Discussion - History
Please use attached files for this assignment.
In no less than two paragraphs (5-7 sentences EACH) please choose one of Venezuelas allies mentioned in this module and discuss the nature of that relationship, the goals of both countries, and the potential impacts these relations have on the US.
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 17
2019 that there were some 2,300 Cuban security personnel in Venezuela involved in providing
security for Maduro and training Venezuela’s security forces in “torture tactics, domestic spying
techniques, and mechanisms of repression.”79 Over time, Cuban intelligence has helped its
Venezuelan counterparts become particularly adept at detecting dissidents within the military.80
Among the other countries that support the Maduro regime, Turkey has purchased large quantities
of Venezuelan gold, despite U.S. sanctions.81 Iran has sent tankers of gasoline in exchange for
gold, despite U.S. sanctions on both countries; provided humanitarian aid; helped rebuild a
refinery; and established a supermarket conglomerate in Venezuela. 82 Iranian-Venezuelan fuel
swaps have begun to occur more frequently. 83
U.S. Policy
The United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. foreign oil
supplier, but friction in relations increased under the Chávez government and has intensified
under the Maduro government. For more than a decade, U.S. policymakers have had concerns
about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela and the lack of
bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. During this time, Congress
has provided funding to support democratic civil society in Venezuela. As the Maduro
government has become increasingly authoritarian, the Obama and Trump Administrations turned
to sanctions, first targeted on specific officials and then aimed at broader sectors of the economy,
the Maduro government, and most recently, entities supporting that government.
U.S. policy has toughened since the U.S. government ceased to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s
legitimate president in January 2019. After recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019,
the Trump Administration coordinated most of its efforts with Interim President Guaidó. In early
2019, President Trump and other officials suggested that U.S. military intervention in Venezuela
was a possibility.84 After U.S. allies, including in the EU and the Lima Group, and Members of
Congress expressed opposition to that prospect, such statements became less frequent.85
During the Trump Administration, U.S. strategy emphasized diplomatic efforts to bolster support
for Guaidó and isolate Maduro; targeted sanctions and visa revocations on Maduro government
officials and their families, along with broader sanctions on the economy and government;
assistance for the Venezuelan people; and actions to cut off the Maduro government’s illicit
79 U.S. Depart ment of St at e, Secret ary of St at e Michael R. P ompeo, “ Interview wit h Margaret Brennan of CBS Face
the Nation,” May 5, 2019; and U.S. Depart ment of St at e, Secret ary of St at e Michael R. P ompeo, “ Remarks t o t he
P ress,” March 11, 2019.
80 Angus Berwick, “ Special Report : How Cuba T aught Venezuela t o Quash Milit ary Dissent ,” Reut ers, August 22,
2019.
81 Mayela Armas and Corina P ons, “ Exclusive: Venezuela Removed Six T onnes of Cent ral Bank Gold at T urn of
Year—Sources,” Reut ers, March 12, 2020.
82 Ian T alley and Benoit Falcon, “ Iranian Milit ary-Owned Conglomerat e Set s Up Shop in Venezuela,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2020.
83 Deisy Buit rago, Marianna P arraga, “ Exclusive: ‘P erfect T rips’ - Venezuela Ships Jet Fuel t o Iran in Exchange for
Gasoline, Sources say,” Reut ers, February 23, 2021.
84 T he Whit e House, “ Remarks by P resident T rump t o t he Venezuelan American Communit y ,” February 18, 2019
85 T hen-Secret ary of St at e Michael P ompeo denied any U.S. involvement in t he bot ched raid against Maduro in May
2020. See Karen DeYoung, Ant hony Faiola, and Alex Hort on. “ U.S. Denies Involvement in Alleged Venezuela
Invasion At t empt as Det ails Remain Murky,” Washington Post, May 6, 2020.
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 18
revenue sources.86 In March 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic transition framework”
backed by Guaidó. The framework would have lifted certain sanctions in exchange for Maduro
releasing political prisoners, having foreign security forces leave the country, and allowing the
creation of a Council of State to carry out presidential duties until elections could be held. U.S.
insistence that Maduro leave office prior to the convening of new elections and reticence to bac k
negotiations eventually drove a wedge between U.S. and EU positions on Venezuela.87
To date, U.S. efforts have failed to dislodge Maduro and enable the convening of free and fair
elections, raising questions for the Biden Administration on whether to intensify, roll back, or
otherwise change U.S. policy. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken with Interim
President Guaidó.88 Senior U.S. officials have said the Biden Administration aims to focus on
supporting the Venezuelan people and engaging in multilateral diplomacy to press for a return to
democracy and hold corrupt and abusive Maduro officials accountable for their actions. 89 On
March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for 18 months (see “Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela,” below).90
Many analysts maintain that restoring a more unified position on Venezuela with allied European
and Latin American nations will be an important task for the Biden Administration.91 Biden
officials are reviewing existing sanctions and reportedly are assessing whether the Maduro
government is willing to allow increased humanitarian access, the selection of a more balanced
electoral council, and a return to Norway-led talks.92 Some policy experts have urged the
Administration to offer sanctions relief in exchange for specific actions by the Maduro
government, such as the release of political prisoners. 93 In exchange for an openness to review
sectoral sanctions, the Administration could seek more targeted sanctions from other countries on
Venezuelan officials and their families, asset forfeitures and indictments of Maduro officials and
enablers, and humanitarian assistance for U.N. appeals on Venezuela. 94 The Biden Administration
has rejoined the U.N. Human Rights Council, in part to keep its attention on abuses in countries
such as Venezuela.95 Some experts have urged Biden officials to work with the EU-led
International Contact Group in backing a negotiated s olution to the Venezuela crisis and to seek
areas of “mutual interest” on Venezuela with China and Russia.96
86 U.S. Depart ment of St at e, “ U.S. Government Support for t he Democratic Aspirat ions of t he Venezuelan P eople,”
accessed August 17; 2020; and T est imony of Elliot t A. Abrams, Special Represent at ive for Venezuela, U.S.
Depart ment of St at e, in U.S. Congress, Senat e Commit t ee on Fo reign Relat ions, August 4, 2020.
87 Elliot t Abrams, “ T he EU T ries and Fails Again on Venezuela,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2021.
88 U.S. Depart ment of St at e, Office of t he Spokesperson, “ Secret ary Blinken’s Call wit h Venezuelan Int erim P resident
Guaidó,” March 2, 2021.
89 Whit e House, “ Background P ress Call by Senior Administ rat ion Off icials on Venezuela,” March 8, 2021.
90 U.S. Depart ment of Homeland Securit y (DHS), “ Secret ary Mayorkas Designat es Venezuela for T emporary P rotected
St at us for 18 Mont hs,” March 8, 2021.
91 P aul Angelo, Synchronizing with Europe on the Venezuela Crisis, Council on Foreign Relat ions, Sept ember 28,
2020.
92 Joshua Goodman, “ US Weighs P olicy on Venezuela as Maduro Signals Flexibilit y,” AP . April 27, 2021.
93 Christ opher Sabat ini, “ Can Biden Succeed Where T rump’s Venezuela P olicy Failed? World Politics Review, January
27, 2021.
94 Ryan C. Berg and Jorge González-Gallarza, Europe’s Last Chance: How the EU Can (and Should) Become the
Prim ary Actor in Venezuela’s Dem ocratic Restoration, American Ent erprise Inst it ut e, March 2021.
95 U.S. Depart ment of St at e, Office of t he Spokesperson, “ Key Out comes at t he 46 th Session of t he U.N. Human Right s
Council,” March 23, 2021.
96 Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde, Recalibrating U.S. Policy in Venezuela: Learning from Failure and Seizing
Opportunities, Washingt on Office on Lat in America, December 2020.
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 19
The 116th Congress supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of
democracy in Venezuela without the use of military force and to provide humanitarian assistance
to Venezuelans. Some Members expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of broad U.S.
economic sanctions. Congress enacted legislation to guide U.S. policy on Venezuela, including
P.L. 116-94, which appropriated $30 million in FY2020 for democracy programs in Venezuela
and incorporated the Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive
bill to address the crisis in Venezuela (see Appendix A). Congress appropriated not less than $33
million for democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified amount of humanitarian support
for countries sheltering Venezuelan refugees. Congress also conducted numerous oversight
hearings on U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
The 117th Congress is likely to provide input to the Biden Administration in sanctioning human
rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its backers,
as well as how to balance sectoral sanctions with humanitarian concerns. Congress may examine
new policy approaches by the Biden Administration and further legislative options, such as
additional sanctions against the Maduro government and its foreign enablers or humanitarian
assistance to Venezuelans.
U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela97
The United States has increasingly employed sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of
the Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. As the political and economic crisis in
Venezuela has deepened, the Trump Administration significantly expanded sanctions on
Venezuela, relying on both existing authorities and new executive orders. Beginning in August
2017, those executive orders established financial sanctions on the Maduro government
(including PdVSA), created economic sanctions on sectors of the economy, and prohibited
unlicensed transactions with the Maduro government. The Trump Administration cited the
Maduro government’s human rights abuses, usurpation of power from the National Assembly,
and rampant corruption as reasons for expanding U.S. sanctions .
Visa Revocations and Sanctions on Individuals. Since January 2019, the State
Department has revoked more than 1,000 visas, including those of current and
former Venezuelan officials and their families. 98 The Treasury Department has
imposed financial sanctions on a total of nearly 150 Venezuela-linked individuals
for terrorism (E.O. 13224); drug trafficking (Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act, P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.); and/or
committing antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or corruption (see
E.O. 13692 in 2014 as codified in P.L. 113-278 and extended in P.L. 114-194 and,
most recently, in P.L. 116-94).
Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and state oil company,
PdVSA, access to U.S. financial markets, with certain exceptions to minimize the
impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests (E.O. 13808 in
August 2017);99 prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O. 13827 in
March 2018);100 and barring the purchase of Venezuelan debt or accounts
97 For more informat ion, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
98 U.S. Congress, Senat e Commit t ee on Foreign Relat ions, Venezuela, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., August 4, 2020.
99 E.O. 13808, “ Imposing Addit ional Sanct ions wit h Respect t o t he Sit uat ion in Venezuela,” 82 Federal Register
41155-41156, August 24, 2017.
100 E.O. 13827, “ T aking Addit ional St eps t o Address t he Sit uat ion in Venezuela, ” 83 Federal Register 12469-12470,
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 20
receivable with the Venezuelan government, including PdVSA (E.O. 13835 in
May 2018).101
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting unlicensed transactions with
PdVSA, Venezuela’s central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
other entities (E.O. 13850 in November 2018).102
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets in the United States and
prohibiting transactions with that government unless authorized as part of efforts
to aid the Venezuelan people. E.O. 13884 also authorized financial sanctions and
visa restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist or support the Maduro
government. To allow continued humanitarian assistance, OFAC issued licenses
authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities,
and medicine; personal remittances; the work of international organizations; and
communications services (E.O. 13884 in August 2019).103
The U.S. government has coordinated its targeted sanctions policies with the EU and Canada. The
Rio Treaty has become the means for U.S. efforts to build capacity and will in Latin America and
the Caribbean to sanction Maduro officials. 104 The Trump Administration demonstrated some
flexibility in its sanctions policy with the lifting of sanctions against the former head of
Venezuela’s intelligence service, General Manuel Cristopher Figuera, in May 2019 after he broke
ranks with Maduro. Many have questioned how willing or able the U.S. government would be to
lift sanctions on others, particularly for those who face U.S. criminal indictments .
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has significantly ratcheted up economic pressure on
Venezuela and on Cuba for its support of Venezuela.105 In 2020, the Department of the Treasury
imposed sanctions on two subsidiaries of Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil and gas company,
for transporting Venezuelan oil and on a Chinese technology company for supplying the Maduro
government with digital surveillance software. Treasury also has sanctioned individuals and
entities for shipping petroleum products to Venezuela in exchange for gold under the Iran
sanctions framework.
It is difficult to attribute precisely the extent of Venezuela’s economic collapse that is due to U.S.
sanctions versus broad economic mismanagement. A February 2021 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report asserted that “sanctions, particularly on the state oil company in 2019, likely
contributed to the steeper decline of the Venezuelan economy.”106 The Maduro government has
defaulted on all its bonds, and U.S. sanctions prohibit debt restructuring with creditors.
March 19, 2018.
101 E.O. 13835, “ P rohibit ing Cert ain Addit ional T ransact ions wit h Respect t o Venezuela,” 83 Federal Register 24001-
24002, May 21, 2018.
