Fluent Essays

Please complete this within 36 hrs. For instruction and information, check the attachment below. Instruction: 1. Read the Chapter 8 reading. 2. Write a write-up outlining ( small article) the major points, 3-5 point for this chapter. 3. This paper should be more than 1 page. 4. Times New Roman, 12 pont, Double space. Due on Wednesday, October 6th, 2021, befroe 11 pm, US central time (Chicago). There are almost 36 hrs to complete this. I continued along the same line of questions and answers regarding the paying of bills and other financial duties. Each line of questioning followed the same course. First, there was the lack of understanding, and then in response to my asking each question a different way, his answers were vague and uninformative. We played the back-and-forth game for a half-hour or so, and then I decided to turn the heat up a bit on the interview. I asked him if he remembered his response when I asked him about any new bank accounts. He said he couldn’t recall. I said he told me that there were no new bank accounts. He said he must have misunderstood what I was asking at the time, because there was an account that was opened just before that day but that there was next to no activity in the account because it was so new. He said he didn’t think about that account because it had just been opened and there was little or no activity in it. I asked him what he thought I meant when I originally asked him if the division had opened any new accounts recently. He said he didn’t think I meant accounts that didn’t have activity in them. I thought to myself, ‘‘The mole obviously knew and told him that we had found the bank information about the new account that he had opened, and therefore he had ample time to prepare an explanation.’’ I knew he wasn’t smart enough to have remembered what was in his trash pail when we showed up the first day. I asked him why the account was opened in the first place. He said the controller told him to open a new account so he did. I asked him why the controller wanted a new account opened. He said I of meetings can be very stressful to the target. Some people get nervous and quiet, while others can get hostile toward the interviewer. Expect the unexpected, and never let your guard down. In this case the individual clearly chose to play dumb, in a poor attempt to show me how smart he was by not providing any responses or information. As with delays and cancellations, it is important not to get frustrated or let people’s behavior and responses (or lack thereof) personally affect you during these interviews. By not reacting to their comments and behavior, and by maintaining your composure through out the meeting, you are more likely to accomplish your objectives and identify information they provide even when they think they are providing you no information. Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 107 should ask the controller that question. I asked him what he knew about the purpose or use for the new bank account. He said he had just told me to ask the controller why he wanted the new account. I asked him why an existing bank account had been closed recently. He said the controller told him to close out the account, and so he did. I asked him what the account had been previously used for. He said the controller mainly used the account, and that I should ask the controller about the closed account. I asked him if he maintained any records about the closed account. He said the account was maintained by the controller, and that I should ask him those questions. I asked him where the records were for that account. He said he just told me to ask the controller about the account. I asked him if he ever had any access to the account, or reconciled the account, or recorded the activity of the account. He said no. I knew from the mailing address on the statements found and the fact that all the bank-related information was found in his desk that he likely received the bank statement each month for this account as well, reviewed and reconciled it somewhere off the division’s books, and that he knew exactly what the account activity and history entailed. I asked him how money went into the bank account. He said there were deposits made into the account by the controller. I asked him the nature or source of the deposits. He said that I should ask the controller that question, as he didn’t have any involvement with the account. I asked him if he ever made any transactions with the bank account. He said no, that the controller handled that account. I asked him into what bank account the payments received by the woman were deposited. He said those funds were deposited into the operating checking account. I asked him about payments that were received in the mail. He said the mail went to the same woman, and that she would include payments received in the mail with the other payments she received in person. I asked him if all the payments received were provided a written receipt. He said that that was the way it was supposed to work. I asked him if that was the actual way it worked. He said he believed it was, but that I should ask the woman that question. I asked him who handled the payments when the woman was out of the office, on vacation, or at lunch. He said he would handle the payments. I asked him if he followed the procedures and wrote out a receipt. He said he did. I asked him 108 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation where the receipt books were maintained. He said everything should have been right in his desk drawers for the current year, and in the boxes for the prior years. I remembered that I saw maybe one manual receipt book within the contents of all the boxes we had collected and stored. The question that remained was where were all the receipt books if a written receipt was written for every payment received? I asked him