Fluent Essays

In no less than two paragraphs (5-7 sentences EACH) please choose a recommendation laid out in "Russia Direct Brief Frozen Conflicts In The Post Soviet Space" and discuss how it could be used in one of the ongoing frozen conflicts. Please utilize information from at least two of the readings provided, and use in-text citations to cite your sources (a full bibliography is not required) Atlantic Council DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER Agnia Grigas A Tool Kit for US Policymakers This report would not have been possible without the generous support of Frontera Resources for the Atlantic Council’s work on Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The author would like to thank Congressman Gerald “Gerry” Connolly, the United States Representative from Virginia’s 11th congressional district, and his staff for feedback in the development of this report. The author would also like to thank Jeanne Frechede for research support. Second edition ISBN: 978-1-61977-478-0 Cover photo credit: Mikhail Voskresenskiy/RIA Novosti/Sputnik. Russian troops during exercises at the Kanchaveli advanced outpost in South Ossetia, July 2013. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. July 2016 Agnia Grigas A Tool Kit for US Policymakers Frozen Conflicts TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 12 8 7 2 US Policy Toward Frozen Conflicts Implications of Frozen Conflict Conditions Manufacturing Frozen Conflicts Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts Introduction About the Author Policy Recommendations for the US Government and Congress 1 15 Endnotes16 FROZEN CONFLICTS 1ATLANTIC COUNCIL INTRODUCTION Since the 1990s, a number of separatist movements and conflicts have challenged the borders of the states of the former Soviet Union and created quasi- independent territories under Russian influence and control. Unrecognized by the international community but generally supported by Moscow, these so-called “frozen conflicts” include the regions of Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Since 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the emergence of pro-Moscow separatist territories in eastern Ukraine—the so-called “people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk— created a new set of potential frozen conflicts. These seemingly disparate conflicts across different states are, in fact, inherently interconnected; together, they demonstrate a pattern of Russian foreign policy, which manufactures frozen conflicts as a means of increasing Moscow’s long-term influence and leverage over target states in its near abroad. The resulting separatist territories create “gray zones” that are problematic for the international community and international law because they challenge the post-Cold War political order, destabilize Europe’s frontier states, and because they are often used by local and transnational groups for money laundering, organized crime, and human and arms trafficking. The US government has generally supported the territorial integrity of such states facing separatism and sought to contain the fallout from these frozen conflicts. In the aftermath of Crimean annexation and war in the Donbas, it is necessary to reconsider the successes and failures of past US government policies vis-à-vis Moscow’s manufactured frozen conflicts. It is important to establish a policy toolbox for policymakers to use in the event of future Russian assaults on the sovereign territories of other countries. Moreover, because frozen conflicts by their very nature are likely to last for decades, it is important to establish “policy memory” of these conflicts and to consider the policy options for managing these conflicts in the near and long term. Going forward, the quasi-states of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia will continue to seek either independence or integration with the Russian Federation. The US government will have to be prepared to address such processes. Likewise, the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk are likely to seek greater autonomy from Ukraine on the basis of international concepts of human rights and self-determination or instead seek integration into the Russian Federation. The flaring of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-2016 shows that the United States will have to be continuously prepared for reignited conflict. Meanwhile, since Russia seems determined to maintain its occupation of Crimea despite Western sanctions and non-recognition by the international community, Washington will have to pursue a long-term policy regarding this issue vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea. The following policy memo seeks to frame the issues at stake and available policy options for both current and future policymakers in the US government and Congress. POST-SOVIET FROZEN CONFLICTS The term “frozen conflict” is used to describe conditions on territories where active armed conflict may have ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides. In the separatist territories that have become frozen conflict zones, internal sovereignty is often achieved in the breakaway territory but at the expense of “external sovereignty” or recognition in the international system.1 The term frozen conflict is almost completely associated with the breakaway territories of post-Soviet republics. Such conflicts emerged as a result of Moscow-stoked separatism often with the ultimate aim of gaining influence and control over foreign territories. With the sole exception of Nagorno-Karabakh,2 Moscow’s pretext and justification for such actions is cited as the need to protect its so-called compatriots—ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities— residing abroad. Usually, but not always, these target territories border the Russian Federation (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas, and Crimea) and are inhabited by minorities who are experiencing some discord with the central government or who are open in one degree or another to the influence of Moscow. With the exception of Crimea, Moscow’s creation of separatist frozen conflicts has not escalated to Russia’s annexation. Nonetheless, these territories generally become de facto separated from the states in question and under Moscow’s direct political influence and military protection.3 FROZEN CONFLICTS 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL MANUFACTURING FROZEN CONFLICTS Russia’s tools for manufacturing such grey zones have been strikingly similar in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. As outlined in the author’s book Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, the trajectory starts with Russia’s softer means of influence such as an appeal to common values and shared membership in the Russian Orthodox Church, cultural, and linguistic support. It continues to humanitarian and compatriot policies, which involve aid to Russian- speaking minorities as well as support for compatriot institutions and organizations. The crucial turning point is the handing out of Russian citizenship to these inhabitants of foreign territories. Thus, Russian citizens are manufactured from Russian compatriots who then inherently warrant the protection of the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, Russia pursues an information warfare campaign declaring an urgent need to protect Russian citizens and compatriots from various, mostly imagined, threats. Support for separatists and militants follows. Direct but covert Russian military involvement is likely—as in the case of the Donbas and Crimea where “little green men” or Russian special forces and troops operated covertly without their insignia. The end result is armed conflict that resembles “hybrid warfare” or a military strategy that seamlessly blends conventional military tactics with irregular ones, which can include civilian participation, guerilla warfare, and modern technology, to achieve an advantage both on land and in cyberspace.4 Moscow generally explains these campaigns as an effort to “protect” Russian speakers, ethnic Russians, or even other non-Russian minorities such as the Ossetians or Abkhazians.5 The circumstances and the details of military conflict have differed in each case: In Moldova’s Transnistria, it was the Soviet army fighting on the side of the separatists that played the decisive role in the territory’s war for independence in 1991. In Georgia, following the 1992 agreement between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi and the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, Russian peacekeepers were deployed in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia to diffuse the tensions between the central government and the separatists. Russian peacekeepers remained in the territories until the Russian military officially arrived with