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Please check attached details College of Administrative and Financial Sciences Critical Thinking Assignment 1: Module-2 & 3 Deadline: End of Week 3 Course Name: Academic Writing and Research Skills Student’s Name: Fill it Course Code: RES500 Student’s ID Number: Fill it Term: First CRN: fill it Academic Year: 2021 For Instructor’s Use only Instructor’s Name: Students’ Grade: Marks Obtained/Out of 60 marks Level of Marks: High/Middle/Low Regulations: · This assignment is an individual assignment. · Support your submission with course material concepts, principles, and theories from the textbook along with few scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles. · Use Saudi Electronic University academic writing standards and APA style guidelines, citing references as appropriate. · Submit your findings in a 3-4 page document, excluding the title page, abstract and required reference page, which are never a part of the minimum content requirements, in the Assignment Dropbox. · It is strongly encouraged that you submit all assignments to the Turnitin Originality Check (available under Information folder on your Blackboard) prior to submitting them to your instructor for grading. If you are unsure how to submit an assignment to the Originality Check tool, review the TurnItIn Originality Check – Student Guide for step-by-step instructions. An Overview about Assignment submission Time & grades: Type of Assignment Posting Date Due date Marks Grace period* Critical thinking Week 2 End of Week 3 60 3 days * Grace Period: with accepted excuse (accepted by instructor) with deduction of 10\% for late submission Module 2 & 3 Assignment-I: Topic selection & research questions (draft) (60 points) A topic of research should be chosen. It can be either a research paper or a startup concept. Once the topic is finalized, the draft research questions (based on which objectives of the study will be formed) must be developed (not more than three). Each selection must be discussed in detail with logic and rationale. Reasons for the topic should be discussed first followed by discussion on selection of each of the research questions. Answers Topic: The Impact of Employee Motivation on Employee Performance in the Banking Sector in Saudi Arabia Creating a motivational working environment for the employee in any organization is vital as it highly affects the performance of each employee and that of an organization in general. A motivated employee will go the extra mile to offer excellent services. It usually aims to empower and liberalize employees through enhancing their entrepreneurial abilities to interact and work with others (Abusharbeh, & Nazzal, 2018. p. 142). Therefore, motivated employees are highly needed in today’s workplaces. Although Saudi Arabia is a developing nation, it is crucial to the economy for organizations to be well-governed and provide maximum effort at the workplace. The top management and the human resource management team need to have a clear understanding of employees expectations and psychology to meet them. However, in todays competitive world, organizations in different sectors including the banking sector are faced with never-ending challenges on the issue of employee engagement, commitment, retention, recruitment, etc. Organizations are experiencing difficulties in recruiting the right employees whereas only a little percentage of employees are highly engaged in different organizations. Creating a motivational environment within an organization indicates that the management gives the staff the right mixture in terms of resources, rewards, direction, etc. (Nurun Nabi, & Dip TM, 2017. p. 2). This will ensure that employees are always inspired to achieve the set goals within an organization. The human resource team needs to understand that employees are not only motivated by money which has become a challenge for a number of institutions making it difficult to retain, recruit, train employees, etc. This research is undertaken with the aim of finding out the level of employee engagement within an institution in decision-making that can motivate employees. Research Questions The aim of the study will be realized by answering the following research questions. 1. How do the Intrinsic and Extrinsic motivational factors impact employee performance in the banking sector of Saudi Arabia? 2. How do the workplace environment and sound communication with top management impacts employee performance in the banking sector of Saudi Arabia? 3. Where do the employees desire to see themselves after 10 years of working performance in the banking sector of Saudi Arabia? The Rationale of the Research Questions RQ1: How do the intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors impact employee performance in the banking sector of Saudi Arabia? The above research question has been set in order to analyze how intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors within the bank are likely to impact employee performance. Employees motivation has for long been categorized into two main categories, which include intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. The intrinsic motivation factors involve individuals undertaking a certain activity since it is enjoyable or interesting. The rewards achieved with the intrinsic motivation factors are psychological rewards e.g. sense of accomplishment, belonging, competence, etc. (Mishra, & Mishra, 2017. p. 31). In the contrast, extrinsic motivation in an organization involves doing something because it leads to separate outcomes e.g. an employee is likely to put in extra effort since they want to earn a bonus at the end of the month. Therefore, the research question will help to evaluate how each of the motivation factors will impact employees performance within the Saudi Arabian banking sector. RQ2: How do the workplace environment and sound communication with top management impacts employee performance in the banking sector of Saudi Arabia? Research indicates that if the working environment and good communication between employees and the management are one of the factors that increase employee performance. Employees will perform exemplarily since there is convenience. Performance appraisal and job enrichment are some of the motivating factors that can be adopted in an organization. Some of the employees are well aware that appraisal will better their performance while others feel pressurized by the management. According to Nurun Nabi, & Dip TM, (2017. p. 2), performance appraisal tend to boost the morale of the employee and also motivate them to work better towards achieving the set goals. Therefore, the research question will help to know how the workplace environment impacts employee performance. RQ3: Where do the employees desire to see themselves after 10 years of working in the bank? According to Iyer, et al. (2017. p. 750), when the employee feels that they have a great future in the organization that they are working at, they are likely to work with more efficiency in order to improve the performance of the company. Therefore, the availability of growth opportunities and future prospects is a great motivator and thus it should be established. However, organizations are facing challenges on employees retention which can be due to the lack of growth opportunities for the employees (Nurun Nabi, & Dip TM, 2017. p. 2). Answering this research question as to where the employees in the Saudi Arabia banking sector see themselves in the next ten years will determine if these companies have established any growth opportunity initiatives for the employees. In addition, it will contribute to the studies that sought to determine if the challenge of employee retention is a result of the lack of establishment of growth opportunities for the employees. References Abusharbeh, M. T., & Nazzal, H. H. (2018). The impact of motivations on employee’s performance: A case study from Palestinian commercial banks. International Business Research, 11(4), 142-153. DOI:10.5539/ibr.v11n4p142 Mishra, S., & Mishra, S. (2017). Impact of intrinsic motivational factors on employee retention among Gen Y: A qualitative perspective. Parikalpana: KIIT Journal of Management, 13(1), 31-42. http://www.i-scholar.in/index.php/Parikalpana/article/view/151269 Nurun Nabi, I. M., & Dip TM, H. A. (2017). Impact of motivation on employee performances: a case study of Karmasangsthan bank Limited, Bangladesh. Arabian J Bus Manag Review, 7(293), 2. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/55147792/impact-of-motivation-on-employee-performances-a-case-study-of-karmasangsthan-bank-limited-bangladesh-1-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1631786920&Signature=EazEfeeB5USvVJesKVA1xpxu92IcRungpjdbLx~DiCn6~2ikt0vC6cqRKWX3xgE7PB4yT-0Cpb8Zhi49QtRlnsdNSYxo4Mizc2sxZVctySQLg-SwKEK4U7S~HokB0KpeUm~hEbl-Zd38FZ~ljIMOuVBPn4eLiB70h1k0yHAOvElSJiS9F6k6BYIleObh32bZAiQTISNKUPYykdAObVGzGZvmmyb4~BNY2XYVthYOGN5A94cKGeD-Y-wVYBpSmgZhm7dMz1X3cPPnWMWA0-qJ16c7T-UmYsDK52E5RkfA8FUvhTJEHDz9iADgP~o7KoxLPTHUW6HZTPrbfzIVcmfDhw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA Iyer, A., Zhang, A., Jetten, J., Hao, Z., & Cui, L. (2017). The promise of a better group future: Cognitive alternatives increase students’ self‐efficacy and academic performance. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56(4), 750-765. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12201 2 Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey: The Vatican and the Diyanet to the Test of Politics Luca Ozzano Università di Torino (Turin) Chiara Maritato Università di Torino University of Graz Abstract: For centuries, Rome and Istanbul have been representing and epitomizing two empires and two entities with both significant spiritual and temporal power: the Papacy and the Caliphate. During the 19th and the 20th centuries, these institutions underwent significant changes in a context of state secularization: in the case of the Papacy, there was a loss of temporal power and its “reduction” to a mainly moral authority; the Caliphate, on the other hand, was abolished after World War I, succeeded by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a bureaucratic body under state control, founded in the era of Kemalist secularism. Despite these changes, today both institutions still play a significant role in the public life and public policies of the Italian and the Turkish republics. While the Vatican is able to influence the Italian public sphere and public discourse through both its influence on common people and its lobbying activities in relation to political decision-makers, in Turkey the Diyanet has become the main tool in the reshaping of Turkish society (both by the Kemalists and, later, by Erdoğan’s AKP). This paper will analyze their influence on the two countries’ public policies in relation to religious pluralism and to family-related issues, to show how different ideas of secularism, institutional arrangements, and historical paths have led to a very different role of the two institutions in the Italian and Turkish political systems. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Luca Ozzano, Dipartimento di culture, politica e società, Università di Torino, Lungo Dora Siena 100, Torino, TO, 10153, Italy. E-mail: luca. [email protected]; Chiara Maritato, Università di Torino, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]; University of Graz, Austria. E-mail: [email protected] 457 Politics and Religion, 12 (2019), 457–477 © Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, 2018 doi:10.1017/S1755048318000718 1755-0483/19 mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] INTRODUCTION Secularization—defined as the idea “that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society” (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 3)—is a multi-faceted process. It involves politics (with “the emancipation of state apparatuses from reli- gious bodies and values”), society (with people less and less referring to religion in their everyday life), and religion itself (with changes in the organization and identity of religious organizations and their relations with the mundane world) (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016, 6). Secularization is today a very controversial concept, both because many regard it as inap- plicable outside the western world or contradicted by the so-called “return of religion”, and also because some scholars question the veracity of the concept itself (Casanova 1994; Huntington 1996; Haynes 1997; Stark 1999; Bhargava 2006). Yet, it is undeniable that political secularism has played a crucial role in the formation and development of contempo- rary European democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Kuru 2009). Political secularism, an “ideology or set of beliefs advocating that religion ought to be separate from all or some aspects of politics or public life (or both)” is by nature a concept imbued with tension, because of its compe- tition with religion for the control of the political agenda (Fox 2015, 2). This paper tries to develop this point by analyzing the cases of Italy and Turkey. The two countries are particularly relevant in terms of relations between religion and politics because they were for centuries not only two of the main political centers of Europe and the Mediterranean world but also the seats of the area’s two main religious institutions: the Papacy and the Caliphate. However, with the construction of the modern secular state, the two institutions underwent significant changes: in the case of the papacy, with the loss of any significant temporal power and— ultimately—the transformation into a transnational actor; and in the case of the caliphate, with the abolition of the institution, later replaced by the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs), a state agency directly controlled by the government (Berkes 1998; Gözaydın 2008). The paper will compare the Vatican and the Diyanet, in a “most dissimilar cases” perspective, trying to understand, first, which impact and consequences the different choices made by the Italian and Turkish state elites at the time of the creation of the two national states had on the development of the two institutions; sec- ondly, it will try to understand if, despite the obvious differences, we can detect similarities between them and their strategies; and, finally, what these differences and similarities imply for the influence of the two institutions 458 458 Ozzano and Maritato on state policies in some sensitive policy areas. More broadly, the conclud- ing remarks will also sketch some reflections on what the comparison carried out in this paper means for the broader theories on political secular- ism and the role of religion in politics. If we look at the literature, we can see a certain reification of the terms “religion” and the “state”, as well as an essentialization of secularism as an ideology, which goes hand in hand with the elaboration of taxonomies pigeonholing different typologies of states. Ahmet Kuru (2009, 8–9) dis- tinguishes between two notions of secularism: the first one is “assertive”, where the state plays an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere, keeping it in the private domain and, thereby, protecting itself from religion; the second one is “passive”, where the state plays a passive role, and does not prevent religion from engaging with the public arena. Describing a different kind of relationship between religion and the state, Rajeev Bhargava identifies three levels of connection and disconnec- tion: (1) ends, (2) institutions and personnel, (3) law and public policy. While theocracies have a complete connection at each of the three levels, states with established religions have institutional disconnection (Bhargava 2006). Although secular states are disconnected from religion at each of the three levels, as shown by many typologies of church-state relations (Haynes 1997; Enyedi and Madeley 2004), not all European states have secularized in the same way. Particularly, although most European coun- tries today officially declare themselves “secular”, some of them are marked by an institutional separation (insofar this is possible in the real world) between state and churches; others are instead marked by the pres- ence of some kind of influence between the two institutions and/or by mechanisms of state control over religion (usually as the result of the pre- dominance of an assertive idea of secularism). These institutional differ- ences became particularly evident after the 1980s, with the “return of religion” to the public sphere (Kepel 1991; Casanova 1994; Haynes 2007), bringing back the sacred as a relevant factor and questioning the “post-secularity” (Bailey 2013; Wilson 2014) or the “multiple seculari- ties” (Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr 2013) of contemporary societies. Moreover, the fact that religious organizations can play an independent role or act as instruments of political power can imply very different con- sequences both in terms of the role of religion in the public sphere and in relation to public policies. Assessed from this angle, political secularism is a socio-historical process, rather than an ideology. Moreover, quoting Saba Mahmood (2009, 836–7), “secularism is understood not simply as 459 Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey 459 the doctrinal separation of the church and the state but the rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance.” This point is crucial since it helps us to conceptu- alize one of the main issues at stake in this contribution: the intertwined relation between power and religion is not only one of the conditions leading to the formation of the nation-state. As Talal Asad highlights, while “secularisation” is a historical process, “secularism” is a political doctrine (Asad 2003, 1–10). Therefore, the latter also epitomizes and call to fully investigate to what extent and how religion might be embed- ded, becoming an instrument of governance (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2005) or an independent actor and influential power. The paper will show how different institutional developments have trans- lated into different patterns of activity of the Vatican and the Diyanet in the domestic public spheres of Italy and Turkey, with the former acting as a powerful independent player, and the latter playing the role of a transmis- sion belt to convey to the population the idea of religion of the power elite (with a secularist outlook during the 20th century, and today with an increasingly pro-Sunni Islamic attitude). The second part of the paper will show what this different role means in terms of advocacy and influence on public policies in relation to two particularly sensitive issues for religious organizations: the family, and the treatment of religious minorities. The Vatican State and Italian Society Between Autonomy and Inference The Vatican was for many centuries the main religious power in Western Europe, but also a very powerful power broker among European rulers. In the Italian peninsula, it enjoyed an even stronger leverage because it directly governed a large portion of central Italy through the Pontifical State. It was only with the revolutionary movements of 1848 and the process of unification, that led to the establishment of the Italian Kingdom in 1861, that the Vatican lost most of its territories. This process culminated in 1870 when the Italian Kingdom’s conquest of Rome relegated the Vatican’s power to a small portion of the city. Moreover, the authorities of the new national state were inspired by secu- larist ideologies: they introduced the separation between Church and State, revoked most of the Church’s privileges, banished several religious orders, abolished ecclesiastic tribunals, and created new institutions such as civil marriage and a secular public education system (Verucci 1999). 460 460 Ozzano and Maritato As a consequence, the Pope refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the new state and retired within the Vatican as a voluntary political pris- oner. With the encyclical Non Expedit (1874), the Church prohibited Catholics from participating in the Italian state’s political institutions and promoted abstention from voting. At the same time, the Church mobi- lized energies at the grassroots level, through the promotion of Catholic associationism in order to try to re-conquer society from below (Lyon 1967; Menozzi 1997). Both this Catholic involvement in civil society, and the rising threat of the Socialist movement at the political level were crucial in inspiring the papacy to soften the Non Expedit in 1905, and then to utterly revoke it in 1919. Not by chance, this year also marked the birth of the first real Catholic political party, the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) led by Father Luigi Sturzo. The party, although promoting cornerstones of the Catholic perspective such as religious freedom and the family, was offi- cially secular, without systematic connections to the Vatican and aiming at representing different social classes (Moos 1945; Almond 1948). Although the party was rather successful in the 1919 and 1921 elec- tions, the Church was ready to disavow it in exchange for an agreement with the new Fascist regime (The Patti Lateranensi, 1929), which recog- nized Catholicism as the state religion and gave back to the Church some of its prerogatives (Coppa 1995). However, the relation between the Church and the Fascist regime was also, at times, quite tense, especially in relation to the Church’s youth activities. Indeed, many of the future Italian political leaders grew up politically within Catholic associations such as Azione Cattolica and the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI). The new Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party, created underground in 1942, became in the following decades the hegemonic power of Italian politics, and the point of reference of most Catholics until a pronounced political crisis in the early 1990s. Although the new party was also officially secular, and developed a “catch-all” outlook (Ozzano 2013) its “associational nexus” was evident, with the Church (and the powerful and widespread Catholic associational network) playing the role of a powerful mobilization resource for the Catholic vote, but also, at times, a source of tensions for the party (Scoppola 2006). In the meantime, both Italian society and the Vatican underwent momentous changes: the former experiencing secularization processes (with very contentious moments such as the legalization of abortion and divorce, both involving popular referenda); the second updating its views on crucial points such as democracy and the role of laymen after 461 Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey 461 Vatican Council II (1962–5). Catholic civil society also developed further with the birth and growth of new powerful religious movements such as Comunione e Liberazione and the Focolare movement (Garelli 2006; Faggioli 2008). Despite these changes, the DC managed to keep hold of power, also thanks to strategic alliances with center-left parties, until a major corruption scandal, Tangentopoli, swept away most of the Italian political class in 1992/1993, making possible the rise to prominence of new conservative and right-wing forces such as Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and the Lega Nord (LN). New, smaller Catholic parties were thus created within both the center-left and the center-right coalitions, while also mainstream center-left and center- right parties often included strong Catholic wings, and new political entre- preneurs tried to exploit the Catholic vote (Giorgi 2013). At the same time, this situation paved the way for a new role for the Catholic Church, which, through the so-called “cultural project”, promoted, since the mid-1990s, a “re-Christianization” of society from below, and cast itself as an autonomous power broker in Italian politics (Magister 2001; Garelli 2007). This became particularly evident in the mid-2000s, with an identity-oriented turn in Italian politics and public spheres, marked on the one hand by Catholic and right-wing engagement on controversial issues such as LGBT rights, the beginning of life, and the religious symbols in public schools, and, on the other, by a right-wing turn of the Italian political debate in relation to immigration and religious minorities (a position not shared, in this case, by the Church, but supported by many conservative grassroots Catholics) (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). A State Agency Governing Religion: The Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) During the Ottoman Empire, the caliph sultan was at the head of temporal and religious administration and responsible for appointing and dismissing the highest rank in religious affairs, the Şeyhü’l-I ˙ slâm. The Şeyhü’l-I ˙ slâm was supposed to legitimize the sultan’s policies from a religious point of view; at the same time, however, the ulemas had a considerable influence on the Empire administration, at least until the mid-19th century. In 1924, 1 year after the proclamation of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) abolished the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations (Şer’iye ve Evkaf Vekâleti) which replaced the Şeyhü’l- I ˙ slâm. By the Law 429, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, Diyanet 462 462 Ozzano and Maritato I ˙ şleri Reisliği (hereafter the Diyanet) was established as an administrative unit attached to the office of the Prime Minister. In accordance with Act 429, the Diyanet was given the mandate to a threefold duty: (1) to execute services regarding Islamic faith and practices; (2) to enlighten society about true (doğru) religion, that is Sunni Hanefi school of interpre- tation, and (3) to manage the places of worship. According to Gözaydın, the Kemalist elite had arranged the Diyanet so that the people could accept an Islamic identity in line with the construct of the state itself (Gözaydın 2009, 278). Although secularism or better laicism (in Turkish laiklik) constitutes one of the core principles of Kemalism, the Republican foundation ideology, the civil and military westernized bureaucratic cadres constituting at the time the ruling elite “sought to adapt the religion of the majority into a new religion of the Republic as an instrument in socialising well-disciplined Republican citi- zens” (Berkes 1998, 495). In the impossibility to reach and wholly control the remote peripheries of Turkish society (Mardin 1973, 179–187), the Kemalist elite opted for an “assertive secularism” in which religion was subordinated to the state and absorbed into its revolutionary mission.” (Kuru 2007, 582). This is the reason why merely to consider Turkish secularism as a state’s assertive attempt to tame and control religion does not paint the whole picture. This mission was accompanied by the intent to transform religion into a set of “rational beliefs” far from superstitions and false beliefs. As Davison clearly expressed: “Islam was not disestablished; it was differently established.” (Davison 2003, 341) Within this framework, the Diyanet epitomized the Kemalist elite’s will to tame religion in accordance with the needs of the state (Yavuz 2000, 28–29). However, such a state control over religion should be attentively assessed to avoid one-way explanations relegating the Diyanet’s bureaucracy to the role of an uncritical yielding actor (Sakallioğlu 1996, 236). The Diyanet’s role and functions were anything but static and evolved according to the political opportunities structure shaping the power relations in Turkey. The decision to set up an institution which subordinated the control of “official” Sunni religion to the government, created thus a very different situation than in the Italian case: while the Vatican, although disempow- ered at first, could remain an independent institution, the Caliphate—a “transnational” institution—was replaced by a national bureaucratic body under the control of the Turkish State. In the following decades, while the Vatican was able to pursue its own strategies, the Diyanet became thus little more than a megaphone for the current ruling elites. 463 Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey 463 The introduction of a multiparty competition between 1945 and 1950, resulted in as a first attempt to reinvigorate the presence of Islam in Turkish public sphere. This occurred through measures such as the deci- sion to open the Qur’an courses, the reintroduction of religious lessons in the state schools, the opening of the Faculty of Theology in Ankara and the religious vocational schools (Imam Hatip Okullari) in 1949 (Yavuz 2003, 59–81). Religious brotherhoods, as well as political entre- preneurs, contributed to the mobilizing of the religious conservative elec- torate, fostering the legitimacy of religion in politics. From the 1970s to the 1990s, pro-Islamic political parties1 representing and mobilizing an “Islamic” and often marginalized electoral basin were established. Against the backdrop, the Diyanet’s visibility and influence were fostered too: its duties now aimed “to carry out affairs related to the beliefs, worship and moral foundations of Islam, to enlighten Turkish society about religion and to manage places of worship” (Gözaydın 2008, 220). In the same period, the elaboration of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Türk-Islam Sentezi), a doctrine which became the official ideology of cold-war Turkey, particularly in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, concurred in officially reshaping the place of Islam in Turkey’s national identity (Eligür 2010, 93–102; Birtek and Binnaz 2011, 14–18). The Diyanet’s role evolved again: from an agency embodying a domesticated religion, to a ruling instrument in the hands of political power by which maintaining the conservative status quo. Moreover, the 1982 Constitution clearly stated (Art. 136) that the Diyanet is charged with the promotion of “national solidarity and integrity”. The use of Islam as an instrument of social control against the leftist’s ethnic (Kurds) and reli- gious (Alevi) forces wavered in 1997. On February 28, a military coup restored a muscled laicism shutting down Erbakan’s Islamist “Welfare Party” government, imposing a strict control religion and cleansing it from the public sphere. (Yavuz 2000, 39) In the aftermath of the 1997 Coup, what Cihan Tuğal brilliantly described as the moderation of political Islam through its of absorption by capitalism (Tuğal 2009) led to the estab- lishment of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP). In the early 2000s, the party formed an alliance of convenience with a different group of actors, including pro-EU liberal intellectuals, and the Gülen movement— a religious, political, and economic network headed by the preacher Fethullah Gülen (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016, 511). The dominant coalition’s common goal was to bring Islam to a prom- inent position in Turkish society while disassembling the military’s tute- lage; therefore, in the early 2000s, the Diyanet “[…] strengthened its 464 464 Ozzano and Maritato relations to religious publics and the party’s domestic and international politics” (Tepe 2016, 178). From 2003 to 2010, at that time President of the institution, Ali Bardakoğlu, talked about religion as a “social phenom- enon” (Bardakoğlu 2009) and invited Diyanet’s male and female person- nel to engage beyond the mosques to diffuse morality and religious knowledge among society. The Diyanet has today become one of the biggest state agencies. Employing about 120,000 people, in 2016 it had competences over a total of 87,381 mosques all over Turkey2. However, little has changed in terms of independence and capability to carry out its own agenda. Moreover, while in the Italian case the Vatican has to deal with several political entrepreneurs from different political areas, willing to exploit reli- gion for different ends, the concentration of power and religious legiti- macy in the hands of a single party, the AKP, has made even more difficult for the Diyanet to escape political control. This influence of politics on the institution has become even stronger from 2010 and, particularly from 2013, after the split between the AKP and the Gülen movement, which has led the AKP to establish itself as the dominant force in Turkey’s politics (Başer and Öztürk 2017; Watmough and Öztürk 2018). In this context of hegemonic and authoritar- ian power grab, the Diyanet risks to lose its residual autonomy and plural- ism (Öztürk 2016). The future of Turkish laiklik and the ontological meaning of the Diyanet as a state institution are at stake. THE VATICAN AND THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM As mentioned above, until the 1980s the Vatican could rely on a strong connection —although sometimes marked by disagreements and confron- tational tones—with the DC party. With the demise of this latter, and the return of religion in the public sphere worldwide (Kepel 1991; Casanova 1994)—which provided more legitimacy to the role of religion in politics—the Holy See on the one hand had to face a plethora of political entrepreneurs willing to exploit the Catholic vote basin (Diamanti 2009); on the other, however, it had the opportunity to play the role of a powerful independent actor. This was also made possible by the wide popularity of the Church as an institution in Italian society, also among many secular- ized people (Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007; Pace 2007). The influence of the Church in the past two decades and a half (after the end of the so-called “first Republic’) has been wielded in several different 465 Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey 465 ways. If we look particularly at the policy areas of family and immigration/ religious pluralism, at least three different modalities emerge.” The first is direct lobbying of the Church hierarchies on policymakers, made possible by the presence of many Catholics among the political leaders of all major coalitions, all willing to tap the Catholic vote base (Galli 2004). Catholic-oriented parties often enjoyed good relations with the Church hierarchies, which the Vatican could exploit to summon them in times of controversy. This was particularly true during Camillo Ruini’s presidency of the Conference of Italian Bishops (CEI) (1991– 2007), when Ruini elaborated the so-called Cultural Project, aiming at restoring the Church’s influence on Italian society (Magister 2001; Garelli 2006, 2007). For example, between 2006 and 2007, during the liveliest phases of the negotiations on a draft bill aimed at legalizing same-sex civil unions, Monsignor Camillo Ruini and other high-ranking CEI cardinals had several meetings (despite a strong criticism from secular left-wingers) with Catholic leaders of the centre-left coalition such as Clemente Mastella, Francesco Rutelli and Prime Minister Romano Prodi himself. This lobbying activity, in addition to other strategies, managed to water down more and more the text of the bill and, ultimately, to block the project (Ozzano 2015; Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). Another modality of influence frequently used by the Vatican are appeals to public opinion. This kind of influence is made possible by the legitimacy and credibility of the Church among wide sectors of the Italian population, also in times of advanced secularization, when, for example, church attendance has dramatically dropped. This is shown by recent surveys about Italians’ most trusted institutions, which regularly show the Church around or above the 50\% threshold: a result well above the European average, which has further increased in recent years, thanks to Pope Francis’s popularity among many nonbelievers (Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007; Pace 2007; Martino and Ricucci 2016). This popularity is mirrored, and amplified, by a media system which is ready to report and emphasize statements by the Pope and other Church officials, as well as by politicians and other visible people commenting on them (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). This does not mean that such state- ments are well received by all political forces, as shown by the strong leftist criticism against the Church’s interventions in the debate on same-sex unions. On the other hand, in relation to the Vatican’s position on immigration and religious pluralism, which welcomes immigrants and is rather favorable to their inclusion in the Italian society, we can witness a 466 466 Ozzano and Maritato strong right-wing criticism (voiced, for example, in the words of the leaders of the Lega Nord party) (Guolo 2011). Finally, the Vatican is influent through the Catholic civil society. Italy has been in the past decades a fertile incubator for many kinds of Catholic movements and associations, from wide umbrella associations and groups such as Azione Cattolica and Comunione e Liberazione, to smaller specialized associations gathering parents, entrepreneurs, teach- ers, medical doctors, or jurists (Giorgi and Polizzi 2015; Faggioli 2016). This thick associational fabric grants the Church a twofold set of oppor- tunities to intervene in Italian society. First, Catholic associations and charities are directly involved in social work. For example, associations such as Caritas are directly and significantly involved in providing many migrants with shelter, foods, drugs and other primary goods and ser- vices: an activity which is not appreciated by the traditionalist-commu- nitarian right (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2010), which would prefer all resources to be directed to poor Italians. On the other hand, the Catholic associational world can mobilize or be mobilized to support the Vatican’s position on sensitive issues, or to try to prevent the approval of the undesired legislation. This latter was the case, for example, of the complex strategy deployed by Catholics in … The Normative Power of Secularism. Tunisian Ennahda’s Discourse on Religion, Politics, and the State (2011–2016) Hanna Pfeifer Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg Abstract: By critically engaging the literature on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this paper seeks to show how the normative structure of secularism constitutes, enables, and restricts the discursive space in which Islamists can justify political action. It analyzes changes in Tunisian Ennahda’s discourse (2011–2016) as an attempt to navigate between standards of recognition imposed on them by the normative power of secularism on the one hand, and what they can convincingly integrate into their own platform on the other hand. It has often been assumed that, once they achieve power, Islamists would try to Islamize society through the state by implementing Islamic law and reversing previous societal and political secularization processes (Scott 2014). This prediction is based on several premises: first, it assumes that the captured state had previously been secular. Second, it posits that Islamists pursue the goal of Islamizing the state. Third, it presumes that there is a clear, universal dividing line between the “religious” and the “political” as a secular sphere. Recent scholarship suggests that these assumptions need to be revised. The state, in particular in the Middle East, has never been as secular as a liberal ideal would suggest (Cesari 2014). Meanwhile, many Islamist actors have distanced themselves from I am very grateful to Jeff Haynes and Erin Wilson, two anonymous reviewers, as well as the editors of this journal for very constructive criticism and helpful comments on how to frame this paper and make a more convincing theoretical argument. Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Hanna Pfeifer, Institute of International Politics, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043 Hamburg, Germany. E-mail: [email protected] 478 Politics and Religion, 12 (2019), 478–500 © Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, 2019 doi:10.1017/S1755048319000075 1755-0483/19 mailto:[email protected] the idea of an Islamic state— they have become post-Islamist (Bayat 2013; Roy 2012). Despite the increasingly critical academic discourse at a theoretical and empirical level, Islamists are still met with a lot of scepticism. The suspi- cion that Islamists in power will eventually leave the democratic game and pursue an anti-pluralist program of Islamization has been nurtured by recent developments in Turkey, where the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has not only made several reforms to re-Islamize society and politics, but increasingly engages in authoritarian practices of rule (Bayulgen, Arbatli, and Canbolat 2018). It is in this context that Tunisian Ennahda re-emerged on the political scene after the ousting of long-time authoritarian ruler Ben Ali in 2011: not only did it gain significant portions of the votes in several elections, it also formed and participated in several government coalitions for the first time since its foundation. During this phase, as many observers have stated, Ennahda made significant concessions to its secular coalition partners and the opposition, and its discourse underwent significant changes, in particular with regard to how it conceptualizes the relationship between religion, politics, and the state. This paper traces and discusses these discursive changes (2011–2016) in the context of two debates: the inclusion-moderation (IM) paradigm and the politics of secularism. It argues that Ennahda has been exposed to significant pressure that led to these discursive changes. This pressure emerged from what I call the normative power of secularism: secularism has become a standard of recognition of political actors as legitimate, both at a domestic Tunisian and an international level. However, secular- ism, as it is used here, is not understood as a substantial concept. While there are versions of political secularism in western political thought that name more or less precise standards for how to separate the political and the religious (Rawls 1993; Habermas 2009), I follow those authors who have put forward the notion of the politics of secularism. They hold that secularism is not a universal, abstract, neutral, let alone natural principle according to which religion and politics, or religion and the state, are and need to be separated. Rather, they understand secularism as a form of (state) power to politically draw the line between politics and religion. This power is found in both discursive structures and state practice. I will argue that Ennahda’s inclusion into Tunisian political pro- cesses exposed it to secularism’s normative power to which it reacted, among others, by adapting its discourse on religion, politics, and the state. 479 The Normative Power of Secularism 479 The paper proceeds in three steps. In a first step, I will briefly review recent debates about IM hypothesis with regard to Islamist actors. Going back to the paradigmatic claims about IM in Jillian Schwedler’s (2006) work, I argue that, while it is not necessarily helpful to think about Islamist politics in terms of “moderation,” her arguments may help us focus on the normative structures that constitute, enable, and restrict the discursive space in which Islamists can justify political action. In the second part, I connect this argument to the debate on the pol- itics of secularism. Secularism has become the core normative structure which Islamists have to navigate in once they enter the political scene, and in particular when they are in government responsibility. I will sketch how the politics of secularism was already influential on Ennahda’s program before its re-entering of the political scene in 2011, i.e., under the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. In the third, empirical part of the paper, I will retrace three phases of Ennahda’s discourse (2011– 2016) after the fall of Ben Ali: (1) the formulation and re-formulation of abstract ideas on religion, politics, and the state; (2) Ennahda’s renounce- ment of an Islamist identity and the recasting of its self-image as a Muslim democratic party; and (3) the discursive creation of a new “Other,” the Tunisian Salafists, as a threat. The conclusion discusses these discursive changes with regard to their credibility and potential risks they may entail. THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE STRUCTURES IN THE INCLUSION-MODERATION DEBATE Much research has been devoted to the question if and how Islamists can become democratic actors. One important paradigm for answering this question is the so-called inclusion-moderation hypothesis (IMH) (Schwedler 2006). It assumes that Islamist actors who enter pluralist polit- ical processes, or even party competition, become more moderate. Since its thorough theoretical development and popularization by Schwedler and others, the IMH has been modified, tested, and criticized by different authors in the field of Middle Eastern Studies, and, importantly, it was used for empirically investigating Islamists’ actual political practice (Schwedler 2011). Recent debates on the IMH revolved, among others, around the following issues relevant for this paper. First, a very basic, yet problematic distinction in the IMH literature is the one between “moderates” and “radicals.” In the literature on Islamists and democratization, there are three basic meanings to this distinction. The 480 480 Pfeifer first understanding emerged from the literature on democratic transitions. It views “moderates” as those who support and “radicals” as those who oppose democratic reforms within the existing authoritarian system (Clark 2006, 541). Somewhat counterintuitively, “radicals” may be more demo- cratic than “moderates” in this interpretation: the latter settle for small reforms, thereby confirming and reproducing authoritarian state power, whereas the former “demand substantive systemic change and strongly oppose the power configurations of the status quo” (Schwedler 2011, 350). A second understanding opposes those who resort to violence (“radi- cals”) to those who do not (“moderates”). This distinction allows for a separation of militant Islamists from those who participate in elections. However, it does not tell us anything about why groups resort to violence. One implication of this is that Salafi jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, end up in the same category as Islamic resistance movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas, who use violence in the context of occupation. Conversely, groups that do not advocate nor resort to violence in the here and now may still adhere to a revolutionary and maybe highly exclu- sionary ideology (Schwedler 2011, 350–51). Finally, the distinction makes actors such as Hezbollah appear as hybrids: they both participate in elections and are even part of the government, and resort to violence (Bokhari and Senzai 2013, 169). This is why a final distinction refers to a group’s ideological stance on the question of participation in a democratic polity. There are those who are (or would be) ready to become part of a democratic system, even though they might not subscribe to a western-style liberal form of democ- racy, and others who reject the participation in any form of secular poli- tics, be they democratic or authoritarian (Clark 2006, 541). In light of a variety of positions Islamists may embrace with regard to different issues, Schwedler and others have put forward arguments for abandoning “moderate” and “radical” as labels for groups. She suggests using the term of moderation instead, thus focusing on the “movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives” (Schwedler 2006, 3, emphasis added). Emphasizing the process of moderation, rather than the category “mod- erate,” involves a second important distinction: “behavioral” (sometimes also tactical or strategic) versus “ideological” moderation. Behavioral moderation is the most common form of moderation analyzed in the liter- ature on democratic transitions. It assumes a causal relationship between regime-induced liberalization and democratization processes and the mod- eration of political actors who are subjected to newly emerging 481 The Normative Power of Secularism 481 institutional structures of opportunity and constraint. Islamists, then, sup- posedly become more moderate simply by virtue of the institutional checks and balances set up in a democratizing system. What this perspec- tive cannot assess, however, is the extent to which this behavioral moder- ation is merely provisional. Schwedler (2006, 18) refers to this problem as the “paradox of democracy”: actors may use democratic mechanisms—e.g., elections—to rise to power, only to abolish these very institutions once they can. Picking up this thesis, authors have argued that Islamist moderation through inclusion may remain purely tactical, i.e., a way to postpone the actual “battle.” As Zeyno Baran (2008, 57) has argued with regard to Turkish AKP as early as 2008, its inclusion into the Turkish political system and rise to power may not have made them “Muslim democrats,” but rather “patient Islamists” who opt for a slow, bottom-up strategy of re- Islamizing the state. Similarly, Mehmet Gurses observes that “support for democracy seems to be provisional and conditioned by whether Islamists are in power or what issue is at stake” (Gurses 2012, 651). Janine A. Clark (2006, 541) finds that cooperation can lead to moderation, which she defines as “a greater acceptance and understanding of democracy, political liberties, and the rights of women and minorities,” but that it may remain limited and selective in that it occurs with regard to procedural rather than substantive issues of democracy. This is why Schwedler holds that, in order to be meaningful, moderation must refer to ideology rather than behavior. Moderation, then, is a “change in ideology from a rigid and closed worldview to one relatively more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives” (Schwedler 2006, 22). Schwedler herself and others have become increasingly sceptical about the analytical value of the behavioral–ideological for understanding Islamist politics. The core problem is that moderation carries a sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit normative baggage with it (Schwedler 2011, 371, emphasis in original): “(W)e want Islamists to become more moder- ate, and so we prioritize causal arguments about which mechanisms produce (…) moderation.” Similarly, Kasper Ly. Netterstrøm (2015) reminds us that “moderate” can only be a relative term, but he rightfully criticizes that this relationality is rarely made explicit. In cases where the normative standard is disclosed, moderation is often used to state that an actor becomes more democratic or more secular, which begs the question what conceptual value “moderation” adds to the debate (Netterstrøm 2015, 114). The assumption that underlies many studies is that Islamist moderation is somehow key to the “global democratic 482 482 Pfeifer project” (Schwedler 2011, 372) and the democratization of the Middle East. This leads to a political and academic focus on how to “tame” the Islamists—despite a broad consensus among regional specialists that the core obstacle to democratization is the “maintenance of repressive auto- cratic regimes,” not least through massive western support (Schwedler 2011, 372). Indeed, while much academic effort goes into researching how demo- cratic, secular, or liberal Islamist platforms are, self-proclaimed secular authoritarian regimes or, as in the Tunisian case, their successor parties are not subjected to the same scrutiny and political scepticism. Overemphasizing the distinction between “ideological” and “behavioral” moderation may thus cover up value judgments about Islamists and a deep mistrust in their ability to become democratic actors. It can also entail misleading, sometimes even contradictory claims. As Schwedler argues, in many accounts Islamists appear as both incurably ideological and rational, strategic calculators whose only purpose is to deceive domes- tic and international audiences about their “true” intentions (Schwedler 2011, 370–372). Emphasizing the tactical nature of moderation is another way of suspecting Islamists to have a hidden agenda behind the façade they present to the public. But if we continue to take Islamists’ dis- cursive and programmatic changes or concessions as mere rhetoric, how can we ever know if they change, and when should we trust them? For Netterstrøm, the problem goes even deeper: he rejects the notion of prioritizing ideological moderation in the study of Islamists, as proposed by Schwedler. In her seminal study on Faith in Moderation, she argues that a mere focus on changing structural opportunities, e.g., the legaliza- tion of party organizations, the institutionalization of regular elections etc., is not enough to explain (variation in) ideological moderation. Rather, scholars interested in ideological moderation should observe inter- nal party deliberations: they are the space where worldviews and, impor- tantly, “the boundaries of what the party can justify on ideological grounds and still recognize as Islamic practices” (Schwedler 2006, 196) are rene- gotiated. For Netterstrøm, this puts moderation in a somewhat apolitical space: “The Islamists make up their mind in a neutral sphere and then make a political move. The ideological evolution