102 E.O. 13850, “ Blocking P roperty of Addit ional P ersons Cont ribut ing t o t he Sit uat ion in Venezuela,” 83 Federal
Register 55243-55245, November 1, 2018.
103 Execut ive Order 13884, “ Blocking P ropert y of t he Government of Venezuela,” 84 Federal Register 38843- August
5, 2020.
104 U.S. Depart ment of St at e, Report on Developing and Im plementing a Coordinated Sanctions Strategy with Partners
in the Western Hem isphere and the European Union, February 24, 2020.
105 See CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 11 6th Congress and Through the Trum p Adm inistration , by
Mark P . Sullivan.
106 Government Account abilit y Office (GAO), Venezuela: Additional Tracking Could Aid Treasury’s Efforts to
Mitigate Any Adverse Im pacts U.S. Sanctions Might Have on Hum anitarian Assistance, GAO 21-239, February 2021
(hereinaft er, GAO 21-239).
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 21
In terms of the sanctions’ political effects, the imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals in
the Maduro government has not encouraged many of those who were not yet sanctioned to
abandon Maduro or changed the behavior of the sanctioned individuals. Broader U.S. sanctions
adopted since 2017 have yet to compel Maduro to leave office. They also have provided a
scapegoat on which Maduro has blamed the country’s economic problems.
U.N. officials and some Members of Congress urged the Trump Administration to ease financial
and sectoral sanctions on Venezuela, even if Maduro remained in office, so the country could
address COVID-19.107 The Administration continued to impose sanctions during the pandemic
and maintained that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela included broad exemptions and licenses to allow
the provision of humanitarian assistance and the export of food, medicine, and medical devices.108
Humanitarian organizations receiving U.S. funds told the GAO that sanctions had made financial
transactions more challenging even for those with exemptions and licenses and likely had
exacerbated fuel shortages and power outages in the country.109 Some in Congress have asked the
Biden Administration to restart a sanctions exemption that had allowed foreign companies to
swap diesel for Venezuelan crude oil, which ended in November 2020.110
Petroleum Sector Concerns and U.S. Economic Sanctions
Commercial oil production in Venezuela began in 1914 and accelerated in the 1920s, following
oil discoveries in Venezuela’s Maracaibo Basin.111 Several U.S. companies established
concession agreements with Venezuela’s government to invest in, explore, produce, and export
the country’s petroleum resources. By 1970, oil production in Venezuela was more than 3.7
million barrels per day, making Venezuela one of the largest oil-producing countries by
volume.112 Venezuela began to take control of its petroleum assets in 1971, fully nationalizing the
sector in 1976 with the creation of PdVSA to manage the country’s petroleum resources. Oil
companies operating in Venezuela were relegated to a service-based support role.
Oil production in Venezuela declined by more than 50\% between 1971 and 1988.113 In an effort to
reverse declining oil production, Venezuela embarked on a program that allowed international oil
companies—including U.S. firms Chevron, Exxon, and Conoco—to either control oil fields or
establish majority-owned joint ventures (JVs) with PdVSA. 114 Policies imposed by former
President Chavez unilaterally modified contract terms contained in the production and JV
107 UN News, “ Ease Sanct ions Against Count ries Fight ing COVID-19: UN Human Right s Chief,” March 24, 2020;
Cynt hia Arnson and Oriana van P raag, “ Venezuela and t he Coronavirus: Anot her P at h Is P o ssible,” Am ericas
Quarterly, March 30, 2020; and Jack Diet ch, “ Democrat s P ush Back on Sanct ions, Cit ing Coronavirus Fears,” Foreign
Policy, March 27, 2020.
108 Office of Foreign Asset s Cont rol (OFAC), U.S. Depart ment of t he Treasury, “ Fact Sheet : P rovision of Humanit arian
Assist ance and T rade t o Combat COVID-19,” April 16, 2020; and U.S. Depart ment of t he T reasury, OFAC, “ Guidance
Relat ed t o t he P rovision of Humanit arian Assist ance and Support t o t he Venezuelan P eople,” August 6, 2017.
109 GAO 21-239.
110 Let t er from Senat or Chris Murphy t o Secret ary of St at e Ant ony Blinken, March 23, 2021.
111 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York: Simon & Schust er, 1991), p. 217-
219.
112 BP , Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020.
113 Ibid.
114 For a complet e list of P dVSA JV part ners, see Energy Informat ion Administ rat ion, Background Reference:
Venezuela, T able 1, January 7, 2019, available at ht t ps://www.eia.gov/int ernat ional/cont ent /analysis/count ries_long/
Venezuela/venezuela_bkgd.pdf.
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 22
agreements. Some companies (e.g., Exxon, Conoco) ceased operations and filed lawsuits for
contractual violations. Other companies (e.g., Chevron) continued operating in Venezuela.
A founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
Venezuela generally has been considered a major oil producer and supplier. However, as of
February 2021, oil production in Venezuela was approximately 500,000 barrels per day—less
than 1\% of global petroleum supply and one of the lowest volumes among OPEC members. 115
Nevertheless, Venezuela’s petroleum sector, which includes the world’s largest proven oil
reserves at more than 300 billion barrels (more than 17\% of global reserves), is a critical element
of the country’s economy.116 During calendar year 2019, the value of Venezuela’s petroleum
exports represented more than 95\% of the country’s total exports.117 Oil’s predominant role in
Venezuela’s economy, combined with the United States having been a preferred oil export
destination, resulted in this sector being a target of U.S. economic sanctions.
Oil Sector Sanctions and Evolving Petr oleum Tr ade Relationships
Sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector generally began in August 2017, with the issuance of
an executive order that limited access to debt capital and prevented PdVSA from receiving cash
distributions from Citgo, its U.S.-based oil refining and marketing subsidiary. 118 Oil sector
sanctions expanded in January 2019, with PdVSA added to Treasury’s Specially Designated
Nationals list.119 This action effectively prohibited U.S. persons and companies from transacting
with PdVSA, unless Treasury allows transactions under a general license.120 The sanctions
framework also prohibited non-U.S. entities from transac ting with PdVSA in U.S. dollars and
made non-U.S. subject to having their U.S. property blocked, should it be determined that they
materially assisted PdVSA.121
Following an authorized 90-day wind-down period, U.S. oil refineries ceased importing crude oil
from Venezuela (see Figure 4). Under the sanctions framework, Treasury also has sanctioned
numerous individuals, vessels, and companies involved in trading and shipping Venezuelan oil.
This progressive application of sanctions—designed to prevent export and sale of oil produced in
Venezuela—has made it more difficult, though not impossible, for PdVSA to complete petroleum
sales and export transactions.
115 Energy Informat ion Administ ration, Crude Oil Production, Venezuela, Monthly, at ht t ps://www.eia.gov/opendat a/
qb.php?cat egory=1039874&sdid=ST EO.COP R_VE.M, accessed April 9, 2021.
116 BP , Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020.
117 Organizat ion of t he P et roleum Exporting Count ries (OP EC), Venezuela Facts and Figures, at ht t ps://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/about _us/171.ht m, accessed March 29, 2021.
118 E.O. 13808, “ Imposing Addit ional Sanct ions Wit h Respect t o t he Sit uat ion in Venezuela,” 82 Federal Register
41155, August 29, 2017.
119 T reasury’s designat ion was pursuant t o E.O. 13850. For addit ional informat ion, see U.S. Depart ment of t he
T reasury, “ Issuance of a New Venezuela-relat ed Execut ive Order and General Licenses; Venezuela-relat ed
Designat ion,” January 28, 2019.
120 T o dat e, T reasury global licenses permit Chevron and some oilfield service companies t o cont inue limit ed act ivit ies
and t ransact ions in wit h P dVSA for essent ial operat ions.
121 For addit ional informat ion about U.S. economic sanct io ns t arget ing Venezuela’s oil sect or, see CRS Report R46213,
Oil Market Effects from U.S. Econom ic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela , by P hillip Brown
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 23
Figure 4. Venezuela Crude Oil Production, U.S. Imports, and
Selected Sanction Events
(January 2014-February 2021)
Source: CRS, using Venezuela crude oil production data from Bloomberg L.P. U.S. imports data from the Energy
Information Administration.
Notes: PdVSA = Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.; E.O. = executive order; bpd = barrels per day.
E.O. 13808 imposed additional sanctions based on a national emergency declared in March 2015 (E.O. 13692),
including limits imposed on PdVSA access to U.S. debt finance an d a provision preventing PdVSA from receiving
cash dividends from its U.S.-based Citgo refining and marketing subsidiary.
With the United States no longer a petroleum export destination, PdVSA sought to develop other
trading relationships to monetize the value of Venezuelan oil. Russian oil trading companies (i.e.,
Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading International) were large purchasers of Venezuelan oil, which
they mostly delivered to refineries in Asia. Treasury sanctioned these companies in early 2020.
This action motivated Rosneft—an oil company controlled by the Russian government—to
reorganize its corporate ownership structure and operations in Venezuela to minimize its
sanctions exposure risk.
PdVSA has since employed other methods to facilitate oil transactions, including (1) oil sales
through a Mexico-based trading company claiming to execute an oil-for-humanitarian-aid
program; (2) oil-for-diesel fuel swap trades—authorized by Treasury until late October 2020—
with refiners located in India and Spain; (3) sales transactions through intermediate oil trading
companies; and (4) petroleum exchanges with Iran. Iran—also the target of numerous U.S.
economic sanctions—has supplied Venezuela with multiple shipments of petroleum products
(e.g., gasoline) following the imposition of sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector. Since January
2019, when exports to the United States ended, India and China have been the top two
destinations for Venezuela’s observable crude oil exports (see Figure 5).
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 24
Figure 5. Observable Venezuela Crude Oil Exports by Destination
(January 2017-February 2021)
Source: CRS, using Bloomberg L.P. tanker tracking service data.
Notes: Export volumes represent crude oil volumes that were loaded onto tankers during each month .
Other research companies and news media organizations report higher export volumes than those reflected in
this figure. Oil exporting countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions employ various methods (i.e., ship -to-ship
transfers and disabling transponders) to conceal export volumes and destinations. Actual Venezuela crude oil
export volumes could differ from those reported by Bloomberg L.P.
Oil Mar ket and Pr ice Effects122
Notable sanctions-related effects on the global oil market include lower Venezuelan oil
production and the elimination of U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil (see Figure 4).
Attributing a precise volumetric effect on Venezuela’s oil production is difficult, as production in
the country was declining prior to the imposition of oil sector sanctions. 123 Nevertheless, data
suggest that production declines accelerated following sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector.
Lower global oil supply generally results in upward price pressure for crude oil and petroleum
products. Venezuela’s oil production decline of approximately 1.5 million bpd (August 2017 to
February 2021) is large enough to potentially affect prices. However, numerous factors (e.g.,
demand/supply balances, OPEC production decisions, and general economic conditions) can
influence oil and petroleum product prices. As a result, it is difficult to quantify effects on crude
oil and petroleum product (e.g., gasoline) prices directly attributable to U.S. economic sanctions.
Changes to U.S. refinery imports of Venezuelan crude oil are quantifiable. Prior to the start of oil
sector sanctions, U.S. refineries imported between 500,000 and 700,000 barrels per day of crude
oil from Venezuela. Crude oil imports from Venezuela ended in April 2019. Refineries that
previously purchased crude oil from PdVSA were required to source alternative crude oils from
122 For addit ional informat ion about how sanct ions aff ect oil market s and prices, see CRS Report R46213, Oil Market
Effects from U.S. Econom ic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela , by P hillip Brown.
123 For addit ional …
IN BRIEF
By Rocio Cara Labrador February 5, 2019 4:00 pm (EST)
Maduro’s Allies: Who Backs the Venezuelan
Regime?
The staying power of Nicolas Maduro’s embattled government may hinge on
three critical allies: Russia, China, and Cuba.
The decision by the United States and a growing number of other countries to
recognize a little-known opposition figure as interim president of Venezuela has cast a
spotlight on the failing petrostate’s chief foreign backers. Without the continued
support of Russia, China, and Cuba, it is unlikely President Nicolas Maduro’s
government will last for long.