to describe how it worked if a payment was received by credit card. He said they processed the charge. I asked him if they came in person, or if they mailed in their card information. He said both. I asked him who physically entered the charge into the credit card terminal and processed the charge to the member’s card. He said the woman processed the cards. I asked him who handled the credit card payments when she was away or unavailable. He said he processed the cards. I asked him if anyone else had access to process credit card transactions. He said anyone who walked up to the credit card terminal could process a transaction. I asked him what he did when he processed a charge. He said he swiped the card, entered the amount, printed the slips, had the member sign the slip, and left the slip for the woman on her desk. I asked him if he wrote out a receipt for credit card payments. He said no, because the credit card slip was the member’s receipt. I asked him if he wrote out a receipt when a member paid by check. He said no because their canceled check was their receipt. I said then, ‘‘The only time you wrote out a receipt was when cash was received.’’ He said, ‘‘Basically.’’ I asked ‘‘What do you mean, ‘Basically’?’’ I asked him at what other time did a receipt get written for a payment. He said never. I said, ‘‘Then the only time a receipt was provided was when cash was received?’’ He had no further response. ! ! ! I was starting to get an idea of how the account was likely funded, and how the credit card was likely being paid (through the ‘‘controller’s’’ bank account). I wanted to see just how much he was willing to provide me regarding the likely scheme, or at least this likely scheme. There could also be other schemes yet to be identified—the inter- view was far from over. I asked him if the credit card terminal was closed and recon- ciled on a regular basis to the bank deposits and bookkeeping Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 109 system (QuickBooks), such as on a daily basis at the end of each day. He said it wasn’t used that way. I asked him to describe how it was used. He said he just finished describing how it was used. I asked him to explain how the credit card activity was reconciled to the bank statement and accounting transactions. He said he re- corded the credit card activity by general journal entry after each deposit made into the account. He said the credit card activity was just part of the entry made. I asked him if anyone else made entries into QuickBooks or any other bookkeeping records. He said no. I asked him who handled those responsibilities when he was away or out. He said he has never been away or out, and no one handled the QuickBooks. I thought to myself, ‘‘That was a good response in light of the United Alliance payment entered into QuickBooks under a different description.’’ In his own words, he had just told me that no one else entered activity into their QuickBooks. LEARNING POINT During the interview, asking the right questions will yield the most infor mation. Done properly, you can get people to provide information that you may be able to use against them. Often they will provide information you didn’t know or expect, expanding the case. In my experience I have found that if I can get individuals to describe how something was supposed to work, and also how it actually worked, I can use their descriptions to expand the interview. By ‘‘playing dumb’’ and asking a lot of questions, you allow the interviewee to provide as many rich details as possible, even though you likely have a good, detailed understanding of how it worked through procedures performed prior to the interview. You can use this nonthreat ening discussion to calibrate the individual and his body language, and watch for changes as you move into discussions about his actions and involvement. In this case I got the office manager to describe the bookkeeping and accounting in his own words, as well as who had access and ability to record transactions within QuickBooks. He stated no one else had access. Then he stated he made all the entries within QuickBooks. When I asked him about questionable transactions and discrepancies within QuickBooks, he stated he didn’t know. I reminded him that he just told me he had the only access to QuickBooks, and that only he entered information into QuickBooks, and (Continued ) 110 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation Having spent a good half-hour talking only about the payments received into the division, I turned my attention to expenses and bills of the division. I asked the office manager to describe the typical expenses incurred by the division. He said utilities, oil, security, payroll, supplies, and those kinds of things. I asked him to describe the process of paying bills at the division. He said he didn’t understand the question. I asked him to walk me through how a bill is received and ultimately processed for payment and filed. He said the bills came in, he wrote the checks, and the controller signed the checks. I asked him if any signature stamps existed. He said there was one stamp. I asked him whose signature was on the stamp. He said it was the controller’s signature. I asked him who handled the signature stamp. He said that he maintained the signature stamp so that no one else could get unauthorized access to the stamp. I asked him where the division’s blank checks were maintained. He said they were kept in the drawer below the printer. I asked him if the drawer was locked. He said the drawer was never locked. I realized I had just identified another potential way funds could have been diverted from the division. Checks could have been written and stamped with the signature stamp by the controller. The statements likely came in and went directly to the office manager for reconciling, and it was likely to be found that the controller never looked at the bank statements or reconciliations. I noted it was something to look further into after the interview. I asked him more questions about how expenses were incurred, approved, selected for payment, and ultimately paid to the vendors. I next asked him to describe the payroll process. He said the employees’ hours were called in, and the next day a package arrived therefore he should know the answer to my question. Then I asked him who else could have entered the activity, and proceeded down that line of questioning. The key in this interview was to get the interviewee to provide founda tional information and continue to build upon that foundation, setting the stage to show that he and only he was responsible for the activity (in QuickBooks in this case). Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 111 with their paychecks and reports. I asked him who called in their hours. He said he called in the hours. I asked him who received and opened the payroll information when it was received the next day. He said he received and opened the payroll, and used the reports to record the payroll within QuickBooks. I asked him who else reviewed the payroll reports and information. He said no one. I asked him if he had ever seen anything unusual or unexpected within a payroll batch received. He said he didn’t understand my question. I asked him if he recognized anyone getting paid when they weren’t supposed to, or anything like that. He said he never saw anything unusual. I asked him more questions about how employees were paid and how much each person made at the division. I already knew the human resource director had requested copies of the employees’ W-2s and the year-to-date payroll report directly from the payroll provider, and having already received them, was able to tell me she didn’t see anything suspicious in the amounts and transactions within the reports. ! ! ! I looked at the clock. We had been meeting for nearly two hours. He looked at the clock as well, and then he rolled up his right sleeve and looked down at his watch. He asked me how much longer I thought we would need to meet, and that he had someplace to be. I asked him what time he needed to be somewhere. He said it didn’t matter. Knowing that he was getting impatient, and not knowing how long he would tolerate my questions, I decided to head right for the most important information. I asked him if he remembered his response regarding credit cards used by the division. He said he told me there were no cards presently in use by the division. I asked him if he remembered a United Alliance account. He said the division had an account at one time, but that the United Alliance account was closed at the time I asked him the question, and therefore the division had no credit cards. I asked him if there were any other credit card accounts other than the closed United Alliance account. He said not to his knowledge. I asked him, if there were any other cards, wouldn’t he be aware of them, as he paid all the bills and received all the statements? He said not that he was aware of. I asked him if he ever 112 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation used the United Alliance card. He said he had used it twice. The first time was in making a purchase for the office under the direction of the controller, and the second time was in paying the bill for a meeting held with the controller. He said he didn’t want to use the card that day, but the controller told him to put the invoice on the card. I asked him if he had ever used the card for personal purposes. He said no. I asked him if anyone else ever used the card for personal purchases. He said the program manager (the woman with the card) used it with the approval of the controller, and that I should ask them about her use of the card. I asked him if she ever reimbursed the division for her use of the card. He said not that he was aware of, and that I should ask them about that. I asked him, if he was the person responsible for making the deposits and recording the bookkeeping, wouldn’t he be aware of any repayments by the individual? He told me to ask the controller about that. I asked him who received the statement in the mail each month. He said it went to the controller. I asked him if he ever reviewed or reconciled the statements. He said no. I asked him how the United Alliance account was paid each month. He told me to ask the controller about that. I said that I thought he was responsible for paying all the invoices and bills for the division, and as such he should have been aware of how the United Alliance account was being paid. He said the controller handled all aspects of the United Alliance account and how it was paid, and that I needed to talk with the controller about it. I asked him if he thought anyone at the division was stealing funds from the organization. He said he didn’t understand the question. I said to him that he was the person primarily responsible for the receipts, deposits, purchases, disbursements, and payroll, and that if anyone would be aware of funds being diverted or used for personal purposes, it would be him. He said he wasn’t aware of anyone stealing from the division, but that others were also involved in making the deposits and paying the bills, and that maybe someone else may know of something. I asked him why the United Alliance payment identi- fied on the operating bank statement was entered into QuickBooks with different information. He said he never entered any United Alliance activity into QuickBooks, and that he never had the state- ments to enter the activity. I asked him if there were any other trans- actions posted within QuickBooks that were different from the underlying transactions. He said he didn’t understand my question. Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 113 He began to look at the clock and his watch again. He was slouched down a bit in his chair, and I could tell he was anxious to end the meeting. In an attempt to lighten things up for him, I asked him what he did in the off time when he wasn’t working at the division (I already knew he belonged to several clubs and acted as the treasurer of at least one of them). That question pressed a nerve. He sat right up and turned bright red. He said what he did on his personal time was none of my business, and had nothing to do with his responsibilities at the division. He seemed pretty agitated. I said I was simply trying to learn more about the person I was talking with, to be more social than ‘‘Just the facts, ma’am.’’ He repeated that what he did was none of my business. I asked him if there was anything he wanted to add to the information he provided. He said there was nothing else, and that we had talked about everything. I asked him, if he had any of the division’s records or items at his house or in his car. He said he had nothing that belonged to the division. I asked him, if we needed to meet again, would he be willing to come back to discuss things further? He said that would be fine, and stood up to leave the room. I stood up, and walked to the door to open it, allowing him to leave and allowing me to observe him at all times. He walked out of the office, picked up his long leather coat, and headed straight toward the front door. I walked behind him, and as we walked down the hall, I thanked him for coming in and spending the time with me. He didn’t respond, opened the front door, and walked out straight down the front walk. I shut the door behind him, ensuring it was locked so that he couldn’t simply return, and stood next to the human resource director as we watched him cross the street and get back into the shiny black car. He drove away, and we continued to watch for a few minutes to ensure he didn’t circle and come back. ! ! ! I needed a break. I asked the human resource director if she heard our conversation. She said she heard more than 90 percent of what was discussed. She also said she took notes based on what she heard, and that she didn’t think she missed anything of importance. I asked her what she thought of the meeting and his responses. She said he obviously knew about the bank account and the United Alliance 114 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation account, and was likely aware of other things happening at the division. I asked her what her thoughts were on continuing his employment on paid administrative leave status. She said the fact that he lied to us on the first day, and failed to respond completely and appropriately today to my questions was likely sufficient grounds to terminate his employment. She asked me if I thought I was going to get any further information or cooperation from him to resolve this matter. I told her that he was not likely to provide anything further, and that his sole motive for today’s meeting was likely to learn what we knew to date to share with the controller. She said that even if he wasn’t terminated right away, he was going to be changed to unpaid administrative leave once she spoke with outside counsel and docu- mented his file. To me it seemed pretty straightforward. The office manager was primarily responsible for the accounting and bookkeeping of the division, and as such, he had firsthand knowledge of things that were happening. He admitted to opening the bank account, only to lie about it on the first day. He said he was the person who entered the activity into QuickBooks, and that no one else entered activity into QuickBooks. He admitted he knew about the United Alliance account, and that at least one unauthorized individual was using the card for personal purposes. Yet he didn’t do anything or tell anyone at the main office about these things. The human resource director walked back to the desk where she was working to call outside counsel and discuss what to do with the office manager. I returned to the room where I had met with the office manager, retrieved my notebook, and began documenting as much of the interview as possible, filling in details around the notes I had taken. LEARNING POINT While it is important to memorialize a meeting or interview, consideration must be made as to how that will be accomplished. Most fraud examiners outside of law enforcement lack interview rooms equipped with two way windows, video, and other recording technology. Video or electronic record ing of a meeting or interview often creates a potential barrier to free flowing (Continued ) Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 115 I knew Tim was anxiously waiting to hear how the meeting went, so I went down to the private office I used to interview other employees and called him. I knew other employees could be coming into the division at some time during the day, and I wanted (Continued ) information from the target, causing him to respond cautiously or in a reserved manner. I know personally I would be more careful what I would say if I knew I was being recorded, and so I would expect anyone else would behave similarly. Taking notes is important during an interview, but if you spend your time writing down every last word people said, two things will likely occur. First, by taking copious notes, you likely spent much of the time looking down at your notes versus watching the individual and his reactions to questions. Body language is often more important than their verbal responses. Second, note taking also creates a barrier, as the interviewee will be talking and watching you write things down that he said. Consider having a second person at the meeting or interview who can take notes and make observations, allowing you to focus on talking with the target while observing all his body language without any distraction. FRAUD FACTS Body language is the nonverbal or unspoken mode of communication and interaction. It involves gestures, mannerisms, and other bodily signs. Body language is like a mirror that informs you of the thoughts and feelings of the other person in response to words and actions. How important is learning how to read and use body language? ! 