the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.6 In Ukraine, it was reliance on existing Russian forces on the military bases in and near Crimea in 2014, as well as the Conflicts Period(s) of Active Conflict Actors Military Length of Conflict Countries that Recognize the Territory’s Independence/ Annexation Number of Casualties Amount of Land Lost US Government Response(s) South Ossetia January 5, 1991- June 24, 1992; July-August 19, 2004; August 7-16, 2008 Russia-backed South Ossetia/Georgia OSCE, European Union (EU), USA, and United Nations (UN)* 1 year, 5 months, 2 weeks, and 5 days; 1 month; 9 days Russian Federation, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela Estimated 1,000 killed and 100 missing; dozens killed; 44 killed and 273 woundedi 3.885 km2 Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Nagorno- Karabakh 1991-1994; April 1-5, 2016 Azerbaijan/Armenia Russian Federation, OSCE, France, and USA* 3 years; 4 days None 20,000-30,000 killed; 95-200 killedii 11,458 km2 iii Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Transnistria March 2, 1992- July 21, 1992 Moldova/Russia- backed Transnistria Russian Federation, OSCE, Ukraine, USA, and EU* 5 months None Estimated 800 killediv 4,163 km2 Non Recognition; Short-Term Sanctions Against Separatists Abkhazia August 14, 1992- September 27, 1993; August 9-12, 2008 Russian Federation, Russia-backed Abkhazia/Georgia OSCE, EU, USA, and UN* 13 months and 13 days; 6 days Russian Federation, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 10,000-15,000 lives uprooted and 8000 wounded;v reported 3 killed 8,600 km2 Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Crimea February 23-March 19, 2014 Russian Federation/ Ukraine Great Britain, France, USA, and Germany* 17 days Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela 6 killedvi 27,000 km2 Non Recognition; Sanctions against Crimean leadership and Russia Luhansk and Donetsk Since April 6, 2014 Russian Federation/ Ukraine OSCE, France, and Germany (‘Normandy Format’)* 2 years (ongoing) None 9,333 killed; 21,044 injured 54,315 km2 Non Recognition; Sanctions against Separatists/Russia *Countries with a status/role of mediator(s) or/and observer(s) i Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 23, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law- violations-and-civilian-victims-conflict-over-south. ii The numbers of casualties are contested between sides. iii It includes Nagorno-Karabakh territory: 4,400 km2 and Armenian- controlled territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh: 7, 634 km2. iv It includes 320 persons from the constitutional forces of the Republic of Moldova and 425 representing Transnistria. v See: Greenburg Research, Inc, Country report Georgia/Abkhazia ICRC worldwide consultation on the rules of war,” International Committee of the Red Cross, November 1999, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Conflicts FROZEN CONFLICTS 3ATLANTIC COUNCIL Conflicts Period(s) of Active Conflict Actors Military Length of Conflict Countries that Recognize the Territory’s Independence/ Annexation Number of Casualties Amount of Land Lost US Government Response(s) South Ossetia January 5, 1991- June 24, 1992; July-August 19, 2004; August 7-16, 2008 Russia-backed South Ossetia/Georgia OSCE, European Union (EU), USA, and United Nations (UN)* 1 year, 5 months, 2 weeks, and 5 days; 1 month; 9 days Russian Federation, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela Estimated 1,000 killed and 100 missing; dozens killed; 44 killed and 273 woundedi 3.885 km2 Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Nagorno- Karabakh 1991-1994; April 1-5, 2016 Azerbaijan/Armenia Russian Federation, OSCE, France, and USA* 3 years; 4 days None 20,000-30,000 killed; 95-200 killedii 11,458 km2 iii Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Transnistria March 2, 1992- July 21, 1992 Moldova/Russia- backed Transnistria Russian Federation, OSCE, Ukraine, USA, and EU* 5 months None Estimated 800 killediv 4,163 km2 Non Recognition; Short-Term Sanctions Against Separatists Abkhazia August 14, 1992- September 27, 1993; August 9-12, 2008 Russian Federation, Russia-backed Abkhazia/Georgia OSCE, EU, USA, and UN* 13 months and 13 days; 6 days Russian Federation, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 10,000-15,000 lives uprooted and 8000 wounded;v reported 3 killed 8,600 km2 Non Recognition; Policy of Engagement Without Recognition Crimea February 23-March 19, 2014 Russian Federation/ Ukraine Great Britain, France, USA, and Germany* 17 days Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela 6 killedvi 27,000 km2 Non Recognition; Sanctions against Crimean leadership and Russia Luhansk and Donetsk Since April 6, 2014 Russian Federation/ Ukraine OSCE, France, and Germany (‘Normandy Format’)* 2 years (ongoing) None 9,333 killed; 21,044 injured 54,315 km2 Non Recognition; Sanctions against Separatists/Russia *Countries with a status/role of mediator(s) or/and observer(s) other/georgia.pdf. vi Зверски убитого крымского татарина звали Решат Аметов, see: http://censor.net.ua/news/276351/zverski_ubitogo_krymskogo_tatarina_zvali_ reshat_ametov_ troe_maloletni h _ deteyi_osiroteli_foto ; Погибший крымский татарин шел в военкомат, захваченный “дружинниками,” see: http://society. lb.ua/ life/2014/03/17/ 259752_pogibshiy _krimskiy_tatarin _ shel.html ; Unrest in Crimea leaves 2 dead; government buildings seized, see: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/02/27/Unrest-in-Crimea-leaves-2-dead-government-buildings-seized/6371393516263/; Two die in rallies outside Crimean parliament, says ex-head of Mejlis, see: http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ ukraine/two-die-in-rallies- outside-crimean-parliament-says-ex-head-of-mejlis-337708.html. vii Associated Press, “UN says 9,333 killed since Ukraine conflict began,” April 28, 2016, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/ cae69a7523db45408eeb2b3a98c0c9c5/Article_2016-04-28-UN--UN-Ukraine/id-1b5e974a4b6b498e8c380972933b91f2; see also: OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdf. Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Conflicts FROZEN CONFLICTS 4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL arming and manning of separatist-minded militias and the secret deployment of Russian troops to eastern Ukraine since 2014. The result has been the self-declared “people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk and statelets of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. All of these separatist territories remain unrecognized by the international community, surviving only with Russia’s protection and support. Only Crimea has been incorporated outright into the Russian Federation.7 Status quo in South Ossetia and Abkhazia Following Stalin’s efforts to “Georgianize” South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 1920s, tensions regarding the regions’ political status and degree of autonomy vis-à-vis Tbilisi persisted but remained under strict control. After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and with the resurgence of Georgian nationalism, tensions flared and war broke out first in South Ossetia in January 1991 and then in Abkhazia in August 1992. The South Ossetian and Abkhazian declarations of “independence,” on May 29, 1992 and on November 26, 1994 respectively, have not received recognition in the international arena outside of Russia and a few states like Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and other separatist territories like Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, among others.8 It is likely that in the years to come these breakaway territories will follow the Crimean example and eventually be incorporated into the Russian Federation. Though the territories have been calling for incorporation since before the 2008 Georgian war, the process is gaining momentum. For example, on November 24, 2014, Russia and Abkhazia signed the Moscow- proposed Alliance and Integration Treaty, which aims to create joint defense and law enforcement structures as well as to integrate the region into Russia’s economic, social protection, and health care systems. In March 2015, South Ossetia signed a similar agreement and effectively handed over control of its border, military, and economy to Russia, while also creating a joint defense and security zone and integrating their customs agencies.9 While the de facto president, Leonid Tibilov, announced the holding of a referendum for South Ossetia to join Russia before August 2016, the Abkhazians appear to be interested in maintaining at least some degree of independence for the time being.10 The Georgian government and the pro-Tbilisi Abkhazian government-in- exile have been pursuing “Involvement without Recognition,” a policy of public diplomacy toward the region without recognizing its independence. The policy aims for support and cooperation