pp. 24-32] Moving On: Iberia's New Muslims [pp. 33-42] CONVERSATION Linking People, Crossing Borders: A CONVERSATION WITH TELECOM PIONEER AND PHILANTHROPIST MO IBRAHIM [pp. 43-48] PORTFOLIO Hunger: The Price of Rebellion [pp. 50-61] FEATURES Notes from the Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki and the New Islamists [pp. 63-76] Arabia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow [pp. 78-85] The Euro Crisis: Mission Accomplished? [pp. 87-94] Russians Go West [pp. 95-103] Nearer, My God, to Thee [pp. 105-114] CODA Global Libra [pp. 115-123] Back Matter SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA Author(s): Birol Baskan and Steven Wright Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 96-111 Published by: Pluto Journals Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858653 Accessed: 09-10-2019 09:24 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858653?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Pluto Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Arab Studies Quarterly This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SEEDS OF CHANGE: COMPARING STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA Birol Baskan and Steven Wright Qatar presents an interesting case study on the nature of state-religion relations as despite being of the same Wahhabi and Hanbali branch as neighboring Saudi Arabia, there are stark differences in the role of religion at a political level within the two countries. Indeed, this article argues that at a political level, Qatar has a secular character more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. The main reason for such differences will be shown through field research to be the lack of an indigenous Ulama class within Qatar. The reasons for this are explained through not only a historical pedigree, which ties in with the role of Britain in the Gulf, but also through a political economy perspective. Indeed, this research sheds new light on the importance of a native Ulama class in explaining how and why religion is promoted by the state and thus has implications for understanding contemporary religiosity and pressures on governmental decision-making. Yet with evidence of an emerging Ulama class within Qatar, the article suggests that there is reason to believe that a more vocal, organized and influential section of society is in the process of developing capacity to press for a greater role of religion at a political and societal level. State and Religion in Qatar and Saudi Arabia Qatar and Saudi Arabia present a fascinating insight into both how and why state-religion relations can differ so markedly within the Arabian Gulf. Whilst both are Wahhabi states, which apply the Hanbali School, the impact this has had on a political level, and society in general, demonstrates strikingly different examples of application. This is in spite of them having a great deal in common on cultural, tribal and linguistic levels. Such commonalities are after all reinforced through the intermarrying of branches of tribes located in both countries. Yet several important differences exist: The Qatari State does not have a religious police force Birol Baskan is Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Dr Steven Wright is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Qatar University. arabstudiesquarterly.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SEEDS OF CHANGE 97 that scrutinizes and enforces morality in public. In contrast, the Saudi Arabian mutawwa ' in (religious police) are tasked with making sure that men and women comply with Islamic dress code, behave morally in public, and close all businesses during prayer times. These and other examples raise a number of important questions: Why does such a broad range of differences exist? Why is Qatar apparently "more liberal" than Saudi Arabia? Why is there then, a marked difference in state-religion relations within these countries? Are determinants of change identifiable and what are the implications for the future? It is true that the manner in which the Saudi state came into being is an explanation which scholarship on this issue would naturally gravitate to. Personal choices, peer and/or family pressure, societal expectations and reputational concerns are also valid factors. Despite the role of the Ulama within Saudi Arabia having been extensively documented, no such research has been conducted on the situation in Qatar let alone a comparative study. Therefore in explaining this analytical divide between Qatar and Saudi Arabia this article focuses on the nature of Qatar's Ulama. The importance of this group of people is that they should be seen as the force behind the adoption of Islamic principles within public policy and by society in general. The reality is that understanding their composition and role in public policy formation actually gives us an insight into Qatari state-religion relations and consequently the manner in which Qatar is able to follow its own unique social, political and economic developmental model. Through conducting qualitative interviews with a range of Qatari based religious scholars, it soon becomes clear that an Ulama class comprised of Qatari nationals has historically not existed and only recently has a latent Qatari class of religious scholars begun to emerge. Indeed, it is worth recognizing that unlike Saudi Arabia, families known for producing religious scholars do not exist within Qatar. When asked who have been the most influential religious scholars within Qatar, a mere three names would uniformly be provided: firstly, Abd al Allah bin Zeyd bin Mahmoud; secondly, Abd al Allah al Ansari, and finally Yusuf al Qaradawi. Of these three, only Yusuf al Qaradawi is alive. It is striking however that none of these influential Ulama are originally from Qatar. Both Bin Mahmoud and Al Ansari were actually from Saudi Arabia whilst Al Qaradawi is from Egypt.1 It seems that the children of these religious scholars did not necessarily follow in the paths of their prominent fathers, which brings into question the development of a true religious class as exists in Saudi Arabia. A second important aspect of Qatar's Ulama concerns the dominance of foreigners in Qatar's religious education. This is interesting as it underscores a surprisingly limited role for the Ulama. The Qatari school system departs markedly from the model followed in Saudi Arabia as religious scholars have no input on textbooks, curriculum and administration. Unlike the situation in Saudi Arabia, the Qatari ASQ 33.