Fluent Essays

Base on the Teslas document, create a case analysis.  2 page (max); 12pt font size; single/double space; normal margin Analysis should be based on the assigned case. Citing and including references does not mean you can copy and paste others’ sentences. You can be creative to fully use two pages. Table, bullet points, and plain sentences are all allowed.  Please Include the question numbers. In a demographic aspect, the average age of people visiting the theaters affects the amount of revenue as well as the interest in theaters. According to the case, movies target 12-24 year olds, more than 50\% of moviegoers are comprised of 60+ year olds. Regarding their economic stance, Revenues have decreased in theaters. Theaters tend to lose during the purchasing of a film, however they break even in tickets and earn in concessions. Sociocultural aspects also affect theaters. Because some days movies aren’t enough to build a revenue for the day, theaters offer extra content. This allows viewers to have options as to why attend the theater. Technologically speaking, theater exhibitors have been able to switch from film to digital display. Theaters have also been able to offer 3D movies experiences as well as 4D. The switch allowed theaters to cut costs and have a faster and easier distribution. Also because there is no physical film, with digital display, images are sharper and of higher quality. Globally Theaters such as AMC and Cinemark have been able to have locations internationally. 71\% of movie revenues come from abroad and it forces studios to internationalize their films making them attractive to international viewers. Threat of New Entrants- Med Power of Suppliers- High Power of Buyers- high Threat of Substitutes - medium Rivalry Relationship- low New theaters cannot compete with the high amount of existing theaters all over the country. International thaters do pose a threat. Studios relying less in domestic exhibitors due to international success. Potential disintermediation can lower major revenues for theaters. Customers might not be willing to pay the ticket price anymore. The less people the less concessions sold, the less revenue. Digital distribution, people can buy a digital version of the movie and see it at home. Most tv sets and audio can substitute the quality of theaters, Yet people still go for the experience. Differences between major theaters are only based on convenience of location. What each theater offers is almost the same. This case was prepared by Senior Lecturer Donald Sull and Cate Reavis, Associate Director, Curriculum Development. Copyright © 2019, Donald Sull. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California 94105, USA. 18-186 May 1, 2019 Tesla’s Entry into the U.S. Auto Industry Donald Sull and Cate Reavis In March 2016, CEO Elon Musk unveiled the company’s latest electric car, the Model 3, in front of an audience of 800 Tesla owners and fans. Musk enthusiastically explained how Tesla’s earlier electric vehicles (EVs) – the Roadster, Models S and X – had paved the way for the company to design and manufacture an EV “for the masses.” The baseline $35,000 Model 3 could accelerate from 0 to 60 miles per hour in six seconds, and its 75-kilowatt hour (kWh) battery had a range of 220 miles (the range increased to 310 miles with a long-range battery option). Deliveries of the car would begin at the end of 2017. Musk boasted to the audience that the company had already secured 115,000 pre-ordered cars at $1,000 per car (a number that would grow to 500,000 pre-orders by 2018).1 By August 2018, Musk’s enthusiasm had turned to misery, laid bare in a New York Times article entitled “Elon Musk Details ‘Excruciating’ Personal Toll of Tesla Turmoil.”2 Working up to 120 hours a week and sleeping on the factory floor, Musk was closely supervising the production of the Model 3. He described Tesla as being in a state of “production hell.” The company had paused production in late February and again in April to work out bottlenecks in its highly automated factory, staffed with over 1,000 robots.3 During a call with equity analysts in May 2018, Musk’s misery was palpable. He became testy, characterizing a question about the company’s capital requirements as “boring.”4 But it was a legitimate question. In the second quarter of 2018, the company recorded a net loss of $743 million on revenue of $4 billion. Analysts estimated that the company needed to produce at least 5,000 units a week to turn a profit in 2018.5 Some wondered whether Tesla would run out of cash by the end of the year.6 (See the Tesla Financials tab in the Tesla case workbook for additional financial data.) TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 2 In The New York Times article, Musk remarked, “The worst is over from a Tesla operational standpoint.”7 The company was finally producing 5,000 Model 3s a week after missing the original production goal by more than six months.8 As he worked to get production ramped up before the company’s cash ran out, Musk admitted on Twitter to one mistake: “Yes, excessive automation at Tesla was a mistake. To be precise, my mistake. Humans are underrated.”9 Investors and auto industry experts were split on Tesla’s future. Some believed that Tesla would create value by disrupting the traditional automobile industry, all while achieving its stated mission to accelerate the world’s transition to sustainable energy. Skeptics disagreed. “Tesla,” according to one prominent investor, “without any doubt, is on the verge of bankruptcy.”10 The Traditional Automobile Industry Industry Overview The new passenger car marketa in the United States was worth about $270 billion at the retail level in 2016.11 While the industry experienced a sharp downturn during the 2008 Great Recession, sales had rebounded by 2013 as the U.S. economy swung into recovery. With higher disposable incomes and easier access to credit, Americans, including Millennials born after 1980, flocked to dealerships. By 2016, the market’s momentum had slowed. Sales (by value and volume) were expected to remain flat until 2021 (Exhibits 1a and 1b). The average sales price of a new car was $35,500 (Exhibit 2). Americans were buying big cars. Of the nearly 7 million new cars sold in the United States in 2016, 60\% were pickups and SUVs.12 However, industry analysts expected demand for small cars to comprise 20\% of new car model launches by 2023, compared to 15\% between 2008 and 2017 (Exhibit 3). Some also predicted that by 2025 nearly 60\% of new vehicles (trucks