Russia
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Russia has been one of Venezuela’s closest allies since 2006, when President Hugo
Chavez, a socialist strongman and fierce critic of the United States, signed a $2.9 billion
arms deal in exchange for Russian fighter aircraft. The relationship allowed Russia
access to Venezuelan oil assets at below-market prices. Today, Russia’s ties to the
country are significant:
Political. Venezuela remains a strategic political foothold for Russia as it seeks to offset
U.S. influence in Latin America and elsewhere. Russia is one of five permanent, veto-
wielding members of the UN Security Council, and it has threatened to block any
council resolutions to suspend Venezuela from the United Nations. The Kremlin has
condemned the Trump administration’s recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido
and warned the United States and its allies against a military intervention.
Military. Russia is Venezuela’s largest supplier of weapons, having sold the country more
than $10 billion in hardware since the mid-2000s, including assault rifles, jet fighters,
tanks, and missile systems. The two nations also conduct joint military exercises, and
Russian jets and warships make regular stopovers. In a recent show of force, two
Russian bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons visited Venezuela.
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Maduro’s Allies: Who Backs the Venezuelan Regime?
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/venezuelas-chavez-era
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council
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https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/01/24/russia-warns-trump-against-military-intervention-venezuela/2665555002/
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/americas/venezuela-news-maduro-russia.html
https://www.navytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/12/10/russia-sends-2-nuclear-capable-bombers-to-venezuela/
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Economic. Russia has been a lender of last resort. In late 2017, Moscow bailed Venezuela
out by restructuring more than $3 billion in sovereign debt, which allowed the Maduro
government to meet its obligations to other creditors. Meanwhile, Russia’s state-backed
oil giant, Rosneft, is one of Venezuela’s largest foreign backers, loaning it roughly $2.5
billion in recent years in exchange for future energy shipments. Rosneft also co-owns
several oil and gas projects with PDVSA, Venezuela’s state energy company—which was
just sanctioned by the United States—and it has a 49 percent stake in Citgo, PDVSA’s
U.S. refining arm.
China
Economic. China has been Venezuela’s other major financial crutch. It views the
socialist regime in Venezuela as a geopolitical ally and an important trading partner.
Over the past decade, Beijing has lent Caracas some $70 billion, mostly for development
projects, in exchange for future oil shipments. Analysts estimate the Maduro regime
owes China about $13 billion. China is behind only the United States and India as an
importer of Venezuelan crude. However, President Xi Jinping has thus far refused to
restructure Venezuela’s outstanding loans, and some experts suggest China could shift
its support to Guaido if he were to guarantee full repayment of Chinese loans.
Maduro’s Allies: Who Backs the Venezuelan Regime?
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https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/after-geneva-summit-daunting-diplomacy-ahead-us-and-russia
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https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-watch-biden-putin-summit
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https://www.cfr.org/report/united-states-china-and-taiwan-strategy-prevent-war
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/venezuela-s-choking-points-here-s-where-maduro-gets-his-revenue
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Political. While Beijing has continued its support for Maduro in recent years, its loyalty
largely depends on Caracas’s capacity to pay its debts. In recent years, China has grown
increasingly wary of Venezuela defaulting on its payments, and it has opened
communication channels with the opposition. Even so, China—which, like Russia, has a
permanent seat on the Security Council—objects to UN intervention in Venezuela’s
political affairs.
Cuba
Security. The island nation is Venezuela’s main political supporter in Latin America, and
it reportedly supplies the Maduro regime with large numbers of security and military
advisors to spy on the military ranks, as well as to provide other intelligence.
Chinese President Xi Jinping walks next to Venezuelas President Nicolas Maduro during a welcoming ceremony in Beijing in
September 2018. Miraf lores Palace/Reuters
Maduro’s Allies: Who Backs the Venezuelan Regime?
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-counts-the-costs-of-its-big-bet-on-venezuela-11549038825
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/world/americas/venezuela-cuba-oil.html
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Economic. Cuba has been providing Venezuela with hundreds of doctors, nurses,
teachers, engineers, and other professionals since 2000, when Chavez agreed to supply
Cuba with discounted oil. In 2017, there were as many as fifteen thousand Cubans
living in Venezuela.
What to Look For
Maduro’s allies have enabled him to maintain his grip on power despite years of
domestic unrest and growing international pressure to step down. Decisions by Russia,
China, and, to a lesser extent, Cuba to withdraw their support could prove the Maduro
regime’s undoing. On the other hand, increasing their assistance could extend Maduro’s
reign. Ultimately, what comes next rests on the strength of Maduro’s alliances.
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T H U, S E P 1 2 , 2 0 1 9
Russia’s intervention in Venezuela: What’s at stake?
Report by John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak
Related Experts: John E. Herbst, Jason Marczak, Mark D. Simakovsky, Diego Area
Democratic Transitions Economic Sanctions National Security
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Rule of Law Russia United States and Canada
Venezuela
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with his Venezuelan counterpart Nicolas Maduro during a meeting at the Novo-Ogaryovo
state residence outside Moscow, Russia December 5, 2018. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
Key points
Absent of civil war, Venezuela is su�ering the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in recent memory. Malnourished children
search for their next meal. Parents lack access to even the most basic medicine for their families. Rampant in�ation makes
money instantaneously worthless, while general lawlessness provides a breeding ground for illicit trade with tentacles that
reach from the Americas to Europe and beyond.
It is an astonishing crash for a country bestowed with the world’s largest oil reserves and that was once a beacon of
prosperity and a thriving democracy. Today, twenty years after Hugo Chávez became president and six years after his
successor, Nicolás Maduro, inherited the presidential palace, Venezuela’s breakneck descent into one of the world’s top
crises has renewed a push for democratic change. Following Maduro’s assumption of a fraudulent new term in o�ce,
much of the world’s attention and optimism turned to Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly, and as of January
23, 2019, the interim president of Venezuela is now recognized by more than �fty democracies.
But Guaidó and other democratic forces face headwinds for reasons beyond the repression and violence unleashed by
the Maduro regime. External actors are using Venezuela as a battleground for their own sel�sh national interests,
bolstering the corrupt and faltering Maduro regime. Cuba, Turkey, China, and, importantly for this analysis, Russia, are key
actors that have provided lifelines of support to Maduro and his cronies. These external forces, each in their own way, are
frustrating the will of the Venezuelan people to restore democracy. A poll taken in April 2019 by the Atlantic Council’s
Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center found that 62 percent of Venezuelans see Russia in either a negative light or as a
direct threat to peace or national sovereignty—a clear repudiation of Russia’s increasingly assertive role in Venezuela.
Deepening Kremlin involvement in Venezuelas economy
Moscow sowing further instability in the United States’ own
hemisphere
Russia frustrating efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela
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https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/john-e-herbst/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/jason-marczak/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/mark-d-simakovsky/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/diego-area/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/democratic-transitions/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/economic-sanctions/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/national-security/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/peacekeeping-and-peacebuilding/
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https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/russia/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/united-states-canada/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/venezuela/
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Why has Moscow thrown its weight behind Maduro? The answer is rooted partly in the increasingly di�cult relations
between Moscow and Washington over the past �fteen years, as well as in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original
foreign policy vision dating back to his �rst days in o�ce.
That vision has several critical elements, which have driven Kremlin policy for most of the millennium and bu�et traditional
Russian, and Soviet objectives in the Western Hemisphere:
A late addition to the list was the imperative to thwart “color revolutions,” in which civil society groups drive anti-
democratic leaders from power—as seen by Putin’s response to the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.
Consistent with these policy drivers, the Kremlin has pursued an increasingly robust and mutually advantageous
relationship with the leftist regime in Caracas since Chávez �rst reached out to Putin in 2000. By 2003, the two had met
President Putin meets with Nicolás Maduro in Moscow on December 5, 2018. (Left to right) Nicolás Maduro, President Vladimir
Putin, his translator, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, Russian career diplomat Yuri Ushakov,
and Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. Photo: President of Russia
restoring Russia as a great power on the international stage that has the ability to in�uence issues in
every corner of the globe;
ensuring Russian hegemony in the “near abroad,” the independent countries that were part of the
Soviet Union and the tsarist empire;
substituting a multipolar international system for the US-dominated unipolar system of the 1990s and
early 2000s;
preventing “color revolutions” that the Kremlin believes overthrow legitimate, if corrupt and un-
democratic, governments around the world;
serving as a spoiler to the United States, undercutting US interests where possible, and using
peripheral issues like Venezuela to sustain US-Russian dialogue and Russia’s role as an arbiter of
international security; and
undermining the rules-based liberal international order, which restricts Moscow’s pursuit of its
declared interests in its neighborhood and globally, and the transatlantic alliance that undergirds that
order.
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three times. For Putin, these contacts would be particularly useful as relations between the United States and Russia
entered a downward spiral. The next decade and a half would bring the Rose and Orange revolutions, Putin’s sharp
denunciation of the United States and the West at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, the Kremlin’s
cyberattack on Estonia in the summer of 2007, its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and
annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas in 2014, the Kremlin’s escalation in Syria in 2015 and challenge to American allies
and forces there, and Moscow’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election.
The political utility of the tie to Venezuela was evident in 2008, when Moscow sent TU-160 strategic bombers to
Venezuela for a joint naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea. This served as a counterpoint to US support for an
increasingly pro-Western Ukraine and for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili during Moscow’s war on Georgia; Chávez
o�ered Russia the use of a Caribbean coastal air base in 2010.
Economic considerations provided additional reasons for Moscow to develop closer relations with Caracas. Venezuela
became a signi�cant market for Russian energy companies and arms makers, as Venezuela used Russian credits to buy $4
billion worth of weapons from 2005 to 2008; the principal Russian oil company, Rosneft, began to invest heavily in
Venezuela.
Russian Interests and Assets in Venezuela
Moscow’s backing of Maduro supports every element of Kremlin policy listed above. It intends to demonstrate Moscow’s
great power reach, thwart US policy in its own hemisphere, and underscore that a multipolar world will replace the era of
American predominance. For some Russian thinkers, it presents a potential “spheres-of-in�uence” bargain: Moscow could
drop Maduro in exchange for Washington giving Moscow free rein in its own sphere of in�uence in Ukraine, Georgia, and
Moldova. Moreover, Kremlin policy seeks to undermine the international liberal order by supporting a friendly authoritarian
ruler fraudulently “re-elected” and on the verge of falling to a democratic movement.
In Venezuela as well as Syria, the Kremlin defends its strongman allies against the consequences of elections or protests,
at least in part to keep the contagion of regime change from spreading to its own shores. The success of Moscow’s policy
in Venezuela rests on its military, economic, and �nancial clout. Russia’s investments and loans to Venezuela are certainly
sizeable, but they have only kept Maduro a�oat. As of July 2019, Venezuela currently owes $10 billion for the purchase of
36 Russian Su-30MK2s �ghter jets, $1.1 billion for Rosneft investment into Venezuelan oil�eld development, and has
received more than $4 billion of investment from Russia, according to Russian Economic Development Ministry. Given
Russia’s present economic status, it is clear while these numbers are only a fraction of Russia’s total assets, Moscow
continues to show a strong political commitment to Venezuela through its sale of military equipment, sending military
advisors, and receiving high-pro�le visits from Maduro and members of his regime to the Kremlin.
Counting its nuclear and conventional arsenals, Russia is the world’s second-ranking military power, and over the past
�ve years, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to deploy forces well beyond its neighborhood. Russia’s principal area of
forward deployment has been Syria, where it has deployed the S-300 surface-to-air missile system, scores of surface-to-
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Alongside the two TU-160 strategic bombers (pictured) sent to Caracas in December 2018, Moscow
continues to shore up its military presence in the region with hardware and advisors. Photo:
Wikimedia Commons/Mil.ru
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air bombers, Spetznatz forces, and the Wagner mercenary group. Moscow has also deployed Wagner to Africa and Latin
America.
Russia’s increased intervention in Syria in the fall of 2015 prevented the fall of President Bashar Assad’s regime, which had
been steadily losing ground to various opposition groups. Moscow’s growing military cooperation with Caracas from the
2005 arms sales was initially much less ambitious. It served to strengthen a friendly regime through arms sales and to
signal to Washington that Russia could operate militarily in the Western Hemisphere. Kremlin strategists saw this as a
suitable response to US support for Georgia and Ukraine.