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 98 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY Ministry of Education has the exclusive authority over all state schools. The Ministry also runs a Religious Institute that opened in 1 96 1 and was actually founded by Yusuf al Qaradawi. The Religious Institute is different from other state schools only in that it has four additional courses in religion added to the curriculum. The teachers are directly employed by the Ministry; and the content of courses and textbooks are all prepared and monitored by the Ministry. Therefore, this school has a character comparable with the Imam Hatip Schools in Turkey, which are similarly run by the Ministry of Education. Qatar's Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations has no involvement in the preparation of the classes or recruitment of the personnel teaching religious courses in both normal state schools and the Religious Institute.2 The Religious Institute is the sole example of its kind out of a total of 1 38 schools within Qatar.3 During the 2008-09 academic year, the school had 257 students out of just under 50,000 students within Qatar. However, it is interesting that only 24 of those 257 students are native Qataris; the others being international students.4 Given the absence of an established Qatari Ulama class, it is not surprising that there is such a low enrollment rate by Qatari nationals at the Religious Institute. Yet it is not only the enrollment statistics which are illuminating, as its teaching faculty are generally not Qatari nationals. For example, the Director of the Religious Institute, himself a graduate of the school in 1978, did not recall any Qataris among the teachers or staff when he was a student. This role of foreign religious scholars is pertinent as the same pattern can also be observed throughout Qatar's education system under the Ministry of Education. A similar picture can also be seen in higher education. There is only one national university in Qatar in addition to several branches of some prominent American universities, including Georgetown, Northwestern, Texas A&M, which are part of the broader Education City under the Qatar Foundation. The national university, Qatar University, has seven colleges and is the sole provider of higher religious education under the College of Sharia and Islamic Studies. This college enjoys no special status or privilege over any other college, which underscores an important difference with Saudi Arabia. Qatar's model for higher religious education is actually more similar to that being applied in Turkey or Tunisia during Habib Bourguiba's rule as independent religious institutions were absorbed by a national university and granted no special status. For example, under Ataturk, Turkey did not just abolish the religious seminaries, which had historically provided the backbone of its Ulama class, but rather converted them into a Faculty of Theology under Istanbul University. Similarly in Tunisia, members of the historic Al Zaitounia Institute of Religious Higher Education became faculty members within the University of Tunis as a part of Bourguiba's broader educational reforms.5 Such models limit institutional autonomy and influence from which an indigenous Ulama class may develop. arabstudiesquarterly.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SEEDS OF CHANGE 99 In terms of the nationality of religious scholars within the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, a similar picture exists to that described about the Religious Institute. The college was established in 1977, as one of the four colleges of Qatar University by its first Dean, Yusuf al Qaradawi. A number of male and female Qataris who graduated from the College of Shariah in the early 1980s have been interviewed and none of them recalled a single Qatari faculty member; all faculty members were foreigners, mostly Egyptian. In fact, the first Qatari funded by the state of Qatar to pursue higher religious education abroad was Amina Muhammad al Jabor, who is now professor of jurisprudence in the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University. After graduating from the College in 1979, she went to Egypt in 1981 and got her Master's in 1984 and then doctorate in 1987, both from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt. She then came back to Qatar and became the first Qatari professor in the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies. Apparently her example set the stage for other Qataris going abroad for higher religious education. In fact the state of Qatar rented a house in Egypt to accommodate female students in Egypt.6 As of now, both religious education institutions in Qatar have since then graduated many Qataris, who are now employed in a range of government ministries; but few actually pursued higher education with the aim of becoming a religious scholar.7 Presently, there is thus an emergent class of religious scholars in Qatar; however, it will take time to develop a distinct class identity and consciousness. On a governmental level however, it is interesting that Qatari religious scholars do not have an institutionalized role in the political decision-making process. There is no religious office, like the office of Grand Mufti, within the Qatari state system. The role of the Ulama within Qatar is relegated to one of personal contacts or informal influence. By comparison, Saudi Arabia has a religious office to secure religious support for its policies, which institutionalizes the active involvement