8\% of the information we receive is from what people actually say. ! 37\% of information we receive is from their tone, inflection, and speed of their voice. ! A staggering 55\% of the information we receive is from their body language. Different signals contribute to different meanings depending on the individual and scenario. A guide is to look for three or four signals that share the same meaning.1 116 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation to be sure no one, including our mole, heard any of the conversa- tion. I thought it was likely the office manager had already called the controller to fill him in on the morning meeting, likely from his cell phone while driving away from the division. I was also sure the office manager would be talking with the others as he had in the past, if he hadn’t done so already. I called Tim and provided him a five-minute rundown of the interview, especially the long leather coat. That’s when I remem- bered the heat was still cranked up in the area where we met. I scratched a note to remind myself to walk down and turn off the heat. Tim seemed pleased with the findings. He asked if I thought we had enough from the meeting to contemplate having the office manager charged as a conspirator should criminal charges be pursued. I told Tim I thought the office manager should be terminated for now, and as the case was further investigated and additional evidence was found, a determination could be made regarding the extent the office manager may have been involved in any schemes. I said I thought, based on how the office manager acted and responded, that he likely had some scheme of his own being perpetrated beyond the bank account and United Alliance account, both areas he clearly attempted to distance himself from. I asked Tim where he stood with receiving the bank statements for the identified bank account. He said he had spoken with the bank earlier, and that the statements would be available for him to pick up by the end of the week. I thought that was pretty fast service from the bank based on my personal experience, but I also knew the organization’s relationship with the bank was very important to the bank, so I wasn’t all that surprised with their prompt attention to his request. As I was finishing my call with Tim, there was a knock on the door. I asked Tim to hold for a moment while I saw who was knocking, and I set the phone down. I opened the door and an individual I had yet to meet was standing at the door. She intro- duced herself by providing her name, and then stated she was the informant providing information to Tim. I asked her to come in, and I shut the door behind her. I went back to the phone and told Tim that an individual who identified herself as the informant just came into the office. Tim said he knew that she would be coming to see me, as he had spoken to her earlier in the day while I was Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 117 meeting with the office manager. Tim said the informant stated she wanted to provide information directly to me while I was out at the division. Tim said he had spoken with outside counsel, and that outside counsel approved of my speaking with the informant based on her request to meet with me. I told Tim I would talk with him later, and ended our call. 118 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation 8C H A P T E R FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES (OBTAINING MORE EVIDENCE) Ididn’t sleep all that well that night. I thought about the upcoming interview, the things that I hoped went well, and potential problems or issues I could face. I tried to remember everything about the office manager from the first day. He was a young guy, still living at home with his parents from what I was told, and could be a potentially angry person having been abruptly removed from his job and placed on leave (albeit paid leave, so a vacation in essence). I still didn’t know much regarding the level of potential fraud I could be facing at the division. I didn’t know if he would do anything rash or behave irrationally in a desperate attempt to derail the investigation. And I didn’t know if he could become hostile. I knew the mole was keeping him informed until we stopped talking around her, and that there had to be some kind of need for information he was experiencing that no longer was being fulfilled. One thing I did know was that the information he had provided me with on the first day was not accurate and was likely grounds for termination of employment, in and of itself, for lying when questioned about employment-related matters. The potential for a bad situation was ever present, and I thought about my safety, as well as the safety of the human resource director. I had checked the day before and I knew the women of the division would not be in tomorrow morning, leaving the place to ourselves for the interview. I thought about the need to determine what the office manager knew, especially if he provided anything that could lead us to the information faster than the measures we 101 already had in place. I decided the meeting would occur as planned, but if anger, hostility, or other risks became obvious, I would immediately end the meeting and set a time to continue the conversation, allowing time to cool off, as well as raise the safety measures to a more appropriate level. There was also the strong chance that he wouldn’t show up for the meeting at all, or would call at the last minute to cancel due to ‘‘an unexpected change or urgent need or something.’’ Based on what I knew thus far, the office manager was told we were at the division to conduct a financial review and as part of that review I would need to speak with the employees. Aside from being paid to stay home, there was no reason for the office manager to cause us harm. If he wanted to end the meeting and leave, I would let him, and then he would likely be placed on unpaid leave for in- subordination for his lack of cooperation with the financial review. LEARNING POINT It is common to set up these meetings and interviews, only to have them canceled, delayed, or have a no show. Sudden illnesses and last minute cancelations are frequent, especially when the target of an investigation knows he may finally have to discuss details of his scheme that he has been concealing for some time. Having to admit to wrongdoing creates much stress, and it is human nature to delay that confrontation as long as possible. Fight or flight? In my experience the target will choose flight. Rather than get annoyed or take it personally, you need to accept the fact that delays and cancellations are just part of the process. Rescheduling even at the last minute to accommodate a scheduling issue with the target is one thing, but in each case a decision will need to be made as to how long you will wait, and how many times you will reschedule the meeting, simply to accommodate the interviewee. At some point you may need to pull the plug on conducting the interview, simply document the meeting attempts, delays, and cancellations, and complete the investigation without the interview. The fact that you tried on several occasions to meet with the individual to get the facts from his perspective and to discuss your findings will only show that you attempted to be thorough with your procedures. In the end, if additional facts later become known through the individual that could change your conclusion, you will be able to show that you attempted to get that information from the individual prior to completing your work and drafting your report. 102 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation I headed out to the division, running through the interview in my mind. It seemed like the shortest ride yet. I arrived to find the human resource director waiting for me in the lobby. Having just arrived herself, she was still turning on the lights and things. The weather was noticeably pleasant, and it was only going to get warmer as the day progressed. I was wearing my khaki pants and a polo shirt—short sleeves, because it was going to be warm in the afternoon. I asked her if she thought the office manager would show up today, and she said she thought he would not show for the meeting. I bet her a dollar that he would show. I went into the office to make sure everything was as I had left it and put my notes on the table. ! ! ! As it got closer to 9:00, we stood in the lobby and looked out the front windows to see if he would show up. If he parked around the corner and walked up, we wouldn’t see him until he crossed the front walkway and headed toward the front door. We both thought he would park right out in front, and that we would see him as he pulled up. Just before 9:00, a shiny, new, luxury four-door sedan pulled up across the street and stopped. As the door opened, we both recog- nized the driver as the office manager. The funny thing was we knew he drove an older Ford Bronco and only made $28,000 a year working at the division, so the car was obviously not his, nor was it consistent with his lifestyle still living at home with his parents. The car was likely his parents’ car, but we were unsure what his message was in coming in their expensive car. When he stood up outside the car, we instantly noticed the full-length leather coat he was wearing. One of the warmest days so far this season and forecasted to only get warmer, and the office manager drives over in an expensive new car wearing a full-length leather coat. I looked at the human resource director and said I had one very important question to get answered before we proceeded. What was under that long leather coat? My mind raced as I tried to find a way to determine if there could be a weapon hidden below the long coat. Then the idea popped into my head. It would work, but only if the office manager wasn’t too bright—something I was banking on. I ran back into the office where we were to meet and cranked the thermostat as high as possible. Then, I opened a Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 103 window in the room, and returned back to the lobby. I didn’t want to leave the human resource manager alone when he came through the door. He opened the exterior door and knocked. I looked at the human resource director and said ‘‘Here we go.’’ I opened the door. I immediately stuck out my right hand to shake his hand, and thanked him for coming in to meet with me. He didn’t seem fazed and shook my hand. Then the human resource director re- introduced herself to him and thanked him for coming in. I watched him as he scanned the lobby and areas. Then I asked him to come in. As we walked down the hallway toward his desk, I told him that we would be meeting in the office just beyond his desk. I then asked him if that would be a good place to meet. His response was ‘‘whatever.’’ Then I told him there was one other thing. I told him that the thermostats in the back had been malfunctioning during the week, and that the offices got extremely hot throughout the day, causing us to open windows at times. I asked him if that had ever happened while he was there. He said not that he was aware (and wouldn’t he be aware of it, since he worked just outside the office we were about to meet in, every day for how long?). I said to him that I thought it would be a lot more comfortable given the heat situation if he left his coat outside on the chair right near the door, because it was only going to get hotter when we closed the door. Unfazed, he agreed and took that long, potentially weapon-concealing leather coat off in front of the human resource director, and laid it on the chair. What he didn’t realize was that I was scanning him the entire time to ensure there were no weapons hidden under his coat. Now with his coat off, I could see around his waist—no bulges. That’s not to say he couldn’t have something hidden elsewhere on his body, but at least I wasn’t going to be distracted wondering and worrying constantly about what might be looming under his coat. I was so thankful he wasn’t brighter than he turned out to be. I was wearing short sleeves, the window was already opened, and we could have simply left the door open during the meeting, reducing the risk of the office getting too warm, which would have allowed him to keep the coat on. Needless to say I was relieved. I directed him to his seat, and went over to where I planned on sitting. He sat down, and then I followed. I started by apologizing for the abrupt way we had met just a few days earlier. I told him it 104 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation wasn’t my call to complete the financial review in that fashion, but just as he took direction from others, I did from my client. I asked him what he remembered from our first encounter. He said he remembered us bursting into the division, and bringing him and the others into the office while members of our team started going through everything. The next thing he remembered was being escorted out of the office like some criminal, and walking out the front door. He seemed a bit angry, but not hostile. I asked him if he remembered speaking with me and any of the questions I asked him that day. He said he remembered talking to me, but couldn’t recall what we talked about. He said it all happened so fast, he wasn’t sure if he even provided accurate answers to the questions asked. I thought this was a nice defense he had created in the event that I showed him the information he provided was less than accurate. I thought I would start with some basic foundational questions, relatively harmless and totally nonthreatening, and asked him to describe what he did at the division. His reply was that he did everything. I said to him that we needed to get a little more specific. I then asked him to describe his original duties and responsibilities when he first started at the division, and if they evolved or changed over time, and to describe how and when they changed. He asked me what I meant. I asked him to identify the main things he did on a day- to-day basis. He said he made deposits, paid bills, and managed the finances for the division. There it was—short and sweet, and to the point. I asked him what making the deposits entailed. He said he took the money that came in, recorded it into the system, and brought it to the bank. He said that’s what you do when you make deposits. I thought to myself, ‘‘Either this guy is an idiot, or he thinks I am an idiot.’’ Either way, I knew I should delve a bit further to see why his responses to these innocuous questions were so bizarre. ! ! ! I asked him to describe how money came into the division. He said funds came in, and they got recorded. I asked him how funds came in, and he said he didn’t understand my question. I asked him to describe the different ways funds were received into the division. He said either they were brought in or they were mailed in. I asked him what form the funds were in when they were received. Again, he said Further Investigative Measures (Obtaining More Evidence) 105 he didn’t understand my question. I asked him if they paid by cash, check, credit card, and/or other means of payment. He said they paid in all of those forms. I asked him who handled the payments when they were mailed into the division. He said the woman sitting near his desk (a.k.a. the crier) handled all the payments and wrote out receipts for the payments she received. I asked him what happened to the funds after the woman received them. He said she put the funds into the safe at the end of each day. I asked him who had access to the safe. He said he didn’t understand my question. I asked him who had the combination or key to get into the safe where the funds were placed by the woman. He said the controller had access to the safe. I asked him if anyone else had access to the safe. He said the woman had access, but it was kept open during the day so that she could put the money into the safe at the end of each day. I asked him if anyone else had access, meaning the ability to open the locked safe. He said he could open the safe, if needed. I asked him if the woman could open the safe if it was closed. He said she couldn’t open the safe, but that it was always open for her to use. I asked him how often he opened the safe. He said he just told me that it was always open during the day for anyone including himself to use, if needed. I said I heard what he said, but my question was how often did you have to unlock the safe and open it for the day? He said he didn’t understand what I was asking. I thought to myself, ‘‘No one is that ignorant.’’ The office manager was clearly playing games with his responses, and likely thought his cute responses and selective memory would prevent him from divulging any information potentially implicating him in any wrongdoing. This seemed to be consistent with what he told the informant—that he would be cleared of any wrongdoing and shown to have done nothing wrong. LEARNING POINT While not holding myself out as an expert in interviewing techniques, I have had great experience in getting individuals to meet, talk, and admit to their actions, even when they didn’t want to provide any information. In my experience, people react in strange ways to stress, and having these types (Continued ) 106 Anatomy of a Fraud Investigation