in health care and education.11 At the same time, the conflicts are not perfectly “frozen,” and skirmishes on the border continue with some evidence that the Russian forces together with the militants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have continued to make further inroads into the territory of Georgia since 2015.12 Status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh Since the 1920s when the Soviet government decided to retain the Armenian- majority Nagorno-Karabakh in the new Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan with autonomous status, tensions have continued to simmer in the region. Under Soviet rule, ethnic tensions remained relatively controlled until the first signs of democratization (1985-87) and the weakening of the regime (1988-90), which was followed by the bloody 1991-94 war. While Armenia is Moscow’s closest military and political ally in the region, Russia sold arms to both sides of the conflict and pursued parallel mediation efforts, and is therefore seen by both parties as a tacit supporter of the adversary.13 The conflict flared again on April 2, 2016, one day after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan met separately in Washington with US Vice President Joe Biden, causing some to suggest that Russia could have played a hand in the violence in order to position itself as an indispensable player in the region and to limit the potential role of the United States.14 Others point to potential domestic political motives in the region to reignite armed hostilities in order to redirect public attention away from economic difficulties and public protests.15 The redeployment of an Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to monitor the ceasefire on the ground, negotiated in Vienna on May 16, 2016, may be a first step to enforce the ceasefire and prevent further casualties. It is likely that in the years to come these breakaway territories will follow the Crimean example and eventually be incorporated into the Russian Federation. FROZEN CONFLICTS 5ATLANTIC COUNCIL Status quo in Transnistria Following the weakening of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol emerged in August 1989, when Moldova first reverted to the use of the Roman alphabet and made Romanian the only official language in lieu of Russian. In Transnistria, where a sizable population of Russian speakers existed, this decision, and the fear of seeing a unification of Moldova and Romania, led the local authorities to look for support from the local Soviet army in their war for independence from Moldova. Transnistria’s “independence,” declared in 1990, has never been recognized by any state, including Russia.16 Yet, because the territory has remained isolated for a quarter of a century with Moscow as its sole supporter and protector, Russia holds all the cards of Transnistria’s future in its hands. In March 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, the leadership of Transnistria submitted their application to join the Russian Federation, but they have not received a response to date.17 In May 2015, calls for protection were again heard when sixty-six Transnistrian NGOs requested that Putin protect the territory and guarantee peace there in light of the fact that Ukraine had terminated its agreement with Moscow on Russian military transit to Transnistria.18 Transnistria’s geographical position and lack of a border with Russia make it less likely to become formally incorporated into the Russian Federation. However, this possibility cannot be excluded as Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast is also not connected territorially to the rest of the country. Nonetheless, Moscow already de facto controls Transnistria, where many members of the government are recent arrivals from Russia.19 Status quo Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk Annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783, Crimea remained part of Russia until 1954, when then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred the peninsula to Ukraine. Since then, due to the continuing presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, stationed in the strategic city of Sevastopol, and the sizable presence of Russian speakers, Ukraine’s autonomous region of Crimea continued to be a flashpoint for Kyiv-Moscow tensions. In February 2014, the Russian military and special forces conducted the takeover of Crimea. The hybrid warfare campaign was conducted covertly with “little green men” supporting local radicals under the cover of propaganda. The Kremlin admitted almost two years later that this had indeed been a military operation.20 In March 2014, the Russian authorities and pro-Russian separatists conducted an illegal “referendum” for Crimea and Sevastopol to join Russia. On March 18, two days after the Embassies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Tiraspol, Transnistria. Photo credit: Marco Fieber/Flickr. FROZEN CONFLICTS 6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL “referendum,” the Russian Federation signed the treaty of accession for Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and thus enacted what the world considers an unlawful annexation of Ukrainian territories. The vast majority of the international community has rejected the validity of Crimea’s referendum and subsequent occupation.21 Ukraine’s border regions of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts with a Russian-speaking majority maintained cultural and economic ties with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Small militant groups launched violence in March 2014 and were soon supported by a Russian military detachment led by Russian Colonel Igor Girkin, who had earlier taken part in capturing Crimea. On May 11, 2014, Russian and pro-Russia militants in Donetsk and Luhansk conducted internationally unrecognized referendums and on November 2 held “elections.” The militants declared “state sovereignty” but not independence for the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics. In September 2014, a first ceasefire agreement (Minsk-1) was designed by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine within the framework of the Normandy Format and signed by Kyiv, the Russian Federation, and the separatists under the aegis of the OSCE, but it was broken several days later when fighting over control of the Donetsk airport began. In February 2015, a second ceasefire agreement (Minsk-2) was signed but conflict and shelling have continued to varying degrees since then.22 As of April 2016, over the course of the crisis in Donbas, 9,167 people have been killed, 1,438,000 people have been internally displaced, and approximatively 9 percent of Ukraine’s territory is under Russian-backed separatists’ control (excluding Crimea).23 On March 16, the separatist leaders of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) began issuing their own passports in eastern Ukraine. The territory’s militant leader Aleksander Zakharchenko called the move “a very important step toward building statehood” that will serve to solidify and formalize the territory’s separatist status.24 Passports were issued to those who recently turned sixteen, but by July 1, 2016, everyone in the oblast will be able to get new passports. Earlier the leaders of the separatist territories stated that the residents of Luhansk and Donetsk would acquire Russian passports from the nearby Russian town of Rostov-on-Don. Nonetheless, the strategy of launching local DNR passports complements the aim of issuing Russian passports in the long term. For once local passports are issued in a separatist territory (as they were in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, A military parade in Transnistria in 2010. Photo credit: Lsimon/Wikipedia. FROZEN CONFLICTS 7ATLANTIC COUNCIL and Transnistria), they serve to consolidate the territories’ sovereignty. Yet, because these local passports are unrecognized in the international community and thus useless for travel abroad, the populations of the territories resort to acquiring Russian citizenship as they have in Georgia’s and Moldova’s breakaway territories.25 IMPLICATIONS OF FROZEN CONFLICT CONDITIONS Frozen conflict conditions enable Russia to gain long-term control over the separatist territories and thus achieve leverage over the target states without necessarily resorting to annexation. In fact, annexation may not be Moscow’s end goal, despite its domestic popularity vis-à- vis Crimea. With annexation come costs—isolation in the international community, the threat of sanctions from the West, and a lack of legitimacy in international law. Annexation also implies costs from assuming control and responsibility for the breakaway region such as government services, rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, gas subsidies, or in the case of Crimea the need to ensure water