Fluent Essays

words count 150-250 these are “The Mytilenian Debate” and “The Melian Dialogue”  The Melian Dialogue  (Thucydides, Book 5, chapters 84-116)      The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the suspected      persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of three hundred, whom the      Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also      made an expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and      two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty      mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and      the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the      Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the      struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory,      assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of      Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, before      doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring      before the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and      the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows:      Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we      may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the      multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that      this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to      pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at      whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this      proposition of ours suits you.      The Melian commissioners answered:      Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing      to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say,      as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably      expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to      submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.      Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for anything      else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that you see before you, we      will give over; otherwise we will go on.      Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one      both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the      safety of our country; and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you      propose.      Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences- either of how      we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you      because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be      believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that      you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no      wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you      know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in      power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.      Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient- we speak as we are obliged, since you      enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest- that you should not destroy what is our      common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and      right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current.      And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the      heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.      Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like      Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the      vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This,      however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we      are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going      to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over      you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.      Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?      Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the      worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.      Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies,      but allies of neither side.      Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an      argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.      Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with      you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some      conquered rebels?      Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if      any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest      them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in      security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others      rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the      sea.      Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate?      For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your      interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide.      How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it      that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the      enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise      have never thought of it?      Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty      which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders      like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be      the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger.      Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to get rid      of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try      everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke.      Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with honour      as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not      resisting those who are far stronger than you are.      Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the      disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to      despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.      Athenians. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant      resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant,      and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only      when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it      is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a      single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human      means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to      prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their      destruction.      Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending      against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may      grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that      what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are      bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence,      therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational.      Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as      yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men      believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we      know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as      if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing      before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it,      knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the      same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to      fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the      Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we      bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own      interests or their country's laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their      conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than      by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering      what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not      promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.      Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to      prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence      of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.      Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while      justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians      generally court as little as possible.      Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake,      and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier      for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity.      Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask      his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this      even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only      with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters      of the sea they will cross over to an island?      Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is      more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to      elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would      fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and      instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your      own confederacy.      Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to      learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for      fear of any. But we are struck by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety      of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in      and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and      your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you      to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after      allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not      be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same      time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very      men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called      disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they      become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur      disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of      misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it      dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate      offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to      you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so      blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their      equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on      the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect      once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more      than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin.      The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves,      came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and      answered: "Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a      moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but      we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the      help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves.      Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to      retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both."      Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference      said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is      future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your      eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most      in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely      deceived."      The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of      yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of      circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states.      Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain      number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force      thus left stayed on and besieged the place.      About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost eighty men cut off      in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took      so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from      breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their      people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities      with the Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians      stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian      lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in corn and all else      that they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians      took measures to keep better guard in future.      Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the      Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable,      and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their      fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the      same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly      garrisoned. Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the      command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some      treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who      put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for      slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place      themselves.  The Mitylenian Debate  (Thucydides, Book 3, chapters 36-50)      Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at once put the latter to      death, although he offered, among other things, to procure the withdrawal of the      Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was still under siege; and after deliberating as to what      they should do with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death not      only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population of Mitylene, and to make      slaves of the women and children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without      being, like the rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the      Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over to Ionia to her      support, a fact which was held to argue a long meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a      galley to communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in      dispatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on the      horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the      guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their      Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote;      which they the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of      the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the matter. An      assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of opinion upon both      sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting      the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most      powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows:      "I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire, and      never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene. Fears or      plots being unknown to you in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same      with regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by      listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to      yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting      that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose      obedience is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by      your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in the case is the      constant change of measures with which we appear to be threatened, and our seeming      ignorance of the fact that bad laws which are never changed are better for a city than good      ones that have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted      insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more      gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule      every proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit in more      important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their country; while those who      mistrust their own cleverness are content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to      pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival athletes,      generally conduct affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by      cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real opinions.      "For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have proposed to      reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a delay which is all in favour      of the guilty, by making the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger      blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it      and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man who will maintain the      contrary, and will pretend to show that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us,      and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either have such      confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all decided      is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such      contests the state gives the rewards to others, and takes the dangers for herself. The      persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see      an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the      practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past      events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard;      the easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves      to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being      that he could speak himself, the next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite      up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick      in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may so      say, for something different from the conditions under which we live, and yet      comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very slaves to the pleasure of the ear,      and more like the audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city.      "In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state has ever injured you      as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for those who revolt because they cannot bear      our empire, or who have been forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed      an island with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there had their      own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent and held in the highest honour      by you- to act as these have done, this is not revolt- revolt implies oppression; it is      deliberate and wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest      enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the acquisition of      power. The fate of those of their neighbours who had already rebelled and had been      subdued was no lesson to them; their own prosperity could not dissuade them from      affronting danger; but blindly confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power      though not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to prefer      might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation but by the moment which      seemed propitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly      tends to make a people insolent; in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success in      reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity than      to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have      done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten      themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration as it is awed by      firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their crime requires, and do not, while      you condemn the aristocracy, absolve the people. This is certain, that all attacked you      without distinction, although they might have come over to us and been now again in      possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in their lot with the      aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider therefore: if you subject to the same      punishment the ally who is forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own      free choice, which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the slightest pretext;      when the reward of success is freedom, and the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible?      We meanwhile shall have to risk our money and our lives against one state after another;      and if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the      revenue upon which our strength depends; while if unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy      the more upon our hands, and shall spend the time that might be employed in combating      our existing foes in warring with our own allies.      "No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the mercy due to      human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their offence was not involuntary, but      of malice and deliberate; and mercy is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore, now as      before, persist against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three failings      most fatal to empire- pity, sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who can      reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and      necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other less important      arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a      momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases;      while indulgence should be shown towards those who will be our friends in future, instead      of towards men who will remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before.      To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the      Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not      oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling,      you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must      carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you      must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds,      therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be      more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what they would have      done if victorious over you, especially they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their      neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger      which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is      more dangerous, if he escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not,      therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering      and the supreme importance which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them      back in their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once      hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking      example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once understand this and you will      not have so often to neglect your enemies while you are fighting with your own      confederates."      Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who had also in the      previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting the Mitylenians to death, came      forward and spoke as follows:      "I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I      approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently      debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste      usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. As      for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of action, the man who uses it      must be either senseless or interested: senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the      uncertain future through any other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a disgraceful      measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks to frighten      opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a      speaker of making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an      unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the      charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only      a fool but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its      advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make such assertions, it would be better      for the country if they could not speak at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The      good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in      argument; and a wise city, without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless      not deprive them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will not even      regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice      their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful      speakers to resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude.      "This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected of giving advice,      however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for the gain which      after all we are not certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit.      Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of      the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the      best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these      refinements, can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it openly      being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering      the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it      our business to look a little farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your      advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who gave the      advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you      visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you upon the single      person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.      "However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of      Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests.      Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be      expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it      be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future      more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects      that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future      quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my      useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming      the more just in your present temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice,      but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians      useful to Athens.      "Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many offences far      lighter than this: still hope leads men to venture, and no one ever yet put himself in peril      without the inward conviction that he would succeed in his design. Again, was there ever      city rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances resources      adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are alike prone to err, and there is      no law that will prevent them; or why should men have exhausted the list of punishments in      search of enactments to protect them from evildoers? It is probable that in early times the      penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and that, as these were disregarded,      the penalty of death has been by degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself      disregarded in like manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must      be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as long as poverty      gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them with the ambition which belongs to      insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of      some fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to drive men into      danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one      conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest      ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. Fortune,      too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the unexpected aid that she sometimes lends,      tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities,      because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting      together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to      prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has      once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.      "We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a belief in the efficacy      of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early      atonement of their error. Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already revolted      perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is still able to refund      expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other case, what city, think you, would not      prepare better than is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one      whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than hurtful to us to be put      to the expense of a siege, because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city,      to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our      real strength against the enemy? We must not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the      offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be      enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we      must make up our minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to careful      administration. At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in      subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it is no sooner      reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it severely; although the right course      with freemen is not to chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch      them before they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection      suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as possible.      "Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon recommends. As      things are at present, in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does not revolt      with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so      that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But if you butcher      the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as soon as they      got arms, of their own motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of      killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the higher classes,      who when they induce their cities to rise, will immediately have the people on their side,      through your having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty      and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to seem not      to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider      it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than      to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's      idea that in punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do      not confirm the possibility of such a combination.      "Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without conceding too much either      to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to      be influenced, upon the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try      calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest      undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the      present moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind      attacks of brute force."      Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that      most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding their change of      feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of hands was almost equal,      although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in      haste, for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found      destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes      were provided for the vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if      they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that they      took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept      by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the      first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the      manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had only just had time      to read the decree, and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into port      and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.      The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the rebellion, were upon      Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians, the number being rather more than a      thousand. The Athenians also demolished the walls of the Mitylenians, and took      possession of their ships. Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but all      their land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three thousand allotments,      three hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the gods, and the rest assigned by lot      to Athenian shareholders, who were sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed      to pay a rent of two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves.      The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent belonging to the      Mitylenians, which thus became for the future subject to Athens. Such were the events that      took place at Lesbos.