happens outside the political realm” (Netterstrøm 2015, 113, emphasis in original). In this way, he goes on, the IM paradigm overlooks the political nature of Islamists, which they share with any other political actor. Once they are confronted with politics, they will necessarily make concessions, some- times against their will, and aim at finding compromises for pragmatic 483 The Normative Power of Secularism 483 reasons. However, these decisions will also affect their ideology—and this should not simply be interpreted as window-dressing or a merely tactical move: if actors invest in convincing their members and constituencies to embrace significant programmatic changes, then this cannot simply be reversed (Netterstrøm 2015, 120–21). As others, Islamists get entrapped in what may have started out as rhetoric, but soon unleashes normative power (Hamid 2016, 188).1 Netterstrøm also reminds us that Islamists may be interested in power not because they want to implement a certain ideology, but rather to guarantee their own survival and persever- ance in a political system. If this goal makes programmatic reforms neces- sary, then they may deliberately decide to adapt their views. Indeed, going back to Schwedler’s earlier work, one can find a similar argument in her book, and one would therefore be mistaken to interpret her model of ideological moderation as apolitical, as Netterstrøm (2015, 14) does. For this perspective underestimates the importance Schwedler ascribes to what she calls the cultural dimension of political contestation, i.e., narrative structures in which political actors are entangled. They “structure political actions in ways that are equally if not more constrain- ing than institutions, and thus may be critical factors in explaining how inclusion may produce moderation” (Schwedler 2006, 147, emphasis added). Actors with a relatively closed ideology face a dual challenge. On the one hand, they need to legitimize their actions with reference to publicly available and acceptable narratives, which may be both hege- monic narratives produced by those in power (e.g., of national unity) and globally diffused narratives (e.g., of democracy, Schwedler 2006, 117). On the other hand, they must reconcile new practices adopted after an opening of the political space with the worldviews they had pre- viously held (Schwedler 2006, 15–26, 130). Or, as Shadi Hamid (2016, 187) puts it: “Islamist movements perpetually find themselves in (a delicate balancing act). These movements must demonstrate ‘moderation’ to secular elites, international actors, and any number of other sceptics. Their conservative base, on the other hand, wants a dose of identity, ideology, and religion, and if not a dose than at least a nod to the movement’s ‘essence’.” While it is not necessary to follow Schwedler’s notion of ideological mod- eration, what she draws our attention to are the normative structures that constitute, enable, and restrict the discursive space in which Islamists 484 484 Pfeifer can justify political action. In what follows, I will argue that secularism is such a normative structure, and a particularly powerful one. THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM AND THE TUNISIAN AUTHORITARIAN STATE Since the 1990s, secularization as a supposedly universal process linked to the modernization of societies has been discussed increasingly critically in several disciplines (Casanova 2006). Besides doubts about the empirical validity of the secularization thesis, authors have addressed the ontological and epistemological foundations of the secularization paradigm, as well as the normative claims derived from it. Charles Taylor (2011, 49), for instance, criticizes the “epistemic break between secular reason and reli- gious thought” that underlies both liberal and post-secular normative the- ories of secularism. Religious arguments are considered as somewhat less rational than secular reasons, which makes religion appear not only as a “faulty mode of reason” (Taylor 2011, 51), but also as a political threat. Rather than formulating abstract principles about the separation of politics and religion, i.e., models of political secularism, authors have increasingly been interested in analyzing the politics of secularism (Hurd 2008; 2012), i.e., the power practices involved in the political act of drawing the bound- aries between religion and an allegedly neutral, secular political space. Authors such as Talal Asad and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd oppose the view that religion can be defined in a transhistorical and transcultural manner (Asad 1993). Rather, they emphasize the political quality of the very act of defining religion as well as its “‘proper place (…)’ in a secular society” (Asad 2006, 526). Secularism, then, is a “powerful political settlement of the relation between religion and politics (…) (or a) practice of state sovereignty that claims to be universal by defin- ing the limits of state-centred politics with something called religion on the outside” (Hurd 2012, 47). A state’s secular power derives from its ability to define religion and manage it through interventional practices (Mavelli 2012), thus claiming a monopoly on authoritative judgments about legitimate and illegitimate forms of interaction between politics and what is defined as religion. According to Hurd, even though “secularism” (in the singular) is often presented as a “fixed and final achievement of European-inspired moder- nity” (Hurd 2012, 36), there are at least two modi in which western secular 485 The Normative Power of Secularism 485 discourse operates. The first is laicism, a republican ideal that aims at expelling religion from politics and posits a “singular and universal set of relations between sacred and profane dimensions of existence that holds regardless of cultural or historical circumstances” (Hurd 2008, 52). Laicism assumes that religion has successfully been banned to the private sphere or disappeared entirely. The second modus, Judeo- Christian secularism, claims that “the separation of church and religion is a Western achievement that emerged from adherence to common European religious and cultural traditions” (Hurd 2012, 43). This dis- course suggests that secularization is a rational, but particular development reserved for those who have the fitting civilizational predispositions. Importantly, both discursive formations rely on an image of political Islam as their “Other,” even though they construct it in different ways. For laicism, it is “an infringement of irrational forms of religion upon would-be secular public life in Muslim-majority societies” (Hurd 2008, 117; Volpi 2010, 120). In Judeo-Christian secularist discourse, it appears as a civilizational feature of Muslim societies reluctant to modernize and secularize, i.e., separate religion from politics (Volpi 2010, 29–33). As a result of both “Othering” practices, Islamism “has come to represent the ‘nonsecular’ in European and American political thought and practice” (Hurd 2008, 48, emphasis added). The globalized discursive formation of secularism and political Islam as its greatest threat has become even more powerful since it is connected to the war on terror-narrative (Spencer 2010). Indeed, “terrorism” has become a key frame not only for legitimizing the use of force and extraor- dinary measures in the west, but also for justifying repression by authori- tarian regimes against an Islamist opposition in the Arab world and beyond (Edel and Josua 2018). But even before the emergence of the war on terror-narrative, delegitimizing the opposition on the grounds that they were hostile to secularism was a common practice of the Tunisian authoritarian state—even though it could hardly claim secularism in the form of neutrality for itself. Rather, it created a state version of Islam while simultaneously denouncing the opposition’s version of political Islam as an “anti-secular” and dangerous form of blending religion and politics. As Jocelyne Cesari (2014) has argued, political Islam is usually under- stood as the politicization and instrumentalization of Islam by Islamist actors who use it as a tool of opposition against the self-proclaimed secular state.2 This dichotomy conceals that the politicization of Islam has primarily been driven by the state. The Tunisian regimes under 486 486 Pfeifer Bourguiba and Ben Ali, for instance, were marked by the “hegemonic status of Islam”: rather than being “neutral” toward religion—as a liberal ideal of political secularism would demand—, religious institu- tions, leaders, and places were nationalized; a specific version of Islam was taught in public schools; other religions were discriminated in the public sector; and freedoms and rights were partially justified on the basis of religious doctrine (Cesari 2014, 3–18). Interventions by the regime in the religious sphere included, among others, the control of imams in Tunisia’s mosques and institutions of religious education, e.g., by opening a state-controlled Faculty of Theology that served Islamic learning rather than leaving this to the prestigious Zaytuna mosque (Cesari 2014, 55; Donker and Netterstrøm 2017). These measures were part of the regime’s project of establishing a form of “State Islam” (Hamdi 1998, 12–6): the regime controlled and regulated the “Islamic” character of Tunisia by promoting a “particular version of Islam suiting its interests (…) (and) advocating a homogenous Muslim identity that contributed to state legitimization” (Cesari 2014, 43). Neither Bourguiba nor Ben Ali pursued an agenda of banning Islam from politics—on the contrary, both concluded “that Islam had to be sub- ordinated to and controlled by state authorities” (Donker and Netterstrøm 2017, 142) in order for their political agendas to work. Thus, while the regime liked portraying itself as secular to the domestic and, importantly, international public, it clearly did not suffice this ideal (Pfeifer 2017b). Controlling religious institutions and creating an official state Islam was but one pillar of this project. The other side of the coin was the systematic delegitimization and dismantlement of the Tunisian Islamic movement which had emerged in the 1960s and 1970. Under the name of al- Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), it initially focused on the level of individual piety and religious life in the private sphere. In its early phase, the movement was ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood, advocating the creation of an Islamic State and the principle of tawhid and defining its project as decidedly Arab-Islamic rather than Tunisian (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 860; Kubicek 2015, 288). However, the more the Islamic group got involved in discussions with young people, the more it realized that its categories did not actually match their motiva- tions for mobilizing against the regime. Adopting the name Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) in 1979, it no longer wanted to limit its activ- ities to the underground but demanded political activism against Bourguiba and pursued a clear politico-economic agenda. In 1981, it even demanded official recognition as a political party (Wolf 2017, 36–51). 487 The Normative Power of Secularism 487 The Bourguiba regime reacted to this politicization by arresting hun- dreds of MTI members. Repression got even harsher when the perpetrators of an attack on tourist sites in 1987 claimed that they were affiliated with the Islamic movement. In this phase, Bourguiba created the narrative of the MTI’s connections to an international, fundamentalist conspiracy network that aimed at the destabilization of Tunisia (Hamdi 1998, 41–53). In the same year, Ben Ali took over the regime. It seemed that he would cede the MTI a place in Tunisia’s political system. Under the name of Harakat an-Nahdhah (Renaissance Movement, hereafter Ennahda), the Islamic movement managed to gain major shares of the votes in national elections. After this, another massive wave of repression and imprisonment hit Ennahda, and many of the remaining Nahdawis went to exile (Wolf 2017, 81). Ben Ali picked up the narrative of his predecessor and portrayed Islamists as an imminent ter- rorist threat that could only be met by “secular” state power. The success of this strategy was supported by the contemporaneous civil war in neigh- boring Algeria where the Front islamique du salut and other Islamist groups fought against the regime, thus also making the “Islamist threat” appear more real to many Tunisians (Stepan 2012, 100–1). The strategy of creating the “Islamists” as (global) terrorist threat on the one hand, and the regime as a provider of stability as well as a secular form of gov- ernance on the other hand, also generated a considerable amount of exter- nal support. Ben Ali managed to sell the increasingly autocratic … DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12461 O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E Lack of pluralism and post-secularism in Catholic countries Sebastián Rudas University of São Paulo, Brazil Correspondence SebastiánRudas,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofSãoPaulo.AvProfessorLucianoGualberto,315.Sala2047.Cidade Universitária-05508-010-SãoPaulo-SP,Brazil. Email:[email protected] Fundinginformation FundaçãodeAmparoàPesquisadoEstadodeSãoPaulo,Grant/AwardNumber:2015/12948-4 In Catholic countries the prominence of the Church is promoted and supported by the state.1 The constitutions of Costa Rica (Art. 75) and Argentina (Art. 2) refer to Catholicism as the religion of the state. Article 16 of the Spanish ConstitutionsuggeststhatCatholicismisthereligionofthemajority.ThePeruvianConstitution(Art.53)acknowledges the “historical, cultural, and moral” importance of the Catholic Church in the state-building process of the Republic. The 1979 revision of the 1953 Concordat between the Vatican and the Spanish state stipulates it must give financial aid to the Church until it becomes financially autonomous (Villot & Oreja, 1979, Arts 1, 3, 6).2 In Italy, Catholic religious edu- cation is “optional, albeit curricular [and] financed by the state” (Giorgi & Ozzano, 2015, p. 95). Bishops participate in designing the syllabus, and although since 2003 it has been the state that appoints teachers for the religion curricu- lum, the Catholic Church “maintains the right of withdrawing permission if the teacher does not comply with the moral standards of the Catholic Church” (Giorgi & Ozzano, 2015, p. 95). The display of crucifixes in state institutions such as courtrooms, city halls, hospitals, and public schools is widespread, and in some cases, mandatory (for example, in Italian public schools).3 Catholic countries can be conceived as adopting the general features of Divinitia, which is Cécile Laborde’s char- acterization of a regime that satisfies the requirements of minimal secularism and that therefore implements a legiti- mate conception of secularism (Laborde, 2017, Chapter 4). Catholic countries are liberal democracies where the state embraces liberal and democratic values and their societies are predominantly Catholic. In these countries Catholics may be interested in influencing political decisions with their religious beliefs, yet they do not attempt to overturn the non-confessional character of the state. They do not promote a political order whose source of authority is divine or where religion shapes the law. In other words, they do not seek a theocracy. What they hope for is that legislation does not contradict religious morality. Catholicism is the majoritarian religion and no organization representing any other moral worldview, religious or otherwise, can rival it in social and political influence. Thus, it is likely that Catholics play a significant role in shaping the way that the coercive power of the state may be used. Catholicism plays a relevant role, for instance, in issues related to the content of education in primary and secondary schools; the nature of the family; legislation on reproductive rights; sexual education; or the promotion of an ethics of non-discrimination towards the 258 c© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/cons Constellations. 2020;27:258–272. RUDAS 259 LGBTI population. Considering these features of Catholic countries, the question that interests me is what limits, if any, should be set to the expectations of a Catholic majority to shape legislation? I analyze this question in light of the debate on the adequacy of post-secular politics for Catholic countries. I under- stand post-secularism as a view that acknowledges that liberal politics has historically been biased against religion and, as a consequence, adjusts liberal requirements towards religion by advocating the inclusion of religion in politics. It is objected that post-secularism is inadequate in Catholic-majoritarian countries because in these contexts there is a low degree of pluralism, which is a necessary condition for the success of post-secular politics. I refer to this criticism as the lack of pluralism objection (Ferrara, 2008, 2009; Urbinati, 2010, 2013, 2014). In contrast, defenders of post-secularism in Catholic countries maintain that in these contexts a form of post-secular politics already exists. They argue, how- ever, that post-secular politics should be understood within the framework of a minimalist understanding of liberal democratic politics. This minimalism should only focus on guaranteeing the protection of basic liberal and democratic principles (Bailey & Driessen, 2017). My purpose is to analyze these two positions and to argue, similarly to the post- seculardefense,thatliberaldemocraciesshouldindeedimposeminimallimitstotheexpectationsofshapinglegislation of the cultural and religious Catholic majority. Yet, following the lack of pluralism objection, I argue that conditions of political equality are not guaranteed in Catholic countries, as their institutional arrangements grant illegitimate politi- cal power to Catholics. In order to remedy this form of illegitimate political power I defend disestablishment, a proposal that post-secular defenders usually reject. Section 1 presents post-secularism and the lack of pluralism objection. Evoking Laborde’s account of minimal sec- ularism, Section 2 defends minimal post-secularism from the objection in Section 1. According to this response, post- secular politics in Catholic countries need only minimal restrictions to religious claims in liberal democratic politics (Bailey & Driessen, 2017). One practical consequence of this is that conservative political Catholicism is entitled to play a key role in shaping legislation according to its core religious beliefs, even if this entails that the interests of citi- zens who are not conservative Catholics are silenced in the political sphere. In Section 3 I argue that the post-secular response is inadequate to respond to the lack of pluralism objection. I show that in Catholic countries, Concordat-like agreements institutionalize illegitimate forms of political power, namely non-publicly justified and status-based political power, which in turn contrast with publicly justified and majority-based forms of political power. I argue that only the former two are illegitimate. By not taking into account this distinction, post-secularism in Catholic countries fails to identify the wrong involved in giving prominence to the Catholic Church through its establishment in Catholic coun- tries. In Section 4 I show that a plausible strategy to remove these forms of illegitimate political power is to pursue disestablishment, rather than the post-secular strategy of promoting multi-faith establishment. Section 5 discusses four objections to the disestablishment argument. 1 POST-SECULARISM AND THE LACK OF PLURALISM OBJECTION Post-secularism maintains that the secularization thesis must be rejected or radically revised.4 This thesis makes two claims. The first is empirical and argues that religion and modernity; roughly speaking the consolidation of democratic government, a capitalist economy, and scientific and technological development are inversely related. Accordingly, since the 19th century it has been common to expect the eventual disappearance of religion in modern societies. This thesis has been empirically disproved. The second claim presumes the former and is normative. It argues that an ade- quate place of religion in modern societies is the private sphere, however defined. It is assumed that in a healthy mod- ern state religion must remain a private issue. The practical consequences of this normative dimension are grounded in the claim that religion must located in private life: the household, the family, individual conscience, and private institu- tions. One sphere where there has been specific reluctance to let religion in is the political sphere, that is, in state insti- tutions and forums of formal politics. Influenced by the secularization thesis, politicians and scholars have assumed— surprisingly uncritically, as José Casanova (1994, p. 11) points out —that religion should occupy no place at all in liberal democratic politics. John Rawls’ trajectory from his first formulation of the idea of public reason to the latest one is 260 RUDAS usually understood as the transition from theories influenced by remnants of the secularization thesis to post-secular ones. In his former formulation of the idea of public reason he argues that the duty of civility requires ordinary citi- zens to exercise their political rights following public—and therefore non-religious—reasons (Rawls, 2005, p. 217). So presented, this view was interpreted as excluding religion from politics and, consequently, was criticized for being biased against religion. Jürgen Habermas points out its “overly narrow, supposedly secularist definition of the politi- cal role of religion in the liberal frame” (Habermas, 2006, p. 6). Charles Taylor claims that it is based on principles that “can be found in reason alone or in some outlook that is itself free from religion, purely laïque. Jacobins are on this wavelength, as was the first Rawls” (Taylor, 2011, p. 35).5 Some of these criticisms may be overstated. Rawls did soften the requirements of the duty of civility, which became more welcoming of religious claims in political deliberations and decision making. In his initial formulation he restricted the introduction of non-public reasons to two circumstances. The first was a case in which there was “serious dispute in a nearly well-ordered society in applying one of its principles of justice.” In this case, the introduction of non-public reasons was considered a means of strengthening mutual trust and public confidence over the moral commitment of the disagreeing parties to honor the same political principles (Rawls, 2005, pp. 248–249). On the inclusive view, an introduction of non-public reasons was also permitted in societies that were not well-ordered and in which there was “profound division about constitutional essentials.” An example used by Rawls is the debate about the abolition of slav- ery in the USA during the second half of the 19th century. Abolitionists used the non-public reason that slavery was against God’s law. This use of a non-public reason was, however, permitted because, in such a specific case, introducing non-public religious reasons appears to be “the best way to bring about a well-ordered and just society in which the ideal of public reason could eventually be honored” (Rawls, 2005, p. 250). This initial formulation of the requirements of public reason was softened in Rawls’ later work, which stipulates that non-public reasons (both religious and non- religious) may be introduced at any time in political deliberations “provided that in due course proper political reasons— and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (Rawls, 2005, p. 462). The incorporation of this proviso to the requirements of public reason has been interpreted as a modification that makes public reason more inclusive to non-public reasons. This openness to religious reasons in political deliberation is what Taylor calls the overlapping con- sensus mode of secularism (Taylor, 1998), which he endorses. I refer to the attitude of opening up liberal politics to religion as post-secular politics.6 Post-secular politics advocates that religious claims are welcome and even encouraged in political deliberations. Habermas, for instance, argues that liberal democratic politics must reject the laicist conviction that religions carry no epistemically valuable content. Instead, it should recognize that “religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regards to vulnerable forms of communal life” (Habermas, 2006, p. 10). Secular citi- zens are asked to “open their minds to the possible truth content of those presentations [that is, exclusively religious] and enter into dialogues from which religious reasons then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible arguments” (Habermas, 2006, p. 11). Likewise, various forms of presence of religion within state institutions become acceptable (for instance, display of religious symbols in state buildings) and state officials might be permitted to exhibit their religious affiliations while on duty.7 One criticism—the lack of pluralism objection—of this view argues that post-secularism is a valid normative proposal only in contexts in which religious and moral pluralism is widespread. Moral and religious pluralism guarantee that no significant differences of power to influence decision-making processes will determine whether legislation is inspired by religion. Given that there are no profound differences in power among religious (and non-religious) organizations, theymustcompete—hencecompromiseandbargain—iftheywanttoadvancetheirclaimsinpoliticssuccessfully.Being mono-religious, there is no pluralist-driven competition in Catholic countries, and therefore they are more likely to reach political deliberations without facing the need to compromise or bargain. Thus, political Catholicism will eas- ily advance its views in politics and the likelihood of its being successful in doing so is high. Further, they might not need to adopt stringent duties of citizenship such as by translating their religious claims into public reasons (Urbinati, 2010,p.16).Consequently,themono-confessionalcharacterofCatholiccountrieshasledtoadefinitionofthetermsof RUDAS 261 toleration between only two actors, namely the Catholic Church and the state (Ferrara, 2009, p. 88). Toleration is fil- tered by what the Catholic Church considers must be tolerated. Ferrara calls this situation as the “Concordat’s Dis- tortion” (Ferrara, 2008, p. 199, 2009, p. 88). According to the lack of pluralism objection, post-secularism in Catholic countries offers leeway to the religious majority for transforming its religious views into legislation and policy, thereby undermining the liberal and democratic credentials of the state. 2 POLITICAL CATHOLICISM: (MINIMAL) POST-SECULARISM DEFENDED According to Laborde, to be legitimate liberal states must preserve at least a minimal degree of the separation of religion and politics. Separation must be preserved in the justification of coercive state power when justificatory reasons are not generally accessible (Laborde, 2017, p. 120); the state must be separated from religion when religion is a social identity that marks vulnerability and domination (Laborde, 2017, p. 137); and the state must be separated from religion when religion is conceived as a comprehensive ethics (Laborde, 2017, p. 144). She refers to this core as minimal secularism. Catholic countries can be assumed to be respectful of minimal secularism and therefore to be rough illustrations of Divinitia, a fictional state where the majority religion inspires some legislation; has a robust presence in the public sphere and in education; grounds exceptions to antidiscrimination legislation, and so forth (Laborde, 2017, pp. 155–156). According to Laborde’s account, a conservative religious majority is entitled to follow its preferences and to shape legislation and the institutions of the state, which means that “state-religion arrangements can permis- sibly be sensitive to the religious make up of societies, without breach of liberal legitimacy” (Laborde, 2017, p. 157). Minimal secularism entails that, regardless of the degree of religious and moral pluralism, a religious majority can legitimately shape state institutions and legislation following its religious convictions. Therefore, the lack of pluralism objection is undermined. Tom Bailey and Michael Driessen (2017) defend a similar view. They claim that Italian political Catholicism meets the minimal standards of liberal and democratic legitimacy and therefore that the lack of pluralism objection is “inade- quately informed by an understanding of the empirical realities of contemporary religious practices and beliefs” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 232). They show that it is not true that in Italy—and I generalize, in Catholic countries—there is a threat to liberal democratic values posed by the lack of empirical and normative religious pluralism. They defend a “more qualified and minimal, while nonetheless post-secular, conception of liberal democratic politics” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 232). It is minimal because it requires only that religious claims be respectful of basic rights and be exposed to democratic competition.8 And it is post-secular because it opens up the public political sphere to religious claims, particularly to political Catholicism. I henceforth refer to their view as minimal post-secularism. According to minimal post-secularism, the presence of religion in politics is legitimate if the following conditions are upheld: (a) respect for basic liberal rights and liberties, and (b) respect for basic democratic competition (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240). According to them, these conditions are satisfied in Italy (and, I am assuming, in other Catholic countries as well). This means that “no further restrictions should be placed on religious claims in demo- cratic politics” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240), and that we must be willing to accept the possibility that a religious and cultural majority will shape legislation in ways it sees fit. By showing that conditions are met in Catholic coun- tries, they disprove the claim that in these countries post-secularism consolidates a pathway for the imposition of Catholicism. They advance two arguments with respect to condition (a). First, they claim that Catholics have internalized liberal political values, as shown by the fact that they often defend their views by using public reasons grounded in liberal values (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 238). Second, they show that the non-liberal reasons used by Catholics in their justi- fications of their political views can be framed as public reasons. This claim can be explained by appealing to Laborde’s conception of public reason; namely, that justificatory reasons must be accessible (not shareable, or intelligible). Acces- sible reasons are reasons that “can be understood and assessed, but need not be endorsed by common standards” 262 RUDAS (Laborde, 2017, p. 120). Notably, public reasons do not need to belong to the substantive core of liberalism; there are public reasons that are not necessarily inspired by liberal doctrine: “the pool of public reasons is wider that the pool of liberal norms of liberty and equality” (Laborde, 2017, pp. 122–123). Appeals to values such as bodily integrity, security, or public order, as espoused by Catholic actors in politics (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240), are appeals to public rea- sons that are not at the core of the values of liberalism. According to Bailey and Driessen, when Catholics oppose same sex marriage and IVF treatment, they are appealling to these kinds of values—protecting the child-rearing function of the family and defending the importance of non-interference with natural processes, respectively (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240). Catholics, therefore, do not seek “to impose Catholic doctrine on society,” as the reasons they offer are reasons that “non-Catholic conservatives could accept” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240). Concerning condition (b), they offer three arguments. First, they reject the claim that Catholic countries are mono- religious. There is empirical evidence that political Catholicism is plural, which in practice blocks initiatives attempt- ing to consolidate a unified Catholic political party or initiative. Political bargain and compromise must be pursued if Catholic actors want to advance their views in politics, and this is often unsuccessful, because “there is no Catholic majority or dominant Catholic agent in Italy” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 235). The pluralization of political Catholicism enhances the secularization of politics, as Catholic actors find themselves under the necessity to pursue compromises and bargains if they want to thrive in democratic politics. This is what Urbinati claims to be lacking in Catholic coun- tries because they are mono-religious (Urbinati, 2010, p. 16). Second, they show that it is false that Concordat-like institutional arrangements endow Catholic elites with the coercive power that enables them to promote Catholicism from within state institutions. In Catholic countries there are institutions that guarantee alternatives protecting non- Catholics and non-conforming Catholics from the formal power granted to Catholic elites. For instance, they claim that although Italian physicians are allowed to refuse to perform abortions, the state is obliged to ensure that abortion is guaranteed by law at the national level (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 239). Furthermore, and this is their third argument, even in cases in which illiberal expressions of political Catholicism gain terrain in politics, democratic institutions are sufficiently resilient to tame them and guarantee that liberal democratic values are secured (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 240). These two sets of arguments imply that there must not be restrictions to religious claims in liberal democratic pol- itics, or a prima facie reluctance to their role in the public sphere. If the social majority is conservative Catholic, and so are its elites, it is foreseeable that its legislation will be conservative and inspired by a conservative Catholic ethos. Does this mean that citizens who are not conservative Catholics are bound to accept that they have been born in a con- servative yet liberal democratic society and that their claims in politics may not be echoed in public deliberations, let alone transformed in legislation? Minimal post-secularism answers yes: secular citizens must tolerate the religiously inspired legislation, education, and policies of Divinitia. 3 THE CONCORDAT’S DISTORTION: UNVEILING ILLEGITIMATE POLITICAL POWER In this section I argue that the lack of pluralism objection is plausible because it shows that contemporary Catholic countries cannot be considered good exemplars of Divinitia because they grant illegitimate power to members of the majority religion. Section 5 argues that these countries can gain Divinitia-status by disestablishing religion. The source of the forms of illegitimate power I identify in this section can be traced historically to the political rele- vance that concordats used to have in Catholic majoritarian countries. With the democratization of Catholic countries these agreements have lost political weight, yet their remnants still situate Catholicism in a privileged condition com- pared with other civic associations. This illegitimate political power is metaphorically captured by Ferrara’s expression, “the Concordat’s Distortion.” On Ferrara’s view, the Concordat’s Distortion is the lack of competition against similarly situated peers that representatives of Catholicism (or its elites) face when negotiating with state representatives on RUDAS 263 the matters of public morality that they consider to be of primary importance (Ferrara, 2009, p. 88). This enables rep- resentatives of Catholicism to influence the way that public morality is shaped, and they shape it according to their religious worldview. Ferrara attributes this outcome to the mono-confessional character of Catholic countries (the lack of significant pluralism). In light of the arguments presented in the previous section, the Concordat’s Distortion so conceived is not a promising strategy for characterizing what, if anything, is problematic about the role of religion in Catholic countries that enjoy a form of liberal democratic politics. A more promising interpretation of the insight expressed the Concordat’s Distortion is to conceive of it as a man- ifestation of the institutional privileges and prerogatives granted by the state to the Catholic Church in the form of Concordat-like institutional arrangements. Minimal post-secularism is correct in arguing that religious claims must not be subjected to major restrictions in liberal and democratic politics, even if this implies that a religious conservative majority shapes legislation in a way that does not contradict their religious beliefs. It is not clear, however, whether minimal post-secularism can explain the illegitimacy of the political advantage granted to Catholic elites by concor- dats (and similar arrangements.) As I argue below, this advantage creates a form of political inequality that is at odds with the egalitarian ideal of liberal democracy. It constitutes the wrongness of concordats (and similar arrangements) in Catholic countries. There are at least two forms in which the political advantage given to Catholic political agents is illegitimate. The first one is formal political power that is not publicly justified. Concordats constitute formal political power if they assign legislative or policy-making roles to members of the Catholic Church. Someone has formal political power if she has been authorized to make decisions about legislation or policy, or to participate in committees that make such decisions, given their alleged authority and competence to be members of these committees. Catholic clergy may hold publicly justified formal political power. A priest can run for office and win, thereby hav- ing a direct influence in shaping legislation.9 One of the reasons that the Mexican Constitution has been labelled as laicist—that is, anti-religious—is that it bans ministers of faith from running for elections.10 The political power of an elected priest would be legitimate if it is publicly justified (for instance, if he won a majority in fair elections) and if it is majoritarian-based; a form of political power I describe below. Formal political power can also be assigned unilater- ally to members of a dominant church in exceptional cases. In circumstances of transitions to democratic government, members of the Catholic hierarchy could be assigned formal political power by virtue of their social role and—probably unique—capacity to stabilize the country. Spain’s transition to democracy is an example of this (Casanova, 1994, Chap- ter 3). In these two cases, formal political power held by Catholic actors is publicly justified and therefore legitimate— although in the latter case the arrangement is provisional. Formal political power may not be accompanied by an adequate public justification. In Catholic countries it is com- mon that formal political power is delegated to representatives of Catholicism because of the historical role of the Catholic Church in the formation and consolidation of the state and the culture of its society (the reference above to the Catholic Church in the Peruvian Constitution is a case in point.) The Catholic clergy’s formal political power is apparent in the field of education. In Italy, religious instruction is curricular (although optional for students) and jointly agreed to by the minister of public education and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference (Giorgi & Ozzano, 2015, p. 95).11 Moreover, the state grants the Vatican a role in “licensing school teachers of religion” if they do not “comply with the moral standards of the Catholic Church” (Bailey & Driessen, 2017, p. 239; Giorgi & Ozzano, 2015, p. 95). In Spain public schools are also obliged to offer Catholic education, which, as stipulated by the Concordat in 1979, is under the tute- lage of the Catholic Church. Catholic authorities assume the task to design the program of the religious tuition and to provide its textbooks. Both in Italy and in Spain, the significance of the course of religion has gradually changed, as it started to be incorporated into the overall evaluation of students, which has an impact in their college applications and “signals a trend of increasing equalization of religious instruction to the other school subjects” (Giorgi & Ozzano, 2015, p. 95).12 The composition of biomedical ethics committees in Argentina includes representatives of religious associations. The Comisión Nacional de Ética Biomédica, although not currently functioning for political reasons, had representatives of all recognized religions, including the Catholic Church, and a representative of the Episcopal Con- ference of Argentina. Regionally, bioethics committees at hospitals include religious representatives in eight of the 24 264 RUDAS Argentinian provinces.13 Formal political power is also apparent in how the state grants different legal personalities to religious associations. … No Faith in the Library: Challenging Secularism and Neutrality in Librarianship Neutralité, laïcité, éthique en bibliothéconomie, éthique de linformation Natasha Gerolami Huntington University [email protected] Abstract: The objective of this article is to examine contemporary debates about the role of religion in public spaces, public discourse, and workplaces and the ideology of secularism at the heart of these debates. The article demonstrates the relevance of such debates for library workers and library patrons and the need to challenge the as- sumed neutrality of secularist ideologies to ensure libraries do not marginalize or exclude religious perspectives and minorities. Keywords: neutrality, secularism, ethics in librarianship, information ethics Resume : L’objectif de cet article est d’examiner les débats contemporains sur le rôle de la religion dans les espaces publics, le discours public et les lieux de travail, ainsi que l’idéologie du sécularisme au cœur de ces débats. Le document démontre la per- tinence de tels débats pour les bibliothécaires et les usagers des bibliothèques et la nécessité de remettre en question la neutralité présumée des idéologies séculières pour assurer que les bibliothèques ne marginalisent pas ou nexcluent pas de perspec- tives religieuses et de minorités. Mots-cles : neutralité, laïcité, éthique en bibliothéconomie, éthique de l’information During the Canadian federal election in 2015, Stephen Harper and the Conser- vative Party candidates promised that they would introduce legislation to ban federal public servants from wearing a niqab, a head-and-face covering worn by Muslim women. Conservatives defended this proposal by arguing that the niqab was contrary to Canadian values and women’s rights. The proposed legislation was intended to apply to women who work for the federal government, which would include library workers in government libraries. According to spokesper- sons from the union representing federal public servants, there were no federal public employees who wore the niqab (CBC News 2015). The Conservative Party did not win the election and, therefore, did not introduce the legislation on the niqab. There are, however, other similar proposals in Canada: the Con- servative proposal was in part inspired by the Parti Québécois’s proposed “secu- lar charter”—namely, the 2013 Charter Affirming the Values of State Secularism and Religious Neutrality and of Equality between Women and Men, and Providing a Framework for Accommodation Requests.1 The charter pro- posed to ban public servants in the province of Quebec from wearing © 2020 The Canadian Journal of Information and Library Science La Revue canadienne des sciences de l’information et de bibliothéconomie 43, no. 2 2019 mailto:[email protected] https://www.utpjournals.press/loi/cjils “conspicuous religious symbols” (Fitz-Morris 2015). Examples of the religious attire that would be banned included Sikh turbans, Muslim headscarves, and large Christian crosses. The secular charter did not become law, but the province of Quebec has since introduced two other similar forms of legislation, with the most recent Act Respecting the Laicity of the State, which is commonly referred to as Bill 21, being passed in Quebec in June 2019.2 These varying proposals for new legislation address the space for religious symbols and attire in the workplace and the public sphere. The proposed legisla- tion would apply to library workers and library patrons to varying degrees and therefore challenges library workers to think through questions of secularism and religion in the workplace. The Quebec secular charter, also known as Bill 60, for example, was to apply to all public servants and quasi-public servants. This meant that the secular charter, if it had been approved, would have applied not only to individuals employed directly by the province but also to those working in public institutions funded by the province; public, academic, provin- cial government, and school library workers all work directly for the province or in institutions funded by the provincial government. The secular charter or Quebec Charter of Values was tabled by the Parti Québécois in 2013, but it died on the order papers before the spring election of 2014. In 2017, the ruling Liberal Party in Quebec passed new legislation (Bill 62) titled An Act to Foster Adherence to State Religious Neutrality and sought, in particular, to provide a framework for religious accommodation requests.3 This legislation was a broader piece of legislation about religious accommodation, but it contained articles that specifically targeted face coverings. The legislation, as proposed, stipulated that anyone working for a provincial public body, as well as anyone receiving services from a public body, must do so with their face uncov- ered. This legislation would have applied to any library workers in publicly funded institutions and, for example, women wearing face veils seeking services in affected libraries. Quebec Superior Court Justice Marc-André Blanchard ruled in June 2018 that the face covering ban be suspended because it appeared to violate freedom of conscience and religion, as set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Free- dom.4 The issue was revisited again in 2019. The ruling Coalition Avenir Que- bec introduced and passed the most recent iteration of the legislation, Bill 21: An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State.5 This bill includes similar provisions requiring people seeking services in provincial public institutions to have their face uncovered but limits the requirement to instances where identifying oneself is necessary for security purposes. The legislation also sets out a list of provincial public employees who are prohibited from wearing any religious symbol in the workplace. Public, government, and academic librarians are not included in this list, but teachers in public schools are banned from wearing religious symbols and, by implication, teacher librarians. Quebec’s proposed legislation has taken different forms, but, in each version of the legislation, it is the principles of secu- larism and state religious neutrality that are cited as justifications for the legisla- tion. Given the ongoing debates about religion in the workplace and the public No Faith in the Library: Challenging Secularism and Neutrality 173 sphere, the secular and neutral nature of the library and the librarian is a timely topic. Various forms of legislation have been proposed, and some have become law, but no law as of yet has come into effect without being challenged for vio- lating individual rights. The proposed legislation enjoins library workers and, in particular, library administrators to ask themselves what role they would play in advocating for their own religious freedoms, for religious minorities in their workplace, or for policing what library workers and library patrons wear. Legisla- tion has been proposed and drafted that would affect many different types of li- braries, so the debates are important for public, academic, school, and government library workers, who have an opportune time to examine the way secular principles of neutrality are mobilized to specifically marginalize and exclude religious perspectives from public discourse, services, and workplaces. This article does not unpack the Quebec legislation in detail but, rather, chal- lenges the ideology that lies at the heart of this type legislation: secularism and its purported neutrality. This article calls for the critique of neutrality in the library to be extended to include a critique of secularism. The critique of neutrality in librarianship em- bodies many similar themes as the critiques of secularism. It is typically social justice commitments that inspire library workers and library advocates to chal- lenge neutrality (Bales 2018; Gibson et al. 2017; Samek 2007). Many of the ar- guments against political and economic neutrality in the library can easily be applied to secularism too. Moreover, a fuller understanding of the different meanings of the terms “secular,” “secularity,” “secularism,” and “neutrality” as well as their implications will permit library workers to be cautious that their principles are not mobilized to inadvertently undermine certain world-views, faith-based practices, and, particularly, the rights of religious minorities. Neutrality Neutrality in librarianship is an unspoken standard (Joyce 2008, 33). The princi- ple of neutrality is not specifically codified by the Canadian Federation of Library Associations or even in the much-referenced American Library Association’s (ALA) (2014) Library Bill of Rights. As John Wenzler (2019) points out, there is very little library studies literature that explicitly defends library neutrality—a lim- itation he endeavours to correct with his essay. The principle is codified in the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions’s (2016) Code of Ethics for Librarians and Other Information Workers. The principle is also regularly mobilized around intellectual freedom controversies or in order to cri- tique library workers’ involvement in political action (Burgess 2019, 25; Wenzler 2019, 58). Neutrality is seen within librarianship as a “hallmark of professionalism” (Lewis 2008, 1). Tracing the roots back to the work of Melville Dewey in the 1870s, Henry Blanke (1989, 39) argues that librarians’ efforts to establish them- selves as professionals and be recognized as such were seen by Dewey and others as requiring librarians to be “politically value-free.” Similarly, Charles Cutter 174 CJILS / RCSIB 43, no. 2 2019 / published October / Octobre 2020 https://www.utpjournals.press/loi/cjils described librarians as professionals “of no political party” (quoted in Birdsall 1988, 75). Librarian neutrality has also been tied to patrons’ intellectual freedom rights, which are a cornerstone of librarianship and embedded in many library statements of principles, ethics, or rights (Burgess 2019, 28; Gorman 2015, 111). Library workers are called to remain unbiased and objective; they are thereby presumably able to ensure that library services are available to all regard- less of their world-view and that reference assistance is not driven by the library workers’ agendas (Foskett 1962). Supporters of library neutrality acknowledge that the principle of neutrality is not value neutral (Foskett 1962, 11; Wenzler 2019, 70). Library neutrality is intended to ensure that library collections are diverse and that library workers’ political and moral positions are not imposed on users. Neutrality as a principle is at times also circumscribed: library workers should advocate for library issues, but they remain neutral at the library on all other moral and political issues (Joyce 2008, 35). With the principle of neutrality, library workers can advocate against censorship of their collections but not against war, to use Toni Samek’s (2007, 7) example. Critique of neutrality The library literature problematizing the principle of neutrality covers a wide range of topics, from the history of the ALA’s Social Responsibility Round Table (SRRT) (Joyce 2008) to the paradoxes of American liberalism (Birdsall 1988) and its potential to be deployed to maintain racist policies (Gibson et al. 2017, 753). There are three core themes within the librarian critique of neutral- ity: (1) ideology and the legitimation of knowledge; (2) neutrality and power re- lations; and (3) moral responsibility. Parallel themes can be found within critiques of secularism. It is therefore possible to extend librarian critiques of neutrality to also problematize secularism. Ideology and the legitimation of knowledge Librarian critiques of the principle of neutrality suggest that neutrality is not neutral at all but, rather, a specific world-view, though it presents the existing system as natural and given. Critics suggest that the debates about intellectual freedom and information access take place within an existing neoliberal system