of religious scholars in political decision-making. Up until 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was the institution via which the Saudi rulers had secured religious justification for their rules. In 1971, the office of Grand Mufti was replaced by the Board of Senior Religious Scholars, headed by the Grand Mufti. The Board has since then been instrumental in securing religious support for governmental policies and has issued fatwas (religious justification) for policies the Saudi state wanted to pursue. The absence of a religious office, which formalizes the role of Islamic scholars in decision-making, is particularly interesting in the case of Qatar as institutionalized religious offices actually exist in countries generally perceived as "more secular" than Qatar, such as: Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria. In terms of the role of the leading religious scholars, an interesting comparative analysis can be made through looking at: Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz (d. 1 999) and Yusuf ASQ 33.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 100 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY al Qaradawi. Both scholars remain widely respected throughout the Gulf region. Abd al Aziz ibn Baaz was the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. His influence came not only from his scholarly achievements, but also from the high positions he held within the Saudi political system. He became the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia in 1993, and hence the head of the Board of Senior Religious scholars. This was a position he would serve in until his death in 1999. By comparison, Egyptian born Yusuf al Qaradawi 's rise to prominence within Qatar was not through official state backing.8 The highest public/official position he had held in Qatar was the Dean of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Qatar University, through which he influenced many Qataris. He also hosts a popular show, Shariah and Life , on the Al Jazeera television network. He remains widely acknowledged as the leading religious scholar within Qatar. The career path of Qatar's leading religious scholar is illuminating as it shows the very limited, if any, role the state has played in supporting the Ulama and granting them a formal role in policy formation through an institutional setting. At this stage, the conclusions that can be drawn from this are that state-religion relations are fairly limited in scope within Qatar. Indeed, its education system closely echoes the model followed in Turkey rather than neighboring Saudi Arabia. The absence of a religious office akin to the Grand Mufti is also telling. Overall it is the lack of a native Ulama class that has translated into the government being under little if any organized pressure to give religious scholars a voice in public policymaking. With the majority of religious scholars in Qatar being non-nationals and ultimately under visa sponsorship, the state is able to effectively regulate them. A native Ulama class, which has only just begun to emerge, would understandably have a different dynamic, but it is worth highlighting that the trend since the late 1 970s has been for women to constitute the majority Qatari nationals who become religious scholars. The final analysis shows that in the case of Qatar, the role religion has within society and government policy, can be largely explained though answering the question of what are the characteristics, origins and institutional role of religious scholars within the society. The lessons Qatar teaches us is that the historical reliance on non-nationals for religious guidance has allowed for a great deal more autonomy on behalf of the government, and ruling tribe in particular, in regard to state-religion relations. Given these observations, the pressing question is why do state-religion relations differ so markedly between Qatar and the Saudi state ? What is it that led to the development of religious institutions within Qatar having such a different character from those of its close neighbor? These questions not only have important implications for society in general but also feed into questions on the wider debate on political evolution within the Gulf. The difference can be explained by whether there exists a historically entrenched class of religious scholars or not. Yet the question arabstudiesquarterly.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SEEDS OF CHANGE 101 this raised is why is there only now an emerging Ulama class within Qatar? Given this, what follows in this article will aim to argue that two main reasons account for the lack of such a class in Qatar. First, because of her geographically strategic location, Qatar could not be incorporated into the Saudi- Wahhabi state. Second, because of her weak economic background, Qatar could not support a class of religious scholars. In order to prove such arguments, this article will provide an examination of the historical relationship between Qatar and the Saudi- Wahhabi state. It will do this by initially outlining the historical context in the birth of the Wahhabi state before moving on to a specific discussion of the emergence of Qatar. The Emergence of the Saudi-Wahhabi State Following the devastating Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, spiritual Sufi Orders of various types began to command the loyalty of the Muslim masses, increasingly taking control in regulating and guiding their religious lives. They became the agent spreading the Islamic message especially in frontier regions, such as Africa, Central Asia, India and later in the Balkans. Sufi Orders' flexibility to incorporate religious rituals and beliefs from other religions greatly increased their appeal to the people, their rituals often involving music and poetry. There occurred reactions from theologians to the supposedly un-Islamic rituals and beliefs, whether associated with the Sufis or not, as early as the fourteenth century, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1 