Fluent Essays

CJ 510 Milestone One Guidelines and Rubric Overview: The final project in this course will expose you to a problem situation and task you with how it should be solved. You will imagine you are employed at a criminal justice organization facing a communal problem. Your superior at the organization has asked you to review the problem situation and offer your recommendations. You will be given the chance to evaluate the situation and develop suggestions that will inform development of strategies to address the issue using appropriate ethical and transparent leadership and communication skills. The main purpose of this first milestone of your project is to get you to reflect seriously and write about the case study that you will focus on for your final project. First, review the Final Project Guidelines and Rubric. Second, read these two case studies and choose one to analyze for your final project. To access the case studies, refer to the Harvard Business Review Coursepack Module: 1. NYPD New 2. The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots In a journal, which is private between you and your instructor, reflect on how you think you will approach this final project. Consider what type of research you might need and how you will be able to use the Shapiro Library to conduct research. Prompt: Your journal assignment should include the following critical elements: 1. Identify your selected case study. Discuss why you chose this case study. 2. Explain your research plan and how you plan to gather research to help you with your final project. After reviewing the Final Project Guidelines and Rubric, describe what research you think you will need to gather to support your final project. 3. Based on what you know about leadership in criminal justice, discuss what you think are the main issues or downfalls with the actions of the leadership in the case study. You will learn more about leadership and ethics in criminal justice throughout the course. Use what you know at this point to reflect on your case study. Rubric Guidelines for Submission: Submit assignment as a 2–4 paragraph Word document with double spacing, 12-point Times New Roman font, and one-inch margins. Critical Elements Proficient (100\%) Needs Improvement (80\%) Not Evident (0\%) Value Case Study Identifies the case study and discusses why the case study was chosen Identifies the case study but the reasons for why it was chosen are not well articulated Does not identify the case study 30 Research Plan Explains how research will be gathered for the final project Explains how research will be gathered for the final project, but explanation lacks detail or contains inaccuracies Does not explain how research will be gathered for the final project 30 Main Issues Discusses the main issues or downfalls with the actions of the leadership in the case study Discusses the main issues or Harvard Business School 9-396-293 Rev. June 22, 1999 Professor James L. Heskett prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. 1 NYPD New Commissioner William Bratton and his executive staff could take satisfaction in the progress made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) toward goals they had set at the outset of 1994 to reduce major crimes in the City. Their efforts had produced better results than even some of them had expected, better even than portrayed in the popular television drama carrying the Department’s name. So much better, in fact, that the Commissioner recently had trumpeted the City’s rapidly improving crime record to a bond rating agency responsible for rating New York City’s debt, pointing out that improvements in quality of life would have an eventual favorable impact on the City’s desirability as a place to do business, further strengthening its credit-worthiness. Although the Department was in the process of delivering results desired by the City’s residents, many questioned whether and how the highly-publicized, results-oriented emphasis of Bratton’s first twenty-four months as Commissioner could be sustained. (Exhibit 1 contains a report of New York’s crime statistics compared with other major U.S. cities.) As Bratton’s team of deputy commissioners (civilians) and chiefs (uniformed personnel) gathered in his office on a morning in late January, 1996, he pondered the appropriate strategy that would enable his organization to continue to produce results with the budget shortfalls that the City was experiencing. The Thursday, January 25 copy of The New York Times on his desk, the very same desk used by Teddy Roosevelt when he was Police Commissioner 100 years earlier, carried a front page article headlined, “Giuliani (Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York) Weighing Cuts to Police to Help Decrease Budget Deficit.” It was no surprise, in that it reflected his recent discussions with Mayor Giuliani, whose administration faced a $2 billion (6\%) deficit in fiscal 1995 in spite of significant efforts to reduce the budget. Bratton opened his weekly Executive Staff meeting by pointing out that achieving a further 10\% reduction in major crimes during 1996 was beginning to pale in difficulty and complexity to several other challenges facing the Department. These included reduction in funding from the City, restrictionsKS1029 Case Number 1588.0 This case was written by Susan Rosegrant for Richard Falkenrath, Assistant Professor in Public Policy, and Arnold Howitt, Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, for use at the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Funding was provided by the Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice. (0800) Copyright © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 617-495-9523, fax 617-495-8878, email [email protected], or write the Case Program Sales Office, Kennedy School of Government, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. No part of this publication may be reproduced, revised, translated, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the written permission of the Case Program Sales Office at the Kennedy School of Government The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots (C) In many respects, it was not surprising that Governor Pete Wilson would offer the services of the California National Guard to help quell the riots that had engulfed South Central Los Angeles. The Guard had played a prominent role in responding to civil disturbances during the 1960s, with more than 13,000 troops deployed during the Watts riots alone. As in other parts of the country, Guard troops had also been mobilized to respond to anti-Vietnam protests and other student demonstrations in the 1960s and early 1970s. But over the following two decades, federal and state support to fund National Guard preparedness for civil disturbance responses had tailed off as law enforcement agencies’ need for military support seemed to lessen. Beginning in 1989, staff officers from the Guard had attended a series of meetings with the state Office of Emergency Services (OES) and other law enforcement groups, in part to discuss the National Guard role in mutual aid. Based on the meetings, some officials at the National Guard headquarters concluded that the state’s improved mutual aid system had largely negated the need for Guard troops to respond to civil unrest. As stated in the OES Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, dated October 1991, “Normally, military support will be provided to local jurisdictions only after a request is made by the chief executive of a city or county or sheriff of a county, and only after the disturbance has been determined to be, or to likely become, beyond the capabilities of local law enforcement forces, as supplemented by forces made available under the existing mutual aid agreements.” Under the mutual aid plan, therefore, a police department such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) would first call on the Sheriff’s Department and other local agencies before