But the starkly deteriorating circumstances in Venezuela over the past eighteen months have added a new urgency to this
cooperation. Once again, Putin intervened to shore up an ally who was in danger of losing power. His �rst play—sending
two TU-160s in December 2018 —was dramatic but not particularly e�ective: while it signaled Moscow’s ability to put
strategic weapons close to the United States, the bombers would o�er Maduro no help against an enraged populace
seeking his ouster. But as Maduro weakened in the �rst months of 2019, Putin supplied the same S-300 systems to
Maduro that he had provided Assad. This play had two objectives. First, the S-300s could help deter US military
intervention on behalf of Guaidó, whom Washington and other Western countries had recognized as the legitimate leader
of Venezuela. (The Trump Administration publicly had left all options on the table for dealing with the growing chaos in
Venezuela.) Second, the S-300s came with Russian “experts” (soldiers), who, along with the thousands of Cuban
intelligence personnel in country, could provide security for Maduro.
By some measures, the Russian deployment was a success: talk of a US intervention largely ceased, although it was
unlikely the United States would intervene in the �rst place, especially given the checkered history of US military activity in
the region.
Economically, too, Russia’s help has been invaluable to Maduro, despite Russia’s own economic vulnerabilities. The
Russian economy has stagnated since at least 2012 and has been hit hard the past �ve years by the decline in
hydrocarbon prices and sanctions resulting from its war against Ukraine. After the gross national product (GNP) fell in 2014
and 2015, its recovery has averaged annual growth of around 2 percent since 2016, and the standard of living remains
stagnant.
But the Russian economy is still the eleventh largest in the world—down from the ninth-largest in 2013. More importantly,
Putin is willing to subordinate economic interests to geopolitical advantage and has done so in Venezuela. In the early
2000s, major Russian hydrocarbon �rms Gazprom, Rosneft, TNK-BP, Surgutneftegaz, and Lukoil were looking to invest in
Venezuela; Gazprom won the rights to explore for gas o�shore Venezuela in 2006. Under Kremlin guidance, Gazprom
and other Russian hydrocarbon �rms formed the National Petroleum Consortium, which in 2010 signed a contract with
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) to set up a joint venture to extract heavy oil reserves in the Orinoco River Basin.
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In 2014, Rosneft, the largest oil producer in Russia and the number two gas producer, bought out Gazprom and the other
Russian �rms to take control of the National Petroleum Consortium. Led by Putin intimate Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s
activities frequently re�ect the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions. Rosneft’s role in Venezuela was to provide a major subsidy
to the government in the form of $6.5 billion in loans to Petroleos de Venezuela in the 2014 to 2016 timeframe for
providing 133,000 barrels a day of oil. While Rosneft has become Venezuela’s largest oil trader, taking 44 percent of
PDVSA exports in July and 66 percent in August, only a fraction of the energy �elds to which it has access have been
developed. The value of these holdings and the untapped reserves beneath them provide the Kremlin with ways of
clawing back their sunk costs, regardless of the outcome of Maduro’s regime. It could either seek long-term pro�ts and
develop energy infrastructure should Maduro stay in power, or, should the regime collapse, it could cash in and sell the
rights to other foreign companies before mounting any further losses.
As of 2018, only half of the contracted oil had been delivered, but the prepayments provided urgent funds to Moscow’s
Venezuelan partners in time for the 2015 parliamentary elections. Moscow’s willingness to pay this subsidy is also
signi�cant because it came as hydrocarbon prices plunged by 50 percent, Ukraine-related sanctions started to bite,
gross domestic product (GDP) fell by over 3 percent, and the standard of living dropped by over 9 percent. Even as the
Russian economy took blow after blow, the Kremlin took on new economic burdens to shore up its ally in the Western
Hemisphere, proving itself a steadfast partner for Caracas.
Rosneft has become Venezuela’s largest oil trader, taking 66 percent of PDVSA oil
exports in August 2019, up from 44\% in July.
Olga Yagova, Chen Aizhu, Marianna Parraga, “Rosneft becomes top
Venezuelan oil trader, helping o�set U.S. pressure”, Reuters, August 29,
2019.
The Kremlin has also helped dull some of the sting of US sanctions on Venezuela. In 2018, the small Russian bank
Evro�nance Mosnarbank began to sell Venezuela’s new cryptocurrency, the petro, created speci�cally to help Caracas
get access to funds despite the sanctions. Evro�nance Mosnarbank is the natural venue to issue the petro: the
government of Venezuela has a 49 percent share of the bank and the other shares belong to VTB and Gazprombank—
both of which are under sanctions prompted by Moscow’s war on Ukraine. Rosneft currently circumvents sanctions by
trading oil as part of debt servicing agreements with Caracas and PDVSA, which currently owes $1.1 billion as of the end of
the second quarter of 2019. This system of a direct exchange of debt for oil has allowed both Moscow and Caracas to
pro�t despite the sanctions currently in place, with Moscow becoming the leading marketer of Venezuelan oil and
adding to its in�uence on global markets and Caracas �nding new means to service its debt and appease its supporters in
the Kremlin. Moves like these allow Moscow to support its ally and help it to create a counter �nancial system to the one
dominated by the West.
Moscow’s Gains Thus Far: A Real Win?
The Kremlin views its policy in Venezuela as a success. Moscow aims to use its relationship with Caracas as a point of
leverage over the United States—to respond to US support for governments in Georgia and Ukraine that it does not like.
PDVSA has developed large re�nery facilities to process raw materials for export such as the Paraguaná Re�nery Complex
(pictured) on Venezuela’s Caribbean coast. Rosneft has become Venezuela’s largest oil trader, taking 44 percent of PDVSA
exports in July and 66 percent in August, 2019. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Luis Ovalles
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Moreover, Maduro’s future quickly became more precarious in early 2019, with the United States hinting about using its
military to oust him. In response, Putin deployed the S-300s and Russian “trainers” arrived to prop up Maduro.
Washington paused talk about all options being on the table. So Putin places Venezuela alongside Syria as a place
where he saved “his guy” and prevented the West from putting its preferred leader to take power.
Moscow also has something to gain economically from its presence in Venezuela, as it seeks to take advantage of a self-
in�icted withdrawal of US energy companies from Venezuela. The US decision to temporarily extend General License 8,
which allows US companies a temporary stay of presence in Venezuela, may not be extended again in October. If not, US
companies’ withdrawal from Venezuela would be a boon to Russian and Chinese, energy companies. Both could acquire
turnkey operations on US invested production facilities.
Yet Moscow’s Venezuelan position is not without risk and cost. Over the past �fteen years, Moscow has bought itself close
relations with an increasingly authoritarian, incompetent, and illegitimate regime. The money that Russian �rms put into the
Venezuelan economy—which has paid no dividends—simply helped the Maduro regime get past the 2015 elections.
Russian companies are losing money in Venezuela, and many have chosen to close up shop and head back to Moscow.
Most importantly, the country’s already dismal economic plight is only getting worse. Maduro clings to o�ce only thanks to
the counterintelligence support of Cuba and the loyalty of Venezuela’s military, which is not assured as the country’s deep
su�ering grows. And supporting Maduro will only become more costly for the Kremlin. Polls by the independent Levada
Center, for example, show that a growing majority of Russians believe the country is spending too much on foreign
adventures and not enough at home. What’s more, the Venezuela strategy undermines one of Russia’s major foreign
policy goals; to create a multipolar world in part by encouraging unity and common cause among the BRICS countries, the
association of �ve major emerging national economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Moscow’s support
for Maduro has driven a wedge between Russia and Brazil, the South American member of BRICS, which considers the
Maduro regime a regional disaster.
Putin faces one more danger from his Venezuelan adventure that dwarfs all the others. The Venezuelan deployments are
di�cult to support logistically, and Moscow’s ability to deploy conventional forces in the Western Hemisphere cannot
compare to US capabilities. If the United States were to send its military to oust Maduro, there is little Putin could do about
it. In that case, Putin would face the worst of all worlds: the loss of an ally whom he had vowed to protect, at the hands of
his geopolitical foe.
Putin surely understands his military’s conventional inferiority to US forces, but he has repeatedly risked confrontation,
expecting Washington to blink. For more than �ve years, Russian warplanes and ships have harassed American ships and
planes, approaching too close and at times with their transponders turned o�. More critically, Russian Wagner mercenaries
repeatedly challenged US-supported opposition groups, accompanied by US forces, in Syria in 2017 and 2018. The last
incident, in February 2018, provoked a US strike that killed hundreds of Russian �ghters. Instead of protesting or
retaliating, the Kremlin simply disavowed the mercenaries. Moscow could face a similar situation in Venezuela, especially
given reports earlier this year that it had sent mercenaries to Caracas.
Four Scenarios: How might Russia Respond?
Although the situation in Venezuela is at an impasse, it remains highly �uid, with Maduro feeling emboldened on the one
hand, but the interim government striving to sustain its momentum on the other. Guaidó is recognized as president by
democracies around the world, and his government has legitimate representation at the Inter-American Development
Bank. The Lima Group—which includes Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—has condemned the Maduro regime and sought international pressure
to force Caracas to hold new elections. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), on the heels of a scathing report following
the July 2019 visit to Venezuela by United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, has
again stepped up its vocal denunciations of the atrocities committed by the Maduro regime and threatened new action.
This report stresses an immediate need for Maduro to take strides to rectify the nation’s ongoing crisis. Drawing from 558
interviews with a wide range of actors, the report documents the criminalization of political opponents, the militarization of
Venezuelan institutions, and the state’s inability to ensure the citizens’ rights to food, health, economic opportunity, and
security.
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Meanwhile, day-to-day life in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Food insecurity and malnutrition are at sky-high levels.
As noted in the Bachelet report, in April 2019 the Venezuelan minimum wage, which sits around $7 per month, only covers
4.7 percent of the basic food basket. More than 80 percent of households in Venezuela are food insecure, with the
majority of those interviewed as part of the Bachelet investigation consuming only one meal per day. The report
highlights that, as a result of hyperin�ation and the disintegration of Venezuelan food production, an estimated 3.7 million
Venezuelans are malnourished. Children and pregnant women are the demographics most likely to su�er from
malnutrition in Venezuela. Survival is a struggle. As a result, Venezuelan refugees �led more asylum claims globally in
2018 than citizens of any other country, including Syria. If the situation does not improve, the number of Venezuelan
migrants and refugees is expected to reach around 8 million in 2020, surpassing total Syrian migration numbers by more
than 3 million.
Although the situation is clearly untenable, there are several likely scenarios for Venezuela. Each will have implications for
Moscow, which is not likely to sit by quietly. What should the international community be prepared for?
Scenario 1. Ongoing Stalemate with Continued Repression by Maduro
One likely scenario is sustainment of the status quo, with the Guaidó government accelerating its international support but
unable to remove the Maduro regime. Under this scenario, protests continue, but pose no threat to Maduro. The regime
continues its repression, with periodic crackdowns that can become violent. National Assembly representatives are
increasingly persecuted and more elected o�cials go into hiding or exile. As a result, the opposition loses some capacity
to organize within Venezuela, while interim government leaders in the diaspora increasingly adopt the more militant
perspectives.
International Response: The United States will continue to ramp up sanctions, increasingly targeting the countries with
which Maduro conspires, though illegal trade keeps the regime a�oat. The international community could even block oil
tankers, gold smugglers, and drug tra�ckers from entering or leaving the country. This requires support from Venezuela’s
neighbors on land as well as from countries in the Caribbean. The EU places more sanctions on speci�c individuals and
blocks assets of regime o�cials in key countries.
Russian Response: With the United States continuing to support Guaidó but no longer hinting at an intervention, Moscow
sees its backing of Maduro as a low-cost way to sow instability in the United States’ hemisphere. Russia continues
occasional military deployments to Venezuela as an irritant to Washington but does not need to devote considerably more
Juan Guaidó (Left) meets with US Vice President Mike Pence (right) and Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez (center) in
Bogota in February, 2019. Much of the world’s attention and optimism turned to Guaidó and as of January 23, 2019, the interim
president of Venezuela, as of now recognized by more than �fty democracies. O�cial White House Photo by D. Myles Cullen
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resources or time to keep the situation at a simmer. The Russians keep helping the Maduro regime to evade sanctions
and, together with Turkey, China, Cuba, and other key allies, allow him to survive another day.
Scenario 2. Power Vacuum
Maduro leaves o�ce amid divisions among his likely successors, while only some security forces support the interim
government, and a power vacuum arises. No one—the government, Guaidó, the police, the military—has control over the
entire country. Energy assets, in which Russia is heavily invested, are at risk. Irregular armed forces tighten their control
over some territory, with the potential to mount terrorism attacks, as in Colombia in the past. Illegal trade grows without
check, and Venezuela becomes an even more fruitful spot for international terror networks to operate. The Bolivarian
Colectivos—irregular armed groups who carry out orders directly from Maduro—ramp up their attacks in urban areas to
cement their control during a time in which these groups are threatened as well. The armed forces supporting the
interim government focus on providing protection only to critical government assets while the rest of the country falls into
increasing disarray as security forces devolve into small bands struggling for day-to-day survival.