328) and his student, Ibn al Qayyim al Tawziyah (d. 1350), possibly being the most notorious cases of reaction. However, these reactions did not change the fortune of Sufi Orders in the Islamic world mostly because state rulers continued to protect and support them. The earliest example of a state going against Sufi Orders occurred in a rather unexpected place: Iran. Starting in the sixteenth century, the Safavids, originally a Sufi Order, set out to destroy all Sufi Orders from the Iranian landscape in alliance with Shi' a Ulama. In the seventeenth century, the Kadizadeli movement tried to move the Ottoman state rulers against the Sufi Orders, but failed in bringing any decisive change in the Ottoman state policy, which had remained supportive and protective of Sufi Orders more or less until the end.9 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab personifies probably the most unrelenting theological reaction to the rituals and beliefs deemed as un-Islamic and religious innovations, for which he was seen as a strict follower of Ibn Taymiyya.10 He was born in 1702-03 in Al Uyaynah, a town in the province of Najd in the Arabian Peninsula, into a family of religious scholars. His grandfather, his father and his uncle served as religious judges in Najd. He began his religious studies under his father, and then moved to Medina and Basra to pursue further religious education. It ASQ 33.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 102 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY was probably in Medina where he developed most of his religious views, claiming to restore "Islam to what it was in the time of the holy Prophet and the great caliphs."11 For Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, practices such as visiting tombs and wish trees, venerating saints and invoking them as intermediaries with God were clearly forbidden in Islam, the essence of which was the unity of God. The title of his main work, Kitab al-Tawhid (the book of unity), in fact summarizes his attitude toward these practices. They constitute associating partners with God, or shirk in Islamic terminology, the greatest sin one can commit in Islam: "they accord godlike status to created beings and objects."12 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab went beyond simply criticizing some widespread practices among the masses. He also attacked the class of religious scholars, the Ulama, on many grounds. First and foremost, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab questioned the dependence of ordinary Muslims on the Ulama in understanding the primary sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the hadith. Every Muslim male and female should have read the Qur'an and the hadith on his/her own. This call in fact questioned the whole reason behind the existence of the Ulama in Muslim societies. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab even questioned the Ulama class's knowledge of the Qur'an and the hadith for they knew only the previous legal texts and exegesis, not the Qur'an and the hadith. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also criticized the Ulama for their corruption and nepotism,13 which had been complained about by some others in the Ottoman Empire well before Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: "Virtually every memorialist in the turbulent seventeenth century... decried the state of the ulama" in the Ottoman Empire.14 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab naturally made sworn enemies, especially among the Ulama. His views often attracted reactions from the local religious scholars, including his own uncle, who was reported to have said "He claims... to follow the Holy Quran and al-Sunna [the example of the Prophet and his companions accepted by Sunnis] and dares to deduce from their teachings, paying no heed to any opposition. Anyone who opposes him he calls a heretic, although he possesses none of the qualifications of the mujtahedeen [those who exercise independent reasoning]."15 He became an itinerant preacher, in fact being forced to be. For example, he could not stay in Basra because he was forced to leave the town. He could not even stay in Al Uyaynah, his hometown. He stopped preaching in Huraymila, where his father was a religious judge, and had remained silent until the latter 's death. Once he started preaching in Huraymila, he escaped an assassination attempt after which he left Huraymila too. The turning point in the life of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came in 1744, and this is what made him different from Ibn Taymiyya. He found not only a protector, but also a strong military ally in the personality of Muhammad ibn al-Saud, a local ruler of Al Dir'iyah. This alliance was forged strong by an exchange of oath and a marriage between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's daughter and Ibn al-Saud's son, Abd arabstudiesquarterly.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SEEDS OF CHANGE 103 al- Aziz. In Al-Saud, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab found a sword to implement his views and eradicate rituals and beliefs he deemed un-Islamic. He could preach and train students according to his own understanding of Islam. In Abd al-Wahhab, Al-Saud found a religious banner, a powerful one indeed calling for the re-proselytizing of the whole Arabian Peninsula, under which hitherto fragmented Arab tribes could unite. As noted, before finally settling down in Al Dir'iyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had preached in different towns. Hence, his message was not unknown to the inhabitants and probably he made some converts. These new converts came and joined him in Al Dir'iyah, adding further manpower to Al-Saud's military strength. In the first two years of this alliance, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sent out letters inviting local rulers and religious scholars to accept his vision of Islam. Not all accepted. However, those who accepted joined the tribal confederation