supplies and build a bridge over the Kerch Strait to connect the peninsula with the Russian mainland. With persistent frozen conflicts, on the other hand, Moscow is still able to boast foreign policy gains without taking full financial responsibility for the regions and the people living there, while the torn-apart countries of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova shoulder many costs.26 For instance, Gazprom still bills Ukraine and Moldova for the natural gas supplies to Donetsk, Luhansk, and Transnistria.27 Nonetheless, though no precedent for this exists, it is possible that following decades of isolation and dire conditions that are inherent in frozen-conflict territories, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and possibly even Luhansk and Donetsk will be integrated into the Russian Federation. These processes are already under way in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the end, there are few options left for territories that have broken ties with their home countries, are internationally unrecognized, and receive financial and military support from Moscow. Whether and when Moscow will finalize their formal integration remains to be seen. The implications of these developments in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova go far beyond the loss of a few territories. The challenge to these countries’ territorial integrity (and even indirectly their statehood) will leave a lasting imprint on their future. The fallout from war and loss of territory will forever divide their political systems and societies. Factions can emerge (as seen in Moldova and Georgia) favoring concessions to Russia in hopes that improved relations will enable the … r u s s i a - d i r e c t . o r g | # 2 3 | a u g u s t 2 0 1 5 ava i l a b l e f o r s u b s c r i b e r s o n ly 2 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 NIKOLAY SILAEV, Ph.D., is a political scientist and a specialist on the Caucasus. He has been a senior research associate at the Center for Caucasian Studies and Regional Security of MGIMO-University since 2004. He compiled and edited the collection “Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” in 2008. He is the director of Caucasian Cooperation and the editor of the analytical online portal, Russia-Georgia: Expert Dialog. | Page 4 WILLIAm h. hILL, Ph.D., is a retired U.S. diplomat. Dr. Hill served two terms (1999-2001, 2003-2006) as Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, where he was charged with negotiation of a political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict and facilitation of the withdrawal of Russian forces, arms, and ammunition from Moldova. He is the author of “Russia, The Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict,” as well as a forthcoming study of European security institutions since 1989. The opinions expressed in his article are entirely his own. | Page 10 IRAKLII KhINTBA is the head of the expert department of the Presidential Administration of Abkhazia and professor of political science and sociology at Abkhaz State University. A graduate of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Khintba previously served as an assistant to the Foreign Minister of Abkhazia (2011- 2012) and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia (2012-2014). | Page 16 AUTHORS The ongoing escalation of tensions in Eastern Ukraine has once again raised the issue of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. According to many observers, the crisis in Ukraine is part of a continuing pattern that began seven years ago with the start of the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in which Moscow has con- sistently sought to intervene in former republics of the Soviet Union in order to advance its own geopolitical goals. Yet, as this report makes clear, the frozen con- flicts in the post-Soviet space – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria – differ significantly in both their root causes and in how Russia has attempted to resolve them. This report describes Russia’s overarching security concerns in the post-Soviet space, analyzes the important factors at play in each of these frozen conflicts and provides an overview of Russia’s new red lines in the region. The report also includes first-hand assessments from the representatives of Abkhazia and Transnistria as well as the list of recommendations for how to normalize the situation in the region and achieve better interaction between all parties involved. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 With recent signs that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is heating up, other conflicts in the post-Soviet space are once again in the news. In addition to Ukraine, there are the two frozen conflicts with Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), one frozen conflict with Moldova (Transnistria), and the frozen conflict involving Armenia and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, what does the state of a “frozen conflict” actually mean in today’s geopolitical context? And how has Russia shifted its foreign policy in response to these conflicts? This August report looks into four frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space and then predicts what might happen next in Ukraine. Of all the frozen conflicts analyzed, the situation in Georgia provides perhaps the best clues as to how the Ukraine crisis might develop. Seven years ago, in August of 2008, Georgia and Russia had a direct military confrontation over Georgia’s breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The result is well known, yet its interpretation still differs signifi- cantly in Russia and the West. In order to present these differing interpretations on Russia’s frozen conflicts, we turned to both Russian and U.S. experts. Nikolay Silaev presents the Russian side of the story while William Hill counters this with the Western view. In addition, Sergey Markedonov sheds light on Moscow’s new red lines in the post-Soviet space. Finally, Iraklii Khintba and Vitaly Ignatiev provide an insider’s view into the lives of people caught in these two frozen conflicts — Abkhazia and Transnistria. Please do not hesitate to send me an email at [email protected] if you have any questions or suggestions. © Russia Direct 2015 All rights reserved. ISSN 2412-8171. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of Russia Direct. FROM THE EDITOR Are Russia’s frozen conflicts warming up? Eugene Abov Chairman, Russia Direct, Deputy Director General, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishing House, Publisher, Russia Beyond The Headlines Julia Golikova Director for Development, Russia Direct, Deputy Publisher, Commercial and Foreign Partnership Director, Russia Beyond The Headlines Ekaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief Pavel Koshkin Executive Editor Dominic Basulto Executive Editor, U.S. Ksenia Zubacheva Managing Editor Alexey Khlebnikov Senior Editor Elena Potapova Head of Video and Mobile Yaroslav Cohen Digital Innovations Producer Pavel Inzhelevskiy Video Producer Olga Fastova Associate Publisher, Sales, Marketing, Events Maria Shashaeva Deputy Publisher, Circulation, Digital Strategy and Operations Olga Ivanova Senior Advisor Alexander Dmitrienko Production and Foreign Partnerships Manager Ekaterina Peregudova Production Finance Manager Ludmila Burenkova Accounts Payable Manager Antonina Steshina Director of Human Resources Antonina Osipova Marketing Director Helen Borisenko Research Manager Anna Sergeeva Account Manager, NY Olga Guitchounts Account Manager, DC Maria Kleymenova Show and PR director Andrey Shimarskiy Art Director Andrey Zaitsev Associate Art Director Alexander Kislov Designer Nikolay Korolev Photo Editor Ilya Ovcharenko Production Designer Ekaterina Zabrovskaya, Editor-in-Chief Write to us Send an email to: [email protected] for general comments, subscription and distribution questions. [email protected] for your submissions, article proposals, topic suggestions, and content-related comments. [email protected] for sales and advertising. 