that is not questioned (Bales 2018, 14; Birdsall 1988; Samek 2007). Libraries that are based on a model of neutrality help to reproduce this ideology. Samek (2007, 8) further contends that “the myth of library neutrality . . . divorces library and information work from participation in social struggle, and makes the profession vulnerable to control networks such as economic and political regimes.” Neutrality can be deployed as a means to intentionally or unwittingly take the current political or economic system as a given. Robert Jensen (2008) notes that libraries that accept the political and economic system are characterized as neutral, but librarians that disagree with it are labelled political. This situation plays out in the workplace (92). For example, a display of business material No Faith in the Library: Challenging Secularism and Neutrality 175 would go unnoticed, but a display of Marxist theory is considered biased and political (94–95). Library workers’ concerns and challenges are articulated within a “neutral” framework that belies the political, social, and secular assump- tions upon which they are founded. Peter McDonald, for example, notes the simplicity of intellectual freedom discussions around censorship and the banning of books. Book banning is typically framed in a discussion of intractable debates between various parties, such as “Gays vs. the Christian Right” (McDonald 2008, 9). According to McDonald, these freedom-of-speech debates are framed in a dialogue of “choice,” yet they mask the corporate hegemony of the publish- ing industry. The corporate control over what we read is hidden, and yet it makes it increasingly difficult to read outside the logic of the marketplace. Neutrality and power relations Quoting Desmond Tutu, Jensen (2008, 92) suggests that by choosing neutrality librarians are choosing the side of the oppressor. Following from the argument that neutrality is ideological, critical librarianship demonstrates how the princi- ple of neutrality is a means to maintain the status quo and existing power struc- tures. Neutrality works to mask and uphold the existing class structure, knowledge elites, and systemic racism (Farkas 2017; Gibson et al. 2017, 253). Blanke (1989, 43) notes, for example, that “neutrality serves to further the inter- ests of a wealthy and influential elite at the expense of society as a whole.” Analysis of the principle of neutrality shows how it has been mobilized to justify passivity in the face of racism in libraries (Gibson et al. 2017, 253; Iver- son 2008, 27). Fights for racial equality and civil rights have even resulted in loss of employment, such as in the case of Ruth Brown, a library director in Oklahoma in 1951 (Sparanese 2008, 76). Furthermore, Blanke (1989, 29) ar- gues that librarians’ neutrality has unwittingly made the profession complicit with existing political and economic structures: “Librarianship’s reluctance to define its values in political terms and to cultivate a sense of social responsibility may allow it to drift into an uncritical accommodation with society’s dominant political and economic powers.” Early champions of the public library saw it as a means to integrate immigrants and the working class into society, but this inte- gration was ultimately intended to support the existing class structure (Rosenz- weig 2008, 6). The manner in which the principle of neutrality supports the status quo can be seen in the times when the principle of neutrality mobilized to require that library workers be apolitical. For example, the SRRT was created as a space where issues of race, violence, war and peace, inequality, and justice could be discussed, and this spurred a heated debate about the place of social justice in a library association (Joyce 2008, 37). David Berninghausen, a vocal opponent of the SRRT, saw librarian advocacy as wholly incompatible with the foundational library principle of intellectual freedom (quoted in Wenzler 2019, 59). Similar criticisms were launched at the ALA’s Gay and Lesbian Task Force (Joyce 2008, 33). Wenzler (2019, 59) defends library neutrality, arguing that Bernin- ghausen’s “intransigence” led him to falsely conclude that political activism was 176 CJILS / RCSIB 43, no. 2 2019 / published October / Octobre 2020 https://www.utpjournals.press/loi/cjils inconsistent with the principle of open debate. For Wenzler, library neutrality is worth defending, but it need not stand in the way of open-minded debate or social justice work. Neutrality and moral responsibility Critics of the principle of neutrality have also expressed deep concern that “neu- trality” is an abdication of moral responsibility: “This is no time to be neutral. The time to act with integrity is now” (Parker 1958, 364). As Joseph Good (2008, 144) notes, librarians developing library standards is not enough: “There is abundant discussion of professional standards and competencies, but little mention of the ethical basis for these standards. Without an ethical basis, these standards are fundamentally two-dimensional.” Critics are concerned that neu- trality leads to moral relativism or goes as far as calling it an “immoral act” because it implies that librarians should not stand up against oppression (Good 2008; Jensen 2008, 91). Stephen Bales (2018, 172) argues that library neutrality is “irresponsible,” and Samek (2007, 7) suggests that it limits library workers’ abilities to advocate for social justice. Secularism Scholars who have challenged the hegemony of the neutrality principle in librar- ianship have been cognizant of the manner in which “neutrality” can be mobi- lized to support the status quo and are concerned about the manner in which neutrality is not neutral at all but, rather, used to justify the priority given to cer- tain ideologies and the delegitimization of other world-views. Similarly, secular- ism is presented as neutral. Quebec’s proposed “secular charter,” for example, reflected a secularist position that holds that religion is an exclusively private matter and has no place in the public sphere. This is not a neutral position but, rather, works from the premise that it is actually possible to have public space that is separate from the sacred and that this separation is necessary for society to function. Secularism has also been critiqued as a form of ideology, which presents itself as neutral and masks the manner in which it delegitimizes certain world- views. There are different schemes to distinguish between a variety of meanings of the secular (Casanova 2011, 54; Taylor 2007, 15–20). José Casanova’s (2011) typology is used in this article because he explicitly distinguishes between empirical/historical forces of secularization and the ideological. Casanova em- ploys the analytic categories of the secular, secularization, and secularism. The “secular,” for Casanova, is the other of the sacred. The secular in Western Chris- tianity originally had a theological meaning that was part of a binary of secular/ profane versus religious/sacred. Casanova uses the example of the religious priest who withdraws from the world into a monastery (56). In Western Christendom, the monastic priest was differentiated from the secular priest who preached to the laity. The distinction presupposed, though, that the secular was intertwined with the sacred; both were a part of religious practice. The secular/ religious binary is the means by which we can classify or make sense of reality No Faith in the Library: Challenging Secularism and Neutrality 177 (62)—hence, the reason why Casanova refers to it as an epistemic category (55). Over time, the secular has come to encompass the majority of the world, with the religious as a “residual category,” and, increasingly, we fail to acknowledge the manner in which the two concepts are linked (55). The term “secularization” points to the empirical and historical process of the world becoming increasingly secular (Casanova 2011, 55). Secularization in- cludes such changes as the separation of church and state, the privatization of religion, and changes in individual belief and practices. The separation of church and state uses the secular/religious binary to limit religious authorities from roles in the governance of the nation-state. Secularization also refers to the privatiza- tion of religion, where religion is characterized as a matter of private belief and does not make up part of public and political discourse. The separation of church and state and the privatization of religion happen together in varying de- grees, depending on the country. There are countries, like the United States, that have enshrined the separation of church and state within the Constitution, though religious belief and commitment make up a part of the political dis- course. Canada does not explicitly refer to the separation of church and state, but religious belief is less acceptable publicly within political debate. Seculariza- tion also refers to decreasing personal belief in religion and people’s decreasing participation in religious practices, be it attendance at religious services, mem- bership within religious institutions, or the practice of religion, such as cere- mony, prayer, and meditation. The term “secularism” signifies the ideological world-view. According to Casanova (2011, 67), there are two main secularist ideologies: the first ideology hypothesizes that over time religion will be superseded; the second ideology as- serts that religion is irrational and should be banned from the public sphere. Sec- ularism becomes an ideology when it develops into a theory about what religion is and what it does (66). It is possible, from Casanova’s view, that a society accept the statecraft doctrine and not the ideology: there would be a separation of religious and political authority, with the state neutral in relation to religion (that is, not requiring or endorsing a specific religion) without the ideological viewpoint that the secular is the natural, given reality to which superfluous and irrational religions have been added. The secularization thesis, which was championed by a number of sociologi- cal thinkers such as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, maintained that science would increasingly provide the answers to humans’ concerns and questions. The secularization thesis has been mobilized by some scholars to suggest that religion would become increasingly irrelevant or even disappear (Bruce 2011), although scholars have seriously challenged this thesis (Berger 2008; Calhoun, Juergen- smeyer, and Antwerpen 2011). Secularism goes further and is an ideological world-view that posits the material world described by scientists as the natural and given and religion as superfluous. On this account, the spiritual realm is pre- sumed not to exist. Secularism therefore is not neutral; it makes specific ontolo- gical claims and derives political ambitions from it. 178 CJILS / RCSIB 43, no. 2 2019 / published October / Octobre 2020 https://www.utpjournals.press/loi/cjils Critique of neutrality and implications for secularism Critical librarianship, which has already articulated concerns about the ideology of neutrality and the underlying political framework, could further problematize secularism for its false claims to neutrality. The library could take a different approach and remain secular in so far as it does not impose or endorse any one form of religion without making claims that public space is naturally devoid of the sacred. There is no need then to ban library employees from wearing attire that has religious significance or is a part of a religious practice. The use of the principle of neutrality to explicitly support secularism in the library is infrequent, but Mike Wessells’s (2003) use of neutrality demonstrates how it can be used to support secularist ideology. Wessells tells the story of a young patron asking a fascinating reference question: “Is God real?” The question inspired him to refer to the “bulwark of neutrality” that would assist him in serving this patron with- out religious bias (42). The term “bulwark” implies that neutrality is a form of defence. Wessells argues that neutrality is protecting us against religious conflict because “blood has regularly been spilled over differences in faith” (42). He ar- gues that we have learned from history “that spiritual certitude and governmen- tal power make an explosive mix” (42). Wessells’s comments are not necessarily representative or emblematic of librarianship as a whole, but they do reflect com- mon myths about religion and the need for a secular state/space and neutrality. Neutrality and coercion As noted above, the separation of church and state is one amongst many defini- tions of secularization. The neutrality of the state with regard to religion speaks specifically to forms of governmentality: state power will not be connected to any specific religious authority. State neutrality further ensures that all citizens may participate in democratic institutions regardless of their religious commit- ments and that the government will not play a role in dictating religious com- mitment (individuals will be free to practice and have the faith of their choice). State neutrality with respect to religion is a very specific political and ethical commitment. Charles Taylor (2001, 35) claims that the foundation for gover- nance should be the principles of liberty, equality, and harmony. Neutrality, in this instance, is not apolitical or lacking in ethical commitments; there are very specific principles at the heart of government neutrality on the question of reli- gion. State neutrality is neutral towards religion, but it is not value neutral. Ac- cording to Taylor, the goals of neutrality are threefold: • no one is coerced in the domain of religion; • people of all different faiths are equal; and • all spiritual families must be heard (35). Taylor argues that government neutrality towards religion should be circum- scribed by a very specific set of values. Government neutrality, therefore, is also not neutral but, rather, the articulation of a specific set of values that ensures that not only is there no coercion in the area of faith but also that people are not silenced or excluded regardless of their belief system. No Faith in the Library: Challenging Secularism and Neutrality 179 We cannot conclude from state neutrality that library workers themselves as individuals must be neutral or that secular libraries cannot include or refer to any religious faith. Kenneth Peterson (1965, 299) makes this mistake when he uses the concept of “the separation of church and state” to launch an examina- tion of the appropriateness of religious texts in state university libraries. In his article, the phrase “separation of church and state” is not examined. He simply takes the separation as given by referring to the American Constitution.6 He cre- ates a false problem with this phrase by assuming he has to defend the inclusion of religious texts for secular reasons in a state-funded university. There is a signif- icant difference between the state being neutral on the question of people’s faith and library workers and collections excluding religion. Furthermore, if library workers need to leave their position on religion out of their profession, this may actually violate the third goal that all faiths should be heard. The problem is equating the separation of religion and state with the privatization of religion, which is a different definition of secularity and not necessarily implied in the first. Chris Kertesz (2001, 34) claims that the “separation of church and state is a thorny issue for public librarians.” One of the “tricky” parts, according to Ker- tesz, for public librarians comes not from reference books on religion that are “objective” but, rather, from being able to “justify the expenditure of public funds for the gray areas of inspirational fiction, spiritual self-help books, ac- counts of encounters with angels or other metaphysical beings, child rearing in specific religious traditions, or essays on sin and morality” (34). Objective refer- ence books are not defined, but the list of tricky topics is inspired by a concern about including texts that advocate a specific religious or spiritual belief or prac- tice in the public arena. Finding the right balance of religious materials in a library collection is a challenge, but, again, state neutrality need not imply that texts from a specific religious or spiritual perspective are problematic for a pub- licly funded library. Library workers should be cautious that the principle of the “separation … Secularism and National Identity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Ayça Ergun and Zana Çitak Most studies relating to the issue of religion in Azerbaijan have been interested in studying religion, politics, and society, as well as the na- ture of the Islamic revival in post-Soviet Azerbaijan with only scant reference to secularism, its nature, and its role in shaping modern Azerbaijan. This insufficient interest is quite striking, considering that düny e vilik (secularism), literally meaning “this-worldliness,” is enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. Moreover, it is common to start any introductory textbook on Azerbaijan by referring to the Azerbai- jan Democratic Republic (ADR) (1918–1920) as “the first secular and democratic republic in the Muslim world.”1 ZANA ÇITAK (BS, Middle East Technical University; MS, London School of Eco- nomics; PhD, Boston University) is Associate Professor in the Department of Inter- national Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. She is the author (with Tunahan Yildiz) of the forthcoming article “The Multiple Identities of the Middle East: A Case of Iraqi Turkmen Refugees in Turkey,” in Journal of Bal- kan and Near Eastern Studies. Her articles have appeared in Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, Annuaire Droit et Religions, Cahiers de l’obTic, Journal of Church and State, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies. Çitak’s pri- mary scholarly interests include nationalism, religion, and Islam in Europe. AYÇA ERGUN (BA, Ankara University; MS, Middle East Technical University; PhD, Univer- sity of Essex) is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. She is the author (with Hamlet Isaxanli) of Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and the Southern Caucasus, NATO Science For Peace and Security Publication Series E: Hu- man and Societal Dynamics, vol. 107 (IOS Press, 2013) and (with Ayşe Ayata, and Işıl Çelimli) of Black Sea Politics: Political Culture and Civil Society in an Unstable Region (IB Tauris, 2005). Her other major recent publications have appeared in Turkish Studies, Journal of Developing Societies, Field Methods, Journal of Euro- pean Integration, Electoral Studies, and Journal of Royal Asiatic Society. Ergun’s primary scholarly interests include post-Soviet studies, South Caucasus, and qual- itative methodology. The fieldwork of this research was supported by Middle East Technical University Research Fund (Project No: BAP-07-03-2016-006). 1. 2018 is officially declared as the centenary of the establishment of the ADR, with endorsement by and much enthusiasm on the part of the Ilham Aliyev regime. Journal of Church and State vol. 62 no. 3, pages 464–485; doi:10.1093/jcs/csz085 Advance Access Publication November 8, 2019 VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] 464 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 Deleted Text: ( Deleted Text: ) Deleted Text: (secularism) This surprising lack of interest in the significance of secularism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan may be related to two factors. First, it seems that the short-lived (23 months) ADR and its secular char- acter have been overshadowed by subsequent longevity of the sec- ular Republic of Turkey, which was established in 1923. Secondly, the important role of secularism in Azerbaijan has been sacrificed to the a priori assumptions of both the post-Soviet transition liter- ature and the challenges against the secularization paradigm in the social sciences. Post-Soviet studies have focused on the mean- ings attributed to religion and have predominantly discussed the potential for religion to become a) a source of unity in times of transition, war, and turmoil; b) a source of political opposition; or c) the foundation of Islamic fundamentalism and/or radicalism. The main assumption is that Azerbaijani society is predominantly Muslim, therefore Islam would automatically become a major component of national identity. Yet the opposite case has also been considered in some other works, which see national identity in the early years of transition with reference to the rediscovery of ethnic identity (i.e., Turkish identity) rather than religious iden- tity.2 Indeed, the Soviet regime left no room for religion, confining it to the private realm and permitting it to operate as popular Is- lam, consisting of the veneration of saints and visits to shrines. Both arguments fall short of problematizing the place of religion in national identity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Increasing chal- lenges against the secularization paradigm have claimed that reli- gion is not a declining force.3 In fact, it is more present than ever in the post-Cold War world though others such as Casanova and Taylor have drawn our attention to different dimensions of secu- larization still relevant to our world.4 In contrast, this study argues that components of national iden- tity, including religion, are contingent and need to be problemat- ized as to whether and in what way each plays a role in national identity. As Greenfeld and Brubaker have argued, religion’s 2. Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992). 3. Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (London: C. A. Watts, 1966); P. B. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1969). 4. Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P. (Rest in Peace),” Sociology of Religion 60, no.1 (1999): 249-73; Peter Berger, “Secularism in Retreat” in Islam and Secularism in The Middle East, ed. Azzam Tamimi and John Esposito (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 38-51; Jos�e Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). Secularism and National Identity in Azerbaijan 465 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 relation to national identity is specific to each case.5 Secularism constitutes one of the essential components of Azerbaijani na- tional identity historically and has been preserved in recent inter- pretations of Azerbaijaniness with reference to multiculturalism and tolerance. Asad has argued that one could not understand secularism independent of religion.6 Thus, notwithstanding the social role of religion both as a source of morality and cultural heritage, it is secularism, and not religion, that comprises the core of national identity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. This is the outcome of the historical legacy of the ADR and Soviet period along with the preferences of the political and intellectual elite for secular- ism and emphasis on Turkish identity over religious or sectarian identity. Secularism in that sense has been the motor of Azerbai- jani modernization, independence, and survival. It is this whole- hearted embracing of the principle that explains the secular character of political elite, both government and opposition, in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. There is a need to understand secularism �a la Azerbaijan with its legal and institutional characteristics but also by a scrutiny of its major characteristics, namely the univer- salism of secularism, the perception of religion as a private mat- ter, an understanding of religion as a social value, the role of secularism as a source of social cohesion, and lastly, a sense of uniqueness and exceptionalism. This article is based on data collected during fieldwork con- ducted in Azerbaijan in November and December 2016 where in- depth interviews were held with experts, academics, representa- tives of non-governmental organizations, government officials, members of parliament, and opposition elite. The first part of the article analyzes the discourses of national identity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan with a particular focus on religion. The second part of the article examines the legal and institutional framework of state-religion relations in Azerbaijan. The third part breaks down Azerbaijani secularism into its constitutive elements. Religion, Secularism, and National Identity in Azerbaijan In the post-independence period, Azerbaijan has endured numer- ous problems characteristic of many post-Soviet Eurasian states 5. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” Nations and Nationalism 18, no. 1 (2012): 2-20. 6. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). Journal of Church and State 466 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 on its new path of social and political transformation.7 The early independence period was marked by the inter-ethnic conflict in the Nagorno-Karabagh region, trials of state and nation-building, attempts at democratization, and the need to secure domestic sta- bility. National identity was to be redefined and reinterpreted. The period was marked by an attempt to challenge the Soviet de- scription of Azerbaijani people as Azerbaijani and to reassert the understanding of the first Republic’s heritage. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic constituted a source of ideological inspira- tion for the pro-independence elite of the late Soviet period and has been a source of historical pride for the existing ruling elite. The ideological discourse of the republican elite was formulated by Ahmet Agaoglu, Ali Bey Huseyinzade, Uzeyir and Ceyhun Hacıbeyli, Ali Mardan Topçubaşı, and Mehmet Emin Resulzade. According to Lemercier-Quelquejay, “this group of brilliant intel- lectuals was the ‘nursery’ of all Azeri political parties” and pro- moted “a certain anticlerical (though not anti-religious) modernism.”8 This ideology, Musavatism, took its name from the ruling party of the ADR, the Musavat Party, and defined the nation with a very strong emphasis on Turkish identity. Altstadt charac- terizes this ideology as “neither pan-Islamist nor pan-Turkist” but “grounded more solidly in ethnic consciousness.”9 For Swieto- chowski, “nationalism still meant broadly, Turkism with a grow- ing component of Azerbaijani identity” and the essence of Musavatism was “secular Turkic nationalism.”10 While underlin- ing the Muslim identity of the Azerbaijanis, this nationalism was significantly secular in its emphasis on establishing an indepen- dent nation-state in harmony with civilized and democratic nations.11 For the nationalist intelligentsia, science, and not reli- gion, was the main mechanism for independence and survival. 7. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks; Audrey L. Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2017); Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence (USA: M. E. Sharp, 2011); Ayça Ergun, “Post-Soviet Political Transformation in Azerbaijan: Political Elite, Civil So- ciety and Trials of Democratization,” Uluslararası _Ilişkiler 7, no. 26 (2010): 67- 85. 8. Catherine Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Islam and Identity in Azerbaijan,” Central Asian Survey 3, no. 2 (1984): 33-34. 9. Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijani Turks’ Response to Russian Conquest,” Stud- ies in Comparative Communism XIX, no. 3/4 (1986): 279. 10. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 61-62. 11. A review of the parliamentary hearings of the ADR period reveals “independence” (istiqlal), “future” (istiqbal), “democracy,” and “right to self-deter- mination”(öz müqad e rratını öz e line almak) in line with Wilsonian principles, “nationalization of education” (maarifin millil e şm e si), “fundamental rights and liberties,” and “international recognition” as an independent and democratic Secularism and National Identity in Azerbaijan 467 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 Despite republican elite’s ambitions about the preservation and consolidation of independence, this could only be achieved with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and Black January (January 20, 1990) constituted a historical turn- ing point for the Azerbaijani political and national revival, with Azerbaijanis discovering the otherness of the Soviets in general and the Russians in particular.12 Yunusov argues that Black Janu- ary led to increasing adherence to Islamic values, rituals, and practices.13 However, while extreme violence and a considerable number of deaths and casualties resulted in mass grief and suf- fering, they rather accelerated the formation of a pro- independence and nationalist mass movement. The Popular Front Movement of Azerbaijan (PFA) promoted a dichotomy of Turks, rather than Muslims, against Russians and Armenians, and hence it portrayed the conflict as ethnic rather than religious. Thus, both the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and Black January provided a major impetus for relocating Turkishness into the core of Azer- baijani identity. The PFA, which was led by Ebulfez Elchibey and strongly in- spired by the ADR’s heritage (i.e., Turkism, modernization, secu- larism, and anti-clericalism), purposefully picked up the idea of Turkishness as the central component of national identity. In fact, it would have been much easier for the PFA to foster religious identity in the population, which had traditionally described itself as Muslim, than to initiate a discourse based on ethnic identity, which had been to a large extent forgotten under Soviet rule.14 The early experience with statehood provided them with an en- thusiasm to build an independent state. According to one of the politicians of the PFA, “We looked back and remembered the ADR, Mehmet Emin Resulzade and his friends and what they did and what they fought for . . . We thought we did it once, [so] we can do it again.”15 Although there was not an explicit focus on member of the League of Nations (Cemiyet-i Akvam) as the most frequent refer- ences in the speeches of the members of the parliament. For a complete coverage of the parliamentary hearings, see Azerbaycan Gazetinde Parlament H e sabatları ve Ş e rhler [Parliamentary hearings and notes in the Azerbaijan newspaper] (Noyabr 1918-Aprel 1920) I. Cild [First Volume] (Baku: Qanun Neşriyyatı, 2015). 12. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks; On January 20, 1990, at 12:20 a.m., Soviet troops entered Baku. After the bloody events, the idea of independence flour- ished. See Aydın Balayev and Rasim Mirze, 20 Yanvar Hadiseleri, Senedler, Mövg- eler, Serhler [20 January Events, Documents, Positions, Notes] (Baki: Casioglu, 2000), 20. 13. Arif Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan (Baku: Zaman, 2004). 14. Tadeusz Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: Perspectives from the Crossroads,” Central Asian Survey 18, no. 34 (1999): 419-34. 15. Authors’ interviews, Baku, November 2016. Journal of Church and State 468 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 Deleted Text: Front Deleted Text: secularism, the policies initiated by the Elchibey government (1992–1993)—such as defining Azerbaijani identity and language as Turkish, changing surnames from Russian -ov/-ova to Turkish names, maintaining extremely friendly relations with Turkey, de- veloping a vision for the unification of all Turks and the establish- ment of a Turkish Union, and, last but not least, propagating the idea of a Unified Azerbaijan denoting the unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan—demonstrated an unequivocal empha- sis on ethnic identity. For Elchibey, Turkishness constituted the very essence of national identity whereas religion “[was] in the spirit of the people.”16 While he acknowledged the value attrib- uted to religion in society, Elchibey did not consider Islam to be a political force and did not anticipate a turn to fundamentalism due to the lack of a tradition of theology and clerics in Azerbaijan: Shiism is not so strict and cruel like it is in Iran. The original religious system does not exist. It is neither widespread nor is it is a system. For fundamentalism the system has to be shaped like a pyramid. For exam- ple, there has to be a sheikh and around him there has to be 30 other sheikhs. Above them there has to be 500 big ruhani, axund, and then ten thousand mollas. Fundamentalism can only be established if there is an established pyramid.17 Moreover, Elchibey had also an anti-clerical tone: Who is going to present Islam to Azerbaijan with modern thought (t e f e k- kür)? I do not see anybody . . . [since] there is no propagation of Islam. There are only ignorant mollas or little mollas (mollacık) benefiting from religion to secure their own livelihoods. People need religion; one has a funeral, the other has a wedding. Eventually they go to a molla and this molla is ignorant.18 Altstadt similarly argues that the mullahs were “available for bur- ials, weddings, or circumcisions, and were well-paid for these es- sential life-passage ceremonies.”19 After Heydar Aliyev came to power, the notion of Azerbaijani identity was preserved and secured by the 1995 Constitution, which called the Azerbaijan people Azerbaijanis (Az e rbaycanlı), and their language the language of Azerbaijan (Az e rbaycan 16. Cited in Adalet Tahirzade, Elçibeyle 13 Saat €Uz- €Uze [13 hours face-to-face with Elchibey] (Baku: Tanıtım, 1999), 142. 17. Tahirzade, Elçibeyle 13 Saat €Uz- €Uze, 189. 18. Tahirzade, Elçibeyle 13 Saat €Uz- €Uze, 191. 19. Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, 183. Secularism and National Identity in Azerbaijan 469 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 Deleted Text: &ndash; Deleted Text: of Azerbaijan Deleted Text: , dili).20 Thus, Azerbaijani became the official name for the na- tional identity, the citizenship, and the language of Azerbaijan, and was justified based on the idea that the term covered all peo- ples living in Azerbaijan, regardless of their ethnicity, leaving no room for disturbances among ethnic minorities. Emphasis on nation-building shifted to Azerbaijanism (Az e rbaycançılıq), an ideology with roots in the Soviet period that sought to ease eth- nic tensions within the country. Further consolidation of the Azerbaijani citizenship identity has taken place during the Ilham Aliyev’s period. Since 2003, this notion of Azerbaijanism has provided a basis for a civic understanding of Azerbaijanism and inclusionary citizenship identity. Ilham Aliyev preserved his father’s heritage, with an added emphasis on diversity, multicul- turalism, and tolerance. This new discourse can also be inter- preted as accommodating all ethnic and religious groups within society and welcoming their differences. In this definition, the idea of secularism has constituted one of the main pillars of both national and citizenship identities. The Azerbaijanism or the Turkism propagated by opposing po- litical elite did not make any reference to religion. This does not imply that they deliberately neglected to define the place of reli- gion in the making of national identity, but rather that it did not constitute a priority. While the post-independence leaders of Azerbaijan have not made strong references to Islam, this does not mean that they have not acknowledged the meaning attrib- uted to Islam culturally. Bedford and Souleimanov argue that “all three presidents have used religion as a legitimation tool, making the presidential oath on both the Azerbaijani Constitution and the Quran, often referring to religion in their speeches, and in the cases of the father and son Aliyev, even performing a minor pil- grimage to Mecca.”21 Yet these culturally symbolic acts should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence of an emphasis on Is- lam but rather a politically correct acknowledgement of the rele- vance of Islam within Azerbaijani society. On the contrary, the Azerbaijani leaders have been strong advocates of secularism in their discourses of nation and state building. It has been common to see the late Soviet and early indepen- dence period in post-Soviet Azerbaijan as a time of religious 20. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1995), Article 21, https://en. president.az/azerbaijan/constitution. 21. Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “Azerbaijan, Islamism and an Unrest in Nardaran,” The Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, last modified December 27, 2015, accessed April 15, 2018, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical- articles/item/13316-azerbaijan-islamism-and-unrest-in-nardaran.html. Journal of Church and State 470 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 https://en.president.az/azerbaijan/constitution https://en.president.az/azerbaijan/constitution https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13316-azerbaijan-islamism-and-unrest-in-nardaran.html https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13316-azerbaijan-islamism-and-unrest-in-nardaran.html revival.22 Observers have often analyzed increasing religiosity and to some extent religious activism in Azerbaijan with refer- ence to the activities of foreigners.23 The popularity of some Mus- lim/Islamist YouTubers, or social unrest expressed through religious motives and led by religious leaders (e.g., Cuma Mesjidi, Nardaran events), are also mentioned by the respondents. 24 How- ever, others have argued that what some have seen as a religious revival was in fact increasing religiosity rather than religious- ness.25 In the same way, Valiyev underlines the “shallowness of Is- lamic revival” in Azerbaijan and emphasizes the peculiar importance of Novruz celebrations, a pre-Islamic shamanic tradi- tion, as a public celebration.26 While one can detect an element of piety in Elchibey as a believer, Heydar and Ilham Aliyev’s pay- ments of tribute to Islam publicly were more an acknowledgement of a cultural heritage that defined Azerbaijani identity than a dis- play of religiosity or a concession made to so-called religious circles. For Heydar Aliyev, Islam is a source of morality and yet remains distinct from politics: “Our state is secular. However, we are not separated from the religion. The state and the religion closely collaborate with each other. We believe that Islam in Azer- baijan would inculcate its wonderful spiritual values in the citi- zens of Azerbaijan.”27 For Heydar Aliyev, the Azerbaijani people “[have] never felt estranged from their religion, [but have] kept it in their hearts and souls.”28 In other words, Aliyev was very well aware of the meaning of religion in Azerbaijan and acknowledged its cultural importance and embeddedness in norms and values, yet he was an unquestionable advocate of secularism. His term in office was marked by the reconsolidation and strengthening of secular institutions; the institutionalization of the state-religion 22. Sofie Bedford and Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “Under Construction and Highly Contested: Islam in Post-Soviet Caucasus,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 9 (2016): 1559-80; Ansgar Jödicke, “Shia Groups and Iranian Religious Influence in Azerbaijan: The Impact of Trans-Boundary Religious Ties on National Religious Policy,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 58, no. 5 (2017): 533-56; Hannah O’Rear, “Negotiating Faith and Government in the Post Soviet Islamic Republics: Azerbaijan as a Case Study,” McGill Journal of Middle East Studies 78 (2012): 78- 90. 23. Galib Bashirov, “Islamic Discourses in Azerbaijan: The Securitization of Non- Traditional Religious Movements,” Central Asian Survey 37, no. 1 (2018): 31-49. 24. Authors’ interviews, November 2016. 25. O’Rear, “Negotiating Faith and Government in the Post Soviet Islamic Repub- lics: Azerbaijan as a Case Study,” 81. 26. Anar Valiyev, “Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic,” Middle East Re- view of International Affairs 9, no. 4 (2005): 6. 27. Cited in Adil Abdullah Al-Falah, Heydar Aliyev and National-Spiritual Values (Baku: Gısmet, 2007), 87. 28. Al-Falah, Heydar Aliyev and National-Spiritual Values, 35. Secularism and National Identity in Azerbaijan 471 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 Deleted Text: y Deleted Text: t Deleted Text: t relationship through the establishment of the State Committee on Religious Affairs; the preparation of the legal framework to con- trol and regulate religious activities; the securing of commitment and unconditional loyalty of the country’s main cleric, Allahshu- kur Pashazade, and the monitoring and prohibition of foreign reli- gious activities in the country. For Bashirov, it is possible to talk about an “Azerbaijani Islam,” which “was a part of secular identity of the Azerbaijani people,” accepting “the supremacy of secular values over religious ones.”29 This native version of Islam is “tolerant . . . and accepts the peace- ful coexistence of different faith groups, particularly Jews, Chris- tians, and Muslims.”30 Azerbaijani Islam was interpreted by Swietochowski as “national Islam” aiming at “downplaying the Shi’a-Sunni differences.”31 In a similar vein, a prominent theolo- gian describes the nature of Islam in Azerbaijani society as “secular religiosity,” which comprises learning Islamic principles, being close to praying and fasting, but remaining far from Sha- ria.32 This peculiar place of Islam and legal and institutional structures of Azerbaijani state-religion regime have been shaped and informed by the Russian Enlightenment under the Tsarist rule, the ADR’s ideological tenets, atheist propaganda of the So- viet rule, and post-Soviet Azerbaijani elite’s treatment of Islam. State-Religion Regime in Azerbaijan: A Legal and Institutional Inquiry The legal basis of the state-religion relationship in post-Soviet Azerbaijan is the 1992 “Presidential Decree on the Protection of the Rights and Liberties of National Minorities, Less Populated and Ethnic Groups and State Assistance for the Development of their Language and Civilization” adopted under the presidency of Elchibey. It was mainly designed to address the protection of the rights and liberties of ethnic and religious minorities, ensuring equal treatment by the state. Without mentioning the principle of secularism specifically, it guarantees the freedom of religious be- lief and equality of all religions, declares the separation of reli- gion and state, and specifically mentions that public education is separated from religion. The subsequent amendments themselves were responses to a series of developments at both the domestic 29. Bashirov, “Islamic Discourses in Azerbaijan: The Securitization of Non- Traditional Religious Movements,” 34. 30. Bashirov, “Islamic Discourses in Azerbaijan,” 34. 31. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: Perspectives from the Crossroads,” 424. 32. Authors’ interview with a theologian, Baku, November 15, 2016. Journal of Church and State 472 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article/62/3/464/5614701 by 81695661, O U P on 20 A ugust 2020 and international levels.33 They provide a more rigorous legal framework to regulate the state-religion relationship, including restrictions on the activities of foreign missionaries, registration requirements for religious communities, limitations on religious propaganda and dissemination of religious publications, and restrictions for persons having diplomas from foreign theological institutions. The 1995 Constitution was in line with the 1992 decree but went further, enshrining secularism explicitly as a characteristic of statehood. Its preamble mentions the intention “to build a law- based, secular state to provide the command of law as an expres- sion of the will of the nation.” Article 7 defines the Azerbaijani state as a “democratic, legal, secular, unitary republic.” Article 18 specifically refers to the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions … © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Academy of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] What Comes After the Critique of Secularism?: A Roundtable Remembering Marx’s Secularism Joseph Blankholm* SCHOLARS engaged in the critique of secularism have struggled with the numerous meanings of the secular and its cognates, such as secu- larism, secularization, and secularity. Seeking coherence in the secular’s semantic excess, they have often elided distinctions between these mean- ings or sought a more basic concept of the secular that can contain all of its senses (Asad 2003; Taylor 2007; see Weir 2015). Numerous scholars have observed strong similarities between secularism and Protestantism (Fessenden 2007; Modern 2011; Yelle 2013; see McCrary and Wheatley 2017), at times echoing a Christian theological tradition that has long been anti-secular (Taylor 2007; Gregory 2012; see Reynolds 2016). Unlike this anti-secular tradition, the strongest version of the critique of secu- larism is a critique of the conditions that produce a distinction between secular and religious and of the ways that empire benefits from this dis- tinction. Overcoming a tidy separation between secularism and religion requires fracturing both and reassembling them in new ways that allow messy life to exceed governance (Hurd 2015, 122–27). Remembering Karl Marx’s secularism provides an opportunity to recover the differ- ences within secularism and its difference from Christianity, but also its *Joseph Blankholm, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA. E-mail: [email protected] I owe thanks to several PhD students at the University of California, Santa Barbara for their valuable insights and feedback, including Matthew Harris as well as the students in my seminar on materialism: Timothy Snediker, Lucas McCracken, Courtney Applewhite, and Damian Lanahan-Kalish. Thanks also to Jonathan Sheehan and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, who provided the opportunity to present these ideas at a workshop hosted by the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion at the University of California, Berkeley. The workshop was funded by the Luce Foundation and made possible by Jonathan VanAntwerpen, to whom I remain grateful for his mentorship and support. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, March 2020, Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 35–57 doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfz104 Advance Access publication on February 11, 2020 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 mailto:[email protected]?subject= Journal of the American Academy of Religion36 odd similarities with religion. This recovery can help refine the critique of secularism and preserve some important tools for improving material conditions. To remember Marx’s secularism means to recall his thoroughgoing empiricism, his avowed atheism, and his critique of religion as well as to acknowledge the anti-religious atheism of Marxists who have engaged in statecraft, such as Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. Remembering Marx’s secularism also means recalling the nature of his materialism, which departs from atheistic materialism not because it dis- agrees with its conclusions but because it considers ontological specu- lation a distraction from a more pressing focus on material conditions. Though there are forms of Marxism that are explicitly Christian or other- wise theological, Marxian secularists have had an enormous influence on the secularization of people and states around the world, and Marx’s naturalism poses a challenge for those engaged in postcolonial critique (Chakrabarty 2000; see Brown 2014, 122). Surely, critique’s debt to Marx does not make it inherently secular (Asad, Brown, Butler, Mahmood 2009), but the specter of his secularism cannot be ignored. This essay begins with an attempt to distinguish some of the many meanings of the secular, emphasizing an important distinction that other scholars have recognized in recent years between worldview and polit- ical secularism (Weir 2015; Quack 2017). The following section analyzes Marx’s materialism as a worldview secularism in order to demonstrate its similarity to nineteenth-century philosophical secularism and recover its debts to ancient atomism and French materialism, thereby placing Marx in a lineage that antedates Christianity (Foster 2000; Foster, Clark, and York 2008). The next section analyzes Marx’s political secularism, which does not attack religion directly but reduces it to supernatural belief and predicts its elimination with the end of alienation from labor and the concomitant end of the need for abstraction from material reality. In the final section, this essay underscores the importance of drawing distinc- tions within secularism. Recognizing a distinction between worldview and politics is a necessary condition for arguing that that Marx’s sub- jective materialism can withstand the critique of secularism more effect- ively than his approach to religion. Drawing a distinction between kinds of secularism—between Marx and Holyoake—shows that the critique of secularism has failed to recognize a non-liberal secular tradition by equating secularism and liberalism. Placing Marx’s materialism within a religion-like secular tradition also sustains and enacts the critique of secularism by deconstructing the distinction between secular and reli- gious. Remembering Marx’s secularism thus refines the critique’s target, D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Blankholm: Remembering Marx’s Secularism 37 undermines the simplistic identity of Protestant and secular, and carves out much-needed space within the secular for atheistic Marxists and other non-liberal secular people. SECULARISM’S CONFUSION Secularism is confusing, which is to say, fecund. Its overdetermin- ation has made it both politically useful and prone to miscommunication (Blankholm 2014). Secularization, its cognate, faces the same challenge, with advocates and opponents of secularization theory besting one an- other using the definition of the term most suited to their agenda or dataset (Casanova 1994 and 2009; Martin 2005; Voas and Chaves 2016). The persistence of disputes over nomenclature does not make talking about the secular impossible, but it signals how important definition is for setting the terms of the conflict. This work of definition and labeling is a confidence game (Wittgenstein 2009; Mckinnon 2002; McCutcheon 2007) in which religion or the secular hides under one shell at the start, but after some prestidigitation, it appears, to the mark’s great surprise, beneath another. Debates over proper labels have consequences outside of universities (McCutcheon 1997), and though scholars have long played a role in defining religion and its related terms (Smith 1998), they re- main less important than other definitional authorities. In the courts of many countries, religious and secular appellation is a high-stakes game with material ramifications for minority groups seeking legal protections or trying to prevent their practices and symbols from being quarantined from public life (Sullivan 2005; Mahmood 2016; Curtis 2016; Wenger 2017). In the United States, the high stakes are literal, with the total value of tax exemptions for religious groups numbering in the tens of billions of dollars each year (Cragun, Yeager, and Vega 2012). What counts as secular or religious matters a great deal—and so does figuring out what we mean when we talk about secularism. As the essay that introduces this forum elaborates, the critique of secularism in the twenty-first century was pioneered simultaneously by Talal Asad (2003) and Saba Mahmood (2006) on the one hand and Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (2000 and 2008) on the other. In both ver- sions of the critique, “secularism” has begun to mean that which structures and sequesters religion from other adjacent categories like spirituality, the secular, and superstition (Dressler and Mandair 2011; McCrary and Wheatley 2017; Josephson-Storm 2018). This process of “religion-making” defines secularism for most of those engaged in critiquing it. They have provided a valuable conceptual vocabulary for observing and thinking D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Journal of the American Academy of Religion38 beyond the religion-related divisions that states and other powerful actors produce, and in the process, their critique has raised worthy suspicions about anything bearing the name “secular.” Asad (2003) finds in the ge- nealogy of secularism multiple origins that feed into the contemporary production of the secular. The critique of secularism is a new formation that adds a layer to the sediment of the term’s definitions. Academics who advocate and critique secularism are engaged in its ongoing redefinition and reappraisal alongside judges, pollsters, and Internal Revenue Service officials. The high-stakes shell game that scholars play with others who label and define amounts to no less than the work of remaking religion. Secularism has not always meant religion-making. The term was coined by George Jacob Holyoake in 1851 (Search 1851) to describe an approach to life that focuses on the material world but stops short of the ontological certainty of atheistic materialism (Holyoake 1871). Holyoake intended something like “agnosticism,” though Thomas Huxley would not coin that term until nearly two decades later (Le Poidevin 2010) in humble acknowledgment of the limits that an empiricist epistemology imposes on a materialist ontology (Huxley 1902). Holyoake’s secularism was a philosophy and a way of life, and it grew into a social movement in Britain (Royle 1974; Rectenwald 2016), the United States (Post 1943; Warren 1943; Schmidt 2016), and India (Quack 2011). Though this move- ment often endorsed the political goal of keeping Christianity out of gov- ernment and though secularists and others referred to non-sectarian education as “secular” (Holyoake 1896; Weir 2015), nineteenth-century secularists considered worldview secularism, political secularism, and secular instruction to be distinct. An ex-Unitarian minister in the United States, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, was likely the first to use the term “secularism” to mean the separation of church and state and to associate it with Holyoake’s—by contrast—“philosophical” secularism (Abbot 1876). By the late nineteenth century, political secularism was synonymous with the separation of church and state, and philosophical secularism meant the beliefs of nonbelievers and their focus on living ethically in the physical world. Secularism, without adjective, could—and still can—mean either or both (Blankholm 2014), but conflating them is a misunderstanding of how they differ in origin and aim. Drawing on these nineteenth-century distinctions, Todd Weir (2015) and Johannes Quack (2017) have framed political secularism and worldview secularism as a binary, where the former is separationism and the latter describes the ontological and epistemological beliefs of secular people. Secularism as religion-making is a recent scholarly coinage that describes the intensity and pervasiveness of the separationist logic, though D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Blankholm: Remembering Marx’s Secularism 39 it often elides a distinction between political and worldview secularisms because it considers them interdependent. Mahmood contrasts political secularism and secularity, where the former is the state-based manage- ment of religion, and the latter is “the set of concepts, norms, sensibilities, and dispositions that characterize secular societies and subjectivities” (Mahmood 2016, 3). “Secularity” in this sense is still religion-making, though not state based; it is a pervasive background that conditions re- ligious believers as well as secular people (see also Taylor 2007, 13–14). It differs from worldview secularism, though it includes it, effectively erasing any way for worldview secularism to stand alone (Warner 2012). This elision also makes it difficult to explain how secular people in the United States can be a quasi-religious minority with almost no political representation despite living in a secular state under the modern condi- tion of secularity (Edgell et al. 2016). Asad acknowledges the gap between worldview and political secu- larism and sees an articulation of their relationship as one of the aims of an anthropology of secularism: “The question of how secularism as a pol- itical doctrine is related to the secular as an ontology and an epistemology is evidently at stake here” (Asad 2003, 21). Mahmood’s “secularity” is the site of articulation that Asad argues is the constitutive background of life in modern liberal nation-states. But as Weir (2015) has shown, though political secularism and worldview secularism are related in their histor- ical development, they cannot be collapsed into one another or lumped under the sign of secularity. Understanding their relationship is important and requires more historical and genealogical research. If political and worldview secularisms are sufficiently similar, then a powerful critique of one can target both; if they are sufficiently distinct, then they require sep- arate critiques, and perhaps one can be spared, entirely or in part. It is odd and demands explanation that secularism names both the pro- cess by which religion and the secular become distinct from one another as well as one of the terms being realized by the work of distinction (see Warner 2012). People who are both secular and religion-like—or secular and avowedly religious—pose a special challenge to conflating these two forms of secularism. Abbot considered “absolute secularism” to be the “political side” of “free religion” (Abbott 1876, 7), the German materi- alist Ernst Haeckel described his scientific naturalism as “a monistic reli- gion” (Haeckel 1879, quoted in Weir 2012, 5), and humanists like Auguste Comte (1851–1854) and Charles Francis Potter (1930) were non-theistic religious innovators who created ways for secular people to belong and behave religiously without believing in the supernatural. Because secu- larism structures and constrains secular people just as it does the religious D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Journal of the American Academy of Religion40 (Beaman, Steele, and Pringnitz 2018) and because secular people have in many times and places considered themselves religious or religion-like and been legally recognized as such (Blankholm 2018), calling all of this “secularism” sows confusion that is difficult to clarify. Lost in this confu- sion is Marx’s non-liberal secularism, which looms large on the scholarly left that takes the critique of secularism seriously. Whether the critique of religion-making or separationist secularism applies to worldview secu- larism is an important question for deciding whether there is a Marxism that is both secular and capable of sustaining critique. MARX’S WORLDVIEW SECULARISM Marx’s secularism is a matter of dispute, and it deserves attention if we want to continue to think with Marx while taking the critique of secularism seriously. Marx called himself an atheist, unequivocally, in English in 1871 (Marx, Foner, and Landor 1972, 15). Those committed to epistemological empiricism and ontological materialism have only self- described as atheists in public since the late eighteenth century, or about a hundred years before Marx’s avowal (Kors 1992). In the preceding cen- turies, “atheist” was a term that Christian culture had reserved as an epi- thet for heretics; it was not a self-appellation (Kors 1990). Though first published under a pseudonym, Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach’s Système de la nature (1770) is one of the first works to articulate a systematic, modern atheism, which is to say a coherent philosophy of ontological materialism (Kors 1976). D’Holbach, along with his contemporaries Claude Adrien Helvétius, Jacques-André Naigeon, Denis Diderot, and the more senior Julien Offray de la Mettrie, comprised a group of writers later known as the French materialists. They argued that a materialist and naturalist ontology followed from a rigorous sensationalist empiricism, which they demonstrated systematically in a series of works that drew heavily from an ancient tradition that included the Greek atomist Epicurus and the Roman poet Lucretius (Kors 2016a and 2016b). Marx is heir to both the ancient atomist tradition and French materi- alism, which he demonstrates in his early writings. His materialism differs, however, from that of the French materialists by turning away from the metaphysical speculation of ontology and toward the subjective activity of human life. He makes this difference clear in his dissertation, which he completed in 1841, as well as in other of his writings from the 1840s. Marx’s dissertation is a comparative study of the natural philosophies of two of the ancient Greek atomists, Democritus and Epicurus (Marx 1975, 25–105). Though other scholars saw Epicurus as merely derivative D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Blankholm: Remembering Marx’s Secularism 41 of the earlier Democritus (Marx 1975, 34, 37–38), Marx carefully distin- guishes between their philosophies to demonstrate Epicurean innovation. In Democritus, Marx finds an empiricism that learns about the world in- ductively by assembling appearances into objective theories. In Epicurus, he finds the objective world present in subjective human consciousness. The mind is reflected in the atoms of the universe and vice versa because thought and the world are both composed of atoms. For Epicurus and for Marx, thought is real and material, rather than abstract, and by extension, deductive human reasoning is concrete self-consciousness of the actual unfolding of the world (Marx 1975, 73). Through Epicurus, Marx argues that he has solved the problem of separate noumena and phenomena that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel inherited from Immanuel Kant and also attempted to resolve. Marx re- lies heavily on Hegel’s dialectical approach, but he believes that because thought is matter—literally, distinct atoms in the Epicurean system—he avoids Hegel’s idealism (see Teeple 1990). Thought is not merely an in- ductive approximation of an ultimately incomprehensible reality but is co-extensive with that reality and follows its same laws. Reason is the logic present in both the mind and the world, and human thought is nature’s concrete self-consciousness of itself. By extension, science should always be in the service of a reasoning subject and thus subjective. It should never be objective and an end in itself because this presupposes a fallacious gap between the world and subjective thought. Marx’s Epicurus unites em- piricist and rationalist epistemologies and asserts the primacy of matter while centering the human subject. What he finds in Epicurus as early as 1841 reflects the entire project of his later work: to bring human life into a self-conscious understanding of its nature and into a proper relation with its material conditions, which are one and the same. In other of his writings on materialism from the 1840s, Marx mir- rors the movement that he makes in his dissertation, from a Democritean empiricism interested in knowledge for its own sake to an Epicurean materialism that centers on human subjectivity and sees in human self-consciousness a reflection of nature. He repeatedly acknowledges his debt to the materialist tradition, including the French materialists, and he describes his own role in materialism’s humanization. For instance, in 1844, Marx co-wrote with Friedrich Engels The Holy Family, which cri- tiqued Bruno Bauer and the other Young Hegelians (Marx 2002, 101–7). In the book’s sixth chapter, Marx wrote a brief history of materialism in which he describes the movement from an English materialism of Bacon and Hobbes that is “hostile to humanity” (Marx 2002, 105) to the French materialism of Helvétius focused on the species-life of human beings. In D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Journal of the American Academy of Religion42 the same essay, he argues that materialism’s focus on the sensuous, social reality of humans leads directly into the communism of Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. “Mature communism,” he writes, “comes directly from French materialism” (Marx 2002, 107 emphasis in original). He sees Ludwig Feuerbach’s work and his own as deepening the focus of materi- alism on sensuous, social life: [Metaphysics] will be defeated forever by materialism which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself [through Hegel] and co- incides with humanism. As Feuerbach represented materialism in the theoretical domain, French and English socialism and communism in the practical field represented materialism which coincided with humanism. (Marx 2002, 102, emphasis in original) Writing again in 1844, in his “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy,” Marx credits Feuerbach with taking Hegel beyond idealism “by making the social relation of ‘man to man’ the basic principle of his theory” (Marx 2002, 76). He builds a persistent contrast between the speculative and theoretical on the one hand and the sensuous, social, and practical on the other. In these early philosophical writings, Marx positioned himself as an heir to the materialist tradition, but he also departed from its namesake ontology, that is, the claim that reality is material. He effectively built a new understanding of the term, which he held onto because he wanted the debt that his practical materialism owed to theoretical materialism to re- main clear despite its difference in focus (see Jordan 1967, pace Megill and Park 2017). Marx’s disagreement with Feuerbach is telling. In his “Theses on Feuerbach,” he criticizes him and all earlier materialists for being still too speculative and philosophical: “The chief defect of all hitherto ex- isting materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contempla- tion, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively” (Marx 2002, 182, emphasis in original). Because Feuerbach’s thought remains speculative, rather than applied, it fails to achieve what Epicurus did, that is, a philosophy focused on improving subjective human life rather than describing it objectively or in abstract terms. Marx repeats the movement he made in his dissertation in which he argues against the proto-science of Democritus in favor of the religion-like missionary philosophy of Epicurus (see DeWitt 1954). As he writes in the final thesis on Feuerbach, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 2002, 184, emphasis in original). The meta- phor of departure is an apposite description of Epicurus’s relationship to D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Blankholm: Remembering Marx’s Secularism 43 Democritus and Marx’s relationship to Feuerbach. Marx continues with many of Feuerbach’s arguments and differs in smaller ways that mark the start of his own path. Marx also departs from the materialism of d’Holbach, whose Système de la nature starts with a rigorous empiricist epistemology and specu- lates that a mechanistic materialist ontology rationally follows. Like other mechanistic materialists, such as La Mettrie, who is best known for his essay L’homme machine (La Mettrie 1996), d’Holbach argues that a nat- uralist ontology forecloses the possibility of agency or free will. Marx’s subjective materialism brackets ontological questions and avoids the im- plications of mechanistic materialism in which agentive change is impos- sible because free will is an illusion and every action is necessary rather than contingent. As he wrote in “Private Property and Communism” in 1844, “Communism begins with atheism (Owen), but atheism is initially far from being communism, and is for the most part an abstraction. The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first nothing more than an ab- stract philosophical philanthropy, while that of communism is at once real and directly bent towards action” (Marx 2002, 131). Like Democritus’s atomism that approaches nature objectively, French materialism is a starting point for understanding reality. But like the subjective philosophy focused on human well-being that Epicurus develops from Democritus, communism is concerned with human flourishing and demands action to change reality. Only after traveling a great distance with objective ma- terialism and appropriating its name does Marx depart from it by urging a shift in focus to the subjective and to actions that improve material con- ditions. He does not contradict atheistic materialism; he shifts its focus to subjective human life. MARX’S POLITICAL SECULARISM Marx’s political secularism sits in tension with his worldview secu- larism. David McLellan has argued that Marx’s understanding of reli- gion was influenced by his father’s deistic Protestantism, to which the elder Marx converted from Judaism (McLellan 1987, 7–8). Surely, Marx adopts a belief-centered understanding of religion that is consistent with Protestantism’s belief-centrism and with the philosophical lineage he in- herits from Hegel and Feuerbach (Mahmood 2016, 13–15, 203). This belief-centrism is on display in an oft-cited passage from Marx’s “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” that is worth quoting at length because it gets to the heart of his approach to religion in his early writings: D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jaar/article-abstract/88/1/35/5733647 by 81695661, O U P on 04 A pril 2020 Journal of the American Academy of Religion44 The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, reli- gion does not make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting out- side the world. Man is the world of man, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spir- itual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn com- plement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is therefore in- directly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. (Marx 2002, 171, emphasis in original) Religion—reduced to religious belief, with little regard for its practice or institutions—is the “general theory of this world” and “an inverted consciousness of the world.” It is a “fantastic realization” of a human es- sence that “has not acquired any true reality.” Struggling against religion is to struggle with the world only “indirectly” because religion is merely a symptom of human alienation from its own essence, rather than the cause. Religion reflects a world out of step with human life and expresses the resulting injustice in the metaphysical inversions it asserts as truth. Religion is a consequence of human alienation, and it serves as a protest against real … Benevolent Secularism and the Recalibration of Church-State Relations in Ireland in the Aftermath of the Clergy Child Sex Abuse Scandals Carolyn M. Warner In 2011, the Irish prime minister (taoiseach), Enda Kenny, gave a speech that made international headlines. He accused the Vatican of frustrating a civil inquiry into child sex abuse in Ireland, a sov- ereign, democratic republic and using the “gimlet-eye of a canon lawyer” to parse its responses, rather than to apologize and to pri- oritize the safety of children. He criticized the “dysfunction, dis- connection, elitism and narcissism” of the Vatican.1 What shocked the world was that a Catholic prime minister in Catholic, socially conservative Ireland would challenge the Catholic behe- moth of the Vatican and assert the primacy of state sovereignty, questioning the moral authority and power of the Holy See. CAROLYN M. WARNER (BA, University of California San Diego; MA, PhD, Harvard University) is Department Chair and Vail Pittman Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. She is the author of Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe (Princeton University Press, 2000). Warner’s major recent publications are (with Ramazan Kılınç, Chris- topher W. Hale, and Adam B. Cohen) Generating Generosity in Catholicism and Is- lam: Beliefs, Institutions and Public Goods Provision (Cambridge University Press, 2018), “The Politics of Sex Abuse in Sacred Hierarchies: A Comparative Study of the Catholic Church and the Military in the United States,” Religions, and (with Mia A. Armstrong) “The Role of Military Law and Systemic Issues in the Military’s Handling of Sexual Assault Cases,” Law & Society Review. Her articles also have appeared in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Comparative Politics, Psy- chological Science, Politics and Religion, and Perspectives on Politics, among others. Warner’s primary scholarly interests include gendered violence, religion and politics, and political corruption. 1. “Enda Kenny Speech on Cloyne Report,” RT�E, last modified July 20, 2011, https://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0720/303965-cloyne1. Journal of Church and State vol. 62 no. 1, pages 86–109; doi:10.1093/jcs/csz092 VC The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] 86 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 https://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0720/303965-cloyne1 Kenny’s speech also pointed to an often overlooked issue: that while policy makers, politicians, and the media had spent most of the years since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States debating whether Islam was compatible with democracy, it was not clear whether Catholicism was. Kenny’s speech signaled a turning point in Irish state relations with the Catholic Church. Changes later culminated in over- whelming Irish support for referenda overturning two of the Church’s key moral agenda items: gay marriage and abortion, af- ter already having challenged the Church on divorce. Further, Ire- land elected (through the parliamentary party process) an openly gay prime minister in 2017. Clearly, the Church had lost its moral authority and much of its political power over Irish voters. This critical power shift leads to critical research questions: to what ex- tent have relations between the Catholic Church and the Irish state changed? How did earlier Church-state institutions contrib- ute to the astonishing and egregious abuse and child sex abuse cases under the auspices of the Catholic Church? The answers lie in looking at the role of the Church in social and educational poli- cies and programs, its legal status, its internal practices, and growing secular and cultural trends. Ireland’s experience shows the strength of institutionalized religion-state frameworks, even in the face of substantial successive scandals. It is a case study in the endurance of basic framing structures that organize religion- state relations.2 There have been changes, but the overarching framework of religion-state relations remains intact: the Church has not been banished from public life, religion has not been rele- gated to the private realm. Education, health, and welfare services in Ireland, long the purview of the Catholic Church, continue to be dominated by Catholic organizations; the state still allows orga- nized religions to deliver many of its key public services. This ar- rangement, what some call “benevolent secularism,” has a malevolent side. Ireland is a case study of potential dangers of the state allowing religious institutions, in the name of religious ac- commodation or freedom of religion, to operate without oversight and to weld substantial policy influence. The abuse scandals in Ireland have long involved the Catholic Church as well as its religious orders, the latter running a system of what are termed industrial schools, Magdalen laundries, and mother and baby homes. As has been the case in other countries, 2. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Joel S. Fetzer and Christopher J. Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2005). Recalibration of Church-State Relations in Ireland 87 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 the Catholic Church and its religious orders prioritized the inter- ests of the institution over the interests of the victims, claimed it alone should handle the issue, protected the perpetrators while re-victimizing the victims, and had serious conflict of interest problems in investigating its own cases internally.3 For decades, the church failed to acknowledge what a serious problem the per- petrators constitute. The religious orders have hardly even ac- knowledged the harm they did and have avoided legal responsibility. Explanations for why individuals abused children and why the institutions covered it up are the subject of other works; explaining why they were able to, and what the long-term consequences are for Church-state relations in Ireland, is the next step in the analysis here.4 Models of Church-State Relations in Ireland Scholars have characterized religion-state relations in various ways, and some have argued Ireland’s can be termed “benevolent secularism.”5 In this arrangement, the state and religions agree to tolerate and assist each other, while respecting the independence of each. The state does not have an official religion and provides all religions with equal support. This description might seem fan- ciful, given the influence the Catholic Church wielded in the Irish state and society for decades. Yet it captures the fact that the Church was never the official religion of Ireland, that there is no wall of separation between religion and state, and that the state has an obligation to be fair in its support of other religions and re- ligious beliefs. Religious actors “co-exist with democratic politics and minority rights protection.”6 3. Helen Goode, Hannah McGee, and Ciar�an O’Boyle, Time to Listen: Confronting Child Sexual Abuse by Catholic Clergy in Ireland (Dublin: the Liffey Press, 2003), 146. 4. E.g., Marie Keenan, Child Sexual Abuse & the Catholic Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Carolyn M. Warner, “The Politics of Sex Abuse in Sacred Hierarchies: A Comparative Study of the Catholic Church and the Military in the United States,” Religions 10, no. 4 (April, 2019). Ireland’s population is predomi- nantly Catholic, and overwhelming Christian by nominal affiliation. I use the term “religion-state” at times to recognize that the country is also home to non- Christian faiths. 5. David T. Buckley, Faithful to Secularism: The Religious Politics of Democracy in Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Jeremy Menchik, “Soft Separation Democracy,” Politics & Religion 11, no. 4 (December 2018), 863-83; Davis Brown, “Measuring Long-Term Patterns of Politi- cal Secularization and Desecularization: Did They Happen or Not?” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (July 2019). 6. Buckley, Benevolent Secularism, 13. Journal of Church and State 88 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 Characterizing that arrangement as “benevolent” may overlook a key element of religion-state relations: power struggles over au- tonomy and influence. Organized religions have long presented challenges to democracies and concepts of citizenship, as religion lays claim to citizens’ loyalties and sees itself as answering to a higher authority. Religious freedom has been a contested issue in a number of countries, even when it is constitutionally guaran- teed. The goals of the state and of organized religions, their rela- tive power, and the extent to which each needs the other to pursue its own interests account for variation over time of epi- sodes of cooperation or conflict between religion and state.7 In the modern era, states have sought to be sovereign over all in their territory, including religions.8 Benevolent secularism and other religion-state arrangements are the result of long struggles, compromises, and quid pro quos.9 In Ireland, earlier religion- state interactions resulted in an arrangement at the founding of the Irish Republic in which the state accepts religion(s) as a public actor, and indeed is supportive of it, while guaranteeing freedom of religion. This “benevolent secularism” arrangement masks, and virtually authorizes, a de facto exemption for child sex abuse in religious institutions, as the Irish case sadly illustrates. The power politicians ceded to the Church, out of need for the Church’s sup- port and out of deference to it, enabled the Church to operate state services independent of any effective oversight, and it en- abled the Church to avoid scrutiny for how it was handling its own cases of clergy child sex abuse. This took pressure off the Church and religious orders to main- tain the bases of their moral authority, allowing appallingly im- moral behavior internally. The implosion led to a repudiation of the Church’s policies that had been instantiated in the Irish Con- stitution and other laws and led to more vigilance on the part of 7. Anthony Gill and Arang Keshavarzian, “State Building and Religious Resour- ces: An Institutional Theory of Church-State Relations in Iran and Mexico,” Poli- tics & Society 27, no. 3 (Sept. 1999): 431-465; Karrie J. Koesel, Religion and Authoritarianism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Ani Sarkissian, The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Carolyn M. Warner, Confessions of an Interest Group: the Catholic Church and Political Parties in Post-war Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 8. Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,” World Politics 52 (2000), 206-245; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 9. Gill and Keshavarzian, “State Building and Religious Resources”; Anna Gryzmala-Busse, Nations Under God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Sarkissian, The Varieties of Religious Repression; Warner, Confessions of an Interest Group. Recalibration of Church-State Relations in Ireland 89 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 parents and civil authorities. As noted, however, the basic archi- tecture of religion-state relations remains that of “benevolent secularism.”10 Historical Background Ireland gained independence from Great Britain in 1921. The is- land was split into twenty-six Irish Free State counties and six Northern Ireland counties that became part of “the United King- dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.” The partition cemented the dominance of Catholicism as the religion of Ire- land (first, the Irish Free State and then Republic of Ireland), and circumstances enabled the Church to accrue extensive power and policy influence in Ireland.11 Its power was institutionalized through what Anna Gryzmala-Busse terms “institutional access” to policymaking processes and was sustained by its being viewed as Ireland’s moral authority. The Church and most citi- zens viewed the Church as sovereign in moral matters. In con- trast to many other European countries, the Irish seemed to buck secularizing trends in Church (mass) attendance through the twentieth century.12 The result was that, as the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs wrote in 2009, “our society was or- dered in a way that permitted systematic and institutional ne- glect and abuse of children. Many different factors permitted this abuse to occur and to continue for so many years. The ideal- ism of the [1916] Proclamation [of the Irish Free State on cher- ishing children] was suffocated by undue deference to religious orders and misplaced trust in certain persons in positions of authority.”13 The power of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and the deference accorded it, have been well-documented by scholars and other 10. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State; David T. Buckley, Faithful to Secu- larism, 82. 11. Gryzmala-Busse, Nations Under God; Brian Girvin, “Church, State, and Soci- ety in Ireland since 1960,” �Eire-Ireland 43, nos.1-2 (Spring-Summer 2008): 74-98; Tom Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1998); John Henry Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923–1979 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillian, 1980). 12. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular (Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2004). 13. Barry Andrews, Office of the Minister of Children and Youth Affairs, Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009, Implementation Plan (Office of the Minister of Children and Youth Affairs: Dublin, 2009), xiii. https://www. dcya.gov.ie/documents/publications/Implementation_Plan_from_Ryan_Com- mission_Report.pdf Journal of Church and State 90 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 https://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/publications/Implementation_Plan_from_Ryan_Commission_Report.pdf https://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/publications/Implementation_Plan_from_Ryan_Commission_Report.pdf https://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/publications/Implementation_Plan_from_Ryan_Commission_Report.pdf commentators.14 The state did not formally establish Catholicism as the official religion of Ireland, and the constitution has always allowed freedom of conscience and freedom to profess and prac- tice religion (“subject to public order and morality”).15 However, the reality was that the Church was dominant in Irish politics, so- ciety, and culture. The deference accorded the Church by politi- cians and the public was summarized by Ireland’s Minister for External Affairs Sean MacBride in an internal cabinet memo in the late 1940s: “Even if, as Catholics, we were prepared to take the re- sponsibility of disregarding [the Hierarchy’s] views, which I do not think we can do, it would be politically impossible to do so . . . We are dealing with the considered views of the leaders of the Catholic Church to which the vast majority of our people belong; these views cannot be ignored.”16 This political deference, a form of benevolent secularism, enabled the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of tens of thousands of Irish children and young women over decades. To understand the collapse of the Church’s moral authority and its diminished policy influence, even as the outlines of Irish religion-state relations remained intact, we need to examine the abuse scandals. The paper proceeds as follows. It provides a brief description of key features of the cases that pro- voked public outrage, covering those of the diocesan Church, then the industrial school system run by religious orders, and the issue of state complicity in those affairs. It then assesses changes in Irish politics and culture affecting religion-state relations and moves on to note areas where there seems to have been less change. It concludes with a discussion of what benevolent secular- ism and religious freedom can mask. Institutional Abuse A significant catalyst for the ensuing challenges to the political and social hegemony of the Catholic Church in Ireland came from the late Mary Raftery’s three-part documentary, “States of Fear,” televised on RT�E, a major Irish station, in the spring of 1999. It revealed, in a way that descriptive text in newspapers or 14. Girvin, “Church, State and Society”; Susie Donnelly, “Sins of the Father: Unravelling Moral Authority in the Irish Catholic Church,” Irish Journal of Sociol- ogy 24, no. 3 (2016): 315-39; Tom Garvin, Preventing the Future: Why Was Ireland Poor for so Long? (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2004). 15. Constitution of Ireland, 44.2.1, 44.2.2, last accessed October 4, 2019, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Ireland_(original_text). 16. Ronan Fanning, “The Age of Our Craven Deference Is Finally Over,” The Inde- pendent, December 6, 2009, https://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/the- age-of-our-craven-deference-is-finally-over-26588891.html. Recalibration of Church-State Relations in Ireland 91 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 https://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/the-age-of-our-craven-deference-is-finally-over-26588891.html https://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/the-age-of-our-craven-deference-is-finally-over-26588891.html government reports could not, the horrors of institutional “care” of children in state-funded institutions run by Catholic religious orders (and two parishes), with strong connections to the Church in the relevant dioceses, and nominally overseen by the state’s De- partment of Education.17 As one survivor stated, “Jesus said suf- fer the little children, he didn’t say beat the fecking hell out of them.”18 The horrors exposed were not only the scale of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of children sent to the institutions, but also the level of state complicity.19 The state, with Church agreement, used the system to round up children of poor families and to corral girls and young women “deemed to be in moral dan- ger.”20 Over 105,000 children had been institutionalized in these schools. The state also repeatedly failed to prevent and investi- gate the abuse that was being perpetuated on children in the insti- tutions. This was the case into the 1990s. Benevolent secularism, with the state not interfering in religious affairs while enabling its very public presence and near monopoly over education, health, and welfare services and policies, facilitated the abuse. Raftery’s well-researched documentary and ensuing co- authored book also exposed the extent of avarice within the reli- gious orders running the institutions.21 The state paid a subsidy on a per capita basis to be used to provide adequate food, medical care, and clothing for institutionalized children. Those funds were often diverted to the benefit of those running the institu- tions, while children starved, were denied medical care, and left shoeless and in threadbare clothing, even in winter.22 Indeed, some children were better off when they had been with their fami- lies: “At home, we used to get proper food—meat several times a week, vegetables, eggs, the lot. In Ferryhouse [St Joseph’s Indus- trial School, run by the Rosminian order] we never saw meat ex- cept a few sausages every so often. They never gave us vegetables—the cabbage water and two potatoes was our main meal.”23 As a woman who had been put in an industrial school run by the Sisters of Mercy when she was three, and held there for 17. Mary Raftery and Eoin O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children: The Inside Story of Ireland’s Industrial Schools (New York: Continuum, 2001); Commission to In- quire into Child Abuse [hereafter CICA], Commission Report, Vol. 1.2 (Dublin: Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009). 18. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 40; CICA, Commission Re- port, Vol. 1.7. 19. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 4.6 20. Susannah Riordan, “Challenging Bad Nuns: Ireland’s Magdalen Laundries,” Irish Review, 4 (2010): 124; Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 64. 21. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children. 22. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 89-122. 23. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 112. Journal of Church and State 92 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 twelve years, said, “I remember the hunger. We were always starved. When we were out for walks, we’d eat weeds.”24 For approximately 100 years, Ireland maintained this system of over seventy Catholic-run “industrial schools” to which primarily poor infants and children were assigned by state authorities. The school system had been set up in the nineteenth century, well prior to Irish independence, and continued with slight revisions after independence, becoming Ireland’s own project.25 Where the Protestant denominations had shifted to a policy of placing chil- dren in foster care, the Church maintained an emphasis on large- scale institutional settings. The schools were intended to house children whose families allegedly could not care for them, who were orphaned, or who had been convicted of small crimes or de- linquency. They were meant to provide children with a standard education and vocational training as well,26 but as a survivor, who had been at St. Conleth’s Reformatory School for two years, said, “There was no attempt ever made at rehabilitation, or even educa- tion for us.”27 Goaded by public outcry after the documentary series, the state established an investigative commission, the Commission to In- quire into Child Abuse (CICA; also often referred to as the Ryan Commission). Its revelations, published in 2009, provide further evidence of what Raftery’s documentary had shown. The report documents an extraordinary degree of physical and sexual abuse of children by their caretakers and a disturbing disinclination of other staff not to challenge the abuse, which went far beyond what was the norm in Irish society and families.28 One survivor stated, “The slightest thing and you’d be beaten. They used a piece of wood, like part of an orange box. We always had splinters of wood in us, cuts all over us. They beat us on the arms, the legs, on the neck. I don’t know how we didn’t die. Our hands were all ripped to pieces.” Nuns and religious brothers would then beat the children for reacting to the pain, prompting a survivor to ask, 24. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 81. 25. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 1.2; Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 16-7, 69-88. 26. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 4.1, 12-13. 27. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 45. The vast majority of in- dustrial schools and laundries were not orphanages, nor were they funded by the charity of religious orders or the church. They were established and funded by the state, with children institutionalized in them by the state. 28. The comment of one man who had been at the Artane industrial school from 1959-1965, run by the Christian Brothers, was typical: “Not all the Brothers would beat you up, some of them were OK. But they never interfered with each other, not that I saw anyway.” In Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 119. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 3.7; CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 3.8. Recalibration of Church-State Relations in Ireland 93 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 “God, were they monsters, were they human at all?”29 The com- mission reported that “In addition to physical abuse as the result of bodily assault by punching, hitting, and kicking, witnesses reported a variety of implements were used to beat and physically abuse residents,” including broom handles, hay forks, hoes, belt buckles, hammers, and studded leather straps. Children also had blocks of wood or concrete thrown at them.30 The Christian Broth- ers conducted demonstration beatings of the children so new trainees could see the “technique.”31 As the commission summa- rized, “a climate of fear permeated most of the institutions and all those run for boys. Children lived with the daily terror of not knowing where the next beating was coming from.”32 With regards to sexual abuse, it was observed that sometimes the per- petrator was moved away but nothing was done about the harm to the child, and “at worst, the child was blamed and seen as cor- rupted by the sexual activity, and was punished severely.”33 When the depravity of those running and staffing the industrial schools was revealed, it shocked and shamed the Irish public. And while the Catholic Church and religious orders continuously blamed low state funding for conditions in the industrial schools,34 as Raftery and O’Sullivan point out, “it has never been explained how the level of State funding, regardless of its inade- quacy or otherwise, could have resulted in regimes of such hor- rendous abuse and degradation of vulnerable children.”35 Another catalyst undermining the moral authority and power of the Catholic Church in Ireland over the state and public were reve- lations of the horrors and hypocrisies of the Magdalen laundries, including the discovery in 1993 of 155 bodies of women who had been institutionalized in an industrial laundry run by the “Sisters of Our Lady of Charity and Refuge” and dumped in mass, 29. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 82. 30. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 3.7, 57. 31. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 3.7, 56. 32. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 4.6, 452. 33. CICA, Commission Report, Vol. 4.6, 454. 34. CICA, Commission Report, Vol 4.2, 59-60; Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 89-122. 35. Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Children, 91. In 1955, the Secretary of the Department of Education visited a school, St. Conleth’s Reformatory in Daingean, County Offaly, run by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, for boys ages 12-17. For as reluctant as the department was to criticize the religious orders, even its head stated in a memo, “in contrast to the conditions for the boys, the conditions of the milking herd were excellent . . . I can see no evidence of any of the profits being ploughed back for the benefit of the boys or for the improve- ment of the building [they lived in]” (Raftery and O’Sullivan, Suffer the Little Chil- dren, 103-4). Journal of Church and State 94 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jcs/article-abstract/62/1/86/5735698 by 81695661, O U P on 17 M arch 2020 anonymous graves.36 While not specifically for children, the laun- dries were a means of incarcerating unwed mothers and a way that industrial schools disposed of girls they wanted to punish further. Over ten thousand women had entered the laundries over the years of their operation. A further horror came to light in 2013, when another mass grave, this time of babies from a large “mother and baby home” run by the Sisters of Bon Secours (an or- der of Catholic nuns) in Tuam, County Galway, was found in the sewage tank of the institution. Further news of astounding practi- ces have emerged in the interim reports issued by the commission established in 2015 to investigate the mother and baby homes, in- cluding that the bodies of at least nine hundred fifty babies were sent to medical schools as cadavers, and that other homes kept no records of where hundreds of deceased babies were “buried” or disposed of.37 The infant mortality rate at those institutions in the mid- and late-twentieth century matched that of Ireland in the 1700 s: an extreme 25 percent, five times higher than the rate in Ireland in 1950.38 By 2010, the main institutions that Catholics as- sociate with the Catholic Church— the parish church, the diocese, and religious orders of nuns and brothers—were repeatedly found to … Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes 177Volume 55 • Number 1 • Winter 2021 | Volume 55 • numéro 1 • hiver 2021 Nationalism, Secularism, and Ethno-Cultural Diversity in Quebec DANIEL BÉLAND, ANDRÉ LECOURS, and PEGGY SCHMEISER Abstract: An ongoing debate over the intersections between secularism and ethno-cultural diversity is taking place in contemporary societies. For example, in just over a decade, Quebec has witnessed multiple attempts to reframe its approach to issues of nationalism in the context of secularism and the regulation of ethno-cultural diversity. This qualitative and historically minded article studies the relationship among nationalism, secularism, and the regulation of diversity, through three stages of analysis. First, it explores the Catholic history of Quebec and the secularization dimensions of its nationalism since the Quiet Revolution and the ongoing debate within the province about religious accommodation and the integration of immigrants. Second, it lays the stage for examining the political and historical rise of the recently passed Bill 21 An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State in Quebec, through analysis of the failed, yet pivotal, proposal for a “Quebec Charter of Values” during the lead- ership of Parti Québécois (PQ) Premier Pauline Marois (2012–14). Throughout this article, the content of the charter under the PQ and the successful Act under the Coalition Avenir Québec are discussed in light of policy transfer from France to Quebec regarding secularism and the public display of religious symbols, as well as Quebec’s unique context within the Canadian federation. Finally, it turns to recent political and policy developments in Quebec, including the passing of the new Act, as they relate to the changing relationship among nationalism, secularism, and diversity. Keywords: nationalism, secularism, diversity, religion, Bill 21, Quebec, Canada Résumé : Les rapports entre laïcité et diversité ethnoculturelle font l’objet d’un débat continu dans les sociétés contemporaines. Par exemple, en un peu plus d’une décennie, le Québec a été témoin de multiples tentatives pour recadrer sa vision du nationalisme dans le contexte de la laïcité et de la réglementation de la diversité ethnoculturelle. Cet article qualitatif à perspective historique étudie les relations entre nationalisme, laïcité et régulation de la diversité dans une analyse en trois temps. Premièrement, il s’intéresse au passé catholique du Québec et au volet laïcisant de son nationalisme depuis la Révolution tranquille ainsi qu’au débat continu dans la province sur les accommodements religieux et l’intégration des immigrants. Deuxièmement, il prépare le terrain pour l’examen de l’ascen- sion politique et historique du projet de loi 21, Loi sur la laïcité de l’État, récemment adopté, grâce à l’analyse de la Charte des valeurs du Québec, proposition – cruciale, malgré son échec – faite pendant le mandat de la première ministre péquiste Pauline Marois (2012-2014). Tout au long de cet article, le contenu de la charte du Parti québécois et celui de la loi que la Coalition Avenir Québec a fait adopter sont envisagés à la lumière du transfert, de la France vers le Québec, de politiques publiques sur la laïcité et sur l’affichage public des symboles religieux ainsi que du contexte unique du Québec au sein de la fédération canadienne. L’article traite enfin des récents développements politiques et stratégiques au Québec, entre autres de l’adoption de la nouvelle loi, qui montrent l’évolution des relations entre nationalisme, laïcité et diversité. Mots clés : nationalisme, laïcité, diversité, religion, projet de loi 21, Québec, Canada 178 D a n i e l B é l a n d , A n d r é L e c o u r s , a n d P e g g y S c h m e i s e r Introduction In just over a decade, there have been multiple initiatives in Quebec signalling what may be regarded as a new era in the province’s approach to issues of secularism, nationalism, and ethno-cultural diversity. In the aftermath of the Quiet Revolution, secularism was regarded as a way to reduce the role of the Catholic Church in government and social affairs. More recently, however, varying notions of secularism (generally translated as laïcité in French) have served as the bases for state responses to social anxieties associated with increased migration, which has led to an expanding heterogeneous population in Quebec. Building on ideals relating to the “secular neutrality” of the state that have increasingly merged with public focus around gender equality, multiple political parties in Quebec have introduced initiatives linking political ambitions and national pride to the regulation of religious dress and objects.1 As this study will suggest, these challenging yet ongoing attempts to regulate diversity through concepts of secularism and state neutrality based on the perceived threat of religion and religious difference both reflect and reinforce the unique political and cultural context of Quebec, shaped in large part by the internal tensions posed by the clash between, on the one hand, substate nationalism and a borrowing from French policy and, on the other hand, Quebec’s Catholic past, played out against the backdrop and rejection of Canadian multiculturalism policy.2 While many studies have focused on various aspects of Quebec nationalism and ongoing efforts by the province to regulate diversity in light of increased immigration, there has been much less scholarly consideration of the inherent linkages of those forces with notions of secularism as a political and governance tool in Quebec’s evolution within the broader federation. Since 2007, numerous episodes that cross multiple party lines serve to illustrate the unique intersections of secularism, nationalism, and diversity in present-day Quebec. The first stage of events occurred following a Supreme Court of Canada ruling in March 2006 permitting Sikhs to carry kirpans (small metal daggers) into schools based on their religious beliefs. As Solange Lefebvre (2008, 180) outlines in her study of religion and law in Quebec, mounting concerns over the potential implications of reasonable accommodation measures such as this played out during the 2007 Quebec spring election in which Mario Dumont, the leader of Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ), “called for an amendment to Quebec’s Charter of Rights to prevent religious practices from entering into conflict with citizen’s fundamental values, especially as concerns the equality between men and women.” Meanwhile, Jean Charest, leading the governing Liberal Party, had set up the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Relating to Cultural Differences. As Lefebvre observes, “even before the Commission had finished its work, Quebec’s main political parties were vying with each other as to which was the best defender of its national identity and strongly held common values” (180). 