International Response: Venezuela’s neighbors could call on the United States for support to restore order, and the interim
government could ask for US advisors. If requested by the Guaidó government, a multilateral force through the Lima
Group—as part of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty—could be organized. In July
2019, the Guaidó government formally requested to rejoin the Rio Treaty, which states that an attack against one member
country is an attack on all members. The interim government might also request a formal UN peacekeeping mission.
Finally, the international community could respond with massive shipments of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, which would
then face the prospect of sabotage by armed groups.
Russian Response: Putin might …
Home ▶ Publications
Could China Play a Role in
Venezuela’s Crisis?
China’s �nancial commitments in Venezuela could
potentially get Beijing o� the sideline and into the
peace process.
Tuesday, July 27, 2021 / BY: Anthony Navone
PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis and Commentary
Few countries can rival the creditor-lender relationship between China and
Venezuela on pure volume. China has loaned more money to Venezuela — some
$60 billion — than to any other country in the world and is Venezuela’s largest lender
by far. But as Venezuela descends further into uncertainty amid a host of economic,
political and social crises, Beijing has remained mostly silent regarding the domestic
political struggles of one its largest trading partners in Latin America.
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People wait in line as Red Cross workers distributed water containers and potable water puri�cation
tablets in Caracas, Venezuela, April 16, 2019. (Meridith Kohut/The New York Times)
“China has more or less had its head in the sand, neither overtly criticizing Venezuela, nor
o�ering as much support as other countries like Russia,” said Matthew Ferchen, a
research fellow at Leiden University in the Netherlands, who authored a USIP Special
Report on China-Venezuela relations.
Still, some see this historically strong bilateral relationship as an untapped source of
momentum for resolving Venezuela’s crises. Speaking at a USIP-hosted event,
Ambassador Thomas Shannon, Jr., a former undersecretary for political a�airs at the U.S.
State Department, said, “There are a variety of ways in which China can be engaged and a
variety of ways in which it can be moved to play a more helpful role in addressing whats
happening inside Venezuela.”
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Whether China remains on the sidelines in Venezuela or becomes an active partner in the
search for peace will be determined, in part, by whether the international community can
�nd areas of shared interest with Beijing and create new opportunities for Chinese
engagement.
The modern relationship between China and Venezuela dates back to roughly 2003,
when China began expanding its lending in Latin America. With a massive domestic
demand for oil, Beijing and the China Development Bank (CDB) quickly keyed in on
Venezuela’s rich oil industry — issuing loans backed by Venezuelan oil sales that created
an economic boom for both countries. “The China-Venezuela relationship was really billed
as the poster child for Chinas win-win rhetoric,” said Ferchen.
In tandem with the economic boom, the bilateral relationship enjoyed a blossoming
diplomatic exchange. “[China’s] presence and in�uence in the region has expanded and
diversi�ed so fast, starting with trade and investment, but really moving into all other
sectors and aspects of life,” said Adriana Erthal Abdenur, the executive director of
Plataforma CIPÓ in Brazil.
Relationship Boom — And Bust
China’s Potential Role in Venezuela’s Political and HuChina’s Potential Role in Venezuela’s Political and Hu……
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However, this mutually bene�cial relationship was centered on China’s dealings with one
person in particular: then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. After Chavez’s death in
2013, and after the subsequent oil market crash of 2014, the relationship between China
and Venezuela hit a number of roadblocks as the oil-driven Venezuelan economy began
to sputter and then rapidly declined. Increasingly concerned that the current Venezuelan
economic model would never be able to produce consistent growth and reimburse
lenders, Chinese o�cials cut o� lending to Venezuela entirely in 2016.
Still, Venezuela remains China’s fourth largest oil importer. Beijing also continues to
diplomatically support Chavez’s successor, President Nicolás Maduro. “The importance of
Venezuela to China is quite large, no matter what kind of political situation there is,” said
Mengqi Yuan, a researcher on China-Latin America issues at Tsinghua University.
In fact, Yuan argued that the relationship between China and Venezuela is still on good
footing, despite the turbulence of recent years. She pointed to the medical assistance
China sent to help Venezuela weather the COVID-19 pandemic and Maduro’s public
support for — and commitment to participate in — China’s Belt and Road Initiative as
evidence that the relationship has not soured completely.
Yuan and others attributed China’s reluctance to engage with Venezuela to Beijing’s
stated position of non-interference when it comes to the domestic political matters of
foreign partners. This position, combined with China’s new dual circulation development
strategy that places an emphasis on its own domestic development, creates an
environment where “China is not putting that much e�ort” into growing its foreign
in�uence beyond current initiatives such as the Belt and Road, said Mengqi.
But China is under increased pressure to alter course, given its outsized in�uence in Latin
America. “There is a growing expectation of positive constructive engagements by
external actors,” said Abdenur. “And of course, that includes China.”
Silent on Political and Humanitarian Issues
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With millions of Venezuelan refugees �eeing to other countries in the region, Abdenur
says China’s lack of action on migrant issues is particularly notable: “Historically, when
China engages with issues of refugees, it tends to either be very stando�sh or focus on
the issue of whether China itself should accept refugees.”
Participants agreed that any positive outcome to engagement with China on Venezuela
must include the protection of China’s economic and larger political interests. “Its
important to understand that China will not be driven out of Venezuela,” said Shannon.
“And it will not be talked out of Venezuela either, unless there is an accommodation that
protects Chinese interests.” This has traditionally been seen as an impediment to progress
but could also produce opportunities if the way forward could produce stability in a future
economic relationship.
“Chinas pragmatists make it necessary to take into account its interests,” said Marialbert
Barrios, deputy of Primero Justicia in Venezuela’s National Assembly. “Their interest has to
do with [Venezuela’s] ability to pay the debt that exists with China, but also with the
possibilities that China can continue to invest in the country in the future [without]
uncertainty.”
The inclination to preserve its interests has been a hallmark of China’s foreign policy over
the last two decades. Joe Tucker, a senior expert at USIP, witnessed just how much e�ort
China devoted to ensuring its political and economic interests were protected during the
2005 Sudan peace process.
Chinese o�cials stepped into an “interesting but quiet” role in negotiating South
Sudanese access to Sudanese ports to export oil — a move that was meant to “not only
preserve economic interests, but create a more conducive situation for peace,” according
to Tucker.
Protecting Chinese Interests
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At the same time, Chinese o�cials were also hesitant to engage on complicated issues
unrelated to Chinese investments. However, this hesitance wasn’t seen as a negative, as
the United States and others knew that China’s narrow engagement on areas of interest
lent a helping hand to the process overall. “I dont think the Chinese would have felt
comfortable engaging on security arrangements on disputed border areas, and that was
�ne,” said Tucker.
For Abdenur, moments like those are “very important precedents to point out if were
trying to think of constructive engagement, even beyond the political level.”
One key to getting China to engage in Venezuela, therefore, is to �nd issue areas where
Beijing’s interests and those of the broader international community and Venezuela
intersect.
In the 2005 Sudan peace process, that issue was South Sudan. “When it became clear
that that peace really hinged on the timely conduct of a referendum on South Sudans
independence, the Sudan policies of China and the U.S. actually converged,” said Tucker.
In moments like that, Tucker stressed the need for �exibility and “to engage on the widest
possible range of issues so that issues of interest can be aligned, even if one party is
focusing on an economic issue or a political issue.”
It also means allowing China to work more through international groups such as the
United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank — organizations that the United
States and others have recently blocked China from engaging in. “The extent to which we
have attempted to block and prevent China from playing a signi�cant role in regional
institutions has actually limited what those institutions can do for Venezuela,” said
Shannon. “This has not been helpful for U.S. policy.”
On the issue of refugees, Abdenur pointed out that while China has traditionally been
reticent to accept refugees or engage in the UNHCR, it has started to play more of a role
Converging Interests
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in humanitarian and refugee crises. Examples include assistance for refugees from South
Sudan, Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories, which could be a model for Chinese
support to Venezuelan refugees in Latin America.
Meanwhile, Tucker said the involvement of the African Union in the 2005 Sudan
negotiations was paramount for lending legitimacy and stability to proceedings: “If another
stakeholder, maybe [a] non-African regional bloc or entity tried to do this, I wonder if China
… would have taken as proactive and helpful a role.”
China has maintained good relationships with similar regional blocs, such as the
Organization of American States and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States, which could allow for opportunities to engage with the region as a whole.
However, this path is not without challenges. “Unfortunately, were living through a
moment here in South America in which regional arrangements and cooperation initiatives
are either paralyzed due to political in�ghting … or lack of commitment,” said Abdenur.
Still, increased Chinese engagement in Venezuela will depend as much upon converging
interests as it does on opening doors for cooperation that have traditionally been shut.
“I think in many ways, the big challenge that were going to face in the 21st century is not
how the United States and China compete,” said Shannon. “I think the big challenge is
going to be how we cooperate and how we collaborate, and how we �nd a way to keep
the peace and ensure that together we can address signi�cant problems.”
ISSUE AREAS
Peace Processes
Global Policy
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CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 1
Contemporary Cuban-Venezuelan relations blossomed in the late 1990s, due in large part
to the close mentor-pupil relationship between then-presidents Fidel Castro Ruz and Hugo
Chávez Frías. Their affinity grew into an ideological and then strategic partnership. Today,
these ties that bind are more relevant than ever, as Cuban security officials exercise influ-
ence in Venezuela and help maintain the Nicolás Maduro government in power. Details of the
relationship, however, remain shrouded in secrecy, complicating any assessment of Cuba’s
role in Venezuela. The Venezuelan and Cuban governments have not been transparent about
the size and scope of any contingent of Cuban military and security professionals operating
in Venezuela. In fact, Havana claims that there are no Cuban security personnel in Venezuela,
but merely medical staff supporting humanitarian missions.1 At the same time, the United
1 Sergio Alejandro Gómez and Ismael Francisco, “Cuba no puede retirar sus tropas de Venezuela, porque no existen, asegura el Minrex,”
Cuba Debate, May 1, 2019, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2019/05/01/cuba-no-puede-retirar-sus-tropas-de-venezuela-porque-no-
existen-asegura-el-minrex/#.XUF5C3dFyUl; Yuniel Labacena Romero, “Emociones con los «militares» cubanos que están en Venezuela,”
Juventud Rebelde, May 23, 2019, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2019-05-23/emociones-con-los-militares-cubanos-
que-estan-venezuela.
“Cuba es el mar de la felicidad. Hacia allá va Venezuela.”
(“Cuba is a sea of happiness. That’s where Venezuela is going.”)
—Hugo Chávez Frías, March 8, 2000
Venezuela and Cuba: The Ties that Bind
CONTENTS
I. Two Nations, One
Revolution: The Evolution
of Contemporary Cuba-
Venezuela Relations
By Brian Fonseca and
John Polga-Hecimovich
II. The Geopolitics of
Cuba–Venezuela-U.S.
Relations:
An Informal Note
By Richard E. Feinberg
I. Two Nations, One Revolution: The Evolution of
Contemporary Cuba-Venezuela Relations
By Brian Fonseca and John Polga-Hecimovich
Latin American Program | January 2020
A portrait of the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in between the Cuban and Venezuelan flags. Credit: Chávez Fusterlandia (On the left) A silhouetted profile of Fidel Castro in his military cap says “the best friend.”
Dan Lundberg, March 18, 2016 / Shutterstock
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS2
States and others have at times exaggerated the number of Cuban security forces in Vene-
zuela for political purposes.2 Despite the lack of transparency and exaggerations regarding
Cuban security professionals operating in Venezuela, it is evident that Cuban security training
and technical assistance has aided the Venezuelan government to establish a firewall against
internal and external threats.
At the outset of this partnership, Castro provided mentorship to Chávez in the areas of
health, politics, and security and intelligence. In return, Chávez helped underwrite Cuba at
a time of economic hardship and diminishing relevance in the international system follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the texture of Cuban-Venezuelan relations
remains consistent with the areas of cooperation borne of the Chávez-Castro relationship,
the intensity and depth of engagement slowly faded under presidents Raúl Castro and
Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba and Maduro in Venezuela—with the notable exception of Cu-
ban security and intelligence support to the Venezuelan leadership. Although it is difficult
to assess the number of Cubans assisting the Venezuelan government and their precise
roles, it is clear that Havana has a compelling economic and political interest in the Maduro
government’s survival.