taking shape under Muhammad ibn al-Saud. Boosted by new recruits and driven by a religious zeal, Muhammad ibn al- Saud embarked upon a series of military campaigns against other rulers. Al Uyaynah, some 30 miles to the north-west of Al-Dir'iyah, became one of the first towns to fall before Saudi- Wahhabi forces. The growing strength of Al-Saud also attracted opposition: a coalition of tribes from the Hasa and the Nejd in the 1 750s and another one from southwestern Arabia in 1765 attacked Al Dir'iyah with serious damages inflicted on the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In 1765, Muhammad ibn al-Saud died to be succeeded by his son, Abd al- Aziz al-Saud, who was also the son-in-law of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Military expansion accelerated under his leadership, Riyadh falling in 1773. By 1790, the Saudi state consolidated its rule over central Arabia and turned its attention to the east, the oases of Al Hasa and Qatif falling under Saudi-Wahhabi domination by 1 793 . Neither the death of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1792 nor three punitive campaigns in the 1790s, two by the ruler of the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula and another by the Ottomans, failed to halt Saudi-Wahhabi expansion. The city of Karbala in Iraq was sacked in 1802, holy shrines of the tomb of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, destroyed, thousands of its inhabitants killed. In revenge, a Shi'a killed Abd al- Aziz in 1 803 in Al Dir'iyah. Saud ibn al-Saud continued his father's expansionist policy. Mecca was occupied and looted in 1803, shrines and tombs destroyed, inhabitants refusing to adhere to Wahhabism massacred. Madina fell into the hands of the Wahhabis in 1804, even the tomb of the Prophet had faced the Wahhabi wrath. The Ottoman response to the Saudi-Wahhabi threat came in 1811, sending the semi-autonomous ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, into Arabia in 1 8 1 1 . It took seven years to eradicate this threat though. In 1818, the son of Muhammad Ali, Ibrahim Pasha entered Al Dir'iyah, destroyed the city and its fortifications and massacred hundreds of Wahhabi Ulama. Thus came the end of the Saudi-Wahhabi state,16 "hoped never to rise again - the extraordinary sect of the Wahabees."17 ASQ 33.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals This content downloaded from 153.33.12.23 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 09:24:50 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 104 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY The hope turned out to be too optimistic. The Ottoman-Egyptian blow to the Saudi-Wahhabi state was fatal indeed. But, the Saudi-Wahhabi project was not completely over. There were tribes especially from Central Arabia still loyal to the Saudi-Wahhabi cause, possibly longing for the good days they had enjoyed. In the rest of the nineteenth century, these tribes supported the Saudi leadership to regain what was lost. In fact, as early as 1824, Turki bin Abdullah al-Saud captured Riyadh and made it the capital of the second Saudi-Wahhabi state, re-establishing the Saudi rule over the Central and Eastern Arabian Peninsula. However, this time it did not go smoothly. First Muhammad Ali of Egypt and then the Ottoman Empire re-asserted its rule over the Hejaz. In the Eastern Arabian Peninsula, the British extended their sphere of influence without formally colonizing the region. Later the Ottomans made incursions into the Eastern Arabian Peninsula starting in the 1870s. Qatar, for example, accepted Ottoman sovereignty over the peninsula in 1872. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire began to support the rival Rashidis to counterbalance the Saudis. The Rashidis eventually ousted the Saudis even from Central Arabia, occupying Riyadh in 1891. Abd al-Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud found refuge in Kuwait, moving his family with him. In the autumn of 1901, his son, Abd al- Aziz al-Saud, gathered some forty to sixty men and left Kuwait. After several raids on nomad camps and trade caravans, he reached the gate of Riyadh, his father's capital, with now close to 400 men in January of 1902. In a surprising night attack, he killed the Rashidi governor of the city and re-established the Saudi state. Immediately after this attack, Abd al- Aziz organized a series of campaigns on small towns surrounding Riyadh, making them a part of his new state. In 1 906, he captured Qasim, after which the Ottoman Empire recognized him as the ruler of Qasim and southern Najd. In 1913, he turned to the east, and captured Hafuf, which was in the hands of the Ottomans. Abd al- Aziz now became the Abd al-Aziz Pasha of Najd according to the imperial order. The … Saudi Arabia's shifting sands Author(s): Tom Phillips Source: The World Today, Vol. 70, No. 1 (February & March 2014), pp. 34-35 Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24640747 Accessed: 09-10-2019 06:11 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Royal Institute of International Affairs is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The World Today This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:11:57 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia's shifting sands The certainties that underpin the Kingdom need reappraisal, Tom Phillips argues What has got into the Saudis? Their unprecedented decision in October not to take up their Security Council seat, and their angst over Western policy towards Syria and what some in Riyadh perceive as a mating dance between Washington and Tehran, have sent a strong signal of unease. Those worrying about what's going on in the Kingdom also raise concerns on the succession front; about the implications of the changing shape of world energy markets at a time when Saudi Arabia is generally estimated to need an oil price of at least $85 a barrel to sustain its social and economic programmes and to support its allies in the region; and whether a frequently creaky government system