4 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 Resolving the conflicts in the post-Soviet space The crisis in Ukraine underlined how inherent contradictions between the former Soviet republics might emerge as new conflict zones threatening the stability on Russia’s borders and on the European continent more generally. T he crisis in Ukraine has had minimal impact on the nature of Mos- cow’s engagement with most members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Contrary to alarmist forecasts that Rus- sia’s neighbors would perceive the annexation of Crimea as a potential threat to themselves, the leaders of most CIS countries have shown either understanding or neutrality. For its part, Moscow has not insisted on unconditional support from its closest partners, or demanded that they share some of the risks in- curred in the face of the crisis stirred up by the West and radical forces in Ukraine. Overall, Russia’s relations with its neighbors are developing in line with the trends that took shape before February 2014. Moreover, its high-priority integration projects with neighboring countries are pro- gressing steadily. Paradoxically, the established system of intergovernmental relations within the CIS — for all the internal contradictions and inconsistencies — has proven to be more stable and flexible than is often thought to be the case. An important caveat is needed. The concept of the “post-Soviet space” is a broader notion than the “Commonwealth of Independent States.” Georgia left the latter in 2008, and the Baltic States were never part of it. nikolay SilaEv ap 5 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 KAZAKHSTANKAZAKHSTAN TURKMENISTANTURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTANTAJIKISTAN KYRGYZSTANKYRGYZSTAN UZBEKISTANUZBEKISTAN UKRAINEUKRAINE MOLDOVAMOLDOVA BELARUSBELARUS ESTONIAESTONIA LATVIALATVIA AZERBAIJANAZERBAIJAN ARMENIAARMENIA GEORGIAGEORGIA LITHUANIALITHUANIA RUSSIARUSSIA MoscowMoscow The Caucasus The EU bu�er zone The Baltic republics Central Asia Policy orientation (according to Russian expert Alexei Fenenko) Integration projects with Russia Balancing between Russia and other actor Resisting Russia and blocking its initiatives The wealth of nations GDP per capita in current USD Georgia Moldova Latvia Estonia Armenia Ukraine Lithuania Belarus Russia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Georgia Moldova Latvia Estonia Armenia Ukraine Lithuania Belarus Russia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 4.8 4.5 3.7 3.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.3 3.5 52 2.9 45.3 3.7 2.9 10 9.4 148 143.8 16.4 17.2 4.4 5.8 7.2 9.5 5.4 8.4 20.9 30.7 3.7 5.3 1,315 3,670 835 2,234 n/a 16,038 n/a 19,720 589 1,490 3,647 3,083 n/a 16,445 1,747 8,040 3,427 12,736 1,513 12,276 576 1,269 1,209 7,884 468 1,099 659 2,038 848 9,031 1991 2014 1991 2014 Population In million How the former Soviet republics have changed since 1991 alyo n a repkin asource: world bank 6 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 russia’s traditional role A feature of the CIS and other unions of post-Soviet countries is that Russia plays a dominating role in all of them. This is not the result of a deliberate policy, but simply due to its overall economic, political and mili- tary power. This dominance will continue at least for the next decade, and will remain an important factor in post-Soviet relations. Over the past decade this status quo has been vio- lated by just two countries: Georgia under Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukraine after the coups d’etat of 2004 and 2014. In these instances the second part of the formula — avoiding overdependence on Russia in internal and external affairs — was interpreted as “oppose Russia by all available means.” In the case of Georgia, the balance was restored immediately when power changed hands. Without abandoning the former foreign policy priorities of NATO membership and rapprochement with the EU, the government of the Georgian Dream coalition be- gan the process of normalizing relations with Rus- sia. That includes the restoration and development of trade and economic ties, i.e. securing the benefits of access to the Russian market. As a result, Georgia is returning to the trajectory common, in varying de- grees, to most post-Soviet countries. red lines In explaining Russian policy with respect to the post- Soviet space and its conflicts, some initial theses need to be formulated. Although some will sound abstract, they are important for an understanding of Moscow’s motives and strategies. Over the past two centuries Russia has waged war on three occasions to protect its very existence (1812- 1814, 1914-1918 and 1941-1945). All three of these wars were fought against strong coalitions centered in Western Europe. This means that Russia’s security policy is based on existential threats from the West. One of the axioms of Russian policy is to prevent the encroachment of Western military infrastructure or military-political blocs on Russia’s borders. At the same time, since at least the 16th century, with the advent of artillery as the key to military superiority, Russia has been keen to establish unim- peded economic, technological and cultural ties with Western Europe. It is the removal of barriers to such exchange that was the driving force behind the Livo- nian War and the founding of St. Petersburg. That is why Russia is so sensitive to the threat of alliances in Eastern Europe that could isolate it from Western European partners. That Russian strategy should take account of the West’s dual nature as both threat and donor of knowledge and technology is perfectly natural for a “semi-peripheral” country. From this perspective, the priorities of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space are to check the approach of Western military infrastructure on its borders and prevent the creation of a “cordon” separating it from Western Europe. In Russian eyes the threats as existential and poli- cies to limit these threats are based on real-world experience of international processes and on calcu- lations of the balance of the military and political po- tential of Russia and its allies, on one side, and likely adversaries, on the other. Herein lies a key misunderstanding between Russia and the West: Time and again circumstances arise in which the West sees itself as an arbiter, while Russia sees it as part of the problem. Talk about Russian restrictions on the sovereignty of post-Soviet countries is only pertinent in the con- text of steps taken to directly or indirectly alter the military-political balance in the vast Russia-West borderlands. Hence Moscow’s suspicions of any re- gime change attempts in neighboring countries. Historically Russia has not regarded interaction with the U.S. and NATO in the post-Soviet space as a zero-sum game. For instance, in 2001-2009 Kyrgyzstan hosted an airbase for an antiterrorist coalition in support of the operation in Afghanistan. Russia did not oppose the siting of the base, since it was in solidarity with the U.S. in the fight against international terrorism. This solidarity was greatly undermined by the unilateral actions of the U.S. in international affairs, in particular the operation in Iraq, NATO’s expansion in the post-Soviet space, and plans to deploy a missile defense shield in Europe. Russia did not even strongly object to the three Baltic countries’ accession to NATO in 2004. Fur- thermore, whereas NATO membership of the three Baltic countries is tolerable, the accession of Georgia and Ukraine would be wholly unpalatable for Rus- sia. A NATO military presence in the Caucasus and on the Russian-Ukrainian border would make Rus- sia vulnerable. The small potential that existed for peaceful NATO expansion in the post-Soviet space has been used up in the Baltic region. Russia does not want international crises on its bor- ders. The experience of the past two decades shows that its tasks in the post-Soviet space can be imple- mented more effectively in a stable environment. Russia Direct Brief “Re-thinking International Security After Ukraine.” Download at http://www. russia-direct.org/ archive. AlSo ReAD 7 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 Lastly, Russia is well aware that overall it is weaker than the collective West, and only in exceptional ca- ses can it resort to unilateral action, while hoping at the same time for a swift return to multilateral talks on dispute settlement thereafter. the matrix of conflict The term “frozen conflict” is intended to describe a situation in which fighting has either stopped or be- come low-intensity, but without a settlement at the institutional level. The term is slippery, because every situation it refers to is unique; not to mention the fact that sometimes the criteria for conflict resolution are not clear-cut. Therefore, the question of Russian policy in respect of frozen conflicts is meaningless in practice. If one discards the most common theses about the inad- missibility of conflict resolution by force, and about the possibility of broad dialogue and compromise between the warring parties, it appears that Mos- cow’s attitude toward various conflicts has changed over time, and the unique nature of each of them makes it hard to draw comparisons. It would be more productive to present the con- flicts in the post-Soviet space as a matrix, with val- ues assigned to indicate the extent of the bloodshed (the “bitterness” factor) and the importance of the geopolitical context (the “geopolitics” factor). The bitterness factor shows how much the parties are willing to compromise, the extent to which vio- lence and the memory of violence permeates their