This essay will explore three periods of Cuban-Venezuelan relations during the past 20 years.
The first period comprised a series of bilateral agreements, including the Comprehensive
Cooperation Agreement (Convenio Integral de Cooperación), and spanned Chávez’s arrival to
power in 1999 and lasted until 2004. The second period involved an increase in the exchange
of goods and the institutionalization and regionalization of relations. It began with rising oil
prices and the creation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bo-
livariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, ALBA) in 2004 and lasted until Chávez’s death
in 2013. The third stage spans the Maduro presidency from 2013 to the present. This period
coincides with a fall in oil prices, Venezuela’s economic and political crisis, and a stronger role
for Cuban political, military and intelligence advisers in Venezuela.
Two Nations, One Revolution (1999-2004)
Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez first met in 1994 following Chávez’s release from prison after
his failed 1992 coup attempt against President Carlos Andrés Pérez. In his visit to Cuba,
Chávez gave an impassioned speech at the University of Havana in which he praised the
country as a “stronghold of Latin American dignity” that must be emulated.3 However, the
relationship did not begin to take form until Chávez’s election to the Venezuelan presidency
2 This includes the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States and anti-Castro civil society organizations, which have
exaggerated claims about the size of Cuban military and security forces in Venezuela.
3 Marco Aponte-Moreno and Lance Lattig, “Chávez: Rhetoric Made in Havana,” World Policy, 2012, https://worldpolicy.
org/2012/03/26/chavez-rhetoric-made-in-havana/.
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 3
For Castro, Chávez appeared as
one of the last champions of the
Cuban-inspired revolutionary
social and political movements
that had swept Latin America
and the Caribbean during the
Cold War. Chávez identified as
a socialist and often employed a
highly charged “anti-imperialist”
rhetoric. He viewed himself as a
revolutionary in keeping with the
precedents set by Simón Bolívar
and Fidel Castro…
in 1998. Castro attended Chávez’s inauguration in 1999 and later that year, the two govern-
ments began to establish vital economic, political, and security ties. The two leaders also
visited each other frequently between 1999 and Chávez’s
death in 2013; Chávez was especially fond of making un-
scheduled stopovers in Havana, and Castro celebrated his
75th birthday in Venezuela.
Castro long sought revolution in Venezuela as well as pref-
erential access to Venezuelan oil.4 Castro’s first trip after
coming to power in 1959 was to Venezuela, where he so-
licited $300 million in oil from then newly elected President
Rómulo Betancourt.5 Betancourt declined and tensions be-
tween Havana and Caracas grew.6 In late 1961, Betancourt
broke relations with Cuba altogether following a new doc-
trine of severing ties with governments that had come to
power via non-electoral means; in 1962 Venezuela voted
to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States
(OAS). For its part, Cuba provided more than $1 million in fi-
nancial support, including arms and military equipment, to
Venezuelan insurgent movements such as the Armed Forc-
es of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional) between 1961 and 1964.7 Tensions came to a head in 1967, when the Venezuelan
Army and National Guard were forced to repel an attack by a small contingent of Cuban
and Venezuelan guerillas on the beach of Machurucuto.8 Carlos Andrés Pérez reestablished
diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1974 at the beginning of his first term in office.9
4 “‘Venecuba,’ a single nation,” The Economist, February 11, 2010, https://www.economist.com/the-Wamericas/2010/02/11/venecuba-
a-single-nation.
5 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1999), 100-108; Patrick Oppmann, “The History That Chains Cuba to Venezuela’s Crisis,” CNN World,
February 2, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/02/americas/venezuela-cuba-history-oil/index.html;
6 “Betancourt Say He Denied Castro a $300 Million Loan,” New York Times, July 20, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/20/
archives/betancourt-says-he-denied-castro-a-300-million-loan.html.
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Foreign Intervention by Cuba,” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP-
77M00144R000400100003-7.pdf; Kevin Ginter, “Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance,” Interna-
tional Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.758003.
8 Kevin Ginter, “Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.758003; Jim Wyss, “From Failed Invasion to Red Carpet, Castro’s
Ideals Still Pushed by Venezuelan Government,” Miami Herald, December 1, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/venezuela/article117749768.html.
9 lsa Cardozo da Silva and Richard S. Hillman, “Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization and International Affairs,” in Latin American and
Caribbean Foreign Policy, eds., Frank O. Mora and Jeanne K. Hey (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), Pgs. 158-60. Harold
Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela’s Bolivarian Foreign Policy?,” Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 2 (February 2006).
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS4
Chávez’s rise came nearly 30 years after the Machurucuto event. For Castro, Chávez ap-
peared as one of the last champions of the Cuban-inspired revolutionary social and political
movements that had swept Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold War. The politi-
cal newcomer identified as a socialist and often employed a highly charged “anti-imperialist”
rhetoric. Moreover, he viewed himself as a revolutionary in keeping with the precedents set
by Simón Bolívar and Fidel Castro—often invoking their names as a means of establishing
legitimacy and inspiring support for his socio-political movement. From the outset of his
presidency, Chávez accepted former Cuban officials and pro-Castro sympathizers as part
of his inner circle and adapted a number of Castroist ideas, including the Bolivarian circles
(círculos bolivarianos), parastatal institutions inspired by Cuba’s Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución).
The Cuba-Venezuela relationship, however, was not based purely on the ideological affinity
of its leaders. Its foundations also included strong commercial ties. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union and throughout the Special Period (Período Especial) of the 1990s, Cuba sought
to replace the economic subsidies long provided by Moscow. Havana wanted access to oil
at below market prices and investment flows from Caracas. For its part, the Chávez govern-
ment pursued global leadership through alliances with other developing countries. Later,
leaders in Caracas desired the political advisory and intelligence and counterintelligence sup-
port that Cuba could provide.10
Opportunities for Cuban participation in Venezuela’s armed forces increased as Chávez be-
gan politicizing the Venezuelan military shortly after taking office.11 In the wake of the deadly
Vargas mudslides in February 1999, the Venezuelan president launched Plan Bolívar 2000 to
engage Venezuelan soldiers in socioeconomic programs aimed at providing food, medical
assistance, education, and infrastructure to some of the poorest parts of the country. The
10 These leaders included Elías Jaua, Alí Rodríguez, and Nicolás Maduro, as well as Chávez himself.
11 James Cohrs, “Venecuba: An Analysis of Cuban Influence in Venezuela and its Support for the Bolívarian Revolution,” Cedarville University,
International Studies Capstone Research Papers, 2015, http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/international_studies_capstones/1.
Chávez and Fidel Castro in Sandino, Cuba, inaugurating the new Simón Bolívar community. Photo: ©Cubadebate
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 5
plan enlisted the support of thousands of Cuban personnel, including teachers, medical pro-
fessionals and an unknown number of Cuban security officials.12
In a related development, and something that deepened tensions between the Venezuelan
military leadership and Chávez, the government allowed guerrillas from the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) to establish
training camps in the western border states of Zulia, Táchira, and Apure. Venezuelan support
to the FARC took place between 1998 and 2002, during the ultimately unsuccessful peace
talks between the group and the administration of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana.
During this period, Chávez ordered Venezuelan officers to provide logistical support to FARC
guerrillas launching raids into Colombia. This angered Venezuela’s military leadership that until
then had been taught—and expected—to defend Venezuela against socialist-inspired insur-
gencies like the ones they were now ostensibly supporting.13
The Cuban and Venezuelan governments solidified their partnership through a flurry of bilateral
agreements, including the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement in October 2000. Under
this framework, Venezuela pledged to sell up to 53,000 barrels of oil per day to Cuba at a fixed,
reduced price through its state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA).14 For its part, Cuba
offered Venezuela “medical services, specialists and health technicians to provide services in
places where such personnel are not available” at no cost.15 The agreement also provided Ven-
ezuelans the ability to send patients and their relatives to Cuba for specialized medical treat-
ment. Although the island had already sent medical professionals to Venezuela, this agreement
increased the number of doctors, nurses, and paramedics from dozens to thousands.
Chávez would soon need Castro’s strategic political and security assistance. When the Ven-
ezuelan president appointed allies to prominent posts at PDVSA in April 2002, dissident
members of the military and the leadership of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of
Commerce (Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezu-
ela, Fedecámeras) briefly ousted Chávez in a coup d’état, before a counter-coup brought
him back to power. In response, according to an interview with Castro, the Cuban leader
coached Chávez and his inner circle through the ordeal. Castro advised Chávez not to resign,
and instead to “demand honorable conditions for surrender, guarantees that you won’t be
12 Carlos A. Romero, “South-South Cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba,” in South-South Cooperation: A Challenge to the
Aid System?, eds. Rosario Bella Guzmán and José Enrique Africa, et al., Reality of Aid Network (Quezon City: Ibon Books, 2010),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E7CA78D6C6C901D0C125775400224AA6-ROA\%20SSDC\%20Special\%20
Report\%28English\%29\%5B1\%5D.pdf.
13 Brian Nelson, The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chávez and the Making of Modern Venezuela (New York: Nation
Books, 2009), 126-27.
14 “Convenio Integral de Cooperación entre la República de Cuba y la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” Article III, 2000, https://
www.oas.org/juridico/mla/private/rexcor/rexcor_resp_ven9.pdf.
15 Ibid.
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS6
the victim.”16 Over the phone, Castro also committed to sending a diplomatic delegation to
Venezuela in support of Chávez. Then-Venezuelan Minister of Defense José Vicente Rangel
reinforced that the call with Castro was “the determining
factor. His advice allowed us to see better through the dark-
ness. It helped us a great deal.”17
In the aftermath of the 2002 coup attempt, Chávez became
more radicalized and distrustful of those around him—espe-
cially, and understandably, the political opposition and oppo-
sition-aligned PDVSA and military leadership. He also grew
closer to Castro and the Cuban government. Following the
event, Chávez changed the nature of the relationship, seek-
ing not only Castro’s advice, but also active support from the
Cuban intelligence service to help him maintain power and
stave off internal opposition and manage tensions with the
George W. Bush administration.18
The number of Cuban uniformed personnel in Venezuela and their roles during this period is
unclear. It is evident, however, that tacit U.S. support for the opposition during the 2002 coup
attempt helped drive Chávez towards Cuban security forces. Cuban military personnel became
more visible in Caracas in the immediate years following 2002, according to multiple sources
interviewed for this study that asked to remain anonymous.19 The increase in Cuban military
members coincided with the decline of U.S. personnel. Chávez started purging the Venezue-
lan military leadership shortly after his return to Miraflores in 2002, and in 2004 he turned his
attention to dismantling the U.S. military presence in his country. In 2004, the president with-
drew the U.S. Military Group’s access to the Venezuelan military headquarters at Fuerte Tiuna,
causing them to take up residence at the U.S. Embassy. At the time, the U.S. military group
comprised 40 military personnel—many of whom served as trainers and liaisons to Venezue-
lan forces. By 2007, only three U.S. defense personnel remained in the country.20
16 Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: My Life (New York: Scribner, 2006).
17 Rosa Miriam Elizalde and Luis Báez, Chávez Nuestro (La Habana: Casa Editora, 2004).
18 Moisés Naím, “The Tragedy of Venezuela,” The Atlantic, February 25, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2014/02/the-tragedy-of-venezuela/284062/; Brian Nelson, The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chávez and the
Making of Modern Venezuela (New York: Nation Books, 2009), 126-27.; William Rosenau and Ralph Espach, “Cuba’s Spies Still Punch
Above Their Weight,” September 29, 2013, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cubas-spies-still-punch-above-their-weight-9147.
19 A special report by Reuters also identifies the post-coup environment in 2002 as a critical moment in the burgeoning relationship between
Hugo Chávez and the Cuban government. The report notes that, “Chávez placed Cuban advisors within his inner circle to tighten security,
according to his former advisors and several former military officials.” See Angus Berwick, “Special Report: How Cuba taught Venezuela
to quash military dissent,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-cuba-military-specialreport/special-
report-how-cuba-taught-venezuela-to-quash-military-dissent-idUSKCN1VC1BX?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews.
20 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, “Report of Inspection:
Embassy Caracas, Venezuela,” Report Number ISP-I-07-28A, September 2007. https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/129671.pdf.
In the aftermath of the 2002
coup attempt, Chávez became
more radicalized and distrustful
of those around him—especially,
and understandably, the political
opposition and opposition-aligned
PDVSA and military leadership.
He also grew closer to Castro and
the Cuban government.