179 Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes Two years following the 2008 release of the report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (as the Liberal initiative came to be known), the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) government in Quebec introduced Bill 94 on accommodation within the public administration, including provisions with respect to showing one’s face during the delivery and receiving of services. This instrument was then followed by the introduction of “a ‘Values Pledge’ for newcomers” through which various immigrants “were asked to sign a statement affirming their commitment to the ‘common values of Quebec society’” (Iacovino 2015, 51). In what Raffaele Iacovino (2015, 52) describes as “perhaps the most explicit attempt to mark a retreat from pluralism,” the Parti Québécois (PQ) minority government of Premier Pauline Marois then pushed in 2013 for the enactment of what became known as the Quebec Charter of Values (on this proposed legislation see Melançon 2015–2016). Although extremely long, the full name of this legislative proposal summarizes the main issues that it targeted: Charte affirmant les valeurs de laïcité et de neutralité religieuse de l’État ainsi que d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et encadrant les demandes d’accommodement (Charter Affirming the Values of Secularism and Religious Neutrality of the State As Well As the Equality between Men and Women While Regulating Accommodation Demands). Marking one of the most pivotal moments in Quebec’s efforts to regulate diversity based on perceived ethnic and religious grounds, this proposed legislation concerned the ban of “ostentatious religious symbols” (signes religieux ostentatoires) affecting public sector employees ranging from law enforcement officers to doctors, nurses, and teachers. Its particular, yet sometimes implicit, focus on Muslim religious garb, including women’s headscarves and face coverings, drew the attention of broader Canadian society that largely opposed the proposed Quebec Charter of Values, even while it widely supported then Prime Minster Stephen Harper’s bid to ban face coverings during the taking of oaths at citizenship ceremonies.3 Following the defeat of the PQ in the 2014 provincial election, many felt that the sentiments driving the Quebec Charter of Values had been defeated and that the chapter was closed (Maioni 2014). However, it soon became clear that the PQ had merely prepared the stage for (more successful) scenes to follow. Despite opponents to the Quebec Charter of Values who claimed it reflected a “rejection of a modern civic conception of the nation—a citoyenneté québécoise open to difference,” the PLQ came forward in 2017 with related legislation in the form of Bill 62 (Morrison 2019). This new initiative limited its restrictions to the wearing of face coverings but with broader application to the giving and receiving of public services in more numerous public contexts (Mathen 2017, 1). Amid a new round of controversy, questions quickly arose over its potential implementation. Would women have to remove all face coverings including winter scarves to ride a bus? Elsewhere, others questioned the new apparent prohibitions on talking to a librarian while wearing sunglasses (The Economist 2017). In December 2017, the Quebec Superior Court suspended enactment of the provisions regarding face coverings pending further clarifications on their application, a suspension that was then extended in June 2018. 180 D a n i e l B é l a n d , A n d r é L e c o u r s , a n d P e g g y S c h m e i s e r Despite ongoing social tensions regarding the basis and potential implications of implementing measures to regulate clothing based on notions of religious difference, the formation of a Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) majority government after the provincial elections of 1 October 2018 brought renewed energy to the political desire to implement legislative measures that would ban certain public servants from wearing religious garments and symbols during the performance of civic duties. Amid a quick and heated backlash, the CAQ proposed various revisions relating to Bill 21, which were eventually passed in June 2019 during a reportedly “marathon special weekend session” in which “some exhausted MNAs cursed each other, [while] others said they were on the verge of tears at times” (Boissinot 2019). Immediately following its adoption, there were indications that the new Act Respecting the Laicity of the State would face legal challenges despite its inclusion of the notwithstanding clause to counter attempted opposition under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada 1982; Quebec 2019).4 As these multiple, cross-partisan, and tumultuous episodes over a short decade-and-a-half period suggest, measures to address tensions with respect to culture, identity, diversity, and inclusion in Quebec are not easily enacted nor extinguished. They are also not easily understood without consideration of Quebec’s nationalism, its ongoing relationship and affinity with France, its Catholic history, and Canada’s broader legal and ideological approaches to concepts like pluralism and multiculturalism. This study on secularism, nationalism, and diversity in Quebec will proceed through three stages of analysis. First, the article lays a foundation for understanding the role of concepts relating to secularism and religion in Quebec nationalism since the Quiet Revolution and the ongoing debate within the province about accommodation, tolerance, and the integration of immigrants. Through a consideration of various notions related to nationalism, this analysis shows how the meaning of secularism changed over time, from a way to push the previously dominant Catholic Church aside to a policy tool directly involved in the management of ethnic and religious diversity in Quebec within and, sometimes, in opposition to the broader Canadian federation. This gradual shift, we claim, provides the necessary historical background to understand the debate over reasonable accommodations of the last 15 years and the related emergence of the proposed Quebec Charter of Values that paved the way for the current Act Respecting the Laicity of the State. Second, this investigation explores the political rise of the Quebec Charter of Values during the leadership of PQ Premier Pauline Marois (2012–14) in more detail, as a pivotal occurrence in Quebec’s efforts to forge a nationalist consensus based on the regulation of diversity. This analysis will include a consideration of the significance of acute electoral competition before explaining the content of the proposed Quebec Charter of Values in light of the policy transfer from France to Quebec. As argued, because of colonial legacies, shared language, and ongoing communications between France and Quebec facilitated by modern technologies and immigration flows, French policy ideas have influenced the 181 Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes Quebec debate on secularism much more directly than similar debates elsewhere in North America. Ultimately, the proposed charter died because the PQ failed to gain re-election in 2014 after a campaign dominated by the issue of sovereignty rather than by the charter itself. From this perspective, the Quebec Charter of Values was not only a policy failure that could not pass the legislative test at the time, but it also became a political failure for the PQ. Finally, the article turns to recent policy and social developments in Quebec as they relate to the changing relationship among secularism, nationalism, and diversity. This section focuses primarily on the formation of the current majority CAQ government, which promotes a stricter version of secularization than the former Liberal Couillard government. Based on this information, we conclude with a consideration of the potential consequences of this electoral shift as it relates to the relationship among secularism, nationalism, and diversity in Quebec. In so doing, we show that Quebec’s political evolution is inextricably linked to the inherent tensions among those three social forces in ways that reflect its uniqueness within the federation. Nationalism and Secularism in Quebec Nationalism in Quebec has come in many shapes and sizes (Balthazar 2013). From a programmatic perspective, three strands have existed: the first one, which we can label autonomist, has essentially sought to protect, and sometimes expand, Quebec autonomy within Canada but without very much engagement with the Canadian federation; the second one, which we can call federalist, has looked for such engagement with Canadian federalism, often with the objective of promoting decentralist reforms; and the third one, which we can call secessionist,5 has favoured outright independence. Each of these strands has corresponded to a particular approach to secularism and its potential deployment as a tool of nation building that later informed conflicting approaches to diversity in an increasingly heterogenous Quebec. The first nationalist strand, which was dominant before the 1960s, featured a national identity and a political community in which the Catholic Church played a leading political and social role. From the beginning of the French settlement along the shores of the St. Lawrence River in the seventeenth century, the Canadiens (later, the French Canadians) defined themselves as much by Catholicism as they did by language. For example, shortly after the British took control of the colony in 1760, the colonial government eliminated, through the 1774 Quebec Act, the requirement for the Canadiens wishing to hold a political or administrative position to disavow the pope’s authority (Serment du Test) (United Kingdom 1774). This move represented a recognition of the pivotal role of the Catholic Church for the Canadiens. The creation of the Canadian federation in 1867 allowed the Catholic Church to preserve its central role in French Canadian society since power 182 D a n i e l B é l a n d , A n d r é L e c o u r s , a n d P e g g y S c h m e i s e r over policy fields such as health care, education, and social assistance was given to the provinces. In Quebec, the Catholic Church was the foremost provider of these services, and Quebec governments were, until the 1960s, happy to leave these responsibilities to the church. Before the Quiet Revolution, which reframed both the identity of the province and the meaning of Catholicism within it (Gauvreau 2005), autonomist nationalism was embodied by the Union Nationale (UN), a conservative party born in the context of the Great Depression that governed Quebec for most of the middle of the twentieth century. Led for most of its existence by Maurice Duplessis, the UN presented a nationalism that combined traditional values linked to rural life, family, and Catholicism with a defence of Quebec’s autonomy against the reach of the federal government (whose ambition to create national social programs it strongly denounced). Catholic symbols permeated UN politics, as reflected in Duplessis’s placement of a crucifix in the Legislative Assembly in 1936. The modernizing and secularizing Quiet Revolution, engineered by the PLQ government of Premier Jean Lesage (1960–66), severely undermined support for the UN, which returned to power from 1966 to 1970 before finally dissolving in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, and as will be discussed shortly, remnants of the movement have re-emerged in the more recent CAQ, whose leader, by his own admission, is a modern-day UN member (Larin 2019). The second strand of Quebecois nationalism is federalist nationalism, which has been carried politically by the PLQ. Before the Quiet Revolution, this strand of nationalism was not as couched in Catholicism as the more conservative autonomist nationalism, but neither was it strongly anticlerical. Between the PLQ and the Catholic Church, a certain neutrality existed (Lemieux 1993, 70). As the PLQ engineered the Quiet Revolution and fought off the influence of the Catholic Church in Quebec society, the PLQ governments took control of education and health care, and the relationship between the clergy and state grew more distant. At the same time, the Liberals who guided the modernization of the province and sought to reshape the Canadian federation in a way that provided more policy powers to the Quebec government were not necessarily regarded as radical secularists per se; in fact, in the early days of the Quiet Revolution, many PLQ leaders spoke strongly of the importance of the Catholic faith (Rocher 2016). As historians like Michael Gauvreau (2005, 489, as cited in Rudin 2007) have argued, there were those who worked from within the Catholic tradition to bring about change during that time that could be regarded as “a sustained attempt to enhance and strengthen, rather than weaken and ultimately sever the relationship between Catholicism and Quebec society.” As this stream evolved, it generally accepted more public expressions of religious affiliation than its rival secessionist stream (Laxer 2019). The PLQ remained committed to the Canadian federation, but its membership included both unconditional federalists and stronger Quebec nationalists whose investment in federalism was more utilitarian. 183 Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes For some political actors of the Quiet Revolution, the modernization of the province ultimately required that Quebec achieve independent statehood. Hence, the development of a secessionist nationalist strand, politically embodied by the PQ, was founded by ex-PLQ member René Lévesque in 1968. Secessionist nationalists adopted a more robust position with respect to secularism than their federalist counterparts (Laxer 2019). They viewed francophone Quebeckers as historically subjugated by both the Catholic Church and the province’s English speakers. The project for the full emancipation of francophones therefore involved not only the political independence of the province but also the adoption of notions regarding clearer boundaries between the church and the state. The party always featured “hard liners” and “soft liners” on both issues. On the political future of the province, supporters of outright independence were usually weaker than those who promoted the notion of offering an “association” or “partnership” to Canada once independent. On the relationship between church and state, the most radical anticlerical elements within the PQ struggled against those who saw Catholicism as part and parcel of Quebec’s cultural heritage. Nevertheless, as Michael Gauvreau (2000, 803) concludes, the Quiet Revolution “decisively marginalized the social and cultural role of Catholicism within Quebec society.” In the 1960s and the 1970s, the relationship between Quebecois nationalism and notions of diversity and secularism was almost completely about the place of the Catholic Church in Quebec society. Not only were most immigrants Christian (many of them Catholic, such as the Irish and the Italians), which helped their integration, but the crucial cleavage in the province was also about language, not affiliation with church movements. Therefore, Quebec politics was internally about the change of a socio-linguistic structure and, externally, about the province’s relationship with the rest of Canada. In the 1980s, Quebec politics was almost completely focused on constitutional negotiations with the federal government and the other provinces. By the 1990s, due to changes to federal immigration policy that began in the 1960s and resulted in a massive increase in non-European immigration, there was more cultural diversity in Quebec than ever before. New Quebeckers held a strong commitment to Canadian unity and were thus strongly courted by secessionist nationalists in the context of the 1995 referendum on independence.6 The position of these communities toward religious affiliation or identity was then a non-issue for the PQ, as it was in the years immediately following the referendum when the close result in the vote (49.4 percent for “yes” and 50.6 percent for “no”) seemed to open the way for a third consultation on the political future of the province. By 2003, however, the federalist PLQ was again in power, and the PQ was unable to muster any enthusiasm for a third vote on independence. As a result, there was a reorientation of Quebecois nationalism away from self-determination and toward linguistic, cultural, and identity issues internal to the province. This move away from 184 D a n i e l B é l a n d , A n d r é L e c o u r s , a n d P e g g y S c h m e i s e r self-determination politics has proved extremely significant for the relationship between nationalism and the province’s cultural communities. When secession is on the agenda, there is a strategic imperative to be as inclusive as possible so as to build support for independence beyond francophone Quebeckers and for secessionists to not be viewed as “ethnic nationalists” by opponents of independence and the international community (Lecours 2000). When secession is no longer on the agenda, this incentive for inclusion disappears or at least weakens considerably. In fact, when its raison d’être loses steam, the PQ typically turns toward its other bedrocks of language and identity. In this new context of identity politics, the upstart ADQ, a party created in 1994 from a split in the PLQ over constitutional questions, began questioning the notion of “reasonable accommodations” toward the province’s cultural communities. For the ADQ, an autonomous nationalist party, criticism of reasonable accommodations had little to do with secularism as they saw it. Rather, its leader, Mario Dumont, argued that Quebec society and its values and identity were being compromised through exaggerated accommodations. Although Catholicism was rarely mentioned by the ADQ, its references to the history of the province led to a consensus over alleged fundamental Quebec values that clashed with accommodations toward (Hassidic) Jewish and Muslim practices, among others. In fact, for conservative Quebec intellectuals and commentators close to that position, such accommodations represented a denial of the Christian roots of Quebec and a submission to multiculturalism that was despised by many as an imposed ideology of the broader Canadian society (Bock-Côté 2017).7 The ADQ’s foray into identity politics forced the other two main Quebec parties to react. For the PQ, it was crucial to be seen as the strongest defender of Quebec’s identity, culture, and values or, in other words, not to leave the terrain of identity politics to the ADQ and its successor party, the CAQ. For the PQ, a party whose raison d’être is achieving the independence of the province, having self-determination politics off the agenda undermines its singularity. This necessitated a shift from showing that the party was the best at promoting the interests and identity of Quebec by seeking independence from Canada to a focus on internal “threats” as the next best political strategy. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the internal “threat” was deemed to be Anglo-Quebeckers but the PQ’s own language legislations from the late 1970s have alleviated much (though not all) of Quebec’s linguistic insecurity. Beginning in the 2000s, and in the context of an increasingly diverse society (at least in the province’s most important city, Montreal), the politics of identity in Quebec involved newcomers much more than the historical English-speaking Protestant minority. The PQ very much couched its issues with reasonable accommodations in the language of secularism. The main narrative was that a crucial legacy of the Quiet Revolution—the secularization of Quebec society—was being threatened by cultural communities whose members had a different view on the nature and role of religion in 185 Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes society. For many intellectuals close to this position, there was a “legislative deficit” on secularism because no Canadian or Quebec law existed that clearly stated this principle (Le Devoir 2010). Therefore, the PQ began arguing in the late 2000s that something needed to be done, from a policy and legislative perspective, on the issue of secularism. The aversion of secessionist nationalists toward the federal policy of multiculturalism also helped the PQ promote its notion of secularism in response to demands for accommodation from cultural minorities. Indeed, for secessionist nationalists, multiculturalism is a Canadian (not a Quebec) approach to diversity whose origins lie in the intent to relativize the distinctiveness of Quebec within Canada. They also view multiculturalism as an approach to diversity that does not spell out the ties that bind, which makes it inadequate for a “nation without a state” such as Quebec (Bouchard 2011, 425–30). In this context, secularism can be presented as one such tie (in addition to the French language) that seeks to oppose the reasonable accommodations and tolerance that are seemingly inherent to a multicultural … Deformations of the Secular: Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism Khairudin Aljunied Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 80, Number 4, October 2019, pp. 643-663 (Article) Published by University of Pennsylvania Press DOI: For additional information about this article Access provided at 16 Oct 2019 08:22 GMT from Ebsco Publishing https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2019.0035 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/735385 https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2019.0035 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/735385 Deformations of the Secular: Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism Khairudin Aljunied Ernest Gellner once commented that, in contrast to Christianity, Islam is a “markedly secularization-resistant religion.”1 He meant that although Muslims had historically appropriated things secular in a variety of ways, they were generally averse to secularism as an ideology. Gellner is far from accurate in his observation. To be sure, Muslim thinkers and writers have long debated the place and relevance of secularism in Muslim life. A num- ber of intellectual positions have grown out of these contentious delibera- tions, as outlined by experts on global Islam such as John Esposito, Vali Nasr, and Jeffrey Kenney, to name a few. The first is the “rejectionist” approach that sets Islam apart from secularism. Muslims subscribing to this line of thinking view the idea of a strict separation of religion from politics, social life, education, economy, and laws as a radical departure from Islamic beliefs, norms, and values.2 Gellner was perhaps animated by this select group of Muslims whom he characterized as those who viewed Islam as “the blueprint of a social order.” He wrote, “It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which 1 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (New York: Routledge, 1992), 5–7. 2 John L. Esposito, “Political Islam,” Joint Force Quarterly 24 (June 2000): 53; and Esposito, “Islam and Secularism: Exploring the Place of Religion in Society,” Arches Quarterly 2, no. 3 (2008): 4–9. PAGE 643 Copyright � by Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 80, Number 4 (October 2019) 643 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:51 PS JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2019 defines the proper ordering of society. . . . These rules are to be implemented throughout social life.”3 The rise of Islamic revivalism and disillusionment with Western ide- ologies in the 1970s expanded the appeal of the rejectionist approach to secularism. But Muslim rejectionists of secularism are by no means a homogenous group. They can be divided along the lines of those who advo- cate a revolutionary response in the path to remove all traces of secularism in Muslim societies, those who hold a passive yet dismissive stance toward secularism, and, an equally significant segment, those who seek to over- come secularism through scholarly argumentation and intellectual delibera- tions. Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), Abul A�la Maududi (1903–79), Ismail Al- Faruqi (1921–86), and, more notably, Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (1931–), who is the main subject of this article, were the main ideologues of the rejectionist group.4 What sets Al-Attas apart from other rejectionists of secularism, as I will show in greater detail here, is his philosophical approach to and critique of secularism. By comparison, a first group of rejectionists, such as Qutb and A�la Maududi, took on moralistic and activ- ist stances. These rejectionists viewed denunciations of secularism as a nec- essary ideological step to mobilize the revolutionary masses toward the establishment of Islamic states.5 Another group of rejectionists, including Al-Faruqi, adopted a more pragmatic standpoint by arguing that a whole- sale rejection of secularism was not possible. They instead called for a judi- cious adoption of some aspects of secular knowledge to bring about an Islamized version of modernity.6 Above and beyond the rejectionist strand, another school of thought has displayed an “accommodationist” posture to the question of Islam and secularism. Muslim thinkers and writers within this line of thinking argue that Islam, as a historically constituted and cumulative religious tradition, has accommodated many aspects and ideals of secularism. They reason that the acceptance of secularism as a state principle does not necessarily entail the marginalization of Islam from the public sphere. According to Asghar Ali Engineer (1939–2013) and Abdullahi An-Na�im (1946–), both of whom 3 Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1. 4 Vali Nasr, “Lessons from the Muslim World,” Daedalus 132, 3 (2003): 70; and Jeffrey T. Kenney, “Secularization and the Search for an Authentic Muslim Modern,” in Islam in the Modern World, ed. Kenney and Ebrahim Moosa (London: Routledge, 2014), 269. 5 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 123–24. 6 Rosnani Hashim and Imran Rossidy, “Islamization of Knowledge: A Comparative Anal- ysis of the Conceptions of Al-Attas and Al-Faruqi,” Intellectual Discourse 8, no. 1 (2000): 34. PAGE 644 644 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:51 PS Aljunied ✦ Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism can be categorized as accommodationists, Islamic history bears evidence of the existence of secular states. To them, secularism is compatible with the spirit of Islam if secularism “creates social and political space for all reli- gious communities.”7 Such reasoning stands in contrast with the “funda- mentalist” approach. This other intellectual faction holds that secularism ought to be the organizing standard for almost all aspects of life in Muslim societies. Islam must therefore fulfill a mere private and spiritual role and the sharia (Islamic legal code) must be domesticated and circumscribed.8 One manifestation of such thinking is Turkey under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk. Even though Ataturk granted religious institutions their autonomy and did not completely decouple religion from politics, he drastically reduced the role of religion in Turkish life.9 Esposito describes Ataturk’s as a “regime of secular fundamentalism” where “the mixing of religion and politics is regarded as necessarily abnormal (departing from the norm), irra- tional, dangerous and extremist.”10 This article presents a critical analysis of the third rejectionist approach to secularism—which consists of those who seek to overcome secularism through the force of ideas and discourses—bringing into sharp relief its main arguments and the manner in which these arguments are articulated and presented. I examine the ideas and writings of one of the most influen- tial modern Muslim thinkers, Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas. He is, to put it succinctly, a philosophical and thoroughgoing rejectionist of secular- ism. He does not accept the transplanting and grafting of Islam with that of secularism, yet he is also not concerned with revolutions and the over- throw of governments. He views secularism as an ideology to be assessed, critiqued, and overcome in the path to promulgate a new form of knowl- edge and an alternative worldview firmly rooted in the Islamic traditions. It is for this reason that Al-Attas is unique and deserving of intellectual scrutiny. As a leading thinker within the rejectionist school of thought, Al-Attas 7 Asghar Ali Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Islamic Political Thought, ed. Ibrahim Abu Rabi� (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 342. See also: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na�im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari�a (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 45–83. 8 Barbara De Poli, “Muslim Thinkers and the Debate on Secularism and Laı̈cité,” in Mus- lim Societies and the Challenge of Secularization: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Gabriele Marranci (New York: Springer, 2010), 37–38; and Sherman A. Jackson, “The Islamic Secular,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 34, no. 2 (2017): 14. 9 Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, “Secularism and Laicism in Turkey,” in Secularisms, ed. Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 63. 10 Esposito, “Islam and Secularism: Exploring the Place of Religion in Society,” 4. PAGE 645 645 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:51 PS JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2019 has offered a unique view of secularism as an ungodly ideology and histori- cal process that grew from the fusion of conflicting world views—Greco- Roman, Judaic, and Western Christian. Al-Attas’s notion of secularism, I further argue, was shaped by his linear and polarized view of the world as one that was torn between the Islamic and Western civilizations. Such a conceptualization set the stage for his critique of the intellectual deforma- tions that secularism has brought upon Muslim societies in the modern world. Al-Attas has identified four specific areas of intellectual deforma- tions: internalization of the dualistic worldview; chaos and confusion in the realm of knowledge; misconceptions about the political; and manufactur- ing of concepts that are alien to Islamic spirit. Before examining Al-Attas’s ideas, it is important to bring to the fore the wider context that shaped his views on secularism: the shifting cultural politics of the Muslim world between the 1930s and 1970s, a watershed period in Islamic history when Muslim thinkers deemed the critique of the West and secularism as a matter of cultural preservation. Al-Attas is among the generation of Muslim thinkers—including the likes of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Ali Shariati (1933–77), Malek Bennabi (1905–73), and Qutb—who received much of their education in secular institutions but soon became increasingly disillusioned with the secular worldview and out- look to which they were exposed.11 Such disillusionment found expression in the form of a global Islamic resurgence and the rapid growth of anti- Westernism throughout the Muslim world after the Second World War. The notion that the Islamic worldview was radically distinct from the Judeo- Christian and secular West sharpened from the 1950s onwards, as Muslims sought to regain their place in a decolonizing world.12 Muslim intellectuals and thinkers founded a host of new movements, institutions, organizations, congresses, and networks to cement a sense of Islamic solidarity that would, at the same time, provide ideological alternatives to the dominance of colo- nial and European frameworks of thought. One effect of this wave of Mus- lim initiatives directed against the West was the production of “narratives of the clash of civilizations.”13 Al-Attas adhered to such narratives arising from the cultural politics that was brewing in the Muslim world throughout his scholarly career. Due to his positioning and the rhetorical force of his 11 Al-Attas studied at University of Malaya (bachelor’s degree), McGill University (mas- ter’s degree) and the School of Oriental and African Studies, London (doctoral degree). 12 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 289–374. 13 Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 173–226. PAGE 646 646 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:52 PS Aljunied ✦ Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism arguments, he emerged as an ideologue to many Muslim movement activ- ists and a key proponent of anti-secularism and anti-Westernism as a means to restore true Islamic culture. Western intellectual culture, Al-Attas main- tained, has tainted what it means to be Muslim. The first step toward addressing this challenge is to rid Muslim societies of the corruptive influ- ence of secularism.14 In his oft-cited Islam and Secularism (first published in 1978, revised and expanded in 1993), he declared: “This book was origi- nally dedicated to the emergent Muslims, for whose hearing and under- standing it was indeed meant, in the hope that they would be intelligently prepared, when their time comes, to weather with discernment the pestilen- tial winds of secularization and with courage to create necessary changes in the realm of our thinking that is still floundering in the sea of bewilderment and self-doubt.”15 To engender a paradigm shift in Muslim thought, Al-Attas pioneered the Islamization of Knowledge movement that began in earnest in the late 1970s. His critique of secularism formed the basis of this intellectual proj- ect, but he was not its only initiator. In a recent study, Christopher Furlow argues that a number of key thinkers spearheaded the movement, namely, Ismail Al-Faruqi, Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1933–), Munawar Anees (1948–), Merryl Ann Davies (1948–), and Ziauddin Sardar (1951–). These thinkers held that Western knowledge should be interrogated and infused with Islamic values and visions. Al-Attas departed from these thinkers in his belief that “knowledge is truth and therefore cannot be Islamized.”16 Recognized as one of the leading intellectuals in the Muslim world in the 1970s, Al-Attas gained a significant following within Malaysian gov- ernment circles. The ruling government of Malaysia led by UMNO (United Malays Nationalist Organisation) adopted Al-Attas’s ideas as part of the state Islamization project.17 In 1987, Al-Attas was appointed as the founder and director of the influential International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). The institute aimed at providing an Islamic alter- native to Western universities and their approaches to the study of Islam 14 Christopher A. Furlow, “Malaysian Modernities: Cultural Politics and the Construc- tion of the Muslim Technoscientific Identities,” Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 1 (2009): 221. 15 Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993), xv. 16 Christopher A. Furlow, “Islam, Science and Modernity: From Northern Virginia to Kuala Lumpur” (PhD diss., University of Florida, 2005), 130. 17 Farish Noor, “Reformist Muslim Voices in Malaysia: Engaging with Power to Uplift the Umma?,” in Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (London: Routledge, 2015), 211. PAGE 647 647 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:52 PS JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2019 and Muslim societies.18 Al-Attas embedded himself within the landscape of Malaysian politics to realize his vision of Islamizing knowledge in his home country. He was a close friend of Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister and a known Islamic movement ideologue. Anwar himself rode the wave anti-Westernism and used some aspects of Al-Attas’s ideas to pro- mulgate the idea of an “Asian Renaissance.”19 With Al-Attas’s ideas as their sources of inspiration, Anwar and other influential Malay Muslim politi- cians pushed for Islamization projects that restructured the moral as well as religious geographies of Muslims and non-Muslims in the country. Age- old non-Muslim dominated neighborhoods, for example, were gentrified to become Islamically compliant spaces. Religious policing characterized Malaysia during the height of Al-Attas’s popularity among politicians and policymakers.20 Beyond Malaysia, Al-Attas’s significance is evidenced in the inclusion of his writings, and discussions surrounding his ideas, in a number of books on influential twentieth-century Muslim thinkers. His intellectual contribu- tions are also recognized in other titles pertaining to ethics, Islamic philoso- phy, and the role of science and technology in the modern world.21 He has been dubbed the intellectual cousin and scholarly equal of the globally renowned American philosopher and historian of Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr.22 Al-Attas’s long list of published works span across a broad range of topics from literature to language, cosmology, metaphysics, Sufism, and philosophy. His importance as a Muslim thinker is evidenced through the impact of his book, Islam and Secularism, which has been translated into the official languages of majority-Muslim states such as Turkish, Arab, Urdu, Indonesian, Bosnian, and Persian.23 The ideas he propounded in that 18 Georg Stauth, Politics and Cultures of Islamization in Southeast Asia (Bielefeld: Tran- script Verlag, 2002), 217–27. 19 Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore: Times Books International, 1996). 20 Richard Baxstrom, Houses in Motion: The Experience of Place and the Problem of Belief in Urban Malaysia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 54–84. 21 Mona Abaza, Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 88–105; Noor, “Reformist Muslim Voices in Malaysia,” 211–16; Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 201; Al-Attas, “Islam and the Challenge of Modernity: Divergence of Worldviews,” in Technology and Cultural Values: On the Edge of the Third Millennium, eds. Peter L. Hershock, Marietta Stepaniants, and Roger T. Ames (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), 121–32. 22 Damian Howard, Being Human in Islam: The Impact of Evolutionary Worldview (London: Routledge, 2011), 121. 23 For a detailed study of the impact of Al-Attas on Islamic thought, see: Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, The Educational Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al- Attas (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1998). PAGE 648 648 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:53 PS Aljunied ✦ Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism iconic book are echoed in subsequent works such as Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam24 and have found wide resonance in Islamic universi- ties globally. Osman Bakar went as far as to state that Al-Attas has influ- enced a generation of Muslim scholars and intellectuals throughout the world and “generated decades-long controversies on Islamisation between its advocates and its opponents or critics.”25 It follows then that studying Al-Attas’s rejectionist approach to secu- larism is pertinent because it informs us of the paradoxes that secularism presented for some Muslim intellectuals. The more immersed they were in secular institutions and societies, the more adversarial and belligerent Mus- lim thinkers became toward secularism and secularization in their home societies. CONCE PTUALIZING SECULA RISM AND SE CULARIZATION Secularism and secularization have been conceptualized and historicized in a host of ways, but theorists do tend to agree on certain aspects that define and explain their evolution. Etymologically, the term “secular” is derived from the Latin word “saeculum,” which can be understood as the “affairs of this world.”26 The popular understanding of the history of secularism has it that the roots of the ideology were planted during the Enlightenment, a time when the hegemony of Christianity in public affairs was questioned by thinkers in the heart of Europe. Such questioning, as this rendering of the history of secularism goes, led to the creation of a society that was concerned largely with ethical issues above and beyond strictly religious matters such as rituals and beliefs. Graeme Smith observes: “What hap- pened was not the triumph of atheism but instead the removal of doctrinal concerns from the public forum. This went alongside the persistence of eth- ics carried out on traditional Christian grounds.”27 As for secularization, Bryan R. Wilson states that the term points toward a “variety of processes in which control of social space, time, facilities, resources, and personnel was lost by religious authorities, and in which empirical procedures and 24 Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2001). 25 Osman Bakar, Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World: Thematic Essays (Brunei: UBD Press, 2014), 288. 26 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 265. 27 Graeme Smith, A Short History of Secularism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 8. PAGE 649 649 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:54 PS JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2019 worldly goals and purposes displaced ritual and symbolic patterns of action directed towards otherworldly, or supernatural, ends.”28 Al-Attas agrees with leading theorists such as Charles Taylor on the linguistic definition of the “secular,” referring to the concept as “the condi- tion of the world at this particular time or period of age.”29 However, he propounds a different view of the origins of secularism and secularization. He traces the emergence of secularism to the fusion of Greco-Roman and Judaic traditions with Western Christianity: “It is this ‘fusion’ of mutually conflicting elements of the Hellenic and Hebrew world views which have deliberately been incorporated into Christianity that modern Christian theologians and intellectuals recognize as problematic, in that the former views existence as basically spatial and the latter as basically temporal in such wise that the arising confusion of worldviews becomes of the root of their epistemological and hence also theological problems.”30 Al-Attas’s delineation of the origins of secularism predates the account of a noted Iranian thinker, Abdolkarim Soroush (1945–). To Soroush, secularism “was the progeny of rational metaphysics. The gateways leading to secular- ism and separating God and his designs from the world and its explanation were thrown open once the philosophers (primarily Greek ones) embarked on the project of philosophizing the world order and subsuming it under nonreligious metaphysical categories.”31 Al-Attas is on the same page with Soroush on Greek contributions in the making of modern secularism. He goes further in highlighting the role of Western Christian theologians and intellectuals. “Indeed,” Al-Attas writes, “many Christian theologians and intellectuals forming the avant-garde of the Church are in fact deeply involved in ‘immanent apostasy,’ for while firmly resolving to remain Chris- tian at all costs they openly profess and advocate a secularized version of it, thus ushering into the Christian fold a new emergent Christianity alien to the traditional version to gradually change and supplant it from within.”32 Al-Attas distances himself from scholars who maintain that Christian- ity embraces the notion of the separation of religion from the state—that one ought to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the 28 Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (London: Watts, 1987), 159. 29 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 16. 30 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 16. 31 Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 65. 32 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 4. PAGE 650 650 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:54 PS Aljunied ✦ Naquib Al-Attas’s Conception and Critique of Secularism things that are God’s.”33 Al-Attas takes a contrarian point of view: “The claim that secularization has its roots in biblical faith and that it is the fruit of the Gospel has no substance in historical fact,” he writes. “Secularization has its roots not in biblical faith, but in the interpretation of biblical faith by Western man; it is not the fruit of the Gospel, but is the fruit of the long history of philosophical and metaphysical conflict in the religious and purely rationalistic worldview of Western man.”34 Hence, for Al-Attas, it is not Christianity that planted the seeds of secularism but the gradual corrup- tion of the faith in the Western context that fostered the separation of the state from the church. Al-Attas however does not address the issue of secu- larism’s biblical roots.35 Al-Attas nonetheless concurs with the standard account that posited the rapid spread of secularism in Europe to the Age of Enlightenment in the seventeenth century.36 To Al-Attas, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and René Descartes (1596–1650) were among the Enlightenment thinkers “who opened the doors to doubt and skepticism; and successively in the 18th and 19th centuries and in our own times, to atheism and agnoticism; to utilitarianism, dialectical materialism, evolutionism and historicism.”37 But he stresses that the foundations of secularism were already in the making, even though they were kept in check, many centuries before the Enlighten- ment. The adoption of Greek philosophy (Aristotle’s in particular) from the twelfth century onward held sway on Western Christianity, making it more susceptible to secularism. Drawing from Harvey Cox’s classic The Secular City, Al-Attas defines secularism as an ideology that desacralizes politics, deconsecrates values, and promotes the disenchantment of nature, all of which are opposed to Islam, which promotes an all-encompassing way of life.38 Whereas some theorists such as Steve Bruce have drawn distinctions between secularism and secularization, Al-Attas views both as one and the same, which attests to his ingenuity in conceptualizing an ideology and a 33 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Perennial, 2003); and Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. 34 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 20. 35 Philip Davies, “Biblical Roots of Secularism,” in Secularism and Bible Studies, ed. Roland Boer (London: Routledge, 2014), 204–15. 36 Vicenzo Ferrone, Enlightenment: History of An Idea, trans. Elisabetta Tarantino (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 161. 37 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 22–23. 38 Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 18–19. PAGE 651 651 ................. 