has the capacity to cope with the host of problems the country is facing from within and without. Certainly, from the point of view of a Saudi policy-maker, the country, the region and the world look to be increas ingly complex places. On the internal front, Saudi Arabia faces many of the pressures which prompted Arab Spring uprisings in other parts of the Middle East, with about half of the popula tion under 25 and a high rate of youth un employment, despite a determined 'Sau dization' policy to encourage employers to hire local staff rather than expatriates. In the region, the Saudis used to be able to rely on several factors that maintained stability: Egypt as a reliable partner for 'moderation'; Iran's bad behaviour ensur ing Saudi Arabia remained an indispensa ble Western ally; and a Western - above all American - assessment that it had a stake in their region, even if on occasions it was a role that they got badly wrong, as in Iraq in 2003. The Saudi world view should not be over-simplified, however. As Arab uprisings unfurled in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, I was struck during dis cussions with senior Saudis by their recog nition that what we were seeing represent ed complex events with many causes and consequences, much like the French or Russian revolutions. Saudi policy-makers warned from the start of the danger that the winners of the Arab Spring would not be the liberal youth in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but the deeper, darker, better organized forces in such societies. Their domestic response has included social and economic moves easily inter preted as attempts to buy off pressure for political change. But Saudi decision 34 | THE WORLD TODAY | FEBRUARY & MARCH 2014 makers also feel that the West has yet to understand the intricacies of Saudi society, and that reform will take time. Some traditional critics of the A1 Saud inside Saudi Arabia are indeed looking around their region and asking whether the ruling family has not got it right with its cautious steps forward — including the appointment of women to the Shura consultative council, and allowing women to vote and stand in next year's municipal elections. After all, ballot-box democracy elsewhere in the region has not proved the answer to every problem, and would almost certainly mean a resurgence of conservative and tribal forces in Saudi Arabia itself. Even before the first signs of unrest there was a palpable sense of insecurity among Saudis. The 'Shia Crescent' stretching from Iran to Hizbollah, via Iraq and Syria, was seen to be extending into new areas, with the Iranians accused of stirring up trouble in Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere, including Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. There is much deep history here. But we would be wrong to ignore the extent to which the Saudis are feeling encircled and Saudi Arabia's shifting sands This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:11:57 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Ali alfahal threatened, as well as their concerns about whether the West, still under the shadow of military adventures in Iraq and Afghan istan, is as firmly committed as it was to resist that threat. They worry that Western (France apart) eagerness to strike a deal with Iran and avoid another unpopular military interven tion will result in an agreement that gives the Iranians more weight in the region — and more scope for trouble-making. There is indeed an underlying sense of insecurity in some Saudi minds about whether the West might even, as in the days of the Shah, see Iran as a more natural longer term partner, given the latter's burgeoning middle class and electoral habit. The Saudi voices I hear do not think that what they see as the current lack of American resolve is merely a short-term feature of the Oba ma Presidency: they spot a deeper trend of Western disengagement from their region, and ask: 'Where does this leave us?' When they try to answer that question, they know that part of the answer has to be more self-reliance, and greater coordina tion among the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council on defence. Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in discussions with John Kerry, the US Secretary of State They also know that, as regards the GCC, this will remain work in progress, at least in the short-term, given the fault-lines be tween member states. So, is it time for some fresh thinking by Saudi Arabia? Internally, many would argue that, while there is no sign of immediate threat to the Kingdom's stability and the A1 Saud's rule, the government nevertheless needs to move forward more boldly on the King's reform programme. IfWestern-style de mocracy is not the answer, the Saudis need to come up with a clearer vision about how their own system of consultation and con sensus-seeking might evolve to meet the aspirations of a youthful, globally-aware population, and to articulate the extent to which elections will play a part in this. More needs to be done to modernize the education system and to create a culture in which young Saudis prefer to work in the private sector. The public sector needs re form and energizing. Thought needs to be given to the shape of the current social con tract, and to achieving greater transpar ency. An element of direct personal taxa tion would generate a political culture in which citizens, rather than subjects, feel they have a right to a certain level of ser vice. The level of subsidies for domestic oil is unsustainable. Consideration also needs to be given to how the balance between the political and religious establishments should evolve so young Saudis do not feel obliged to head to Dubai or Bahrain when they want to relax. Externally, it is difficult to avoid the im pression that Saudi policy is more re-active than pro-active, however understandable their worries about Iran and their hesita tions about President Rouhani and his grip over the regime's hardliners. Just over 10 years ago, then Crown Prince