relations, and the mutual exclusivity of their visions of the future. The geopolitics factor indicates the de- gree to which the conflict plays a part in the ge neral Russia-West dispute over the post-Soviet space. That said, the position of any given conflict in the matrix is not be set in stone. It is free to move in ac- cordance with the actions of the warring parties and third countries. abkhazia and south ossetia Russia’s approach to settling the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was determined by several factors. First, its own experience of the threat of fragmen- tation and armed separatist movements meant that it was unwilling to consider revising the boundaries of CIS countries. Second, Russia took great pains to stabilize Georgia, largely through military support for Eduard Shevardnadze. Third, Russia’s special re- sponsibility for peace and stability in the post-Soviet space was generally recognized by the West, with which Moscow had no antagonisms on the scale of those of the past decade. Moscow made many attempts to settle the two conflicts. But the obstacle to the settlement was the memory of violence: There was a permanent threat of renewed hostilities. As per the Abkhaz national project, which formed particularly during the conflict years of the early 1990s, Abkhazians inside Georgia faced an existential threat. Russian and Western diplomats put forward fewer initiatives to settle the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, which was essentially eclipsed by the Georgian-Ab- khazian feud next door. Since 1992 the Joint Control Commission, made up of representatives from Geor- gia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and the Russian federal authorities, has been in operation. Despite the ferocity of the conflict, its severe humanitarian consequences, and the mutually exclusive elements in the Georgian and South Ossetian national projects, interaction between the two ethnic communities “on the ground” has frequently been active and positive. The situation around the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts changed after the arrival A statue of former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin is seen from a window shattered by bullets in Gori, Georgia, Aug. 16, 2008. ap 8 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 of Mikhail Saakashvili as president. His attempts to “unfreeze” the conflict, in particular by deploying troops and police forces in South Ossetia in summer 2004, created a new set of problems. The strategy of the Georgian government was aimed at pushing both conflicts into the narrative of the Georgian- Russian confrontation and integrating the latter into the context of the rising discrepancies between Russia and the U.S. on a range of European security issues. Thus, both conflicts were part of the same geopolitical context, which for Russia was associ- ated with existential threats. Not without reason did Russia suppose that Geor- gia expected its NATO aspirations to be rewarded with Alliance patronage for a military operation to establish control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow could not allow such an operation — and not only for humanitarian reasons. Such scenario would also be an indication that Russia’s position on security matters on its very borders could be ig- nored even by a relatively weak country like Georgia. The original text of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan proposed international discussions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its implementation would remove the issue of recognition of the two re- publics as independent states and would preserve, at least legally, the territorial integrity of Georgia. However, the Georgian government rejected this point, which left no option to ensure the safety of residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia other than recognition of their independence. nagorno-karabakh The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is quite different. The protracted fighting with heavy losses on both sides, the fragile cease-fire with continuous clashes and frontline skirmishes, and the very active (espe- cially in Azerbaijan) propaganda of hate make it ex- tremely difficult to achieve a settlement. Nonetheless, there is a stable agreement between the key intermediaries — the members of the Minsk Group — on the principles of settling the conflict. Even the sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the U.S. has not undermined this accord. In July 2015 U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, James Warlick, described the Karabakh issue as “an area where the views of Moscow and Washington actually coincide.” It is this accord that enables the intermedi- aries to just about keep the lid on armed confronta- tion in Karabakh. transnistria The Transnistria conflict has a low bitterness factor. There have been no relapses into violence. The con- flicting parties cooperate on a wide range of issues. At the same time the geopolitical context of the Transn- istria conflict is significant. Under the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, the only obstacle to a resolution of the conflict was the clause on the stationing of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria. At the eleventh hour Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, following a meeting with the U.S. ambassa- dor, refused to sign their already initialed agreement to settle the conflict. For Russia, its continued mili- tary presence in this strategically important area was and remains important in terms of its own security. ukraine The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is similar. Despite the fighting, casualties and humanitarian consequences, the prospect of a settlement with the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (as of March 18, 2014) has not died. The principal difference between this conflict and other conflicts in the post-Soviet space is that the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Re- publics (DPR and LPR) do not insist on independence. The status of the breakaway territories is already set- tled and provided for in the documents signed by the parties: the Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014, and the Minsk II package of measures of February 12, 2015. In accordance with these documents, the DPR and LPR remain part of Ukraine on condition of autonomy. If the cease-fire had been effectively maintained over the past six months, the conflict could be assigned a low bitterness score. The geopolitical context of the Donbas is impor- tant. Ukraine’s foreign policy tug-of-war was one of the causes of the mass protests in Kiev in February 2014. The internal conflict in Ukraine was a major (but not the only) factor in the sharp deterioration in Russia-West relations. Russia wants Ukraine to be over 200,000 people were displaced as a result of the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. The principal difference between the Ukrainian conflict and other conflicts in the post-Soviet space is that the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics do not insist on independence. 9 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 stabilized on a guaranteed non-hostile (i.e. not anti- Russian) basis. Judging by the results of the Nor- mandy Four meetings, this approach is shared by France and Germany. The question of whether the U.S. has the same view remains open. The paradox lies in the fact that Ukrainian officials are now calling for the conflict to be frozen and the settlement to be effectively rejected. how the major powers can help Russia and its Western partners would be advised to recognize that they cannot be totally neutral in resolv- ing conflicts in the post-Soviet space. It should also be remembered that the world knows very few ex- amples of conflict resolution on the basis of recon- solidating a ruptured state. Breakaway Chechnya’s return to Russia is perhaps the only instance, yet this merely underlines how long and complicated the re- covery process can be. Nor should we forget that the resolution of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is an argument in favor of the managed division of formerly integrat- ed states, not their restoration. The conflicts in the post-Soviet space are at various stages of the settle- ment process. The circumstances do not suggest a common approach to resolving these conflicts. The major international players who mediate — or claim to mediate — conflicts should remember that the prospects for settlement depend on the willingness of the parties involved. The 20-year history of conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space is littered with failed peace initia- tives. In fact, the choice faced by the major powers is whether they hold the inhabitants of conflict areas hostage to their geopolitical