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 7
The Deepening of Cuban-Venezuelan Relations (2004-2013)
Interdependence between the two countries grew on December 14, 2004, on the tenth
anniversary of Chávez’s first visit to the island, when Chávez and Castro signed the Cuba–
Venezuela Agreement. This strategic arrangement established “cooperation between the
Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela... based... not only on solidarity
principles, which will always be present, but also, in the highest possible level, on the
exchange of goods and services that are most beneficial for the economic and social
needs of both countries” (Article 2). Each country sought
material and ideological benefits from the agreement.
Cuba eliminated duties on all Venezuelan imports (Article
12.1), offered tax exemptions to profits on Venezuelan in-
vestment in Cuba (Article 12.2), and granted scholarships
(Article 12.7) and educational exchanges (Article 12.10).21
Perhaps the most consequential service it offered, how-
ever, was increasing the number of Cuban medical profes-
sionals sent to Venezuela.
As president, Chávez promoted dozens of social welfare
missions (misiones sociales) to bring state services to the
poor. One of the earliest and largest of these missions was Misión Barrio Adentro (Into the
Neighborhood Mission). This program began in early 2003 when the mayor of Libertador
Municipality outside of Caracas, Freddy Bernal, initiated discussions with the Cuban Embas-
sy to bring 58 Cuban physicians to poor neighborhoods in his municipality. By December of
that year, Bernal’s Plan Barrio Adentro had become so popular that Chávez transformed it
into the first national social mission.
The December 2004 agreement thus allowed Barrio Adentro and other social missions us-
ing human capital from Cuba to grow. While Venezuela provided financial support through
PDVSA, Cuba sent medicine and personnel necessary to design, execute, and supervise
the program with the help of the Venezuelan Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense.
According to some sources, Barrio Adentro included 23,789 Cuban doctors, dental special-
ists, optometrists, nurses, other personnel, and more than 6,500 sites where patients were
seen. The agreement itself asserted that Cuban health care professional served some 15
million Venezuelans (Article 12.12).22
21 “Agreement between the President of Venezuela and the President of Cuba for the implementation of the ALBA,” 2004, http://
www.fidelcastro.cu/en/documentos/agreement-between-president-venezuela-and-president-cuba-implementation-alba.
22 P. Sean Brotherton, Revolutionary Medicine: Health and the Body in Post-Soviet Cuba (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 174.
Interdependence between
the two countries grew on
December 14, 2004, on the tenth
anniversary of Chávez’s first
visit to the island, when Chávez
and Castro signed the Cuba–
Venezuela Agreement.
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS8
A number of other social missions also used the expertise and personnel offered by Cubans
over the course of the decade. Through Misión Milagro (Miracle Mission), Cuban ophthalmol-
ogists performed eye surgeries on impoverished Venezuelans. Additionally, Cuban medical
professionals participated in Venezuela’s Misión Sonrisa (Smile Mission), established in 2006
to offer dental prosthetic rehabilitation to the poor as part of the national public health pro-
gram, and in Misión Dr. José Gregorio Hernández, created in 2008 to provide medical home
visits to people with disabilities. Cuban teachers contributed to the Misión Robinson I and II,
Misión Ribas, and Misión Sucre educational programs, and
Cuban experts contributed to other social missions as well
via social cooperation agreements.
In all, Venezuelan social scientist Carlos Romero estimates
that, at its apex in the mid-2000s, there were some 30,000-
40,000 Cuban professionals in Venezuela.23 Importantly, this
includes Cuban military members. While the Venezuelan
armed forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional, or FAN, until 2008,
and Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana, FANB, after 2008)
maintained the central role in most social missions’ logis-
tical support and facilities construction, Cuban military of-
ficials and civilians who reported directly to Chávez or the minister of defense often played
technical advisory and supervisory roles. Cuba—through its National Defense Law 75—has
vast experience in leveraging the military to provide technical support to society, especially
with respect to natural or manmade disasters.24 According to retired Venezuelan officers
interviewed for this study, these Cubans were housed in military installations and given lodg-
ing, food, and transportation. The exact number of Cuban security and intelligence personnel
reporting directly to Chávez or the minister of defense is unknown. In addition to their sti-
pend in bolívares, the Cuban government paid them in dollars as per the bilateral agreement.
In this period, Venezuelan oil diplomacy approached its peak. The country not only used the
2004 agreement to increase the amount of oil it sent to Cuba at favorable prices (Article
12.5), raising it to some 96,000 barrels per day, but the document also marked the formal
creation of the ALBA regional alliance.25 At its inception, Venezuela and Cuba were the only
members. Subsequently, a number of other Latin American and Caribbean states joined: Bo-
livia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Honduras, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and
23 Carlos A. Romero, “South-South Cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba,” in South-South Cooperation: A Challenge to the Aid System?
24 Cuba Defensa, “Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo,” http://www.cubadefensa.cu/?q=ejercito-juvenil&b=d2.
25 “Agreement between the President of Venezuela and the President of Cuba for the implementation of the ALBA”; Juan O. Tamayo,
“How will the Venezuela-Cuba link fare after Chávez’s death?” The Miami Herald, March 5, 2013, https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article1947916.html.
While Venezuela provided financial
support through PDVSA, Cuba sent
medicine and personnel necessary
to design, execute, and supervise
the program with the help of the
Venezuelan Ministry of Health and
Ministry of Defense.
CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 9
Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Saint Lucia.26
The promulgation of this agree-
ment marked a new phase of
cooperation beyond the energy sector and medical and other personnel, including the
regionalization of the Cuba–Venezuela partnership.
Far more consequential to regional relations and to Venezuela’s place in the Caribbean was
the formation of PetroCaribe. Launched on June 29, 2005, as an ALBA initiative, Petro-
Caribe was originally conceived as an alliance of Central American and Caribbean states,
including Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Re-
public, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.27 Participant countries
would purchase Venezuelan oil on conditions of preferential payment. In Jamaica, Guyana,
Nicaragua, and Haiti, the value of preferential Venezuelan financing for oil imports was more
than 10 percent of government revenue and the equivalent of around four percent of GDP,
and accounted for all of Haiti’s national oil supply and until recently nearly 75 percent of
Nicaragua’s.28 Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua drastically diminished between 2017 and 2019,29
and other PetroCaribe members have seen similar declines. Still, Venezuelan oil has been a
significant source of aid for cash-strapped countries in the region.30
According to then-oil minister Rafael Ramírez, between the creation of PetroCaribe in 2005
and January 2012, Venezuela provided a total of 178 million barrels of crude oil worth $14.4
billion to the 18 member countries. Ramírez said that PetroCaribe members had saved $2.7
billion as a result. Unsurprisingly, many of these small states have supported Venezuela
26 Honduras withdrew in 2010 and Ecuador withdrew in 2018. Ken Cole, “Progress into the 21st Century: The Bolivarian Alliance for
the Peoples of Our America,” International Journal of Cuban Studies 3 (2/3), 2011, 116-27.
27 Guatemala and Honduras later withdrew from the program.
28 “Single point of failure,” The Economist, October 4, 2014, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2014/10/04/single-point-of-failure.
29 Arturo Cruz, “How to Understand the Nicaraguan Crisis,” Wilson Center, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
nicaragua_crisis-arturo_cruz_final.pdf.
30 “Caribbean islands warned as Venezuela collapses,” Curaçao Chronicle, 2016, …
Photo: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta�/Flick
BLOG POST - THE POST-SOVIET POST <http://csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post>
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An Enduring Relationship – From Russia,
With Love
September 24, 2020
�is article is part of the CSIS executive education program Understanding the Russian Military
Today <https://www.csis.org/programs/russia-and-eurasia-program/understanding-russian-military-today>.
�e United States must consider Russia’s diplomatic, information, military, and economic
(DIME) activities for a post-Nicolás Maduro Venezuela. Mr. Maduro eschews democracy,
human rights, and economic prosperity, all while squandering away Venezuela’s vast
natural resources and perpetuating instability throughout the region. Still, Russia
continues supporting the Maduro regime and one wonders how far Russia will dig in. Has
Moscow in fact laid the conditions to bene�t from its entrenchment in the long term? For
https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post
https://www.csis.org/programs/russia-and-eurasia-program/understanding-russian-military-today
Russia, it is a gambit because, as Special Representative for Venezuela Elliot Abrams said
<https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-
representative-elliott-abrams42020> “. . . It has taken 20 years for the Chavez and Maduro
regimes . . . to destroy the Venezuelan economy . . . It is going to be quite a long time. . .”
before Venezuela sees a return to economic prosperity. Russian President Vladimir Putin
has staked his claim in Venezuela across the DIME spectrum and the United States must
fully understand how Russia’s relationship with Venezuela can pose enduring challenges.
If it does not, the United States may be ceding ground in shaping the future of Venezuela.
Diplomatic
From Moscow’s perspective, with minimal investment, Venezuela is a perfect opportunity
<https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/�les/�les/publication/russia\%20in\%20syria\%20-\%20web.pdf>
to maintain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, promote its role on the international
stage as a global power, and challenge a world order that Russia perceives as increasingly
skewed towards U.S. interests. In the diplomatic realm, Russia’s intervention in Venezuela
and its support for the repressive Maduro regime is re�ective of the situation in Syria and
the role Moscow plays there. Its role in Syria could portend Moscow’s desire to play a
similar role as an interlocutor and ultimately serve as an obstacle restoring peace and
prosperity in Venezuela.
�is is an instance where we observe Russia’s actions as an extension of its foreign policy.
�ere is a remarkable similarity between Russia’s interactions and its diplomatic actions
with Syria and its relationship with Venezuela. Russia cannot, or does not desire to, bring
Mr. Maduro into negotiations with the opposition. �is is a close version of Russia’s role in
Syria <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/�les/isw\%20report\%20-
\%20russia\%e2\%80\%99s\%20dead-end\%20diplomacy\%20in\%20syria\%20-\%20november\%202019.pdf>
with President Bashar al-Assad. Like President Assad, Mr. Maduro depends on Russia for
its military hardware, training, and continued maintenance of said hardware. Venezuela
relies on Russia for the legitimacy Russia brings as one of the few global powers o�ering
diplomatic support backed by military capability. However, Russia does not have
unlimited resources and/or capacity
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/�les/isw\%20report\%20-
\%20russia\%e2\%80\%99s\%20dead-end\%20diplomacy\%20in\%20syria\%20-\%20november\%202019.pdf> in
Syria, and with Covid-19 directly challenging Russia’s economic stability
https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-representative-elliott-abrams42020
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Russia\%20in\%20Syria\%20-\%20web.pdf
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW\%20Report\%20-\%20Russia\%E2\%80\%99s\%20Dead-End\%20Diplomacy\%20in\%20Syria\%20-\%20November\%202019.pdf
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW\%20Report\%20-\%20Russia\%E2\%80\%99s\%20Dead-End\%20Diplomacy\%20in\%20Syria\%20-\%20November\%202019.pdf
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-economy-suffers-double-hit-from-oil-slump-and-coronavirus-11589976001#:~:text=Now\%20the\%20economic\%20pain\%20has,the\%20economy\%20hard\%2C\%E2\%80\%9D\%20\%20\%20\%20\%20https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-representative-elliott-abrams42020.
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-economy-su�ers-double-hit-from-oil-slump-and-coronavirus-
11589976001#:~:text=now\%20the\%20economic\%20pain\%20has,the\%20economy\%20hard\%2c\%e2\%80\%
9d\%20 https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-
special-representative-elliott-abrams42020.>, it has even less to commit to Venezuela given its
geographic location. Still, Russia is positioned to shape negotiations should Mr. Maduro
step aside and gain further acknowledgment as a diplomatic broker beyond what it has
achieved in Syria. However, as long as Mr. Maduro is in power, Russia—theoretically—is
guaranteed debt repayments, will maintain its foothold in Latin America, and continue to
upend U.S. and allied attempts to reestablish a democratic Venezuela.
Russia also serves as Mr. Maduro’s protector internationally
<https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-
representative-elliott-abrams42020>, especially in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Russia, leveraging its veto power and acting as a spoiler at the UNSC and champion of Mr.
Maduro, sti�es attempts of the international community to remove his repressive regime
and challenges the United States on its actions in Venezuela. In February 2019, both the
United States and Russia proposed two competing resolutions. �e United States proposed
new elections and a recognition of Mr. Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela
until elections could be held. Russia, China, and South Africa voted against the resolution.