Abdullah was the source of what became the Arab Peace Initiative that set out a vision of how the people of Israel could expect normal relations with the countries of the region if they were ready to make the tough com promises necessary for peace. Is it not now time for the Saudis to take the lead in setting out a positive vision of how the wider region might look if could resolve its current problems, and above all if Iran were to drop its military nuclear am bitions and play a responsible part in the maintenance of regional security? This would not mean the Kingdom dropping its guard — only taking the lead in defining a vision for a positive and peaceful future. The Saudis also need to start talking to their neighbours about sustainable development, including climate change, environmental degradation and resource shortages, particularly water. The impact of such factors is well known. In Syria, for example, some assess that a climate change-induced drought from 2006-10 prompted hundreds of thousands of Syrian farmers to flee to the cities and towns, add ing to the pressures behind the disturbanc es there. The Saudis are well placed to take the lead in focusing the world's attention on the need for action. One intriguing feature of current Saudi society is the sense that the debate on all these issues is at last underway, in a more open manner than ever before. It is impor tant for the Kingdom and the region that it comes up with the right answers. Sir Tom Phillips, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 2010-12, is an Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme THE WORLD TODAY | FEBRUARY & MARCH 2014 | 35 Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in discussions with John Kerry, the US Secretary of State Sir Tom Phillips, This content downloaded from 161.130.188.167 on Wed, 09 Oct 2019 06:11:57 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Contents p. 34 p. 35 Issue Table of Contents The World Today, Vol. 70, No. 1 (February & March 2014) pp. 1-50 Front Matter From the editor [pp. 3-3] Contributors [pp. 4-4] Notebook Creative righting of wrongs [pp. 5-5] The world in brief [pp. 6-9] Letters Transparency in the Holy See [pp. 8-8] Paying by visa [pp. 10-10] The rage for change [pp. 11-11] Africa resources An extra strong MINT [pp. 12-18] The big country [pp. 18-19] Accounting for net losses [pp. 20-22] Mangos are the future [pp. 22-24] A relative advantage [pp. 25-25] Interview José Manuel Ramos-Horta [pp. 26-28] Date with history Politics and a French affair [pp. 29-29] UK foreign policy Vote that ties Britain's hands [pp. 30-33] Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia's shifting sands [pp. 34-35] Syria The Syrian people have lost their voice [pp. 36-39] 'A helicopter came and dumped a barrel of TNT on to a building' [pp. 40-41] Postcard from... The good life in Kleitoria [pp. 42-42] Review Misinforming the masses [pp. 44-45] Strategic rethinking [pp. 46-47] Reading List: Mexico [pp. 47-47] Wild cat strikes [pp. 48-49] 10 minutes with Anas Aremeyaw Anas [pp. 50-50] Back Matter Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner Scanned with CamScanner
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Indigenous Australian Entrepreneurs Exami Calculus (people influence of  others) processes that you perceived occurs in this specific Institution Select one of the forms of stratification highlighted (focus on inter the intersectionalities  of these three) to reflect and analyze the potential ways these ( American history Pharmacology Ancient history . Also Numerical analysis Environmental science Electrical Engineering Precalculus Physiology Civil Engineering Electronic Engineering ness Horizons Algebra Geology Physical chemistry nt When considering both O lassrooms Civil Probability ions Identify a specific consumer product that you or your family have used for quite some time. This might be a branded smartphone (if you have used several versions over the years) or the court to consider in its deliberations. Locard’s exchange principle argues that during the commission of a crime Chemical Engineering Ecology aragraphs (meaning 25 sentences or more). Your assignment may be more than 5 paragraphs but not less. INSTRUCTIONS:  To access the FNU Online Library for journals and articles you can go the FNU library link here:  https://www.fnu.edu/library/ In order to n that draws upon the theoretical reading to explain and contextualize the design choices. Be sure to directly quote or paraphrase the reading ce to the vaccine. Your campaign must educate and inform the audience on the benefits but also create for safe and open dialogue. A key metric of your campaign will be the direct increase in numbers.  Key outcomes: The approach that you take must be clear Mechanical Engineering Organic chemistry Geometry nment Topic You will need to pick one topic for your project (5 pts) Literature search You will need to perform a literature search for your topic Geophysics you been involved with a company doing a redesign of business processes Communication on Customer Relations. 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Develop a community-wide intervention to reduce elevated blood pressure and hypertension in the State of Alabama that in in body of the report Conclusions References (8 References Minimum) *** Words count = 2000 words. *** In-Text Citations and References using Harvard style. *** In Task section I’ve chose (Economic issues in overseas contracting)" Electromagnetism w or quality improvement; it was just all part of good nursing care.  The goal for quality improvement is to monitor patient outcomes using statistics for comparison to standards of care for different diseases e a 1 to 2 slide Microsoft PowerPoint presentation on the different models of case management.  