contradictions. They control the extent to which the geopolitical context is isolated from the conflict settlement process. This means that a broad, equitable and mutually-binding discussion of security in Europe is still relevant. The events of recent years should have convinced every- one on the continent that attempts to build such a system on the basis of unilateral action by NATO or the European Union are counter-productive. A fitting precedent here is the discussion of ways to apply the economic part of the Association Agreement between Kiev and Brussels under the EU-Ukraine-Russia format. Also required is an in- stitutionalized form of cooperation between NATO and the CSTO, no matter how unattainable that may seem at present. But what is needed above all is a new agreement on European security, the ground- work for which could involve a reassessment of the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, but only after having securely ruled out the factor of geopolitical schism on a shared continent. An Ossetian woman stands in front of the house destroyed in a Georgian assault in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. ap 10 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 The thawing of Russia’s frozen conflicts as conflicts broke out in the post- Soviet space, the Western strategy by and large was to support the territorial integrity of states. That approach is now being tested during the current Ukraine crisis. T he term “frozen conflicts” came into gene- ral use in the 1990s to refer to conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Na- gorno-Karabakh, each of which seemed impossible to settle. These conflicts broke out in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Soviet Union was collapsing. They were never really “frozen,” as their nature, dynamics, and prospects changed over time. They were each quite different from the others, with the chief similarity that they all occurred in small states on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. It is therefore difficult to speak of an overall Rus- sian or Western position or strategy at any point in time for all of these conflicts. Perhaps the most important common element in the Western ap- proach to these conflicts has been to support the principle of territorial integrity of states, and to call for the protection of the rights of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria by granting these entities a special, agreed upon political status within the recognized states of Azerbaijan, Georgia or Moldova. This general approach preserves the 1991 decision by the international community to recognize only the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. within their existing borders as independent states, while not affording recognition to subordinate republics or autonomous regions, such as Chechnya. The over- all Western approach has thus been to support ne- gotiations aimed at winning the agreement of the four breakaway entities to return to the states of which they were once a part as Soviet republics. reuters William h. hill 11 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015 the current situation in nagorno-karabakh The situation around Nagorno-Karabakh and the standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to be extremely dangerous. Neither Baku nor Yerevan appears to be at all willing to engage in any of the se- rious compromises necessary to resolve this conflict. In the meantime, Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces remain in close proximity to one another. Vio- lent incidents along the line of contact are a regular occurrence, and there are no serious physical barri- ers to rapid, serious escalation. Some unilateral Russian efforts at mediation in recent years have not produced a settlement, but these do not appear to have seriously weakened the Russian, French, and U.S. cooperation as Minsk Group co-chairs. new tensions in moldova In Moldova, political … Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia’s Periphery Hard Targets and Intelligence Week 3 Duggleby The Florida State University 1 Sovereignty? 2 Let’s address that sovereignty thing again Only states deal with sovereignty and exercise authority over territory States have “national interests,” which drive decision-making and policy History, Culture and Religion play a major role within a state… So does Nationalism, Patriotism and Pride! The United States is the only remaining true super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union 3 What is a ‘Frozen Conflict’? Armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides(1) Russia is responsible for ALL internationally recognized ‘frozen conflicts’ that began since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 Sovereign nations affected represent 1/3 of countries previously part of the USSR: (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) Russia’s response has been to send ‘peacekeepers’, but then remain in the region and ‘stoke the fire’ Moscow’s pretext and justification is the need to ‘protect’ its compatriots—ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (1) It all begins innocently, with attempts to appeal to the geographically conflicted locals by citing common values, the Orthodox Church, culture —leads to handing out Russian citizenship/passports(2) Internal sovereignty is achieved, but external sovereignty is not—no international recognition. The United States and NATO respects the sovereignty of all states affected Agnia Grigas: Frozen Conflicts; A Took Kit for US Policymakers Beyond Crimea, the new Russian empire 4 5 Frozen Conflicts Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers” 6 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) U.S. sponsored, 18-month, $64 million program aimed at increasing the capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and enhancing Georgia’s CT capabilities Began in May, 2002, ultimately trained and equipped four 600-man Special Forces battalions (2 Brigades) with light weapons, vehicles and communications Was US SOF lead in the beginning, shifting to the USMC and the British Army GTEP ended in April 2004, but actually continued under the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, preparing Georgian troops for operations in Iraq 3d largest troop contributor in Afghanistan in 2008. Georgia had its two U.S. trained brigades deployed at the time Russia invaded in August of that year. This was certainly a calculated strategic move by Putin 7 Georgia Frozen Conflicts Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers” 8 9 10 11 Hybrid Warfare Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare.[1] In addition, hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare.[2] This approach to conflicts, is a potent, complex variation of warfare.[3] Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response.[ What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander. Irregular warfare, Informal aggression, cyber. http://yle.fi/uutiset/cyber_security_pro_finland_under_hybrid_warfare_attack/7470050   12 13 This is OSINT, but we get notifications with more intel through sharing 14 “Sanctity of Borders.” “Lack of Respect for the Sovereignty of other Countries.” (Robert Shaw – NATO, Brussels 28 June 2017) Ukraine Ukraine remains at risk of domestic turmoil, which Russia could exploit to undermine Kyiv’s pro-West orientation. These factors will threaten Ukraine’s nascent economic recovery and potentially lead to changes in its foreign policy that further inflame tension between Russia and the West.   Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed standards of living, perceptions of worsening corruption, and political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and legislative elections in 2019 could prompt early elections.   Opposition leaders will seek to capitalize on popular discontent to weaken President Petro Poroshenko and the ruling coalition ahead of elections in 2019. The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and marked by fluctuating levels of violence. A major offensive by either side is unlikely in 2018, although each side’s calculus could change if it sees the other as seriously challenging the status quo. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine to stymie and, where possible, reverse Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Kyiv will strongly resist concessions to Moscow but almost certainly will not regain control of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine in 2018. Russia will modulate levels of violence to pressure Kyiv and shape negotiations in Moscow’s favor.  