19365$ $CH7 09-19-19 07:58:54 PS JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2019 historical process.39 Al-Attas stresses that secularization “is the setting free of the world from religious and semi-religious understandings of itself; the dispelling of all closed worldviews, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols; the “defatalization” of history; the discovery of man that he has been left with world on his hands, that he can no longer blame.”40 Secularization is therefore not only a process but an ideological and philosophical program in itself that calls for the dismantling of reli- gious beliefs and the espousal of worldly success as the end goal of life.41 Secularization is “as a whole the expression of an utterly unislamic world- view, it is also set against Islam, and Islam totally rejects the explicit as well as implicit manifestation and ultimate significance of secularization.”42 Accordingly, for Al-Attas, secularization ought to be understood as “secularizationism.” Both secularism and secularizationism, he writes, “are equally opposed to the worldview projected by Islam. As far as their oppo- sition to Islam is concerned we do not find the distinction between them significant enough for us to justify our making a special distinction between them from the point of view of practical judgement.”43 Both are ideologies that seek to separate the profane from the sacred, in Al-Attas’s postulation. They are “definitely opposed to religion. . . . that seeks to destroy the very foundations of religion.”44 Al-Attas’s conceptualization of secularism and secularization is tenuous because secularism is but an ideology that calls for the separation of religion and state. Secularization, in turn, is a process by which secularism is put into operation. The two may not necessarily come in tandem with one another nor are they similar. Secularism as an ideology may or may not necessarily be imposed upon and/or accepted by everyone. Secularization, on the other hand, is a process that could eventually lead to the realization of secularism in a given domain, although such a process is barely left uncontested by the clergy and the laity. It is interesting here to contrast Al-Attas’s conceptualization of secularism and secularization as twin phenomena with that of another contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim intellectual, Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid explains that “by secular- ization one does not mean the application of secularism and the transfor- mation of Muslims into secularists. What is intended is the “temporalizing” 39 See Steve Bruce, Secularization: … Original article Secular changes in the progression of clinical markers and patient-reported outcomes in early rheumatoid arthritis Lewis Carpenter1, Elena Nikiphorou2, Patrick D. W. Kiely 3,4, David A. Walsh5, Adam Young6 and Sam Norton 1,2 Abstract Objectives. To examine secular trends in the progression of clinical and patient-reported outcomes in early RA. Methods. A total of 2701 patients recruited to the Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Study or Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Network with year of diagnosis from 1986 to 2011. The 5-year progression rates for patients diagnosed at different points in time were modelled using mixed-effects regression; 1990, 2002 and 2010, were compared. Clinical markers of disease included the 28-joint count DAS and the ESR. Patient-reported markers included the HAQ, vis- ual analogue scale of pain and global health, and the Short-Form 36. Results. Statistically significant improvements in both 28-joint count DAS and ESR were seen over the 5 years in patients diagnosed with RA compared with those diagnosed earlier. By 5 years, 59\% of patients with diagnosis in 2010 were estimated to reach low disease activity compared with 48\% with diagnosis in 2002 and 32\% with diag- nosis in 1990. Whilst HAQ demonstrated statistically significant improvements, these improvements were small, with similar proportions of patients achieving HAQ scores of �1.0 by 5 years with a diagnosis in 1990 compared with 2010. Levels of the visual analogue scale and the Mental Component Scores of the Short-Form 36 indicated similar, statistically non-significant levels over the 5 years, irrespective of year diagnosed. Conclusion. This study demonstrates improvements in inflammatory markers over time in early RA, in line with improved treatment strategies. These have not translated into similar improvements in patient-reported outcomes relating to either physical or mental health. Key words: inflammatory arthritis, cohort studies, longitudinal analysis, patient-reported outcomes Introduction The last 30 years have seen many changes in the pres- entation of RA in the clinics, as well as how it is managed therapeutically. Recent data from early RA cohorts highlight how new RA patients are presenting with increased levels of comorbidities and higher levels of obesity [1], as well as increased levels of patient- reported outcomes (PROs), such as pain and fatigue [2]. Alongside these changes in clinical presentation, a num- ber of significant changes in the therapeutic manage- ment of RA has also taken place. This includes the switch to MTX as the anchor DMARD, the introduction of biologic DMARDs (bDMARDs) and the adoption of a treat-to-target approach [3, 4]. There is growing evidence that these therapeutic changes have had positive effects on lowering inflam- mation and halting the progression of structural joint Rheumatology key messages . Changes in the presentation and clinical management of RA has seen improvements in inflammation. . These improvements in inflammation, however, are not translating into improvements in patient-reported outcomes. . More emphasis needed on mental health, pain and fatigue in research and clinical care. 1Health Psychology Section, King’s College London, 2Centre for Rheumatic Diseases, King’s College London, 3Department of Rheumatology, St George’s University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, 4Institute of Medical and Biomedical Education, St George’s University of London, London, 5Arthritis UK Pain Centre, University of Nottingham, Nottingham and 6Postgraduate Medicine, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK Submitted 20 August 2019; accepted 22 November 2019 Correspondence to: Sam Norton, Health Psychology Department, 5th Floor Bermondsey Wing, Guy’s Hospital, King’s College, London SE1 9RT, UK. E-mail: [email protected] C L IN IC A L S C IE N C E VC The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Rheumatology Rheumatology 2020;59:2381–2391 doi:10.1093/rheumatology/kez635 Advance Access publication 3 January 2020 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8091-2717 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1714-9963 damage [5–7]. Data from the Norfolk Arthritis Register (NOAR) demonstrated that patients recruited between 2000 and 2004 had significant improvements in disease activity compared with those patients recruited between 1990 and 1994 [8]. However, there was little difference in functional disability, and there- fore it is unclear whether these improvements in dis- ease activity have translated into improvements in key PROs, such as mental health, fatigue and pain [9–12]. Studies have shown that psychological distress, including depression and anxiety, is more prevalent in patients living with RA [13–16], although its precise rela- tionship with disease activity is not clear [17]. A recent systematic review highlighted how health-related quality of life (HRQoL) was reduced in RA populations, with measures of physical function, bodily pain, fatigue and mental well-being lower than that of the UK and US general population [15]. Furthermore, health economic evaluations have shown that those RA patients with worse HRQoL outcomes are associated with higher health care resource utilization [18]. Whilst few in num- ber, longitudinal data from observational studies have also sought to examine the long-term progression of HRQoL outcomes for early RA patients. One study showed that levels of psychological well-being and func- tional disability remained relatively stable over a 10-year period [19], whilst a study of a small cohort of early RA patients in Sweden indicated greater improvements in physical and mental health for both men and women over a 6-year period [20]. Previous studies examining secular changes in HRQoL outcomes have primarily focussed on functional disability using the HAQ, as this is a common outcome measure in arthritis. The current evidence base suggests that whilst patients diagnosed and treated in earlier cohorts demonstrate statistically significant differences in HAQ, these changes relate to small absolute differen- ces in the overall score [8, 11]. Despite reductions in these HRQoL outcomes, these patients still exhibited pronounced levels of pain and disability compared with reference values [11]. To date, there has been no study utilizing longitudinal analytical techniques to assess secular trends in long- term trajectories of pain, functional disability and HRQoL in early RA patients diagnosed over a 30-year time frame. This study examines progression of disease ac- tivity, functional disability and measures of HRQoL from two early longitudinal RA cohorts, recruiting between 1986 and 2011. Longitudinal data for both cohorts allows for the estimation of 60-month trajectories over different time periods. It is hypothesized that 60-month trajectories of disease activity and other objective markers of inflammation have seen improvements in more recent decades, but functional disability, pain and HRQoL remain largely unchanged. Methods Patients The data used for this study were collected from two longitudinal inception cohorts: the Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Study (ERAS) and the Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Network (ERAN). ERAS recruited 1465 patients from across the UK between 1986 and 2001, while ERAN recruited 1236 patients from across the UK between 2002 and 2011. All patients had a confirmed diagnosis of RA and were recruited within 2 or 3 years of symptom onset, typically prior to conventional DMARD initiation. Maximum follow-up for ERAS was 25 years (median 10 years) and for ERAN was 11 years (median 3 years). Standard clinical, laboratory and radiographic data were collected at baseline, 6 months and 12 months, and then yearly thereafter. Treatment All patients were treated based on standard clinical practice at the time [21]. For ERAS, this typically meant DAMRD monotherapy, largely SSZ, with a gradual switch to MTX over time [22]. For ERAN, SSZ and MTX were used in equal proportions, with a shift to predom- inately MTX towards the end. Median time to first DMARD was 2 months for ERAS and 1 month for ERAN. All patients in ERAS were DMARD naı̈ve, whereas in ERAN a small proportion (13.5\%) had commenced DMARD therapy prior to baseline visit. Combination DMARD therapies were reserved for more severe dis- ease (around 25\%) and, from 2002, <10\% of patients received bDMARDs by 3 years. Measures Disease activity score For ERAS, the original three variable 44-joint DAS (DAS44) was used to measure disease activity, com- prised of the 44 swollen joint count, Ritchie Index for tender joint count and ESR. For ERAN, the 4-variable 28-joint count DAS (DAS28) was used, comprised of the revised 28 swollen joint count and tender joint count, ESR and a Patient Global Assessment (PGA). For those where ESR was missing, but a value of CRP was avail- able, the DAS28-CRP version was used [23]. To enable comparison of disease activity across the two cohorts, the DAS44 in ERAS was converted to DAS28 using a re- cently developed transformation formula that has been validated in the ERAS cohort [24]. Functional disability The UK version of the HAQ disability index was used to collect data on patient’s functional disability [25]. Consisting of 20 items across eight domains of daily liv- ing, it provides an overall disability score that ranges from 0 to 3. Generally, a score of >1 indicates moderate disability, whilst scores >2 indicate more severe disability. Lewis Carpenter et al. 2382 https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 Visual analogue scale For patients recruited into ERAN, the PGA was recorded, which is a sub-component of the DAS28 and asks patients to rate their overall health on a visual ana- logue scale (VAS) from 0 to 100. However, patients recruited to ERAS did not record PGA (except in one centre), but instead rated current pain levels using a 0– 100 VAS. Whilst the focus of the item is specifically on pain for ERAS, using a small subset of patients (n¼85) with both the PGA and pain VAS, it was found that both scores correlated highly (rICC¼0.9, P < 0.001), with Bland and Altman plots indicating only a 0.39 mean dif- ference (95\% limits of agreement –23.57 to 22.80) be- tween the scores. As such we decided it was appropriate to compare changes in VAS over time across both cohorts [26]. Short-Form 36 The Short-Form 36 (SF-36) was used to assess patients’ quality of life for ERAN patients only. Patients are assessed on quality of life across eight domains; Physical Function, Physical Role, Vitality, Mental Health, Emotional Role, Bodily Pain, General Health and Social Functioning. Two summary component scores are cal- culated, the Physical Component Summary (PCS) and Mental Component Summary (MCS). Scores are normal- ized to the UK national average [27], whereby 50 indi- cates the population average score and a difference of 10 units indicate 1 S.D. difference in the general popula- tion (e.g. �16\% of the general population score <40, and 2\% <30). The overall MCS and Mental Health sub- domain will be used as measures of mental well-being, whilst the Vitality sub-domain will be used as a measure of fatigue. Other clinical measures Seropositivity was assessed using RF and for a subset of patients recruited after 2000 anti-CCP was also recorded. Patients who were positive on either RF or anti-CCP were defined as seropositive, whilst those that indicated negative to both were defined as seronegative. ESR was recorded at each follow-up and used as an objective marker of inflammation, along with CRP, which was available in 46\% of patients. Data on comorbidities were recorded at each clinical visit and were coded according to the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases. These codes were used to generate a weighted Charlson Comorbidity Index [28]. The score was modified to remove RA, as it was the index condition for this study. Statistical analysis Descriptive analysis for all variables were explored for both ERAS and ERAN to determine differences in demo- graphic, clinical or laboratory data. Means and S.D., or medians and interquartile range were used where appro- priate depending on the distribution of the underlying data. For categorical data, number of patients and proportions of total cohort (excluding missing data) were provided. To examine the rate of progression of the DAS28, HAQ, VAS, ESR and SF-36 over 5 years of follow-up, mixed-effects linear regression models were used. The analyses were restricted to 5 years since the rate of at- trition was high beyond this point in the ERAN cohort. Mixed-effects regression models with a random inter- cept allows for the non-independence of data to be accounted for, whereby each patient had repeated observations over time. Preliminary analyses identified each of the outcomes to have a non-linear progression over the 5 years, indicating a greater change in the first 12 months (the initial treatment response), with a more gradual change from months 12–60. To account for this, months from baseline assessment was included in the model as linear splines with knots at both 6 and 12 months. The models also controlled for important confounding factors, including age at disease onset, gender, seropositivity, baseline BMI, baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index, and DMARD or steroid use prior to baseline visit. The calendar year in which the patient was diagnosed was entered as a main effect and with an interaction term with month of follow-up, in order to allow for different rates of change over time between the different calendar periods. The model allowed for estimated mean scores to be calculated at different years of diagnosis, over the 60-month follow-up period. These were used to display the trends over time graph- ically for a number of selected dates; 1990, 2002 and 2010, along with corresponding 95\% CIs. These dates represented the early, middle and late end of both cohorts combined. Further analysis dichotomized each outcome to deter- mine the proportion of patients achieving pre-specified ‘good’ outcomes by 60 months. DAS28 was based on whether they achieved low disease activity (LDA) (DAS28 �3.2), ESR and PGA were based on achieving �10 units, reflecting Boolean remission critiera [29], HAQ was based on achieving a score �1 [30], and SF-36 PCS and MCS were based on achieving scores �50 units, which reflects the UK population average. The probability of achieving low scores over the 60 months was estimated using a mixed-effects logistic regression analysis, following a similar modelling method as the linear models described above. All analyses were conducted using Stata (StataCorp. 2017. Stata Statistical Software: Release 15. College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC.) and significance was assumed at P < 0.05. Ethics The ERAS study received ethical approval from the West Hertfordshire Local Research Ethics Committee and subsequently from the Caldicott Guardian. The ERAN study was approved by Trent Research Ethics Committee (reference 01/4/047). All participants gave signed, informed consent to participate in line with the Declaration of Helsinki. Secular changes in PRO in early RA https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology 2383 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 Results A summary of the demographic, and baseline clinical and laboratory variables is shown in Table 1. Patients in ERAN were older at onset and more likely to be female. Mean baseline DAS28, VAS and HAQ levels were similar across the two cohorts, whilst patients in ERAN had lower mean levels of ESR and HAQ, along with a smaller proportion of patients with seropositive RA. In order to account for these differences in baseline characteristics, all analyses controlled for age at disease onset, gender, seropositivity status, baseline BMI and baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index, along with steroid or DMARD use prior to baseline visit. Measures of disease activity and inflammation Mixed-effects linear regression models were used to as- sess the progression of the DAS28 and log-transformed ESR over the first 5 years of the patient’s disease, with estimated mean scores for patients diagnosed in 1990, 2002 and 2010. These are shown in Fig. 1. Comparisons TABLE 1 Baseline demographic and clinical variables Total N ¼ 2701 ERAS N 5 1465 ERAN N 5 1236 Years recruited Range 1986–2011 1986–2001 2002–2011 Age at onset N (missing) 2701 (0) 1465 (0) 1236 (0) Mean (S.D.) 56.1 (14.43) 55.3 (14.57) 57 (14.22) Median (IQR) 57 (46.0–67.0) 57 (45.0–66.0) 58 (47.0–68.0) Range 0–93 17–93 0–89 Female N (\%) 1812 (67.09) 973 (66.42) 839 (67.88) Missing (\%) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) Baseline BMI N (Missing) 2392 (309) 1272 (193) 1120 (116) Mean (S.D.) 26.5 (5.00) 25.6 (4.50) 27.6 (5.30) Median (IQR) 25.9 (23.0–29.2) 25 (22.5–28.0) 26.8 (23.9–30.5) Range 14–55 15–49 14–55 Baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index N (missing) 2698 (3) 1465 (0) 1233 (3) Mean (S.D.) 0.2 (0.61) 0.1 (0.38) 0.4 (0.80) Median (IQR) 0 (0.0–0.0) 0 (0.0–0.0) 0 (0.0–0.0) Range 0–7 0–3 0–7 Baseline DAS28 N (missing) 2588 (113) 1399 (66) 1189 (47) Mean (S.D.) 4.8 (1.47) 5 (1.35) 4.6 (1.58) Median (IQR) 4.9 (3.8–5.9) 5 (4.1–6.0) 4.7 (3.5–5.7) Range 0–9 1–8 0–9 Baseline pain VAS N (missing) 2642 (59) 1411 (54) 1231 (5) Mean (S.D.) 43.8 (26.01) 44 (26.37) 43.5 (25.61) Median (IQR) 45 (23.0–63.0) 45 (23.0–63.0) 45 (22.0–63.0) Range 0–100 0–98 0–100 Baseline ESR N (missing) 2511 (190) 1458 (7) 1053 (183) Mean (S.D.) 37.2 (27.52) 42.2 (28.79) 30.2 (24.00) Median (IQR) 30 (15.0–54.0) 37 (18.0–62.0) 24 (12.0–41.0) Range 1–140 1–140 1–126 Baseline HAQ N (missing) 2660 (41) 1460 (5) 1200 (36) Mean (S.D.) 1.1 (0.77) 1.1 (0.77) 1.1 (0.76) Median (IQR) 1 (0.5–1.6) 1 (0.5–1.8) 1 (0.5–1.6) Range 0–3 0–3 0–3 Seropositive N (\%) 1569 (62.04) 914 (62.77) 655 (61.04) Missing (\%) 172 (6.37) 9 (0.61) 163 (13.19) Baseline demographic and clinical variables for all patients and stratified by the separate ERAS and ERAN cohorts. DAS28: 28 joint count DAS; ERAN: Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Network; ERAS: Early Rheumatoid Arthritis Study; IQR: inter- quartile range; VAS: visual analogue scale. Lewis Carpenter et al. 2384 https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 in the estimated mean scores at baseline and at month 60 between patients diagnosed in 2010 and 1990, and between patients diagnosed in 2010 and 2002, are illus- trated in Table 2. At baseline, there were statistically sig- nificant differences between the three time periods, and these were increased by month 60, where those diag- nosed in 2010 had statistically significantly improved DAS28 scores of 1.12 units (95\% CI 0.90, 1.35) com- pared with 1990 (P < 0.001) and of 0.45 units (95\% CIs 0.36–0.54) compared with 2002 (P < 0.001). This was also reflected in the mixed-effects logistic regression model investigating the probability of achieving LDA over the 60 months. Whilst it is esti- mated that �31\% of patients reached LDA by 60 months where they were diagnosed in 1990 [odds ratio (OR) 0.31; 95\% CI 0.28, 0.34], 50\% reached LDA in where they were diagnosed in 2002 (OR 0.50; 95\% CI 0.46, 0.53), and 63\% were estimated to reach LDA if they were diagnosed in 2010 (OR 0.63; 95\% CI 0.57, 0.68). The declines in DAS28 were in part due to reductions in ESR levels, where patients diagnosed in 2010 had significantly lower ESR at baseline and at month 60 rela- tive to those diagnosed in 1990 (P < 0.001) and 2002 (P < 0.001) (Fig. 1 and Table 2). This was also evident in the logistic regression model, which estimated the prob- ability of achieving a ESR �10, where 51\% (OR 0.51; 95\% CI 0.45, 0.58) of patients diagnosed in 2010 were estimated to reach ESR levels �10, compared with 37\% (OR 0.37; 95\% CI 0.34, 0.41) in 2002 and 20\% (OR 0.20; 95\% CI 0.18, 0.23) in 1990. Measures of patient-reported outcomes The results of the estimated mean scores for HAQ and VAS from the mixed-effects linear models are given in Fig. 2 and presented in Table 2. Whilst the models indi- cated statistically significant improvements at baseline and at month 60 between patients diagnosed in 2010 and 1990 (P < 0.05) and between those diagnosed in 2010 and 2002 (P < 0.05) for both outcomes, these dif- ferences were small. This is reflected in the logistic re- gression models looking at the probability of achieving HAQ scores �1.0 and VAS scores �10 units, where by FIG. 1 Estimated mean scores of the DAS28 and ESR scores, along with the predicted probability of achieving LDA and a ESR �10 over the first 60 months for patients diagnosed in 1990, 2002 and 2010 For the DAS28, black dotted lines indicate thresholds at 2.6 for remission, 3.2 for LDA and 5.1 for HDA. Shaded areas represent the 95\% CIs. Patients were diagnosed in: 1990 (circle markers solid line), 2002 (triangle marker solid line) or 2010 (square marker dashed line). For the probability graphs, the red dotted line indicates the 50\% probability level. Models controlled for age at onset, gender, seropositivity status at baseline, baseline BMI, baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index, and use of DMARDs and steroids at baseline assessment. DAS28: 28-joint count DAS; LDA: low disease activity; HDA: high disease activity. Secular changes in PRO in early RA https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology 2385 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 FIG. 2 Estimated marginal means of the functional disability (HAQ) and VAS scores, along with the predicted probabil- ity of achieving a HAQ �1 or a VAS of �10 units over the first 60 months for patients diagnosed in 1990, 2002 and 2010 Patients were diagnosed in: 1990 (circle markers solid line), 2002 (triangle marker solid line) or 2010 (square marker dashed line). Shaded areas represent the 95\% CIs. For the probability graphs, the red dotted line indicates the 50\% probability level. Models controlled for age at onset, gender, seropositivity status at baseline, baseline BMI, baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index, and use of DMARDs and steroids at baseline assessment. VAS: visual analogue scale. TABLE 2 Estimated differences of each outcome at baseline and 6-months between 2010, 2002 and 1990 DAS28 ESR 2010 vs 1990 2010 vs 2002 2010 vs 1990 2010 vs 2002 Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Baseline �0.68*** �0.88, 0.47 �0.27*** �0.35, 0.19 �14.62*** �17.80, �11.43 �4.90*** �5.76, �4.04 Month 60 �1.12*** �1.35, �0.90 �0.45*** �0.54, �0.36 �10.49*** �12.30, �8.67 �3.31*** �3.673, �2.89 HAQ VAS 2010 vs 1990 2010 vs 2002 2010 vs 1990 2010 vs 2002 Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Delta 95\% CI Baseline �0.15* �0.26, �0.05 �0.06* �0.10, �0.02 �1.20 �4.570, 2.30 �0.48 �1.88, 0.92 Month 60 �0.24** �0.36, �0.13 �0.10** �0.14, �0.05 �0.35 �4.12, 3.42 �0.14 �1.65, 1.37 The estimated mean differences, along with their corresponding 95\% CI, for the DAS28, ESR, HAQ and VAS at baseline and at month 60 comparing patients diagnosed in 2010 with those diagnosed in 1990, and those diagnosed in 2010 with those diagnosed in 2002. Models controlled for age at onset, gender, seropositivity status at baseline, baseline BMI, base- line Charlson Comorbidity Index, and use of DMARDs and steroids at baseline assessment. *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001. DAS28: 28 joint count DAS; VAS: visual analogue scale. Lewis Carpenter et al. 2386 https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 month 60 the probability for HAQ was similar across the recruitment periods. Some 54\% of patients indicated a HAQ �1 at 60 months where they were diagnosed in 1990 (OR 0.54; 95\% CI 0.51, 0.57), compared with 61\% of patients who were diagnosed in 2002 (OR 0.61; 95\% CI 0.58, 0.64) and 60\% of patients diagnosed in 2010 (OR 0.65; 95\% CI 0.60, 0.70) (Fig. 2). The VAS differed from other PROs in that it indicated a statistically signifi- cant improvement for those patients diagnosed in 1990 relative to 2002 and 2010 between the 6 and 48 months of follow-up. However, like the other PROs, there was no statistically significant difference at baseline, or by month 60 (Table 2). For those patients in the ERAN cohort where the SF- 36 was collected, mixed-effects linear models were used to estimate both the PCS and MCS, as well as the Physical Function, Bodily Pain, Vitality and Mental Health sub-components. As the SF-36 data were only available in ERAN, only 2002 and 2010 recruitment peri- ods were modelled. The progression of these scores are illustrated in Fig. 3, and relative differences between 2010 and 2002 are given in Table 3. Relative to 2002, patients diagnosed in 2010 had sig- nificantly better PCS at both baseline (P < 0.001) and month-60 (P < 0.05). This improvement was reflected by similar improvements in both Physical Function and Bodily Pain. However, by month 60, the magnitude of the improvement had reduced. The improvement for patients diagnosed in 2010 was reflected in a greater likelihood of achieving a PCS �50 of 21\% (OR 0.21; 95\% CI 0.13, 0.28) by month 60, compared with those diagnosed in 2002 with just 5\% (OR 0.05; 95\% CI 0.02, 0.10). In contrast, whilst patients diagnosed in 2010 experi- enced significantly better MCS at baseline (P < 0.05) rela- tive to those diagnosed in 2002, the magnitude of this difference was much lower. As with the PCS, this differ- ence diminished over time and by month 60 was statis- tically non-significant. This was reflected in both the Vitality and Mental Health sub-components. The likeli- hood of achieving a MCS �50 units was similar in both 2010 (OR 0.42; 95\% CI 0.29, 0.55) and 2002 (OR 0.58; 95\% CI 0.49, 0.67). FIG. 3 Estimated mean scores of the SF-36 PCS and MCS, along with the Physical Function, Bodily Pain, Vitality and Mental Health sub-domain scores over the first 60 months for patients diagnosed in 2002 and 2010 The black dotted line represents a score of 50, the normalized population average. Patients were diagnosed in 2002 (circle marker) or 2010 (triangle marker). Shaded areas represent the 95\% CIs. Models controlled for age at onset, gender, seropositivity status at baseline, baseline BMI, baseline Charlson Comorbidity Index. and use of DMARDs and steroids at baseline assessment. SF-36: Short Form-36; PCS: Physical Component Score; MCS: Mental Component Score. Secular changes in PRO in early RA https://academic.oup.com/rheumatology 2387 D ow nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /rheum atology/article/59/9/2381/5695681 by 81695661, O U P on 31 A ugust 2020 Discussion This study reports significant declines in disease activity in RA over the last two decades, driven largely by reductions in inflammatory markers. However, these improvements in disease activity have not translated into similar levels of improvements for mental health, functional disability, or patient ratings of overall disease activity, pain or vitality/fatigue, where levels have remained relatively stable over the same period. These findings are in keeping with other published work look- ing at secular changes in PRO [9–12]. Compared with the data presented from the two NOAR cohorts [8], the HAQ trajectories of the 1990 and 2002 cohort follow a similar pattern, albeit starting at a slightly lower score. This is likely due to NOAR including all inflammatory polyarthritic conditions, whereas ERAS and ERAN were restricted to RA patients only. These findings were also corroborated in a recent meta- analysis using data from 29 early RA cohorts (including ERAS and ERAN) of over 10 000 patients, which found that levels of pain, fatigue, physical function and general measures of mental health had not improved when com- paring pre- and post-2002 cohorts of patients with early RA. … Beyond Salem and Secularism: Jonathan Edwards and Satan in Early America Andrew J. Juchno Destroyer. Serpent. The Old Serpent. The Great Red Dragon. The Accuser of the Brethren. The Enemy. Belial. Beezlebub. Mammon. The Angel of Light. The Angel of the Bottomless Pit. The Prince of the Power of the Air. Lucifer. Abaddon. Apollyon. Legion. The God of this World. The Foul Spirit. The Lying Spirit. The Tempter. The Son of the Morning. Satan. Such are the Biblical names that Daniel Defoe, an adept commentator on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Christian traditions, identified for the being that many consider to be the bane of Christianity. Per Defoe’s observation, those names were largely confined to the Old Testament. In naming God’s rival, the second half of the Christian Bible was more concise. “But to sum them all up in one,” Defoe wrote, “he is called in the New Testament plain DEVIL.” From the texts of the Hebraic to the Christian tradition, then, Satan gained nominal unity. That is not to suggest that across time and place, Christians have recognized the same devil. Although perhaps plain in Scriptural name, Christian understanding of the devil has evolved over the centuries since the birth of Christ. The American devil is no exception to this fact. 1 The Reformation era, in all of its complexity, altered what the historian Jeffrey Burton Russell calls the “theater of struggle” between Christians and the devil. Whereas the medieval tradition identified the devil as God’s opponent, and to a lesser extent the opponent of the greater Christian tradition, the inward, self- reflexive turn that Christianity took during both the Protestant and Catholic Reformations shifted the burden of struggle onto the shoulders of individual Christians. In a sense, Satan became more personal, especially for Protestants whose sola scriptura and sola fide tenets, paired with the denunciation of exorcism, left the faithful with a deep fear of the evil that they read of with little worldly means of redress. Prayer and hope for salvation would have had to be enough for them. 2 In the midst of this personalization process, the persons left alone to fight the devil began to move across the Atlantic Ocean to North American shores. On those earliest voyages westward from Europe, the men, women, and children who came to 1 Daniel Defoe, The History of the Devil, sixth edition (Boston: C.D. Strong, 1851), 31. 2 Jeffrey Burton Russell, Mephistopheles: The Devil in the Modern World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 31. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 74 settle and colonize carried a host of possessions, skills, diseases, deficiencies, assumptions, and expectations. For those who went to New England, not least among this cultural baggage was fervent and constant belief in the Reformed devil. Generally, the devil featured prominently in the writings of New England’s seventeenth-century Reformed ministers. Ever the careful shepherds, they took it upon themselves to educate their flock on the real threat that Satan posed to their well-being and salvation. As a fellow settler, Satan brought a range of strategies to bring the newly established godly communities out of their covenants. Most if not all of those Puritan ministers would have heartily agreed to the assertion that Satan did his best to sow a neglect for religious sentiment among their followers. Although they maintained that his powers were only preternatural, never supernatural—that is, below the level of God’s might—he worked on congregant and minister alike to bring about discord. That discord did not end with the reckoning of the Salem witch trials. With a comparative of Cotton Mather’s and Jonathan Edwards’s diabologies, a portrait of the American devil emerges. That devil defied death at the Salem witch trials and thrived in the Evangelical Enlightenment.3 If we treat Cotton Mather’s diabology as a direct antecedent of Edwards’s diabology, or rather, Edwards’s diabology as the progeny of Mather’s diabology, parallels between the two emerge to create a coherent portrait of an orthodox, clerical understanding of the devil. Both Mather and Edwards used historical and theological enquiry to flesh out the devil’s origin story, powers, and attributes, and then took that conception and applied it to their respective religious and political climates. For both theologians, Satan and his devils were historical and contemporary actors. Though remarkably similar, their conception of Satan diverged at several key points. As the seventeenth century became the eighteenth and Protestantism took on evangelical overtones in New England, Edwards’s devil took on more of a singular characteristic. Although Edwards and other Protestant clerics understood the devil historically as a body of multitude, an order of fallen angels, with Satan at the helm and numerous devils beneath him, it was Satan himself who acted against Christians. Departing Cotton Mather’s diabology, Edwards emphasized the devil’s direct and active role in the world. Edwards, in effect, began the process of compressing the devil. And yet, this is not a disenchantment narrative, nor does it indicate the rise of secular modernity. The line between the devil’s dominion and God’s was becoming 3 Richard Godbeer, The Devil’s Dominion: Magic and Religion in Early New England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85-121; Edward Trefz, “Satan in Puritan Preaching,” The Boston Public Library Quarterly 8 (1956): 71-84; 148-159. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 75 clearer. And the devils themselves were reducing in number but, importantly, not in strength.4 I argue that it is possible to examine colonial diabology outside of and beyond the context of the Salem witch trials. Against the historians that take those trials to be the end-all be-all of colonial understandings of Satan, I show that Jonathan Edwards had a complex understanding of the devil that had little to do with witches and much to do with Cotton Mather. In examining the relationship of Jonathan Edwards’s diabology to Cotton Mather’s diabology, I argue that historians ought to take Cotton Mather’s diabology seriously as the predecessor for Jonathan Edwards’s. Although at least one historian has suggested this connection, I would emphasize it as a primary connection. In doing so, a portrait of the colonial clergyman’s understanding of the devil emerges—one that changed over the eighteenth century, but shared a fundamental history and was applicable to the particularities of colonial life that clerics addressed. All too often, the historians that consider colonial American diabology examine it is as a function of, and in relation to, the Salem witch trials. A whole cast of early Americanists have molded scholarly careers around interpreting and reinterpreting the events of 1692, and for good reason.5 The witch-hunting fervor that enveloped Essex County in the early 1690s was among the most visible and violent occurrence of a larger social and cultural phenomenon pervading life in the seventeenth-century Atlantic world. Although besetting North America later than most European societies, witch hunts and trials were highly local affairs that brought out the best and the worst in people. However interesting these crusades may be to early Americanists, though, affairs regarding witchcraft are far from the only source of knowledge on colonial diabology. Witch-hunters were not the only people of early modernity who worried about Satan and that worry continued through Cotton Mather to Jonathan Edwards. Some historians are not convinced of the ubiquity of the Salem experience, as it relates both to the study of witchcraft and of diabology more generally. As John Demos rightly observes, historians have traditionally been prone to “overemphasis…on a few sensational episodes—with the Salem trials of 1692-1693 making the most obvious case in point.” For Demos, balancing the witchcraft 4 This interpretation counters the claim that “by 1700, [Satan] was already losing his grip on the imagination.” Andrew Delbanco, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 4. 5 Some of the most influential works of the Salem historiography include Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Mary Beth Norton, In the Devil’s Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); Benjamin Ray, Satan and Salem: The Witch-Hunt Crisis of 1692 (Charlottesville, VA: The University of Virginia Press, 2017). The University of Virginia even hosts the “Salem Witch Trials Documentary Archive and Transcription Project.” © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 76 historiography requires that scholars “explore its everyday presence and meaning,” for “witchcraft…belonged to the regular business of life in premodern times.”6 Although Demos deals with witchcraft, the same can be said of diabology. Dealing with the devil was an everyday affair. Salem was but one instance of a much larger history. Richard Godbeer’s reminder that “sermons of the 1690s did not become any more preoccupied with matters diabolical” rings especially poignant in this regard.7 Salem, then casts a long, distorting shadow over our understanding of the devil in colonial New England. So lumped together are Salem, witchcraft, and diabology, that it is all too easy to infer that the passing of Salem ended colonial interest in witches and, by dint of that assertion, the devil. By reading Cotton Mather’s writing on the devil in conjunction with Edwards’s, it is clear that belief in Satan remained a potent force among some orthodox clergymen. Satan, though, had his reign constricted. Before making our way into Edwards’s writings, there exist two portraits of Edwards’s devil that exist among scholars that require some attention. Christopher Reaske, in one of the few articles explicitly concerned with the topic, posits that three distinct sources and traditions informed and, to varying degrees, shaped Edwards’s writing on the devil. Those sources, observes Reaske, are the Bible, the writings of John Flavel, and John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667). Conversely, Gerald McDermott in his study of Edwards and the devil would lead readers to believe that to the extent that Edwards considered Satan, it was to portray Native American religion as devil worship and its practitioners as Satan’s spawn. 8 In some ways, Reaske and McDermott present the two approaches to understanding Edwards’s demonology. For Reaske, Edwards conceived of the devil in a rarified, intellectual realm, rendering his devil the product of a scholarly, ministerial career. For McDermott, on the other hand, Edwards conceived of the devil in a worldly, religious-political context, rendering his devil the product of a sustained missionary effort. In essence, the two scholars present both the theoretical roots and the practical application of Edwards’s demonology, but they do so in such a way as to suggest that these understandings are mutually exclusive. Yet Edwards 6 John P. Demos, Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the Culture of Early New England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), xi. 7 Godbeer, The Devil’s Dominion, 86 n.3. This “beyond Salem” paradigm motivates Godbeer’s study of the other 1692 New England witch hunt, which happened south of Salem in Stamford, Connecticut. Richard Godbeer, Escaping Salem: The Other Witch Hunt of 1692 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 8 Christopher R. Reaske, “The Devil and Jonathan Edwards,” Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1972), 123-38. Reaske’s article seems to be the only attempt at nailing down Edwards’s position on the devil, in which he makes a minor mention of Edwards possibly drawing on Cotton Mather’s Wonders of the Invisible World (1693); Gerald R. McDermott, “Jonathan Edwards and American Indians: The Devil Sucks Their Blood,” The New England Quarterly 72, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 539-57. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 77 wrote with remarkable consistency, and there is little evidence to suggest that his devil could not have been both an intellectual project that he developed and refined as well as a lens through which he understood colonial life. To begin, we will examine how Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards understood the devil as an historical actor. For Jonathan Edwards, Satan perched atop the pillar of evil, a very real, historical being. More powerful than human beings, Satan was present and identifiable in all of human history.9 That is to say, for Edwards, Satan was no metaphor, nor was he some rhetorical device meant to scare sinners towards redemption in the same way that hell fire functioned in Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God. First and foremost, Jonathan Edwards’s Satan was a powerful actor who reappeared in world history always with the intention to oppose the realization of God’s visible kingdom on Earth. So far, Edwards was in Davies’s company. That purpose, Satan’s raison d’être, was present from the very moment that Satan became the antichrist. To that end, Edwards understood Satan to be a fallen angel. Once the chief angel—the most powerful and wisest of God’s creations— Satan grew jealous when he learned that God intended to create humankind with Jesus Christ at its head. Satan, scared by the knowledge that God would subject him to a human (as Christ was to be, among other roles, the head of angels), allowed his pride, arrogance, and sense of superiority to get the better of him. Lacking the will and desire to submit himself to Christ, a being that he saw as inferior, Satan rebelled against God and against God’s entire heavenly order. To Edwards, Satan’s intentions were clear. He meant to do nothing less than establish himself as god on Earth, the head of the human race.10 If Satan was no mere metaphor, he was a figure embedded in hierarchy and a dark distortion of God’s cosmic order. To that point, Edwards imagined Satan as a king, quite literally at the head of a visible antichristian kingdom. Accordingly, “He is also called Antichrist, because he is Christs rival. He disputes with Christ for the power and authority, for his throne and dominion… sets up himself as being supreme head of the church, in opposition to him [Christ].” In that manner, Edwards envisioned Satan as a god on 9 On terminology: as Edwards seemed to used Satan, Lucifer, and the devil interchangeably, so too will I. The only exception to this rule is in reference to the lesser fallen angels beneath Satan, which Edwards exclusively called devils. Accordingly, when referring to those fallen angels, I will refer to them exclusively as the devils. Edwards also referred to the devil as the antichrist, a serpent, and a dragon. 10 For Jonathan Edwards on the fall of angels, see Miscellanies no. 438, Fall of Angels,” in Works of Jonathan Edwards Online, Volume 13, “The Miscellanies” (Entry Nos. a-z, aa-zz, 1-500), ed. Thomas A Schafer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 488. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 78 Earth; a false god, surely; one meant to do irreparable harm to mankind, definitely. But a god and a king nonetheless.11 Jonathan Edwards’s origins story of the devil was consistent with the orthodox puritan understanding of the devil’s beginnings, as told by Cotton Mather and other puritan forefathers. Generally, Mather posited that the devil was a collective of fallen angels that used lies, deceit, and trickery to tempt and persuade, though never compel, Christians and potential converts towards sin and away from God. United under Beelzebub, the chief devil, in a military order, these devils were the first apostates. Driven by their envy of God’s preference for mankind, they denied God’s heavenly order and rebelled. As Samuel Willard (1640-1707), the minister at Groton, so aptly put it “discontented persons are fittest for traitors.” Beelzebub and his discontented followers, collectively called Satan, had created a “Covenant of rebellion.”12 Although God allowed the devils’ existence, once on Earth they acted with free reign, spreading their mischief and deceit through the entirety of human history. Thomas Shepard (1605-1649) catechized this same narrative of the devil’s creation some forty years before Mather. To young congregants in his Cambridge parish, Shepherd reminded them “that an excedding great number of these [angels] fell from God by sinn, which are called devils.” For Shepard, just as God claimed the heavens, “the place of the cursed estate of the lapsed angels or devils, is especially the earth and the ayrr where sinful man dwells.”13 Mather, though, spent considerably less time and attention than Edwards did in developing a cohesive origins narrative for the devil. More important to Mather was identifying the devil’s nature across time. Where some commentators in the Christian tradition maintained the existence of single devil, Mather held that there were likely twelve thousand devils plural operating on the earthly realm. To speak of the devil, then, was to utter “A name of Multitude.” For Mather, there was “not One Individual Devil, so Potent and Scient 11 Jonathan Edwards, “Notes on the Apocalypse,” in Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume 5, Apocalyptic Writings, ed. Stephen J. Stein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 139. Although Edwards does not say as much, it is important to emphasize that he was in no way implying that Satan and God were equals. Far from it. Satan’s ultimate sin was in thinking himself to be capable of god- like action. Thus, Satan thought himself to be god and thought himself to be a king. It is perhaps more consistent with Edwards’s position to say that Satan believed himself to be a king. 12 Samuel Willard, Useful instructions for a professing people in times of great security and degeneracy (Cambridge, MA: Samuel Green, 1673), 34. 13 Thomas Shepard, A short catechism familiarly teaching the knowledge of God (Cambridge, MA: Samuel Green, 1654), 12. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 79 as perhaps a manichee would imagine; but it means a Kind.”14 Less a singular foil to God as Augustine conceived it, the devils were a genus of being that existed in kind. Admittedly, this conception provided some linguistic confusion that Mather himself recognized, for he spoke of Satan—seemingly, a singular devil—as regularly as he spoke of devils. Why would he use the singular to refer to an entire group, unless he didn’t really believe in an entire order of devils? The reason was quite clear to Mather. Although there was certainly a host of devils, because they all existed under Satan’s control, it was acceptable to “mention them under a Name of the Singular Number.”15 Referring to them as such did not erase the reality of their multitudinous existence. In his theological writings, Jonathan Edwards maintained the continued existence of a historical multiplicity of devils. As a king would be nothing without subjects to rule, beneath Satan were the devils (lesser fallen angels) that populated Satan’s earthly kingdom, manning the battlements in preparation to oppose Christ. These devils shared in Satan’s agony when Christ gained a following in the first centuries, and their agony will only increase when they are judged alongside Satan at Christ’s second coming. Like Cotton Mather before him, Edwardss demonological writings varied, sometimes to the point of unclarity, between an emphasis on the devil, singular, and the devils, plural. In Religious Affections (1746), for example, the devils served not as a singular foil to Christ as Satan in a Manichean schema, but as the antonym of angels. Whereas “the elect angels are the more glorious for their strength and knowledge…the devils… be not more lovely.” Edwards’s continued belief in the dual existence of, and pronounced distinction between, the devil and the devils is a legacy of the Protestant reformation. When, in the sixteenth century, European reformers subjected the Church, her teachings, and her guardians on Earth, to sustained reconsideration, the devil was not without revision. Among other changes that Heinrich Bullinger and others in Zurich began to make to Protestant demonology was to think of the devil as a seducer in many guises. It was not a misspelling, then, when Edwards claimed the devils to appear uglier than angels. For the devils were different than Satan, even if they became devilish by the same process of falling from God’s grace. 16 14 Cotton Mather, The Wonders of the Invisible World: Being an Account of the Tryals of Several Witches (Boston: 1693), 6. 15 Cotton Mather, The Armour of Christianity (Boston: T. Green, 1704), 3. 16 Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards Online, Volume 2, Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 257. Mather, alternatively, argued consistently that the devils were an order of being, not just the singular Satan. For Mather, the devil was “name of multitude…not One Individual Devil, so Potent and Scient as perhaps a manichee would imagine; but it means a Kind.” Cotton Mather, The Wonders of the Invisible World: Being an Account of the Tryals of Several Witches (Boston, 1693), 6. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 80 Amidst other mid-century revivalists, there seems to have been a spectrum of reliance on this distinction that Edwards drew between the devil singular and the devils plural. Some who preached during the revivals were, like Edwards, mindful of the distinction. Amidst these pastors, the devils plural would not have been a foreign concept. Lest we forget, Samuel Davies’s chilling tale of human history was that of the biography of devils, not the devil. Similarly, of God, Davies wrote, “So he employs Devils, the worst of Beings, to execute his Vengeance upon Sinners in Hell.” If the devils were the execution of God’s wrath on sinners, though, a broader focus showed that “The Scriptures represent our world in its state of guilt and misery, as the kingdom of Satan.”17 Pennsylvania Presbyterian Gilbert Tennent was another such revivalist that balanced the devil singular and the devil plural. As is the case with Edwards’s and Davies’s demonology, it was the devils for Tennent that incited particular acts of temptation and acted upon sinners and the damned. Accordingly, those who had sinned lingered “among damned Men and Devils in the prison of hell” and suffered with “devils [as] their tormentors.”18 Yet it was Satan, not the devils, who remained “The God of this World.”19 That Edwards, Davies, and Tennent all ascribed distinct roles to the devil and to the devils, albeit to somewhat varying degrees is a testament to the influence of a particular author on the American colonial Protestant understanding of the devil. Like Cotton Mather before them, these men understood the devil to be an order of being, a subcategory of angels. For these men, the connection here to the devil as portrayed in John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667), is unmistakable. Milton, as Reaske rightly observes, Milton posited the existence of a host of devils and popularized that demonological understanding. Although Reaske only ventures to connect 17 Samuel Davies, The Crisis: or, the uncertain doom of kingdoms at particular times (London: Printed for J. Buckland, 1757), 30. Davies and Edwards have remarkably overlapping demonologies. Although this is far from a developed analysis, and one does not yet exist, some similarities are as follows. In keeping with the understanding of Satan as a rebel against God, Davies describes devilish people as having “uneasy rebellious spirits” who, “unless this Temper be changed…must dwell with Devils for ever.” Samuel Davies, The Vessels of Mercy, and the Vessels of Wrath (London: Printed for J. Buckland, 1758), 18. Samuel Davies, The mediatorial kingdom and glories of Jesus Christ (Bristol: Printed by W. Pine, 1783), 18. In keeping with the understanding of Satan as creating a visible kingdom on Earth, Davies describes the devil as “god of this world.” Samuel Davies, Sermons on the most useful and important subjects, volume III (London: Printed for J. Buckland, 1767), 330. 18 Gilbert Tennent, The Necessity of Receiving the Truth is Love (New York: Zenger, 1735), 63; 181. 19 Gilbert Tennent, The Espousals or A Passionate Perswasive to a marriage with the Lamb of God (New York: Printed by J. Peter Zenger, 1735), 43. There does seem to be here, however, a divide between the ministry and the laity. From what I can tell of lay accounts of temptation during the revivals, nonclergymen were more likely to chalk that temptation up to Satan rather than his devils. See for instance Douglas Winiarski, Darkness Falls in the Land of Light: Experiencing Religious Awakening in Eighteenth-Century New England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 212-13. © Author Jonathan Edwards Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (2021) ISSN 2159-6875 81 Edwards’s devil to Milton, it seems likely that Davies and Tennent at the very least followed in the Miltonian tradition, even if they did not directly cite Paradise Lost. 20 There is, of course, one shared source the certainly informed the plurality of devils among revivalistic preachers. On shared source material, Reaske errs in suggesting that Edwards could not have drawn the plural devils from the Bible. Cotton Mather himself, Edwards’s forefather in the argument for a pluralistic understanding of the devil, derived his multitudinous devils from Scripture. Mark 5:15 (“And they come to Jesus, and see him that was possessed with the devil, and had the legion, sitting and clothed, and in his right mind”) was paramount to Mather’s prescribed defense against the devil. Because the devil was not a singular figure, defense against diabolical forces required more than a single champion. In essence, that devils existed in legion required each Puritan congregant to join together under Christ’s banner in an epic battle for the good of the colony. Protection against devils generally demanded military-like fortification that resulted from the accumulated strength of the individual New England Christian waging war against temptation. With the language of a military general, Mather urged New Englanders: “Arm yourselves against all the devices with which the Devils would hook you into any Rebellion against the Lord…Now furnish yourselves with Armour to keep off the dint of the Devils Instigations; in short, put on the whole Armour of God.”21 On the one hand, Mather’s advice was likely a thinly-veiled reference to the English Puritan William Gurnall’s three-part The Christian in Complete Armour: A Treatise on the Saints’ War with the Devil (1655-1662). Before Mather, Gurnall maintained that the Christian dressed in God’s full armor against the devil had his loins girded with truth and feet protected by the “preparation of the Gospel of Peace,” wore the “breastplate of righteousness.” The “Helmet of Salvation” completed the set of armor. Gurnall also 20 For Mather and John Milton, see Sacvan Bercovitch, “Cotton Mather Against Rhyme: Milton and the Psalterium Americanum,” American Literature 39, no. 2 (May, 1967): 191-193. For Edwards and Milton, see Reaske, “The Devil and Jonathan Edwards,” 128; George F. … 98 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition FOUNDATIONS OF SECULARITY: GLOBAL EXPERIENCE AND KAZAKHSTAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.09 Damira SIKHIMBAYEVA Ph.D., Head of the Department of Science, Nur Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture (Almaty, Kazakhstan) Lesken SHYNGYSBAYEV Ph.D. Student, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan) Inkar NURMOLDINA Ph.D. Student, Nur Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture (Almaty, Kazakhstan) A B S T R A C T he paper examines the methodologi- cal approaches and the conceptual foundations used to assess the degree of secularity in Western political thought. The concepts of secularity and secularism appear and develop due to historical, social, economic and cultural specifics of each par- ticular society, and different factors, social T imams do not ban the dhikr practice in mosques; everybody knows in which mosques dhikr sessions are held. The state remains undecided. Today, at the outset of new discourses, Sufis are creating new religious constructs and readjust- ing the fundamental criteria of accession to dhikr. Self-identification and self-reflection of the Sufi groups in Kazakhstan should be further studied in greater detail. Those who study Sufism insist that it is an important component of the spiritual and cultural heritage of Central Asia and, specifically, of Kazakhstan. Our contemporaries treat the humanitarian, educational and other Sufi traditional values as absolutely relevant to our time. Murad Rektangel 99 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 transformations and the changing role of re- ligion in public space among them, revise the content of these concepts. The paper discusses two main trajecto- ries of such changes in the correlations be- tween religion and politics that contributed to the development of secularity models as they are known today. It offers a clear inter- pretation of the concepts of secularity, the secularity principle, secularism and secular- ization and an analysis of the main models and interpretations of secularism and the socio-political factors that affect each of the secularity models. The contemporary religious situation and religious politics of Kazakhstan, as well as the political experience of identifying the principles and criteria of secularity in the re- public that synthesizes foreign experience and the specific features of interpretation of secularity inside the country are reflected in the paper. KEYWORDS: post-secular society, desecularization, secularism, secularity, religion, principle. I n t r o d u c t i o n The unfolding desecularization processes and religion that returned to public space pose the democratic secular states with difficult tasks. They need to arrive at new approaches to the conceptu- alization of secularity and secularism and identify the place and role of religion in the world, which since the mid-20th century has been dominated by the secularization theory that predicted an inevi- table collapse of religion as a social influence factor. While developing the secularization theory, social sciences conceded that religion was marginalized and measurably pushed out from public to private space by modernization processes. Today, political and academic communities all over the world are confronted by post-secular realities of religious dynamism and a reestablishment of religion as part of politics, economy, culture and public space. Peter L. Berger, one of the prominent figures in the unfolding secularization/desecularization discussions, has written: “The world today, with few exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it was” and “Today the world is massively religious, is any- thing but the secularized world that had been predicted ... by so many analysts of modernity;” “...ex- periments with secularized religion have generally failed.”1 The above confirms that the secularity problem and the role and place of religion in the post- secular society is moving to the fore as one of the actively discussed issues both in social sciences and even in a wider public space. In the last three or four decades the number of studies in political science, international relations, sociology and social anthropology related to different patterns (pro- cesses) of secularity, secularism and desecularization unfolding in post-secular societies has consider- ably increased. Kazakhstan is trailing behind: so far, its academic community has not studied in detail the concepts of secularity, the principle of secularity, secularism, secularization, different types and models of secular states to say nothing of desecularization and post-secular society, the topical sub- jects actively discussed by the world academic community. This explains why the public discourse of a secular state in Kazakhstan is either superficial and one-sided or practically absent. The political elite and power prefer a narrower interpretation of the state secularity principle, an echo of the Soviet ideological understanding of the role of religion in society and an ignorance of 1 P. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in: The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. by P.L. Berger, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, MI, 1999, pp. 2, 9, 4. 100 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition the variety of secular states and fundamental scholarly works on the legal and political nature of secularism. Public manifestations of religion in state structures are not encouraged or even banned, which is explained and justified by the secular nature of the state. The solutions for these problems related to religious politics can be found in a deeper comprehensive interpretation of the secularity principle, an analytical separation of the concepts of secularity, secularism and secularization and conceptualization and development of the liberal interpretation of secularism. The paper attempts to fill the gap with a more liberal approach to secularity based on an analysis of the key works on secu- larism and the secular state. Main Approaches to the Interpretations of Secularity in the European and American Traditions The secularity of state is one of the basic foundations of the majority of contemporary law- governed states, upon which they are built and continue to function.2 According to the index of the state-confessional relations modes, 12 states out of 197 are religious states; 60 are states with an es- tablished religion; 5 are antireligious states; 120 are secular states, where the secularity is established by law.3 Each of them understand and interpret the principle of secularity according to the specifics of their religious situations and public discourse of the role and place of religion in public space. Clearly, the concepts of “secularity” and “secularism” take shape and develop according to the historical, socio-political, economic and cultural specifics of any concrete society. Their content is modified by numerous factors, social transformations and the changing role of religion in public space. Over the last two centuries the world has seen numerous models and interpretations of secular- ism. Today, the public and academic communities are discussing the secular state and its desirable and undesirable forms. In most cases, it is these discourses that determined the nature and the course of the policy of secularism in some of the democratic states. Without going too far into the history of these concepts, the paper points out that the concepts of secularity and secularism as construed today are the products of centuries-long confrontation be- tween the church and the state. The conceptual foundations of secularism were formed in the context of Western European socio-political realities as a result of fairly complicated relationships between these two institutions. For instance, José Casanova, a prominent sociologist, has stated that all delib- erations about a secular state should begin with an admission that “the formation of the secular is itself inextricably linked with the internal transformations of European Christianity.”4 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, another prominent scholar, has pointed out that laicism and Judeo- Christian secularism, the most influential factors of international relations are two basic trajectories, or strategies of managing the relations between religion and politics. The former belongs to the sepa- ration narrative, in which religion is banned from politics. The latter, to the accommodational narra- tive in which the Judeo-Christian secularism occupies a special place in public space as a unique cornerstone of secular democracy. Both forms of secularism can be described as inconsistent, since these traditions invariably change to fit any specific geocultural area. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd 2 See: N.V. Ponkin, Svetskost gosudarstva, Uchebno-nauchny tsentr dovuzovskogo obrazovania, Moscow, 2004, p. 25. 3 See: A.T. Kuru, Seсularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, Illustrated Edition, 2009, p. 12. 4 J. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: Global Comparative Perspective, Hedgehog Review, Critical Reflection on Contemporary Culture, 2006, p. 10. 101 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 deemed it necessary to explain that each defends a certain form of separation of church and state for different reasons, in different forms and with absolutely different political effects. Laicism (from French laïcité) tends to create a neutral public space in which religious faiths, practices and institu- tions are deprived of any political consequence, banned from political competition or locked in the private sphere. Laicism considers the mixture of the political and the religious to be irrational and dangerous. This strategy has already become a tradition and formed an everyday perception of the relations between religious organizations and the state in certain countries, which blurs obvious lim- itations of this approach. As distinct from laicism, Judeo-Christian secularism, the second tradition of secularism does not strive to remove religion or, at least, Judeo-Christianity from public life. Unlike laicism, this strategy does not treat the secular and the religious as two mutually exclusive spheres. These traditions, or the two main strategies of the development of secularism, influenced differ- ent models of separation of state and religious institutions in the contemporary world to different extents. Ahmet T. Kuru, an American scholar, has written in his fundamental work Seсularism and State Policies toward Religion that state religious policy is a result of the struggle between “passive and assertive secularism,”5 which shapes religious policies and defines the place of religion in the public space. Passive secularism demands that the state should remain passive to avoid consolidation of any religion as dominant, to let religion manifest itself as a free public phenomenon. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, demands that the state should exclude religion from the public sphere and play an “assertive” role as the main actor of social engineering, which keeps religion in the private sphere. Passive secularism is a pragmatic political principle that tries to preserve state loyalty in its relations with all religions, while assertive secularism is a “comprehensive” doctrine that mainly aims to com- pletely exclude religion from the public.6 Peter Berger, in his turn, has identified three variants of the development of secularism: “There is the moderate version, typified by the traditional American view of church-state separation. Then there is the more radical version, typified by French laïcité and more recently by the ACLU, in which religion is both confined to the private sphere and protected by legally enforced freedom of religion. And then there is, as in the Soviet case, a secularism that privatizes religion and seeks to repress it. Its adherents can be as fanatical as any religious fundamentalists.”7 According to Canadian scholars Rosalie Jukier and José Woehrling, when talking about secular- ism we can identify “a ‘strict’ or ‘rigid’ conception of secularism” that accords more importance to the principle of neutrality than to freedom of conscience and religion. This can be interpreted as an attempt to relegate the practice of religion to the private and communal sphere, and to keep the public sphere free of any expression of religion. On the other hand, more “flexible” or “open” secularism is based on the protection of freedom of religion, even if this requires a relaxation of the principle of neutrality. In this model, state neutrality toward religion and the separation of church and state foster respect for religious and moral equality and freedom of conscience and religion as the fundamental objectives. In open secularism, any tension or contradiction between the various constituent facets of secularism should be resolved in favor of religious freedom and equality.8 The Canadian scholars have identified the four key principles that form the basis for any model of secularism: people’s moral equality; freedom of conscience and religion; state neutrality towards 5 See: A.T. Kuru, op. cit., p. 36. 6 See: J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 162. 7 P. Berger, “Secularism Falsified,” First Things, February 2008. 8 See: J. Woehrling, R. Jukier, Religion and the Secular State in Canada: Interim National Reports. The XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, The International Center for Law and Religion Studies. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 2010, pp. 185-198. 102 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition religion and the separation of church and state. Secularism, however, assumes different meanings according to the importance accorded to each of these four principles.9 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor insist that we cannot define secularism through “the sepa- ration of Church and State; the neutrality of the State with respect to religions; or an absence of reli- gious expression in the public sphere” even if these formulas are partially true.10 According to Taylor, “there is no such sets of timeless principles which can be determined, at least in the detail that must be for a given political system, by pure reason alone; and situations differ very much, and require different kinds of concrete realization of agreed general principles; so that some degree of working out is necessary in each situation.”11 And further: “...the issues concerning secularism have evolved in different Western societies in recent decades, because the faiths repre- sented in those societies have changed. We need to alter the way in which we proceed when the range of religions or basic philosophies expands: for example, contemporary Europe or America with the arrival of substantive communities of Muslims.”12 “Comparative analysis identifies a range of types of secular states, and recognizes that the idea of the secular state is a flexible one.”13 Religions in Post-Secular Contexts The role and place of religion in the public space have radically changed under the pressure of the modernization processes unfolding in all spheres of public life. While in many Western European countries modernization of society was accompanied by a gradual retreat of religion from collective consciousness and individual minds, in the post-Soviet societies modernization is accompanied by religious resurrection. Having analyzed the global religious upsurge unfolding in front of our eyes, Peter Berger point- ed to the two mightiest global trends: “Passionate Islamic movements are on the rise throughout the Muslim world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the China Sea, and in the Muslim diaspora in the West. The rise of evangelical Protestantism has been less noticed by intellectuals, the media, and the gen- eral public in Western countries, partly because nowhere is it associated with violence and partly because it more directly challenges the assumptions of established elite opinion.”14 Upon returning to the public space, economy and politics, religion caused a reassessment of its role in society, the problem of redefinition of the post-secular has come to the fore as the most delib- erated subject in the public space. Professor of sociology José Casanova, one of the prominent figures in the discourse of secularism and secularization, has pointed out that starting in the 1980s, religious traditions around the world refused to accept an absolute public-private dichotomy to demand, often by force, a specific and important place in the public space across the world.15 9 See: J. Woehrling, R. Jukier, op. cit. 10 G. Bouchard, C. Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Government of Quebec, Quebec City, 2008, available at [http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf], 20 April, 2020. 11 Ch. Taylor, “What Does Secularism Mean?” in: Dilemmas and Connections. Selected Essays, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 310. 12 Ibidem. 13 J. Martínez-Torrón, W.C. Durham, Religion and the Secular State. Interim National Reports. XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, pp. 2-18. 14 P. Berger, “Secularism Falsified.” 15 See: J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London, 1994, p. 153. 103 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 According to the same author, there are no compelling reasons, either democratic or liberal, to banish religion from the public sphere.16 According to Rob Warner, religion has become more contested, complex and diverse in the 21st century, while the secularization processes have profoundly changed the power and significance of religion.17 To sum up: religion has become the strongest identification marker in post-Communist societ- ies, which explains its status of the most contradictory subject of public and political discussions. The Main Principles and Criteria of Secularity in the Republic of Kazakhstan Independent Kazakhstan has already acquired its national legal base that regulates the relations between the state and religion. The state religious policy should be corrected in view of all sorts of global threats to national integrity and challenges to national security: the unfolding processes of desecularization and deprivatization of religion, the growing role of public religions, contradictions between ethnic, national and Islamic identities, proliferation of radical Islamic ideology, interna- tional terrorism and extremism, religious education of the republic’s population as a whole and of the younger generations, in particular. These socially important problems cannot be resolved unilaterally; they require concerted efforts of state structures and religious associations. In Kazakhstan, this role belongs to traditional religions as an important component of the national spiritual heritage and a powerful ideological resource in national construction. The state should move aside from the old methods and methodologies used to define the place and role of religion in public space; we should clarify the main content of the secularity principle to identify the main trends in the relations between the state and confessions. This means that we should build up the state-confessional relations on a wider, more open and more liberal interpretation of secularism. The separation of church and state principle is not universal; its implementations vary depend- ing on internal socio-cultural, political and public specifics of states. We have already written that despite the existence of different models of a secular state there are two main interpretations or strat- egies that serve as the foundation of the relationship between the state and confessions in any secular state. The first of them, the so-called passive (open) secularism, is a pragmatic political principle that insists on state neutrality toward all religions; the second, assertive secularism, is a doctrine in its own right, spearheaded against including religion in the public sphere. In our case, taking into account the latest trends in the religious sphere, it would be wiser to adhere to the strategy of open secularism. This would allow us to realize the cooperative strategy of interaction between state and religion. The state should not try to push religion out of public life into the peripheries of national construction, otherwise it will lose the ideological struggle against numerous radical trends. Armed with assertive secularism, the state creates a marginal group of believers on the periphery of national construction that may, in the course of time, develop into a fairly large opposition group. According to its Constitution, the Republic of Kazakhstan is a democratic, secular state ruled by law; people, their lives, rights and freedoms being its highest values. Today, the state pursues a policy that contains no anti- or pro-religious intentions. Freedom of conscience and freedom of reli- 16 See: J. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: Global Comparative Perspective. 17 See: R. Warner, Secularization and its Discontents, Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, 2010, p. 182. 104 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition gion are guaranteed, while propaganda of and agitation for the ideas that may stir up religious or any other hatred and animosity are banned.18 American scholars Cornell, Starr and Tucker have pointed out that the Kazakh “government took upon itself to regulate religion, thus gravitating toward the Skeptical/Insulating model and draw- ing on the French and Turkish experience. Going one step further, however, the Kazakhstani model differentiates between traditional and non-traditional religious communities. Government policies explicitly endorse and promote the traditional communities, and seeks to allow them to restore their position in society, while being hostile to the spread of non-traditional religious influences. That means Kazakhstan also borrows elements of the ‘Dominant Religion’ model, though with a twist: it does not privilege one particular religion, as most examples of this model do, but traditional religions at the expense of the foreign and novel interpretations.”19 The same authors are convinced that “over time, Kazakhstan has adopted increasing restrictions in the religious field, and new measures were passed following terrorist incidents in 2011 and 2016. A 2011 law prohibited foreigners from registering religious organizations, required the registration of places of worship, and prohibited the holding of religious services in private homes — a practice common to more secretive religious groups. The law also forced religious communities to re-register with the state, and required a minimum number of adult members for registration at the local, provin- cial, and national levels. As a result, some smaller or less established groups failed to register. The law also restricted the dissemination of religious literature, requiring approval by the Agency for Religious Affairs.”20 Furthermore, they state that the events of the past decade forced the republic’s authorities to conclude that they had underestimated the threat posed by extremist religious groups. They revised laws and policies and thus interfered in life and activities of individuals and communities they deemed extremist or nontraditional. This is one of the reasons for Western criticism of Kazakhstan. There is another, more philosophical reason behind this criticism; the West advocates full religious freedom and state neutrality toward religion, and accepts intervention against groups engaged in or inciting violence. However, the Kazakhstani authorities have embraced a fundamentally different approach: the state should regulate religious affairs to revive traditional religious communities and to ensure social stability and harmony.21 There are several other factors and trends that forced that state to tighten its policy in the sphere of religion and consolidate the republic’s secular foundations. According to the Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2020, the following trends should be amended: — Today, more frequently than before, people refuse to fulfill their constitutional and civil du- ties; they demonstrate their disrespect of laws, the republic’s state symbols and national cultural traditions, as well as commonly accepted ethical and behavioral norms; — The demand not to wear religious symbols at schools and universities is violated, non-atten- dance of educational establishments on Saturdays has become more frequent, while there are many excessively religious parents (legal representatives) who refuse to let their children study certain subjects of school curricular; 18 See: A. Ermegiiaev, K. Kazkenov, “Religioznye protsessy v Kazakhstane: neobkhodimost analiticheskogo, diskussionnogo polia, dialoga vzaimodeystviy,” in: Sbornik materialov mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Almaty, 2002, pp. 54-62. 19 S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, J. Tucker, Religion and the Secular State in Kazakhstan, Institute for Security and Develop- ment Policy, April 2018, available at [https://isdp.eu/publication/religion-secular-state-kazakhstan/], 22 April, 2020. 20 Ibidem. 21 See: Ibidem. 105 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 — Sometimes parents refuse to vaccinate their children for religious reasons; — Men and women conclude religious marriages without registering at the corresponding state structures more and more frequently. Archaic family values that contradict the current status of women in the family, their social activity, employment and gender equality are actively promoted; — Followers of destructive religious teachings, which have nothing in common with the values of Kazakhstan and negatively affect health, psychic and material wellbeing of citizens, are highly confrontational; — Cultivated by these population groups, fundamentalism and radicalism present a real threat to state and society; they undermine the unity of the Kazakhstani people; traditional spiri- tual culture and traditional identity and violate the rights of members of other confessions; — Sometimes members of radical religious teachings deliberately stir up conflicts with the of- ficial clergy; — Believers may pile heaps of accusations and reproaches on those who do not share their re- ligious ideas. The Concept has identified three main priorities of the development of state religious policies, one of them being the consolidation of the state’s secular principles. The document contains a detailed explanation of the state’s secular principles, which aims at supporting the consolidation of secular foundations of the state and the functioning of its institutions. C o n c l u s i o n The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan declares in Part 1, Art 1 that “The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself as a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are a person, his life, rights, and freedoms.” According to this thesis, there is no official religion in Ka- zakhstan, and none of the religious teachings are accepted as obligatory or preferable. The state demonstrates no preferences to any confession or denomination. All religions and confessions are equal before the law, yet the Law on Religion of 11 October, 2011 “recognizes the historical role of the Hanafi school of Islam and Orthodox Christianity in development of culture and spiritual life of people.” Kazakhstan’s secularity model gravitates towards the French and Turkish model in which religion is completely separated from politics with certain socio-political, historical and cultural spe- cifics expected to preserve inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. Copyright of Central Asia & the Caucasus (14046091) is the property of CA & CC Press AB and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holders express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic and Political Studies Volume 14, Issue 2, 2019, https://thesocialsciences.com © Common Ground Research Networks, Farhan Mujahid Chak, All Rights Reserved. Permissions: cgscholar.com/cg_support ISSN: 2327-0071 (Print), ISSN: 2327-2481 (Online) https://doi.org/10.18848/2327-0071/CGP/v14i02/35-50 (Article) Is There a Symbiotic Relationship Between Secularism and Fundamentalism? Farhan Mujahid Chak,1 Qatar University, Qatar Abstract: This article explores the relationship between secularization and fundamentalism in ‘Western’ liberal society and the manner it impacts socio-political “exclusionary” narratives, which is a theme both timely and important. Now, more than ever, a scholarly analysis of the socio-political environment that is aggravating such violence is important. To accomplish that, this study investigates how “secular values,” at Casanova’s civil society ideal-typical level, transformed the meaning of “society.” That contributed to a social malaise characterized by deteriorating social bonds, loss of meaning and moral ambivalence, described by Durkheim as “anomie.” However, there are variant intensities of the anomic condition. And, a high condition of ‘anomie,’ with moral ambivalence across social spheres and low-levels of social cohesion ripens the conditions for virulent “fundamentalisms” to emerge. Keywords: Secularism, Fundamentalism, Anomie, Society, Social Cohesion, Exclusion Introduction he European enlightenment, with its empowering, self-confident intellectualism, was erasing normative boundaries, rupturing the hitherto understood ethical order and inaugurating a new modern epitome. Actually, the “enlightenment,” in any reading of Western society, remains a turning point from which its “modernity” was born. Today, hundreds of years later, the corollaries of that transformation, through expansive secularities, continue to impact the world in noteworthy ways. Of course, as Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Middell (2015) attest, this is not to presume that modernity impacted all societies’ in a similar manner. Decolonized societies acquire a postcolonial distinctiveness that is inherently contradictory due to contesting social interfaces and dissimilar identities—whether ethnic, tribal, national, global, gender, or class-based. Indeed, the impact of modernity varies according to context, manifesting in novel and conflictual ways, producing what Bhabha describes as hybridity (2004). Nevertheless, for Europe, it unabashedly describes emancipation from age-old bigotries, superstitions, and myth. As Armstrong (2000) explains, replacing mythos with logos. By elevating human agency, mandating freedom, celebrating diversity, underscoring equality, and championing science, the European enlightenment facilitated extraordinary achievements. Yet, notwithstanding its ingenuity, it was inexorably problematic. Modernity has been described by Weber (1991) as “disenchantment,” Camus (1992) labels it “absurd,” and Taylor (2007) refers to it as “empty.” Of course, the European “Enlightenment” was not a singular event that replaced apparently well-ordered, religious, meaningful societies with “incoherent,” atheistic, meaningless amalgams. As Carey and Trakulhun show, there have always been contests around modernity (2009). Casanova, too, critiques Taylor for, purportedly, essentializing the pre-enlightenment era and ignoring the multiplicity of modernities, social push- and-pulls and trajectories therein (1994). He asserts that global religious decline is normatively flawed, empirically false and, instead, delineates three variant “secularisms” operating on the state, political and civil-society levels (2011). Still, that does not minimize modernity’s far- reaching and troubling impact on social and political life. Moreover, Casanova’s criticism of Taylor is not applicable in this study for three reasons: first, the manifestation of divergent secularities in non-European societies is irrelevant in this study that explores the relationship between secularism and fundamentalism in the West; second, this study focuses on how a secular 1 Corresponding Author: Farhan Mujahid Chak, Gulf Studies Program, College of Arts and Science, Qatar University, P.O. Box 2713, Doha, Qatar. email: [email protected] T https://cgscholar.com/cg_support mailto:[email protected] THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY STUDIES ethos impacts social consciousness and political life, acknowledging variant secularities; third, the existence of variety in a social setting does not negate the presence of broad social consensus. There were salient, discernable features of social consensus that were challenged, and/or ultimately derided, as a consequence of Europe’s newfound intellectualism. Indubitably, this is what Weber, Taylor, and Camus, and a host of others, refers to when lamenting modernity. What requires more thoughtful analysis is the social/political consequences of secularism’s moral privatization and the emergence of scornful new cultural trajectories such as notions of white supremacy, the alt-right, and “rightest Americanism” (Chak 2018). Is there a plausible, symbiotic link between secularism and fundamentalism? If so, how is it linked with the psychology of sociopolitical exclusion? Specifically, this article explores the relationship between secularization and fundamentalism in Western liberal society and the manner in which it impacts sociopolitical exclusionary narratives, which is a theme both timely and important. Especially now, after the terrorist Islamophobic rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, in which over fifty-seven people were killed in two mosques. Now, more than ever, a scholarly analysis of the sociopolitical environment that is aggravating such violence is important. To accomplish that, this study investigates how secular values, at Casanova’s civil society ideal-typical level, transformed the meaning of society. That transformation of society amounted to a social malaise characterized by deteriorating social bonds, loss of meaning and moral ambivalence, described by Durkheim as anomie. However, there are variant intensities of the anomic condition; a high condition of anomie, with moral ambivalence across social spheres and low-levels of social cohesion (Williams 2009), ripens the conditions for virulent fundamentalisms to emerge. Here, social exclusion emerges, particularly if shared meaning remains unplaced, or insufficiently so. Moreover, exclusion challenges people’s fundamental need to belong to a social unit. “It causes a number of dysfunctional reactions including lowered self-esteem, greater anger, inability to reason well, depression and anxiety, and self-defeating perceptions and behaviors. Being excluded also evokes antisocial and aggressive responses, most likely because of the threat it poses to people’s need for control,” (Abrams, Hutchison, and Christian 2007, 29). Hence, in tackling this thorny issue, this study employs a four-fold dissection: First, it describes how society transformed as a result of Europe’s modernity. Secondly, it describes secularism—as a coherent value-system, by relying on Holyoake’s conceptualization since he was the original intellectual to present it as a theory. Admittedly, since then, numerous scholars have grappled with the concept of secularism such as Berger, Armstrong, Juergensmeyer, Casanova, Cox, Asad, and Taylor. Still, broadly speaking, the contours of secularism—its value system, remain essentially explicit and Holyoake’s original, lucid articulation is widely-shared. Third, it assesses the impact of secular values on society per se, highlighting the emergence of new forms of sociopolitical consciousness and exclusion. Fourthly, this study describes key features of fundamentalism, and thereby establishes a plausible link between it and secular values. That includes hindrances to replace lost meaning, increasing social alienation, uncertainty and moral ambivalence—all of which is exacerbated by removing normative benchmarks from the public, civil sphere. In fact, it did much more than that—it allowed for the compartmentalization of values without recourse to coherence across social spheres. All this led to a unique “emptying” of society that would cultivate high anomie. Consequently, in response to those disaffecting conditions, the intensity of anomie and dearth of social bonding capital, fundamentalism emerges and facilitates sociopolitical exclusion. Sociopolitical exclusion is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses a multiplicity of interrelated processes and problems. “It has far-reaching consequences for individuals and groups and has been linked to a host of negative outcomes, including poor health and well-being, academic underachievement, antisocial and criminal behavior” (Abrams, Hutchison, and Christian 2007, 30). Modernity, arguably, has spawned extremist movements globally. In other religions, and throughout the world, whether the Middle East, Central Africa, or South Asia, there may be a 36 CHAK: IS THERE A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM? link between fundamentalism and post-enlightenment expansive secularities, propagated by colonialism and spell-bound elites (Chak 2017). All too often the problems of Islamist fundamentalism, for instance, are directly related to causes in the so-called Islamic world, when the current outgrowth of fundamentalism should be placed in a broader global cultural context (MacDonald 2014). Moreover, this study, at least indirectly, engages theoretically in the debate on postmodernism, but avoids the many debates/trajectories that emerge in that context. For purposes of brevity, both issues are outside the scope of this article, which focuses on plausible links between secularization and fundamentalism in the West and explores how anomie facilitates sociopolitical exclusion. Lastly, as Juergensmeyer writes, “It may be one of the ironies of history, graphically displayed in incidents of terrorism, that the answers to the questions of why the contemporary world still needs religion and of why it has suffered such public acts of violence, are surprisingly the same” (Juergensmeyer 2003, 15). Transforming Society Society is a “dialectic phenomenon in that it is a human product…that yet continuously acts back upon its producer” (Berger 1964, 3). That is, the empirical reality of society is a by-product of human agency—both influencing and being influenced by its own social constructivism. Looking closer, the outcome of this dialectical process, between individual agency and society, materializes through a ternary process: externalization, objectivation, and internalization. It is through externalization that society is a human product. It is through objectivation that society becomes a reality sui generis. It is through internalization that man is a product of society (Berger 1964). In other words, humans—with our very ideas, beliefs, and conduct, participate in the social construction of reality—in creating society. Plainly speaking, this occurs as such: (1) we externalize our psyche; (2) that leads to the twin processes of impacting our social environment, which, in turn, rebounds back on our psyche—becoming objectivation; lastly, (3) the sum total of what we take from that experience, is internalization. Here, what is important to appreciate, is the changeable, shifting processes involved in the formation of society. Further explaining this concept, Durkheim grieves the impact that industrialization had on society leading to a loss of discipline, diminished attachment, and reckless autonomy (1893). He speculates that “…every society is a moral society. In certain respects, this characteristic is even more pronounced in organized societies. Because the individual is not sufficient unto himself. It is from society that he receives everything necessary to him” (Durkheim 1973, 112). This conceptualization of society is, as Bellah explains, a “shared composition of ideas, beliefs, and sentiments of all sorts, which realize themselves through individuals. Foremost of this idea, is the moral ideal, which is its principal raison d’etre” (Bellah “Introduction,” in Durkheim 1973, ix). Yet, herein lay the illogicality, since that description of society is no longer applicable. Society, its very essence, has changed. Now, it has become “a group of disparate individuals pursuing private projects, protected by Law. Collective beliefs and practices are largely a phenomenon of the past; they are inappropriate for today and would present obstacles to an individual’s happiness” (Durkheim [1912] 1995, vii). This radical transformation of what “society” means— from the collective to individualist, led to weakening social bonds, a loss of norms, disregard for authority, relativism, moral ambivalence, and the eradication of that moral “ideal”—all of which causes human sorrows to multiply. Arguably, society malformed by the gradual pervasiveness of a secular ethos led to eroding collective beliefs and practices. Armstrong reasons this began to take shape as early as Spinoza (2000). Yet, it was not until Englishman George Jacob Holyoake penned his ground-breaking treatise, The Principles of Secularism that secular values, plausibly accelerating this, were explicitly described: 1) materialistic this-worldly orientation, 2) science, 3) liberalism—freedom, equality, and individualism, and 4) service (1871). Of course, since his treatise, several intellectuals have contributed to the secularism debate. Casanova’s (1994) multiple secularities, Asad’s (2003) formation of secularisms, Taylor’s The Secular Age (Taylor, 2007), Cox’s The 37 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY STUDIES Secular City (2011), or Terry Eagleton’s post-Nietzschean analysis of the “Death of God” (2014), all describe the movement of religion out of the public sphere, even while studying secularism varyingly. Yet, the diverse ways that secularism is investigated does not take away from its salient features. Consequently, Holyoake’s value-orientated framework, while not conclusive, is sufficient enough to highlight its troubling link with social alienation, loss of meaning, and moral ambivalence. Moreover, the totality of what secularism amounts to—those clear, salient values—are generally agreed by Holyoake (2015), Armstrong (2000), Casanova (1994), Cox (2011), Asad (2003), and Taylor (2007). Therefore, it is those secular values that in this article we expound to: a) Explore the meaning and implication of secular values, including correlational values; b) Analyze the consequences of secular values on social consciousness; c) Reveal a plausible co- relation between secular values and emerging fundamentalist trajectories; and d) Explain the materialization of socio-political exclusion. The following sections share insights on how the ubiquity of secular values upset the traditional definition of “society,” created the conditions necessary for anomie to emerge and, thereafter, for violent fundamentalism to thrive. A Secular Ethos The cornerstone of a secular ethos is a “this-worldly orientation” and “materialism,” both of which complicate the relationship between the empirical world and speculative afterlife (Holyoake, 2015, 5). As a result, a wide-range of philosophical transformations affect social consciousness, i.e., 1) focusing on now; 2) lack of accountability; 3) diminished civic responsibility; and 4) disappearance of immanence. Specifically, Holyoake says secularism “replaces theology, which mainly regards life as a sinful necessity, as a scene of tribulation through which we pass to a better world. Secularism rejoices in this life...” (Holyoake 2015, 5). That is, the wellbeing of humans is sought in the empirical world, without reference to religion, rebirth, or an afterlife. This radical, new thinking contested a worldview connecting our life to meaning beyond our immediate present. Consequently, ethical structuring and norms, or even abstract values, were disrupted by dismissing the notion of an afterlife, intricately linked to personal and public duties. So, if there was no moral consequence for our actions, notwithstanding a legal one, then a new explanation was needed to root civic responsibility and encourage social solidarity. This was laxly tackled by liberal intellectuals who rationalized ethics by utility, incorporating the Buddhist concept of “karma” and reciprocity, with questionable success (Lloyd 1980). Not only is the concept of the afterlife or the future changed, but the past is potentially affected by this-worldly emphasis. The abrupt disavowal of long-standing normative values, replaced with loose meaning or nothing at all, disregards a reasoning that connects the past, present, and future together. Obviously, this is not meant to presuppose complete social unanimity, but as Armstrong writes citing Da Costa, “There was as yet no secular alternative to the religious life in Europe. You could cross over to another faith, but unless you were a very exceptional human being, you could not live outside a religious community” (Armstrong 2000, 30). In other words, the sociocultural impact of this-worldliness is a disavowal of the historical processes involved in the emergence of communities per se, which complicates belonging. The complication of the basic human need of belonging leads to an upsurge in feelings of exclusion, and, in a series of experiments, psychologists found that exclusion often led to more aggressive/violent behavior towards others, decreased the likelihood of cooperation, and heightened self-defeating attitudes (Leary, Twenge, and Quinlivan, 2006). Admittedly, Holyoake acknowledges past wisdom, yet insists upon reexamining its usefulness. Demonstrably, that belief is typified in the popular maxim “living in the now,” as if the present is all that matters. This is precisely what secularism inadvertently demands, being almost anti-historical. This is especially true, when it ignores pressures/ramifications from within a cultural ecosystem, by demanding new values to surface and old ones be discarded. Ignoring 38 CHAK: IS THERE A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM? the past, or future, will certainly not resolve social contestation, or illumine the historic and cultural processes involved in the standardization of normative values—often a consequence of competing cultural trajectories. This dissonance is just the small, noticeable part of the philosophical upshots of a life premised solely on the “now.” In fact, a healthy, functioning social system requires “bonding social capital” (Lin 2002, 8–13) that takes years for maturation. By emphasizing the “now” and elevating human autonomy, there is a significant risk of “bonding social capital” being brusquely swept away and never being able to take root. Relatedly, by accentuating “now,” immanence is abandoned, leading to desacralization, which in turn removed ethics across social spheres compartmentalizing life (Chak 2017). This intensifies normlessness and deregulation, leading to the great inward turn of modern society (Taylor 1999). Secondly, secularism advocates for science, which means a firm conviction in rationalism, reason, observation, and experiment (Fawcett 2015). This value espouses a belief in natural causation and, consequently, emphasizes the generalization and applicability of the “methodological pattern of Newton’s physics for the discovery of truth” (Moten 2006, 2). Certainly, there are considerable advantages associated with this intellectual transformation. In European society, there was dissonance between religion and science, and the only way to escape from the domineering nature of religious institutions was to curtail its authority. Consequently, proof, evidence, not mere opinion, was the hallmark for justification of this belief. Though, the effects of this shift are much more than this—it was a reimagining of the entire social world— axiology, ontology, and epistemology. Unfortunately, science too was susceptible to human fallibility, or deliberate misleading, especially in the absence of ethical moorings. More troubling was the manner in which science could lead to dehumanization as Lukacs’ “phantom objectivity”—a perception of humans as nothing more than machines to exchange value for their labor—explains (2017). By doing so, it was disassociating people from the fruit of their labor, their emotional realities, and bonding necessities, further aggravating sociopolitical exclusion and ostracism (Williams 2009). Thirdly, secularism advocates for liberalism—namely, equality, freedom, and individualism. Clarifying, Holyoake says, “Secularism accepts no authority but that of Nature, adopts no methods but those of science and philosophy, and respects in practice no rule but that of the conscience, illustrated by the common sense of mankind” (Holyoake 2015, 7). Vagueness aside, this type of freedom is often cited as modernity’s most significant achievement. Human agency is empowered to form its own conclusions on values, beliefs, and principles, without concern for others. Taylor writes “We live in a world where people have a right to choose for themselves their own pattern of life, to decide in conscience what convictions to espouse, to determine the shape of their lives in a whole host of ways that their ancestors could not control” (Taylor 1998, 2). Actually, that is our freedom, but it comes with a price; uncertainty, moral ambivalence, relativity, and loss of deference. All this contributes to a breakdown of society. This, Taylor writes, is the “dark side of individualism…centering on the self, which both flattened and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concerned with others or society, (Taylor 1998, 3). Lastly, Holyoake (2015) highlights service in his conceptualization of secularism. Perplexingly, it is constantly mentioned throughout his writings, thereby adding to the confusion of how to develop a shared ethical outlook on life when championing relativity and undermining bonding social capital. He described assisting the less fortunate as noble, which clearly outdid those resisting secularism’s seeming anti-theism. How could theists discredit secularists when they were doing God’s work? Possibly, by emphasizing service, Holyoake may have intended to encourage social bonding, assuming he understood the consequences of ignoring it. He writes: It is only by serving those beyond ourselves that we can secure for ourselves protection, sympathy, and honor. The neglect of home for public affairs endangers philanthropy, by making it the enemy of the household. To suffer, on the other hand, the interests of the family to degenerate into mere selfism, is a dangerous example to rulers. (Holyoake 2015, 8) 39 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY STUDIES Clearly, his endorsement of service is not thoughtless and, likely, is an attempt to mitigate social disruption. Still, that dilemma endures: how to protect human autonomy, individualism, and self- determining freedom, while intensifying means of social solidarity, encourage bonding capital and, thereby, protect a shared meaning of society? Homo Duplex, Anomie, and Anomie Écrasant At this point, three inter-related concepts need elaboration: homo duplex, anomie, and anomie écrasant. First, Durkheim’s concept of “homo duplex” describes a symbiotic relationship between human beings and society in which society plays a regulatory function on the moral ethos of the individual. In a way, Durkheim conceptualizes homo duplex “as an ontological device” that is “defining humanity as having the unique capacity to create and participate in the social. This collective process permits humans to transcend the profane…into social solidarity: a realm generating morality and, ultimately, the sacred” (Ross 2016, 18). However, with society no longer regulating the individual, social life is adversely affected. To further explain, Elwell writes The modern individual is insufficiently integrated into society. Because of these weakening bonds, social regulation breaks down and the controlling influence of society…[on] the individual is rendered ineffective; individuals are left to their own devices. Because of the dual nature [homo duplex] of human beings this breakdown of moral guidance results in rising rates of deviance, social unrest, unhappiness, and stress. (Elwell 2017) Secondly, for Durkheim, “anomie” is understood by exploring two inter-related phenomena: a) The division of labor and consequent social alienation, resulting from diminished solidarity in society; b) A derangement occurring when society provides no ethical guidance, which thereby disrupts homo duplex (Durkheim [1893] 2014). As a result, social alienation increases, leading to, for instance, surges of suicide (Durkheim [1897] 2007). Admittedly, others inflate the definition of anomie in capacious ways. LaCapra describes it as the absence of conceptually limiting norms (1972), Nesbit explains it as a conflict between competing norms (1970), and Merton understands it as a state in society (1993). Aside from this, there is a broad consensus that anomie emerges by weakening social solidarity and intensifies during transitional periods, when new modes of cohesion are slow to surface as a consequence of rapid social change. In other words, as Elwell states, an “increasing division of labor weakens the sense of identification with the wider community and thereby weakens constraints on human behavior. These conditions lead to social “disintegration”—high rates of egocentric behavior, norm violation, and consequent de- legitimation and distrust of authority” (Elwell 2017). Succinctly, Teymoori, Bastian, and Jetten define anomie as “the breakdown of social integration and social regulation” (2016, 4), and recognize varying levels of intensity in the anomic condition. That intensity depends on two factors: a) the level of breakdown in leadership and legitimacy, which leads to disintegration of social bonding; and b) and, the level of breakdown of society’s social fabric, which leads to a moral crisis. A high anomic state exhibits both leadership breakdown and moral crisis, in addition to low levels of four basic human needs, based on Williams’ taxonomy: 1) a need for a meaningful life; 2) a need for self-esteem; 3) a need to belong and connect to others; and 4) a need to have a sense of personal and collective control and security (2009). Expanding on the concept of anomie, this study describes the most severe manifestation of the anomic condition as anomie écrasant (Chak 2018). That occurs, in addition to Teymoori, Bastian and Jetten’s classification, with three additional challenges: 1) “Emptying” comprehensive meaning from the public sphere which leads to moral ambivalence and culture wars; 2) A lack of effective replacement of meaning or reintroduced social bonding mechanisms; 40 CHAK: IS THERE A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM? 3) High levels of social exclusion leading to greater anger and propensities for violence (Abrams, Hutchinson, Christian 2007). To further explain, emptying describes the absence of ethical moorings and coherence across social spheres. This is, inadvertently, highlighted by Taylor who writes, “as we function within various spheres of activity—economic, political, cultural, educational, professional, recreational—the norms and principles we follow, the deliberations we engage in, generally don’t refer us to God or to any religious beliefs; the considerations we act on are internal to the “rationality” of each sphere” (Taylor 2009). Adding to that, Taylor goes on to explain that rationality in politics, for instance, would mean the greatest benefit for the greatest number, instead of self-interest. Yet, how does he conclude that? What deserves closer scrutiny is how he comes to demonstrate what the rationality of politics is—or, any social sphere for that matter. Actually, anomie écrasant emerges from social conditions in which there is no given rationality, ethical mooring, and no definitive or comprehensive meaning in or across social spheres. More … Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 240 Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry (TOJQI) Volume 9, Issue 3, July 2018: 240-261 / Cilt 9, Sayı 3, Temmuz 2018: 240-261 DOI: 10.17569/tojqi.322997 Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism1 Muzaffer Çatak2 Abstract Social studies is an important course in middle schools. Social studies, however, varies in scope as social studies benefit from social sciences’ knowledge production. Social studies include social sciences’ topics as well as such topics as social responsibility, socialization, social relations. These topics are directly or indirectly linked to the concept of secularism. The concept of secularism influences and shapes the political, social, military and even economic structures of a given country. The purpose of this study, by way of metaphor, is to examine the concept of secularism that students learn in social studies courses. In this study, the descriptive survey model was used and the content analysis was used in determining the categories and themes. The study group consists of students from two middle schools located in Siirt province center. The prepared forms were applied to 155 students. In determining the sample, convenience sampling was utilized from non-random sampling methods. As a result, when metaphors, categories and category ratios related to secularism are examined and they were found as 35\% socially and culturally, 25\% politically and administratively, 16\% religiously, 13\% legally and 11\% in the sense of belonging. Considering the ratios, it is seen that they are considered in terms of social and cultural the most and in terms of legal and sense of belonging the least. The categorization of the secularism concept by the students at a high rate socially and culturally and politically and administratively is assessed as positive by considering the definition and structure of the concept. Keywords: Secularism; social studies, metaphor, qualitative research. 