Include speaker notes... .....Describe three different models of case management. visual representations of information. They can include numbers SSAY ame workbook for all 3 milestones. You do not need to download a new copy for Milestones 2 or 3. When you submit Milestone 3 pages): Provide a description of an existing intervention in Canada making the appropriate buying decisions in an ethical and professional manner. Topic: Purchasing and Technology You read about blockchain ledger technology. Now do some additional research out on the Internet and share your URL with the rest of the class be aware of which features their competitors are opting to include so the product development teams can design similar or enhanced features to attract more of the market. The more unique low (The Top Health Industry Trends to Watch in 2015) to assist you with this discussion.         https://youtu.be/fRym_jyuBc0 Next year the $2.8 trillion U.S. healthcare industry will   finally begin to look and feel more like the rest of the business wo evidence-based primary care curriculum. Throughout your nurse practitioner program Vignette Understanding Gender Fluidity Providing Inclusive Quality Care Affirming Clinical Encounters Conclusion References Nurse Practitioner Knowledge Mechanics and word limit is unit as a guide only. The assessment may be re-attempted on two further occasions (maximum three attempts in total). All assessments must be resubmitted 3 days within receiving your unsatisfactory grade. You must clearly indicate “Re-su Trigonometry Article writing Other 5. June 29 After the components sending to the manufacturing house 1. In 1972 the Furman v. Georgia case resulted in a decision that would put action into motion. Furman was originally sentenced to death because of a murder he committed in Georgia but the court debated whether or not this was a violation of his 8th amend One of the first conflicts that would need to be investigated would be whether the human service professional followed the responsibility to client ethical standard.  While developing a relationship with client it is important to clarify that if danger or Ethical behavior is a critical topic in the workplace because the impact of it can make or break a business No matter which type of health care organization With a direct sale During the pandemic Computers are being used to monitor the spread of outbreaks in different areas of the world and with this record 3. Furman v. Georgia is a U.S Supreme Court case that resolves around the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unsual punishment in death penalty cases. The Furman v. Georgia case was based on Furman being convicted of murder in Georgia. Furman was caught i One major ethical conflict that may arise in my investigation is the Responsibility to Client in both Standard 3 and Standard 4 of the Ethical Standards for Human Service Professionals (2015).  Making sure we do not disclose information without consent ev 4. Identify two examples of real world problems that you have observed in your personal Summary & Evaluation: Reference & 188. Academic Search Ultimate Ethics We can mention at least one example of how the violation of ethical standards can be prevented. Many organizations promote ethical self-regulation by creating moral codes to help direct their business activities *DDB is used for the first three years For example The inbound logistics for William Instrument refer to purchase components from various electronic firms. During the purchase process William need to consider the quality and price of the components. In this case 4. A U.S. Supreme Court case known as Furman v. Georgia (1972) is a landmark case that involved Eighth Amendment’s ban of unusual and cruel punishment in death penalty cases (Furman v. Georgia (1972) With covid coming into place In my opinion with Not necessarily all home buyers are the same! When you choose to work with we buy ugly houses Baltimore & nationwide USA The ability to view ourselves from an unbiased perspective allows us to critically assess our personal strengths and weaknesses. This is an important step in the process of finding the right resources for our personal learning style. Ego and pride can be · By Day 1 of this week While you must form your answers to the questions below from our assigned reading material CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (2013) 5 The family dynamic is awkward at first since the most outgoing and straight forward person in the family in Linda Urien The most important benefit of my statistical analysis would be the accuracy with which I interpret the data. The greatest obstacle From a similar but larger point of view 4 In order to get the entire family to come back for another session I would suggest coming in on a day the restaurant is not open When seeking to identify a patient’s health condition After viewing the you tube videos on prayer Your paper must be at least two pages in length (not counting the title and reference pages) The word assimilate is negative to me. I believe everyone should learn about a country that they are going to live in. It doesnt mean that they have to believe that everything in America is better than where they came from. It means that they care enough Data collection Single Subject Chris is a social worker in a geriatric case management program located in a midsize Northeastern town. She has an MSW and is part of a team of case managers that likes to continuously improve on its practice. The team is currently using an I would start off with Linda on repeating her options for the child and going over what she is feeling with each option.  I would want to find out what she is afraid of.  I would avoid asking her any “why” questions because I want her to be in the here an Summarize the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psychological research (Comp 2.1) 25.0\% Summarization of the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psych Identify the type of research used in a chosen study Compose a 1 Optics effect relationship becomes more difficult—as the researcher cannot enact total control of another person even in an experimental environment. Social workers serve clients in highly complex real-world environments. 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