Russia will work to erode Western unity on sanctions and support for Kyiv, but the Kremlin is coping with sanctions at existing levels. Russia. We expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most likely using new capabilities against Ukraine. The Russian Government is likely to build on the wide range of operations it is already conducting, including disruption of Ukrainian energy- distribution networks, hack-and-leak influence operations, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and false flag operations. In the next year, Russian intelligence and security services will continue to probe US and allied critical infrastructures, as well as target the United States, NATO, and allies for insights into US policy. 15 16 so much for sovereignty! 17 International Actions after 2014 The NATO – Russia Council in Brussels is dissolved in Brussels—Russia told to “go home.” Civilian and Military Cooperation has ceased Agreement still in force on paper – still functioning in a limited manner with occasional talks G-7 member states decided that Russia is no longer welcome because meaningful discussion would not be possible with Russia at the table U.S. – Russia security cooperation programs canceled, permanently impacted: Russian exercises in violation of Vienna Documents by not inviting observers. No transparency Joint Staff Talks Naval Ship Visits Military Exercises and Exchanges Security Assistance and Defense Education The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established as a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. Within the NRC, the individual NATO member states and Russia have worked as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest. The NRC was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality”. The Rome Declaration builds on the goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations. The NRC replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for consultation and cooperation created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In April 2014, following Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including that which took place in the framework of the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on the crisis in Ukraine. Three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place in 2016 and three in 2017. The first meeting in 2018 took place on 31 May. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful political dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, as agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. The NATO-Russia Council has an important role to play as a forum for dialogue and information exchange, to reduce misunderstandings and increase predictability. The 29 individual Allies and Russia are equal partners in the NRC – instead of meeting in the bilateral “NATO+1” format under the PJC.   18 NATO Allies in Europe Russia Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States has declared is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia’s ongoing development of other Treaty-compliant missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make it worth risking the political repercussions of violating the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official stated publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. Other Russian officials have made statements complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not some of its neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 19 20 Transnational Organized Crime Use of Energy as a Weapon Nuclear Power Plant Catastrophe Hybrid Warfare Other Threats 21 Non-kinetic punishment - Energy “RUSSIA’S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT OUTSIDE POWERS (USA, NATO) FROM INTERFERING IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS.”(3) Dunay, Pal, When Outsiders Interfere, per Concordium 22 Two Forever Frozen? Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers” 23 Two Forever Finished? Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers” 24 Problems on Russia’s Periphery 2020 was a year to be remembered. In addition to the myriad challenges surrounding the pandemic, Putin and the Russian Federation faced several problems maintaining it’s sway and influence in the post-Soviet space, taking Putin by surprise by the rapid succession of crises occurring back-to-back on Russia’s periphery: In August 2020, demonstrators in Belarus began staging weekly protests against rigged presidential elections, won “officially” by long-standing leader Alexander Lukashenko In September 2020, the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh thawed, and war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan In October 2020, violent protests led to the ouster of Putin puppet and Kyrgyz president Soornonbay Jeenbekov Problems on Russia’s Periphery and Internal Strife These events affected Vladimir Putin greatly, and contributed to the growing internal problems in the Russian Federation. 4 Warning Signs of Instability: Wage Arrears: Russian workers, primarily in Siberia and the Primorsky regions are not getting paid Russia’s Banking System: Illegal and irresponsible activity, the decline in the price of oil, more workers not getting paid and bankruptcies Political Protests: Economic difficulties leads to social unrest. Russians not getting paid and reduced social services points directly to an inept Putin government Purges: Political and security purges ordered by Putin—basically getting rid of political rivals. Most prominent being Alexey Navalny’s poisoning with Novichok and recent arrest Navalny is important because he epitomizes and catalyzes growing political awareness and a perceptible sentiment for change, especially among younger Russians Recent Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh If the political unrest in Kyrgyzstan and Belarus tested Russia’s handling of “people power,” the outbreak of war again between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 challenged Moscow’s role as the preeminent power in the South Caucasus and threatened the Kremlin’s ability to contain hostilities between the countries Baku (Azerbaijan) is better armed than it has been in the past due to oil revenues and a lot more defense spending on sophisticated weapons Yerevan (Armenia), still has the backing of the Russian Federation, to include Russian bases and troops on its territory “Russia was doing all it could to maintain ties both with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Every day of conflict in Karabakh is helping zero out Russia’s authority. There is nothing good about these conflicts for Moscow.” (Konstantin Zatulin, senior Russian lawmaker and Putin ally) Public Discontent and Cold War-style foreign policies Within Russia, the economic hardship caused by the pandemic has helped deepen public anger against Putin Some analysts say that public discontent within Russia means that Putin needs to turn more of his focus to domestic issues such as economic hardship, pollution and poor health care, rather than delving into global geopolitics Moscow is likely to continue Cold War-style confrontation with the U.S. and its allies, wielding influence through arms and energy agreements, to further its aims In the Western Hemisphere, Russia has expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access to markets and natural resources in Latin America “For Putin, practically his entire mission and his vision of Russian greatness and success revolve around his foreign-policy agenda. The new series of crises will very much distract Putin from domestic problems.” (Tatiana Stanovaya, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center) Desperately seeking solidarity The multinational response to the Skripal attack—in which 27 NATO countries expelled 123 Russian diplomats and spies—remains the single most visible rebuke to the Russian intelligence challenge and also the most powerful example of a potential systemic counter NATO has proven to be a uniquely effective alliance precisely because of the solidarity it embodies: an attack on one member state is an attack on all At NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, it was decided that a ‘hybrid attack’, mainly through cyber, could potentially lead to the invocation of Article 5 and retaliation in kind or kinetically That is a mutual commitment that even Moscow appears to take seriously, for all Western concerns about potential faint-heartedness and division In the context of the NATO alliance, where sharing intelligence and discussing common plans are a daily necessity, member states which fail to invest in their counter-intelligence agencies put not only their own security at risk but also that of their allies Concluding Thoughts Russia has been the cause or enabler of every frozen conflict in the Post Soviet Space Putin seeks multipolarity and continues to destablize the region in his near abroad I believe there will be more, and most of the current crises will not be resolved any time soon. What might be next? Russia is in need of some foreign policy success—aggressive foreign policies unsupported and definitely not popular with the U.S., NATO, UN 30 31