Conversely, Russia proposed a dialogue between Mr. Maduro’s regime and the opposition,
along the same lines as the Montevideo mechanism
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1033832>. Russia, China, South Africa, and Equatorial
Guinea voted for the proposal and seven voted against. Ultimately, neither proposal
passed. In May 2020, Venezuela sent a letter to the UNSC requesting the council hold
discussions on the incursion into Venezuela and named the United States and Colombia
behind the events. Russia then called a UNSC meeting
<https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/05/venezuela-open-vtc.php> to gain adoption of a draft press
statement about the incursion. �e United States blocked the statement, but again, Russia
acted as a diplomatic backer of Mr. Maduro and his regime.
When the U.S. plan to oust Mr. Maduro back�red, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Mr.
Maduro had been on his way to the airport <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-
frustrated-trump-questions-his-administrations-venezuela-strategy/2019/05/08/ad51561a-71a7-11e9-9f06-
5fc2ee80027a_story.html)> but Russia convinced him to stay
<https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/30/pompeo_maduro_planned_to_�ee_venezuela_but_rus
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-economy-suffers-double-hit-from-oil-slump-and-coronavirus-11589976001#:~:text=Now\%20the\%20economic\%20pain\%20has,the\%20economy\%20hard\%2C\%E2\%80\%9D\%20\%20\%20\%20\%20https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-representative-elliott-abrams42020.
https://www.hudson.org/events/1804-video-event-the-future-of-venezuela-a-conversation-with-special-representative-elliott-abrams42020
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1033832
https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/05/venezuela-open-vtc.php
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-frustrated-trump-questions-his-administrations-venezuela-strategy/2019/05/08/ad51561a-71a7-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html)
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/30/pompeo_maduro_planned_to_flee_venezuela_but_russia_convinced_him_to_stay.html
sia_convinced_him_to_stay.html> – though Russia denies it. During that chaotic time, Russia
increased its information operations against the United States to counter its support for
Mr. Guaidó. �ese actions have rea�rmed Russia’s alignment with the Venezuelan regime
and ensured its status and position for the long haul.
Information
Russia is renowned for its subversive exploitation of the information environment
through its in�uence operations and information warfare tactics. Russia operates no
di�erently in Venezuela and Latin America than it does in the rest of the world and its
informational presence is extensive. It has established an information footprint
throughout the region, to include media agreements, and television and social media news
services. Russia uses its involvement in Venezuela as an information tool
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-continuing-engagement-venezuela-2019-and-beyond-
update> promoting Russia’s actions as bene�cial, and U.S. actions as deleterious.
Russia’s Federal News Agency (FNA) (formerly the Internet Research Agency) is another
tool Russia employs to espouse false narratives regarding Venezuela’s economic and food
situation <https://www.fastcompany.com/90318986/despite-sanctions-top-russian-propaganda-
operation-still-active-on-popular-platforms>, such as: “�ere are �ve times fewer beggars in
Caracas than in Kiev,” or that there are no shortages of food in Venezuelan stores.
In 2018, as an example of Russia’s targeted information operations, it appeared as though
Russian-linked social media accounts attempted to stir up civil unrest
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/us/politics/south-america-russian-twitter.html> in South
American countries—countries that had called for the resignation of Nicolás Maduro
(chie�y Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Chile). Several protests broke out in these
countries, as a con�uence of several events, but Russian trolls were found to have
exacerbated the discord.
Russia leverages its two Spanish language news organizations—state-�nanced Russia
Today (RT) Español and government-run Sputnik Mundo—to actualize its information
warfare campaigns throughout the Spanish speaking world. In the days preceding and
following the October 2017 Catalonian independence referendum in Spain, Mr. Javier
Lesaca of the George Washington University analyzed over �ve million social media
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/30/pompeo_maduro_planned_to_flee_venezuela_but_russia_convinced_him_to_stay.html
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-continuing-engagement-venezuela-2019-and-beyond-update
https://www.fastcompany.com/90318986/despite-sanctions-top-russian-propaganda-operation-still-active-on-popular-platforms
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/us/politics/south-america-russian-twitter.html
messages and determined that Russia’s RT and Sputnik
<https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2017/11/11/inenglish/1510395422_468026.html> spread pro-
independence disinformation <https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-venezuela-waging-cyber-war-
in-europe>. Russia used accounts related to Venezuela and chavismo
<https://archive.thinkprogress.org/russian-meddling-goes-global-92a078cec947/> to further fuel the
Catalan crisis and project a negative image of Spain.
And �nally, Clint Watts, at the launch of the Hamilton 2.0 dashboard
<https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-68-a-new-tool-to-track-russian-disinformation-on-
twitter/>, stated <https://www.gmfus.org/press-releases/alliance-securing-democracy-launches-hamilton-
20-dashboard> that the “idea of Russian active measures is to win through the force of
politics, not the politics of force . . . Hamilton 2.0 allows us to identify how the Russian
government seeks to divide . . . the themes and narratives they push and the audiences
they target.” �e dashboard <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/>, in this
case and without further context, is a snapshot that illustrates the reach of Russia’s
in�uence operations in Spanish speaking countries. Searching on Twitter alone resulted in
3,482 related tweets, from 324 accounts, across 66 countries. �is is not illustrative of
direct linkages to the Russian state, but it does highlight the reach of Russian-sponsored,
Spanish language social media (Twitter only).
Military
Since 1999, Venezuela has borrowed billions of dollars from Russia to �nance the buildup
of its military arsenal. �ough not a comprehensive list, Venezuela has purchased S-300
anti-aircraft missiles, Igla-S man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/venezuela-is-armed-to-the-hilt/>, and multiuse aircraft,
helicopters, and T-72 tanks. �roughout 2019, Russia continued to send maintenance
specialists and technicians <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-venezuela-specialists/russian-
military-specialists-arrive-in-venezuela-to-service-equipment-interfax-iduskbn1wa2�> to service
previously purchased equipment even after Rostec, a Russian state-owned military-
industrial corporation <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-inner-workings-rostec-russias-
military-industrial-behemoth>, withdrew key defense advisors <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-a-
blow-to-maduro-russia-withdraws-key-defense-support-to-venezuela-11559486826> from Venezuela.
As always, there is a crossover between each element of the DIME spectrum. An example
https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2017/11/11/inenglish/1510395422_468026.html
https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-venezuela-waging-cyber-war-in-europe
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/russian-meddling-goes-global-92a078cec947/
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-68-a-new-tool-to-track-russian-disinformation-on-twitter/
https://www.gmfus.org/press-releases/alliance-securing-democracy-launches-hamilton-20-dashboard
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/venezuela-is-armed-to-the-hilt/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-venezuela-specialists/russian-military-specialists-arrive-in-venezuela-to-service-equipment-interfax-idUSKBN1WA2FJ
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-inner-workings-rostec-russias-military-industrial-behemoth
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-a-blow-to-maduro-russia-withdraws-key-defense-support-to-venezuela-11559486826
of this is Russia’s use of private military contractors (PMC) as part of its foreign policy
toolkit. It is reported Wagner group PMCs <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-
russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-
iduskcn1pj22m> operated in Venezuela in January 2019 to provide protective security to Mr.
Maduro. �e United States’ continued pressurization strategy, Venezuela’s worsening
economic situation, and continued instability increase the likelihood that Maduro may
again seek out PMCs for protection against regime change pressure. Drawing another
correlation to Syria, Russia deployed the Wagner Group to secure the Assad regime
<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/swj-factsheet-observing-wagner-group-open-source-intelligence-
study> in exchange for economic bene�t. PMCs o�er Moscow plausible deniability; Russia
can employ military type action without going head to head with the United States,
United Kingdom, or other allied military powers. Venezuela o�ers fertile ground for this.
Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu remarked in December 2018, that Russia
deployed two nuclear capable TU-160s to Venezuela and would continue sending military
aircraft and warships to visit Venezuela <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-sends-2-
nuclear-capable-bombers-venezuela-n946246> as part of the military to military cooperation. In
doing so, Moscow signaled to the United States its ability to project power into the
Western Hemisphere—the presence of Russian TU-160s in Venezuela puts the United
States in their range. Russia and Venezuela also signed agreements in August 2019
<https://www.newsweek.com/russia-navy-venezuela-unacceptable-us-1454639> allowing reciprocal
warship visits to each countries’ ports. Russia again reminds us of its ability to increase its
military access in the region and power projection in the Western Hemisphere.
Even if Mr. Maduro were to step aside and allow a transition government to step in, there
is still the question of Russia’s existing military contracts and the continued maintenance,
security, and training for these military articles. Any party involved in transition
government negotiations will need to factor in Russia’s military cooperation and arms
sales from over the last 20 years and into the future.
Economic
Venezuela ranks as one of the 10 richest countries
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-most-natural-resources.html> in the world in
terms of natural resources; approximately $14.3 trillion worth of natural resources,
including gold, iron ore, and oil. And while Maduro’s ine�ective and corrupt government
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/swj-factsheet-observing-wagner-group-open-source-intelligence-study
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-sends-2-nuclear-capable-bombers-venezuela-n946246
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-navy-venezuela-unacceptable-us-1454639
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-most-natural-resources.html
policies have led to astronomical levels of hyperin�ation and near economic collapse,
Moscow still stands with Mr. Maduro. Oil production
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/01/29/charting-the-decline-of-venezuelas-oil-
industry/#64c6dcf94ecd> has decreased from a peak in 1970 of 3.8 million barrels per day
(BPD) in 1970 to its lowest production rate of approximately 13,000 BPD in July 2020.
Venezuela’s cash reserves are dwindling, and the government has reportedly turned
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-real-reason-venezuelas-maduro-survives-
dirty-money/2019/05/12/ba96413e-7263-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html> to drug tra�cking,
illicit gold and iron mining, fraudulent oil sales, and other black-market activities to �ll its
co�ers.
Yet, as recently as February 2020, Russia rea�rmed its support for Mr. Maduro and
signaled its intention to boost ties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Mr.
Maduro in Caracas and stated <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51423110>, We
have agreed to deepen our economic, commercial and investment co-operation in several
areas despite the illegitimate sanctions . . . �e most promising sectors are energy, natural
resources and industry.” �ough Russia’s investment in Venezuela is only $10 billion, this
is an exorbitant amount for Venezuela. However, if Russia maintains its role in Venezuela,
it can play a role in, and gain from, Venezuela’s economic recovery through its
investments in Venezuela’s energy sector.
Conclusion
Russia has decided that rather than abandon its ally and cut its losses, it will stay in the
�ght against U.S. “interference” for the long run to recoup its debt and maintain or even
increase its foothold in Venezuela. Russia has employed measures across the DIME
spectrum – UNSC interference, information warfare, military support, force projection,
and military access, and economic investment in the country. Moreover, Russia has laid
the foundation to play arbiter in negotiations for Mr. Maduro to step aside and to establish
a transitional government. �e United States will have to factor into its calculus a
continued Russia presence in Venezuela, including its economic stranglehold over
Venezuela that can be traded for additional access to the country’s oil and mining sectors
and potentially a permanent military footprint through a material-technical support
point (PMTO) or increased military �ights or out of area deployments. As Russia’s support
to Mr. Maduro and a failing Venezuela increases regional instability, the United States will
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/01/29/charting-the-decline-of-venezuelas-oil-industry/#64c6dcf94ecd
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-real-reason-venezuelas-maduro-survives-dirty-money/2019/05/12/ba96413e-7263-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51423110
BLOG POST BLOG POST
need to focus more attention and resources in the region to prevent this from impacting
the United States. While the United States cannot eliminate Russia’s role in Venezuela, the
United States must endeavor to contain it.
Ms. Alison Brown is the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Russia Campaign Planner and
leads planning e�orts to provide U.S. SOUTHCOM-oriented objectives in the Russia Global
Campaign Plan. Ms. Brown leads initiatives promoting and advocating on behalf of U.S.
SOUTHCOM, developing the strategic approach for countering and competing against Russia in
the U.S. SOUTHCOM AOR. All ideas presented in this commentary are solely the perspective of
the author and do not represent the views or position of U.S. SOUTHCOM, Department of
Defense, or the broader U.S. Government or of CSIS.
CSIS does not take speci�c policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and
conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the
author(s).
MEDIA QUERIES
Contact H. Andrew Schwartz
Chief Communications O�cer
Tel: 202.775.3242
Contact Paige Montfort
Media Relations Coordinator, External Relations
Tel: 202.775.3173
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Russia <http://csis.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/russia>, Russia and Eurasia Program
<http://csis.org/programs/russia-and-eurasia-program>
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