1 This study is a developed and modified form of the report presented at the International Symposium on Social Studies Education (USBES VI) held during 4-6 May, 2017 at Anadolu University. 2 Asst.Prof.Dr., Siirt University, Faculty of Education, Department of Social Studies and Turkish Education, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7059-7979 Received: 21.06.2017 Accepted: 31.07.2018 Muzaffer Çatak 241 Ortaokul Öğrencilerinin Laiklik Kavramına İlişkin Metaforik Algılari Öz Sosyal bilgiler mihver bir ders olduğundan ortaokullarda önemli bir yeri vardır. Bununla beraber sosyal bilgiler, sosyal bilimlerin bilgi üretiminden faydalandığı için kapsam bakımından çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Sosyal bilgiler, sosyal bilimlerin yanında öğrencilerin toplumsal sorumluluk, sosyalleşme, toplumsal ilişkiler gibi unsurlara da önem vermektedir. Bu unsurlar, laiklik kavramı ile doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak birbirleriyle bağlantılıdır. Bu kavram bir ülkenin baştan ayağa siyasi, sosyal, askeri hatta ekonomik olarak neredeyse bütün yapılarını etkilemekte ve şekillendirmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı; öğrencilerin, sosyal bilgiler dersi ile edindikleri laiklik kavramını, metafor yolu ile nasıl algıladıklarını ortaya koyarak incelemektir. Bu araştırmada tarama modeli kullanılmış olup, kategorilerin ve temaların belirlenmesinde ise içerik analizinden faydalanılmıştır. Çalışma grubunu, Siirt il merkezinde yer alan iki ortaokulun öğrencileri oluşturmaktadır. Hazırlanmış olan form 155 öğrenciye uygulanmıştır. Örneklemin belirlenmesinde seçkisiz olmayan örnekleme yöntemlerinden uygun örnekleme kullanılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, laiklikle ilgili oluşturulan metaforlar, kategoriler ve kategorilerin oranları incelendiğinde; sosyal ve kültürel açıdan \%35, siyasi ve idari açıdan \%25, dini açıdan \%16, hukuki açıdan \%13, aitlik açısından \%11 olduğu görülmektedir. Oranlara bakıldığında en fazla sosyal- kültürel ile siyasi - idari açıdan ele alındığı, en az ise hukuki ve aitlik açısından ele alındığı görülmektedir. Öğrencilerin laiklik kavramını sosyal- kültürel ve siyasi- idari açıdan yüksek oranda kategorileştirmesi, kavramın tanımı ve yapısı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda olumlu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Anahtar Sözcükler: Laiklik, sosyal bilgiler; metafor; nitel araştırma. Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 242 Introduction The root of the word secularism is the adjective ‘laikos’ in the ancient Greek and the word ‘laos’ meaning ‘people, crowd, mass’. Hence ‘laikos means ‘of public, crowd, mass. With the spread of Christianity, the people involved in the church were called ‘derici’ and the believing community was called ‘iaici’ in Latin. This word entered Turkish during the Constitutionalism Period first and was translated to Turkish as ‘ladini’. The word ladini means non-religious (Dinçkol, 2002). In another resource, secularism: ‘laikos’ originates from Latin ‘laicus and means dealing with world affairs as separate from religious affairs and religious authority. In the legal sense, secularism is the separation of the state and religious affairs and the impartiality of the state for attaining liberty of conscience. In other words, secularism is the situation where the state does not stand between God and his servants and the religion does not interfere with the state affairs (Saray, 2006). When secularism is conceived as a triangle, preventing the religious guardianship of state, institutions constitute one side of the triangle. The second side of the triangle, when pointing to the right or the freedom to believe and not to believe in the individual and social belief, while the last edge of the triangle expresses the equality of different religions and non-religious beliefs by the law (Albayrak, 2015). Democracy in secularism comprises of fundamental attributes including tolerance, equity, and liberty (Özturanlı, 1999). In this context, it is clear that secularism is a crucial factor for the progress of the country securely towards modern civilization (Akgün, 2006). Tolerance is needed for the progress and development of a country and this can only be attained with the principle of secularism. Tolerance, which exists in the nature of Turkish people and Islam’s core, directly harmonizes with the sentiment of respecting the thoughts and believes of others. Considering the history of Turkish states, the people of foreign origin living there maintained their own language, religion and culture in content (Saray, 2006). In France, with the law of 1905, religion and the state separated from each other by certain lines. The state did not finance religious services and abandoned these services to religious societies. In the French Constitution, the secular phrase, which states the nature of the state, has been included since 1946 (Gişi, 2015). Starting from the 1920s in Turkey, a secular Muzaffer Çatak 243 republic project has been implemented based on the French model. Despite secularism in Turkey took France as an example, it does not simulate secularism practiced in France substantially. It is advocated that France separated the state and religion fundamentally and Turkey keeps religion under control (Kahraman, 2008). Turkey, positive and/or negative additions, secularism has become a proper state system to its cultural code (Dağcı & Dal, 2014). Considering the secularism concept in the constitutions formed after the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, secularism was not discussed in 1921 Constitution and the provision that the state religion was Islam was added with the amendments made on October 29, 1923. Though there were provisions against secularism in 1924 Constitution, these provisions were removed with the amendment made in 1928. In this Constitution, the secularism term was used once and the way for the secularization of the new Turkish State was paved. The secularism term took place 7 times in 1961 Constitution. The term was used as a component of national, democratic and social state in general. Hence, it was a powerful constitution as far as the secularism was concerned. In 1982 Constitution, secularism was emphasized more. Secularism was used 10 times including the initial and provisional provisions and it was expressed as a part of democratic republic in general (Ertan, 2007). Secularism is a psycho-social phenomenon (Paker & Cesur, 2013), characterized by an ideological polarization in one direction and the examination of the existing relations between groups. The concept of secularism has become as a political material by political parties and different extremities rather than human rights, freedom of religion and belief in the agenda of Turkey. As a consequence of anti-Islam, Islamophobia and psychological pressure and ethnic nationalism which in developed democratic countries such as USA and Europe, the perception and attitudes of people in different circles towards secularism have become controversial today. The concept of secularism remains to be current as a political issue in Turkey frequently in discussions. Even in the developed democratic countries, the perceptions and attitudes of people about the secularism concept turned out to be discussed today in the political or social relationships. Whereas the concept of secularism is regarded to be virtually equal to atheism by some sections of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, it is the foundation of the values for some sections and it is in the central position of politics for some others. The resolution of these extremists will be possible by the gaining and shaping of this knowledge correctly by the students in their minds. Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 244 Social studies teaching, which is the lead of this core class, is a duty with the highest professional and conscious responsibility in terms of teaching the values and crucial concepts for the country. Social studies teachers can ensure various interpretations of the concept of secularism by the students as well as learning of the concept objectively. In this context, it is clear how important the social studies teachers are for becoming a good citizen even though only a concept. Social Studies Lesson and The Concept Secularism Considering the social studies program, it is seen that 160 concepts were used in the 4th grade through the 7th grade. Considering the concept of secularity on the class basis, there is no secularity concept in the 4th-grade social studies class. Social studies are taught at the beginners level in the 5th and 6yh grades. In the 7th-grade social studies class, on the other hand, this concept is taught by social studies teachers at the development level (Bilgili, 2016). The concept of secularism is taught at the reinforcement level by social studies teachers in the textbook of Turkey Republic revolution history and Kemalism. In the academic year 2017-2018, the fifth-grade textbook used in the social studies class, the sixth and seventh-grade social studies and the eighth- grade Turkish Republic reforming history and Kemalism teacher guidebooks have been examined in terms of secularism. When the fifth-grade social studies textbook (Evirgen et al. 2017) is evaluated in this respect, secularism must be given at the beginners level to the fifth-grade students, but it is seen that the concept of secularism is not included in the book of this course. The removal of the fifth- grade teachers guidebook reduces the chances of students facing the concept of secularism. When the concept of secularism is examined in the sixth grade social studies teacher manual (Karakaya et al. 2017), the learning field: power, management and society; it is seen that this concept has passed in three different places within the topic of The Adventure of Democracy which is the sixth unit in the unit. The subjects taught here to take part in the constitution of secularism and the abolition of the caliphate, the state structure of the Republic of Turkey and the Unification of Education Law. As it is known, in the 5th and 6th grade, the concept of secularism is given to students at the beginners level. Without Muzaffer Çatak 245 introducing the concept of secularism directly in the fifth-grade textbook, entering the above- mentioned topics in the sixth-grade textbook will definitely make the cognitive perception of the students difficult. In the sixth grade book, the concept of secularism is given as a gap filling. This concept is given in accordance with the beginners level. It is seen that the concept of secularism is repeated nine times in the seventh-grade social studies teacher guidebook (Unal et al). When they are assessed in general, the field of learning is: science, technology, and society; the unit is science in time and it is seen that the concept of secularism passed twice in this unit. The concept of secularism is repeated 6 times in the living democracy unit within learning area the power, government and society. In the workbook, it is seen that the concept of secularism is between the test items, but the test cannot be related to secularism and this workbook seems to be very weak in terms of the development level of secularism. In the eighth- grade Turkish Republic reforming history and Kemalism teacher guidebooks (Ataş, 2017), (Başol et al., 2017), the concept of secularism was used at the level of reinforcement. When the social studies curriculum (4-7) published by the Ministry of National Education (2017a) is examined in terms of standards, it is determined that the concept of secularism is not directly given. Again in the Turkish Republic reforming history and Kemalism Teaching Program published by the Ministry of National Education (2017b), it has been determined that expressions aiming to standards, the concept of secularism are not included in this program. If the purpose and purpose of this study are to be mentioned, In Siirt province, it is known that there are around 60 religious schools operating outside the Tillo Medressehs (theological school attached to a mosque) and there are sects (Keser & Seyidoğlu, 2017). Since the people living in this city have a generally conservative way of life, it would be interesting to see how students as part of the community perceive the concept of secularism. In addition, the place of secularism in curriculum and textbooks and the investigation of the teaching level of secularism constitute another component of this study. The purpose of this study is; it is to examine how students perceive the concept of secularism, which they acquired through social studies lessons, through metaphor. At the same time, In Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 246 the curriculum and social studies books, the concept of secularism; level, standards, spiral structure, and the subject of this concept will be examined in relation to each other. Another aim is to try to minimize the shortcomings that are obtained as a result of this the examined. In addition to this, the other questions that need to be answered are: 1- What is the relationship between the definition and structure of secularism and the metaphors that students create? 2- Among the metaphors created by students, what is the proportion of students who place extreme points on the concept of secularism? 3- Metaphors obtained from students, in which category and at what rate was collected; these collected categories will be evaluated according to the definition of the concept of secularism. Methodology Research Pattern In this study, a descriptive survey model was used. Descriptive survey research is generally called researches on larger subjects than on other studies, in which characteristics such as a subject or interest, ability, attitude are identified (Büyüköztürk, Çakmak et al., 2014). According to Karakaya (2014), it is a research used in social sciences which are used widely on large groups, in which individuals opinions about facts and events, their attitudes, facts, and events are described. Again, according to Robson (2017), it is necessary to collect data in a standard form with a relatively large number of individuals in descriptive survey research and to select individuals who represent the universe. In this study, metaphor applied to students as stated in the definition of descriptive survey research; the opinions, interests, and attitudes of the students in an indirect way towards the concept of secularism were searched. Study Group The study group consisted of the secondary school students enrolled in two secondary schools located in Siirt city center in the middle of the second semester of the academic year of 2016-2017. The prepared forms was applied to 155 students. In determining the sample, Muzaffer Çatak 247 convenience sampling was utilized from non-random sampling methods (Büyüköztürk et al. 2014). The data on the study group are shown in Table 1. Table 1 The Frequency and Proportional Distribution of the Students in the Study Group Based on the Grades they are Enrolled and their Gender Section Gender Total Male Female Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) 5th Grade 23 57,5 17 42,5 40 26 6th Grade 26 65 14 35 40 26 7th Grade 23 62 14 38 37 24 8th Grade 16 42 22 58 38 24 Total 88 57 67 43 155 100 Out of 155 students making up the study group, 88 (57\%) were males and 67 (43\%) were females and their distributions within the classes themselves were respectively; 5th grade (26\%), 6th grade (26\%), 7th grade (24\%) and 8th grade (24\%). Excluding the 8th grade, the number of girls was lower than that of the boys. Table 2 From The Study Group, The Frequency and The Proportional Distributions of The Students Who Answer The Forms and didn’t Answer According to The Classes They are Situated Section Total Responding Nonresponding Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) 5th Grade 17 42,5 23 47,5 40 26,5 6th Grade 24 60 16 40 40 26,5 7th Grade 20 54 17 46 37 23 8th Grade 19 50 19 50 38 24 Total 80 52 75 48 155 100 Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 248 Out of 155 students who made up the study group, 80 (52\%) answered the secularism forms and 75 (48\%) did not answer the forms. Considering the students who answered the forms and who did not answer it based on their class, the 6th grade was the class with highest responding rate scoring 24 (60\%) and the 5th grade was the class with the lowest responding rate scoring 17 (42.5\%). Considering the ratios of the nonresponding students, the 8th grade had the highest ratio scoring 19 (50\%) and the 6th grade had the lowest ratio scoring 16 (40\%). Data Collection A form, which included the statement ‘secularism is similar to …….because……’, in order to determine the perception of the secondary school students in Siirt city center about the concept of secularism. It was explained that metaphors, i. e. resemblance, could be made by anything (tangible, intangible, living and unloving beings) and the students were asked to write the reasoning for the metaphor in the ‘because…’ section. The participants were allowed in the classroom a 10 minute period for relaying their thoughts by focusing only on one metaphor. These forms were filled by the students and make up the fundamental data source of this research as a document. Data Analysis and Interpretation The qualitative data derived at the end of the study were resolved according to the content analysis. The content analysis aimed to acquire the concepts and relationships that could explain the collected data. The primary procedure carried out in the content analysis was to combine the similar data in the framework of specific concepts and themes and to organize and interpret them in a fashion for the readers to comprehend them (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2013). The data derived from the study group were analyzed in five stages as (1) coding and sorting, (2) compilation of sample metaphors, (3) category development, (4) validity and reliability and (5) sending the data to the computer environment (Saban, 2009; Coşkun, 2010). The studies conducted on this issue are given below. Muzaffer Çatak 249 Coding and Sorting Stage: 155 forms were distributed to the students. 75 of the 155 students surveyed are using the expressions and signs such as ?, What is this!, I do not know this on these forms they answer when they do the sex and class coding on the form. 80 of the 155 students were able to produce a metaphor for the concept of secularism. These metaphors produced are numbered again by the researcher. In short, in this research, while the concept of secularism was evaluated over 155 students, categorization was carried out using the metaphors obtained from 80 students. The Example Metaphor Compilation Stage: The metaphors listed in this stage were reviewed and an example metaphor statement representing each metaphor was selected from the forms filled by the students. The purpose was to improve the validity of the analysis process and interpretations by using these data. The Category Improvement Stage: The conceptualization of the ‘secularism’ phenomena of each metaphor image by the students was studied based on 80 metaphors formed by the students. Moreover, the metaphors formed by the students were studied in terms of their attributes about the ‘secularism’ concept. In order to generate a category, the metaphors that were formed by the students were grouped based on their subject and explanations. The relationship of the metaphors within themselves and between the groups was analyzed and five conceptual categories were generated. The Validity and Reliability Stage: To achieve reliability, the list consisting of 80 metaphors and the list consisting of 5 conceptual categories were submitted to experts and he was asked to match the first list with the second list. The list generated by the experts and the list generated by the researcher were compared and their identities and differences were determined and then the reliability of the study was estimated with the formula of Miles and Hubermann (1994) ‘Reliability= (opinion identity): (opinion identity + opinion difference) x 100’. It was seen that the experts related the 6 metaphors with different categories. In the reliability analysis made accordingly, the study reliability was estimated as 0.92.5. The procedure is formulated as follows: [Reliability= ((74) : (74+6)) x 100 = Reliability= 0, 92.5] Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 250 In qualitative studies, the desired reliability level is achieved when the conformity between the expert’s and researcher’s assessments is 0,90 and higher (Saban, 2008). The Stage of Sending the Data to the Computer Environment: All data were sent to the computer environment and the number of participants (f) representing the 80 metaphors and 5 conceptual categories and their ratio (\%) were estimated. Findings In the results section, the metaphors developed by the students about the ‘secularism’ concept with the forms and the 5 categories generated based on these metaphors were supported by the example statements developed by the students. The Metaphors about the ‘Secularism’ Concept The metaphors generated about the ‘secularism’ concept by the students are shown in Table 3. Table 3 The Metaphors generated by the Students about the ‘Secularism’ Concept and the Number of the Students Representing them and their Percentages Item Generated Metaphors F re q u e n c y ( f) Item Generated Metaphors F re q u e n c y ( f) Item Generated Metaphors F re q u e n c y ( f) 1 Religion 9 16 Atheism 1 31 Republic 1 2 State 6 17 Arasat 1 32 National 1 3 Innovation 6 18 Religion 1 33 Independence 1 4 Right 5 19 Respect 1 34 World 1 5 Equity 5 20 Constitution 1 35 Society 1 6 Justice 3 21 Renovation 1 36 Islam 1 7 Friendship 3 22 Family bond 1 37 Nationality 1 8 Law 2 23 Technology 1 38 Turkey 1 9 Country 2 24 Good manners 1 39 Separator 1 10 Peace 2 25 Willpower 1 40 A clock 1 11 Education 2 26 Liberty 1 41 Mind 1 12 Separation 2 27 Atatürk 1 42 Unity 1 13 Democracy 2 28 Brotherhood 1 43 Presidency 1 14 Social Studies 2 29 Human 1 TOTAL 80 15 Home country 1 30 Election 1 Muzaffer Çatak 251 Table 3 shows that the frequencies were between 2 and 9 of 14 metaphors from 43 metaphors, and 29 metaphors have been a frequency. A total of 80 metaphors were generated by students. The students formed the following metaphors the most; Religion (f=9), state (f=6), innovation (f=6), right (f=5), equity (f=5), justice (f=3), friendship (f=3); law, country, peace, education, separation, democracy, social studies (f=2). The Distribution of Metaphors about the Concept of ‘Secularism’ based on the Categories The concept of secularism expresses the separation of religion and state affairs by improving the scope of politics, law, and religion in time and the mind is dominant in the social, political, economic and legal order of the state (Akbıyık, 2001). While the categories were being created, the metaphors created by the students and their explanations have been taken into consideration. With regard to the concept of secularism, the above explanations show that the identity with made together with the formation of the categories are compatible with each other. Considering the metaphors of the students about the concept of ‘secularism’ based on the categories, there are 5 categories as in terms of ‘politics and administration, social and cultural, religion, law and belonging (Table 4). There are also common metaphors included in more than one category, and these are state and right metaphors. Table 4 The Metaphor Categories Formed by the Students about the Concept of ‘Secularism’ Item Categories Metaphor Names Metaphor Metaphor Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) 1 Politically and administratively Liberty, independence, presidency, State, democracy, separation, separator, respect, country, family bonds, a clock, peace. 12 20 25 2 Socially and culturally Election, republic, world, unity, good manners, education, renovation, 16 28 35 Metaphoric Perceptions of Middle School Students About the Concept of Secularism 252 Item Categories Metaphor Names Metaphor Metaphor Frequency (f) Ratio (\%) innovation, technology, mind, brotherhood, friendship, state, national, equity, Atatürk. 3 In terms of religion Religion, atheism, Islam, human, religion. 5 13 16 4 In terms of law Constitution, justice, arasat, right, law. 5 10 13 5 In terms of belonging Willpower, Turkey, Nationality, right, society, Social studies, home country. 7 9 11 Total 45 80 100 The Categories for the Concept of ‘Secularism’ Politically and Administratively The students prioritized the secularism concept in this category as political and administrative metaphors. The metaphors included in this category are; liberty (f=1), independence (f=1), presidency (f=1), state (f=5), Democracy (f=2), separation … artigo Novos estud. ❙❙ CeBRAP ❙❙ sÃo PAuLo ❙❙ v39n02 ❙❙ 415-434 ❙❙ MAI.–AGo. 2020 415 AbstrAct This article describes the postulates that guided Republican laity and Catholic secularism processes until the first half of the twentieth century and their current transformation under the impact of the intensification of religious diversity and their renewed public presence. We sought to demonstrate that, despite measures to establish a lay Brazilian state since the beginning of the Republican regime, the Catholic religion and, more recently, religions in general have not entirely lost their moral-political influence. KeywoRds: Brazilian religious field; pluralism, Catholic Church, evangelical religions, secularism Laicidade e secularismo no pluralismo brasileiro contemporâneo resumo Este artigo visa caracterizar os padrões que regulavam a laici- dade republicana e o secularismo católico no Brasil até a segunda metade do século xx e suas transformações atuais sob o impacto do pluralismo. Procuraremos demonstrar que, apesar de medidas laicizantes do Estado brasileiro ao longo da sua história, a religião católica e, mais recentemente, a religião em geral não perderam completamente seu poder de influência político-moral e que as tensões implicadas na expansão do pluralismo mais contemporaneamente não desalojaram o religioso do espaço social construído como secular. PALAvRAs-ChAve: Campo religioso brasileiro, pluralismo, Igreja Católica, religiões evangélicas, secularismo Paula Montero* Lilian Sales** Laity and SecuLariSm in contemporary BraziLian pLuraLiSm1 [*] Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. E-mail: pmontero @usp.br [**] U n i v e r s i d a d e F e d e r a l d e São Paulo, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. E-mail:[email protected] [1] This study is the result of the project “Religion, Law and Secularism” financed by Fapesp (n.15/02497-5), to which we express our appreciation. It is also a con- tribution to the ongoing project IntroductIon In the past two decades, the literature about the Bra- zilian religious field stressed the significant changes that definitively altered its configuration (Sanchis, 1997; Pierucci; Prandi, 1996, 2004; Novaes, 2002; Camurça, 2006; Mafra, 2013; Mariano, 2001, 2010). Until the mid-1980s Brazil was considered as “the world’s largest Catholic country”. In fact, by observing census data regarding reli- gious affiliations in Brazil through 2010, we see that until the 1940s the vast majority of Brazilians declared themselves Catholic (95.2\% h t t p : / /d x . d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 2 5 0 9 1 / s01013300202000020009 416 LAIty ANd seCuLARIsM IN CoNteMPoRARy BRAzILIAN PLuRALIsM ❙❙ Paula Montero and Lilian Sales Understanding Nonreligion in a Complex Future led by Lori Beaman and granted by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. [2] According to data from the Lati- nobarómetro Corporation, between 1995 and 2017, the Catholic popula- tion of 18 Latin American countries declined from 80\% in 1995 to 59\% in 2017. The only country where Ca- tholicism strengthened in the same period was Mexico. Uruguay stands out not only as of the second least Catholic country in the region (38\%), behind only Honduras (37\%), but also as the country with the highest rate of atheists, agnostics, and those declared without religion. of the population). However, since the 1950s, the demographic hege- mony of Catholicism began to change. Gradually, at first. In the 1980s, Catholics still represented 89.0\% of the population, yet, since then, this percentage declined more intensely, reaching about 73.9\% of the population in the early 2000s. In two decades, the Catholic Church in Brazil lost nearly ¼ of its declared adherents, and by the 2010 Cen- sus, only 64.63\% of Brazilians declared Catholicism as their religion. Although this percentage is still quite high, representing about 120 million people, there has been a remarkable drop in the portion of the population that declares itself Catholic. This decline of the Catholic community is not only a Brazilian phenomenon. It has been seen in many countries with Catholic tra- ditions in Latin America,2 and especially in Europe, as highlighted in the book Portraits du catholicisme, a collective work by researchers from five Catholic European countries—Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Italy—under the direction of Alfonso Pérez-Agote (2012). The book presents a detailed portrait of Catholicism in each of these countries, identifying a pattern typical to all of them: the decrease, in different degrees of intensity, of the rates of adherence to Catholicism. Although religious practices declined in all of those countries, in Portugal and Italy there has been a more recent and weaker trend than in the others. Portugal is the European country with the highest percentage of Catholics, with nearly 85\% of the population declaring itself Catholic in 2001. Parallel to the decrease of practitioners of Catholicism, the authors noted growth in the percentage of people who declare themselves non- religious. This phenomenon also began to be examined in Brazilian studies. In Brazil, this contingent jumped from 0.2\% in 1940 to 8.4\% of the population in 2010. That is, while Catholics have decreased 22.3\%, those who declared themselves “without religion” increased 3,700\%. This change is dramatic but similar to that observed in Euro- pean countries with a Catholic tradition. Perhaps the only change that is more distinctive in the Brazilian religious configuration is the sharp expansion of the population who declared themselves to be evangeli- cal. In the 1940 Census, Protestants represented only 2.6\% of the Bra- zilian population, but by the turn of the century they reached 15.5\% of the population, and in the 2010 census, the striking level of 22.16\%, a growth of more than 500\%. Remarkably, the evangelical expansion is the census variable that showed the greatest transformation between 1991 and 2000—more than marriage, fertility, housing, occupation, income, and access to consumer goods. However, the multiple religious belongings of the Brazilian population and the various changes in the classificatory structure of religions in the censuses during the twentieth century have pre- Novos estud. ❙❙ CeBRAP ❙❙ sÃo PAuLo ❙❙ v39n02 ❙❙ 415-434 ❙❙ MAI.–AGo. 2020 417 vented a more precise description of Brazil’s contemporary reli- gious profile. Even so, the decrease of Catholics in the past 50 years, and the expansion of Protestants, especially pentecostal evangeli- cals, and the nonreligious, is a tangible fact. The data indicates that the Brazilian religious field has become more plural, although still predominantly Christian. Other religions, although numerous, jointly represent only 5\% of the population. However, the signifi- cant growth of the nonreligious, which since the 1990s became the third largest segment in the country, indeed introduced a new ele- ment in the configuration of Brazilian secularism. Although these numbers are currently well known and widely commented, this ar- ticle offers a large depiction and analysis of the impacts and politi- cal tensions raised by these recent transformations in the religious configuration in Brazil. chArActerIstIcs of lAIty And seculArIsm In brAzIl In his 1991 lecture at the École Pratiques des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Jean Baubérot suggested, for heuristic purposes, distinguishing processes of laity from those of secularization. For Baubérot, while a process of laity would be associated with interven- tions by the state apparatus to resolve tensions or explicit conflicts between different social forces (religious, cultural, political, military), secularization would correspond to a loss of social belonging of the religious. Much has been written about these concepts (Casanova, 1994; Connolly, 1999, 2011 Calhoun et al., 2011). We have addressed the issue in previous studies (Montero, 2011; 2016; 2018). Therefore, we do not intend to conduct a critical reflection on these concepts but to characterize these processes in Brazil, considering the changes in the configuration of the religious field mentioned above. For this analysis, we will consider a “laity process” to involve the social-political dynamics of separation between the institutional structures of the state and the Catholic Church and the consequential regulation of religious prerogatives. The concept of “secularization” will be used to refer to the social, political, and symbolic processes that give structure to a civil society that perceives itself as autonomous from the state and religion. We seek to demonstrate that these two processes did not develop at the same pace. Despite the legal measures historically taken to increase the laity of the Brazilian state, the Catho- lic religion, and, more recently, religion in general, did not wholly lose their moral-political influence. Besides, we argue that while the ten- sions implied in the more contemporaneous expansion of pluralism have changed attitudes concerning beliefs and religious institutions, they have not removed the religious from the secular social space. 418 LAIty ANd seCuLARIsM IN CoNteMPoRARy BRAzILIAN PLuRALIsM ❙❙ Paula Montero and Lilian Sales 1. Legal laity The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 established, in its article 5, Ca- tholicism as the religion of the Empire. Despite ulterior state tolerance towards the Protestant cults celebrated by the German immigrants, the emergence of a pluralist culture was still not on the horizon. In the first national census of 1872, in the religious category there were only two options: Catholic and not-Catholic. This agreement with the Catholic Church ended in 1888, when the Republican regime adopted the principle of separation between the state and the Catholic Church. Education was declared to be a lay field; baptism and ecclesiastical marriages no longer had legal civil standing; cemeteries came under the control of the state; and, simultaneously, legislative measures in- corporated the principles of religious liberty and religious equality. The legal separation of the state from the Catholic Church radi- cally changed its social and political position, requiring a new defini- tion of the relations between state and religion. In general terms, the ecclesiastic hierarchy opposed this legal separation with the state. Nevertheless, some new republican concepts, such as “religious lib- erty”, earned its support, and, according to Giumbelli (2008), were phrased under its inspiration. In the first Republican Constitution of 1891, this principle was written as follows: “All individuals and religious beliefs can worship publicly, associate together for this purpose and purchase goods, ob- serving the dispositions of the common law”. The first Civil Code of 1917 reaffirmed the same notion. The idea of “religion” presented in this Code refers virtually exclusively to the Catholic Church and eccle- sial Catholicism, whose “religious” status left no margin for doubts. An analysis of how the official texts concerning religious regulation were written reveals that Catholicism served as a tacit reference for the legal definition of what would be considered a religion. Laws do not mention which religion would have liberty, but regulated the liberty that religion, in this case, Catholicism, would have (Giumbelli, 2002, p. 276). In the first decades of the republican regime, the Catholic ecclesiastic leadership’s first concern was to guarantee the preserva- tion of its property and civil prerogatives. Thus, “religious liberty” did not mean, during the first half of the nineteenth century, respect for “freedom of conscious” which would imply, according to Baubéraut (2013), a guarantee of free-thinking even if opposed to religion, or “freedom of belief,” understood as tolerance for the exercise of wor- ship by minority non-Christian religions (which had still not been conceived as such). Above all, it involved the guarantee of neutrality of the state concerning religion, that is, the certitude that the public ac- tions of the Catholic Church would not be limited. During this period, non-Christian movements such as Allan Kardec’s spiritism and Afro- Novos estud. ❙❙ CeBRAP ❙❙ sÃo PAuLo ❙❙ v39n02 ❙❙ 415-434 ❙❙ MAI.–AGo. 2020 419 Brazilian practices were struggling to be declared religious cults and to be able to enjoy the “religious liberty” established in the 1917 Civil Code, as Emerson Giumbelli (2002) demonstrated. The Catholic ecclesiastic elites were quite successful in imposing their political positions. In the first years of the Republican regime, despite the legal separation, the intervention of the Catholic Church in issues of national public interest, such as the civil and criminal codes, was notable. The Church’s political hegemony continued for nearly the entire twentieth century. The tensions between the Catholic influence and other social spheres that sought autonomy—particularly the fields of law, medi- cine, and public education—surfaced since the first decades of the Republic. Even so, as we will see, until very recently, the Catholic he- gemony allowed the Church to speak legitimately in the name of the nation and the civil society. The decline of this hegemony followed the emergence of new actors in civil society, and the increasingly more evi- dent expansion of religion and moral pluralism since the 1980s. The emergence of new voices and different interests progressively made these ecclesiastical interventions the object of questioning and public controversies. 2. Social and political secularism As the work of Montero (2006) shows well, the increased laity of the Brazilian state and the secularization of society have to be consid- ered two distinct processes that do not necessarily coincide. Despite having lost many of its traditional prerogatives for the control of the population, the Catholic Church, in the very process of reconstructing its institutional autonomy from the state, remained very active as a voice of civil society. In this sense, “the radical subtraction of broad sectors of civil society from its influence or the reflux of religious ac- tion in general towards the domestic sphere did not take place” (p. 48). On the contrary, the intervention of the Catholic Church in the Brazil- ian public sphere remained alive during the entire twentieth century. Its form of action, however, has changed. With the institutional separation from the state came a more distant stance from the politi- cal structure. The Catholic Church leadership reorganized itself in the first decades of the twentieth century, seeking to be seen as a political expression of the will of the nation. They did so by promoting reli- gious ceremonies on civic holidays, inaugurating public works, and mobilizing Catholics and political authorities in Catholic liturgical celebrations. During the military regime (1964-1985), it created new institutional organizations and new arrangements of para-diocesan practices of worship that would contribute to the emergence of new political actors and to the construction of Brazilian civil society itself. 420 LAIty ANd seCuLARIsM IN CoNteMPoRARy BRAzILIAN PLuRALIsM ❙❙ Paula Montero and Lilian Sales a. The Catholic Church and Civil Society The Catholic Church, as an expression of the nation’s soul, is an already well-studied subject and falls beyond the scope of this work to review this well-known topic. Our interest is to focus on a recent period, which began with the emergence of the military dictatorship in 1964 that sparked intense actions by the Church to support the creation of a “culture of rights.” Founded in 1952, the National Con- ference of Catholic Bishops (cnbb), which hierarchically is an essen- tial pastoral entity whithin the Catholic Church, became one of the leading institutions to support the restoration of civil rights and the promotion of human rights during the regime of exception. In this sense, the Church was one of the few institutions capable of giving public voice to the defense of rights in this oppressive political context (Rosado-Nunes, 2008). In order to do so, it created new entities like the Commission for Justice and Peace (1969) and Centers for Defense of Human Rights (1976), and reproduced them at the level of the dio- ceses. It also disseminated new categories and ideas until then absent in the Brazilian political vocabulary, such as the defense and promo- tion of human rights, specifically civil rights and individual liberties. Steil and Toniol (2012) have demonstrated that these institutions, although formed within the domain of the dioceses, “established themselves as active entities in the legal, political, and media fields by denouncing human rights violations, protecting political prisoners, and defending victims of the military regime” (p. 78). According to them, an international and Latin American movement collaborated to this development. Documents produced since the Episcopal confer- ences of Latin America (Celam) held in Medellín (1968) and Puebla (1979) supported and legitimated the Catholic Church’s actions in defense of human rights. The emphasis on human rights as social rights was consistent with some Catholic Liberation Theology concepts, such as the “preferential option for the poor”, and the idea of human rights as “dignity for the oppressed.” (Relatório final do ii Encontro dos Direitos Humanos). In this understanding, social rights were conceived as rights of the poor, while the liberal concept of these rights, born in the liberal revolutions, was rarely mentioned. Ecclesial actions in support of human rights continued and inten- sified in the re-democratization period of the 1980s and ‘90s, pri- marily through the promotion of human rights as social rights. At the beginning of this period, the Catholic Church worked to incorporate social rights in Brazilian law. The Church also incorporated the con- cept of rights in its discourses and proposals for pastoral activities and made a substantial investment in structures suited to dissemi- nate Catholic notions of rights through clergy and lay movements. Novos estud. ❙❙ CeBRAP ❙❙ sÃo PAuLo ❙❙ v39n02 ❙❙ 415-434 ❙❙ MAI.–AGo. 2020 421 One example of this effort to propagate these concepts is the annual Fraternity Campaigns organized by the National Bishops Conference, which in this period mostly addressed human rights issues. An examination of the motives and slogans of these campaigns in the 1980s and ‘90s reveals a central focus on the promotion of social rights for the Brazilian population, still mostly Catholic. In the 1960s and ‘70s, the chosen topics were more doctrinaire and pastoral, as shown by the slogans “Remember You Are also the Church” or “Dis- cover the Joy of Serving”. In the 1980s, other motifs appeared, such as Health and Fraternity, with the slogan “Health for All” (1981), sup- porting the right to public healthcare, which only became a universal in Brazil with the Constitution of 1988. Education and Fraternity also turned into a prominent issue with the slogan: “The Truth Will Set you Free” (1982), highlighting the importance of the universalization of the right to education. Fraternity and Land rose with the slogan “God’s Land, Land of Brothers” (1986) highlighting the rights to land and the importance of agrarian reform in the country. The Catholic Church, through the Pastoral of Land, was historically involved in the complex agrarian problem in Brazil, and one of the most significant social movements of the time, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Ru- rais Sem Terra (mst) [Landless Workers Movement] had very close relations with representatives of Catholicism in the country since its birth in the 1980s (Vasquez, 2002). Another topic was Fraternity and Minors, framed with the slo- gan “Those Who Shelter the Minor, Shelters Me” (1987). It is well- known that the Catholic Church, through the Pastoral of the Child, was one of the main actors in drafting the country’s Statute for Chil- dren and Adolescents (eca). This statute is a landmark in the es- tablishment of the rights for children in the country. It defined new and broader rights for children and teenagers, who became subjects of rights and gained an Integral Protection Policy. The Pastoral of the Child supported various elements of the version of the Statute that was approved. The Fraternity Campaign also addressed racial issues, with the slogan “Listen to the Clamor of this People” (1988), regarding the rights of black people. These campaigns are launched annually by the cnbb, addressing a specific theme every year. The theme and corresponding slogan in- spire an official position paper outlined in legal-scientific language. Along with hymns, posters, and prayers, this paper is written to cir- culate widely throughout the year. All Brazilian parishes repeat them in their yearly liturgical calendar, especially during mass. Through this strategy, the material is broadly disseminated in many directions. Catholics who participate either occasionally or regularly in the rituals engage with these ideas, values, and perceptions. 422 LAIty ANd seCuLARIsM IN CoNteMPoRARy BRAzILIAN PLuRALIsM ❙❙ Paula Montero and Lilian Sales The analysis of the Fraternity Campaigns gives us a good idea of the significant engagement of the cnbb in the national propaganda of its social rights project. As Steil and Toniol (2012) observed, “the capillarity of Catholicism in the Brazilian society and the centralized structure of the Catholic Church” (p. 78) were essential factors in hav- ing these concepts become enrooted in the consciousness and public opinion of the country. However, the cnbb did not limit its actions to a Catholic audi- ence. It also sought to act directly in civil society, organizing social movements in defense of human rights and, since 1981, coordinat- ing National Human Rights Encounters. In reality, the human rights movements are one of the many examples of social movements born through the action of the Catholic Church, with the support of the Pastoral Commissions and Ecclesiastical Base Communities. Many other major social movements in Brazil founded in that period, such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (mst), were also born through and articulated with the Catholic Church. Although these encounters were presented as lay events, the Cath- olic Church led their organization. According to Steil and Toniol, “the foci of the encounter maintained the Catholic jargon and presented proposals forged at the heart of the Church, all related to its pasto- ral activity”. This pattern established an ambiguous approach by the Church towards social movements in which the institutionalization of the human rights policy was based on organizations controlled by the Catholic Church (2012, p. 7). In sum, the birth of a human rights policy in Brazil took place at the heart of the Catholic Church, through its institutions and representatives. Only in the late 1990s did civic human rights organizations gain autonomy from the Catho- lic Church. It is also essential to emphasize that, although the Catholic Church historically defended civil rights, when this topic more recent- ly became related to sexual and reproductive rights, as well as to issues linked to biotechnology and bioethics, their position shifted to clear and explicit opposition. In this matter, the Brazilian church followed the direction established by the Vatican since the late 1990s. We will return to this issue. This brief overview illustrates how the Catholic Church, with its strong institutional presence and symbolic strength, occupied a cen- tral position in the last century as a regulatory agency of social life, stimulating different forms of mobilization, and collaborating in the construction of civic culture and public morality. The activity of Catholic actors (individuals and collectives) was so consistent with the values circulating in the public spheres of social action that, until very recently, its presence as a political actor was nearly not noticed. Therefore, the naturalization of the action of the Catholic Church that Novos estud. ❙❙ CeBRAP ❙❙ sÃo PAuLo ❙❙ v39n02 ❙❙ 415-434 ❙❙ MAI.–AGo. 2020 423 permeated the fabric of the Brazilian social landscape would offer it an “invisibility effect” (Almeida, 2010). The social and political changes over the past three decades car- ried with them the emergence of new actors, prepared to challenge the Catholic Church’s protagonism, such as neo-Pentecostal evangelicals and the non-religious. This new interplay broke the enchantment of Catholic invisibility. The imagined “consensus” of a Catholic nation came to be questioned, as indicated by a series of lawsuits recently filed in the courts that required the Catholic Church to argue and justify its position in various disputes for social influence (Sales, 2014; 2015). There have been many reasons for the decline of the hegemony of the Catholic Church over the past 50 years. On the political level there has been a complexification and diversification of actors in civ- il society, with a proliferation of non-governmental organizations that have come to work in collaboration with the state; a reorganiza- tion of political parties and parliamentary action; and the incorpo- ration to the state apparatus, in the late 1990s, of human and civil rights agendas. In the legal field, since the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, the concept of human rights has been continuously broadened by the inclusion of new actors in the dispute. New rights, in particular the right to difference, gained space in the national public agenda, and since the 1990s new public policies towards gen- der, ethnic, and religious equality have been gradually implemented. These public policies concerning diversity began to appear during President Fernando Henrique’s administration (1995-2002) and intensified in the administrations of Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003-2016). Although increasingly losing its position as a protagonist, the Catholic Church followed the first movements regarding the incor- poration of the pluralist agenda. According to Steil and Toniol, at the V National Human Rights Encounter in 1988, “respect for difference became one of the main causes of the human rights struggle” (2012, p. 76). The cnbb became engaged in defense of the environment, indigenous and traditional populations, and racial issues. Neverthe- less, in the late 1990s, when this agenda was being institutionalized as state policy, and in particular when agendas concerning gender and sexual and reproductive rights began to be considered in public poli- cies in 2010, deep cleavages emerged between the perception of the Catholic agencies and other social actors. In this period, the relationship of Catholic human rights activ- ists with those from other social movements was diverted by these movements’ defense of sexual and reproductive rights. Abortion, the day-after pill, in-vitro fertilization, and other issues, especially those related to the beginning of life and of human reproduction, were in- 424 LAIty ANd seCuLARIsM IN CoNteMPoRARy BRAzILIAN PLuRALIsM ❙❙ Paula Montero and Lilian Sales corporated as “human rights”. These “new rights” generated tensions and disputes between representatives of Catholicism, such as the Na- tional Conference of Bishops, and nonreligious social movements, particularly feminist groups. In the 2000s, the Catholic Church made numerous attempts to interfere, through the cnbb, in debates about legal changes that would redefine “the beginning of life”. Through its organizational structures and movements such as Catholic Charismatic Renovation, the Catholic Church mobilized rallies “in defense of life” and filed suits before the Brazilian Supreme Court focused on constitutional issues. The Episcopal Conference participated actively in two recent suits; adi 3.510, which questioned the use of embryonic stem cells in scientific research (2008) and adpf 54, which challenged the ability to interrupt pregnancy in case of anencephaly of the fetus (2012). It issued statements at public hearings, presented …