and buses included) sold in the United States would offer some form of alternative propulsion (e.g., EVs, hybrids, and fuel cellb cars).13 Automakers In 2018, three U.S. automakers accounted for nearly 46\% of the U.S. car industry’s market share by volume. General Motors (GM) led the market with a 17.9\% share, followed by Ford with 14.7\%, and Chrysler with 12.9\% (Exhibit 4).14 Toyota was the leading non-U.S. manufacturer with 13.5\% by volume. Tesla held a 0.2\% market share. (See the Competitors tab in the Tesla case workbook for additional financial data.) Automakers, who were sometimes referred to as original equipment manufacturers or OEMs, had historically earned low returns on their investments. The operating margins (operating income as a percentage of sales) of GM, Ford, and Chrysler were 7.4\%, 6.4\%, and 3.2\%, respectively. a Passenger cars include sedans, hatchbacks, SUVs, 4x4s, and other related vehicles that have four wheels and have no more than eight seats in addition to the driver’s seat. b A fuel cell car is a type of electric vehicle that uses a fuel cell instead of or together with a battery. A fuel cell uses hydrogen and oxygen to produce electricity. TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 3 OEMs faced significant barriers to exit. The automotive sector employed nearly 3 million people in the United States – nearly 1 million in manufacturing and 2 million in retail – and politicians at the federal, state, and local levels were keen to protect those jobs.15 The automakers’ resources, including factories and brands, were highly specialized and could not be easily redeployed to other uses. Not one of the “Big Three” U.S. manufacturers had left the market, even during the 2008 Great Recession when their manufacturing capacity utilization fell below 33\% (Exhibit 5). Both Chrysler and GM declared bankruptcy in 2009. The federal government rescued GM, and Chrysler was acquired by Italy-based Fiat. Within two years, GM had returned to profitability, although it continued to earn low returns on investment. Customers demonstrated little brand loyalty when it came to the cars they bought. Eighty percent switched brands when trading in a car and buying a new one. Customers of Toyota’s luxury brand Lexus were the most loyal; but even among Lexus owners, only 30\% replaced their trade-in with another Lexus. Replacement rates for other luxury brands were lower, considerably so for some: Mercedes-Benz, 28\%; BMW, 24\%; Porsche, 22\%; Audi, 16\%; and Jaguar, 12\%.16 Wall Street was not convinced that the traditional automotive OEMs were well positioned to respond to significant industry shifts brought on by startups like Tesla and technology companies with deep financial pockets like Google and Apple. New entrants were investing heavily in EVs, autonomous driving, and mobility services – technologies and services that enabled goods and people to move around more freely.17 As the industry moved from selling cars to providing mobility services, the sources of industry revenues and profits were projected to shift (Exhibits 6a and 6b).18 New Entrants The barriers to entering the auto industry were high. New entrants had to contend with creating brand loyalty, building manufacturing capabilities and factories, developing a dealer network, and attaining the capital requirements to develop and build a new car, which could be as much as $6 billion and take up to six years.19 Research and development (R&D) expenditure for OEMs based in the United States was about 5\% of revenue. Six automakers were among the world’s most valuable brands, including Toyota with an estimated brand value of $45 billion, Mercedes-Benz ($34 billion), BMW ($31 billion), Honda ($26 billion), Audi ($14 billion), and Ford ($14 billion).20 Exhibit 7 shows how much the ten largest OEMs spent on capital expenditure, R&D, and acquisitions between 2006 and 2016. While there had been no domestic entrants at scale in the United States since the 1920s, there had been entry by non-US manufacturers. Japanese (Toyota, Honda) followed by Korean (Hyundai, Kia) automakers entered at the lower end of the market in price starting in the early 1980s and moved up to higher-end brands (e.g., Lexus) once they had established a firm foothold. In 2018, OEMs headquartered outside the United States were producing more cars in the United States than GM, Ford, and Chrysler combined.21 Companies like Toyota, Daimler, BMW, and Nissan were building and TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 4 expanding factories and workforces across the southern and southwestern regions of the United States. Daimler was investing $1 billion in its Alabama-based plant, which produced 286,000 cars in 2017, and BMW was spending $600 million to expand its South Carolina plant, which produced 370,000 cars.22 Toyota’s four U.S. factories, which together produced nearly 2 million cars in 2017, were about to become five after the company announced in January 2018 that it would be building a $1.6 billion shared factory with Mazda in Alabama, which would result in 4,000 new jobs.23 Suppliers Globally, over 11,000 companies supplied automobile manufacturers with parts (tires, batteries) and systems (braking, electrical). These suppliers ran 60,000 production facilities and employed 7 million people worldwide. The $2.2 trillion global automotive supply business was highly fragmented. The top five players - Robert Bosch, Continental, Magna, Denso, and ZF Friedrichshafen - accounted for 8.1\% of revenue.24 (See the Suppliers tab in the Tesla case workbook for additional data on suppliers.) There were three tiers of suppliers. Tier 1 suppliers (e.g., Robert Bosch) sold components and sub- systems that integrated multiple parts, such as a steering system, directly to OEMs.25 Tier 1 suppliers had deep technical capabilities that allowed them to diversify beyond the automotive industry.26 More than 40\% of Bosch’s revenue, for example, came from the company’s non-automotive business. The company sold solutions that integrated smoke detectors, climate control, and appliances into what it called a “smart home” system. Tier 2 suppliers sold parts such as interior trim, bumpers, wires, and cables to Tier 1 suppliers. Like their Tier 1 counterparts, many Tier 2 suppliers sold to customers in multiple industries.27 Tier 3 suppliers sold undifferentiated raw materials such as steel or rubber to OEMs and to Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. On average, a car manufacturer had hundreds of suppliers. Ford, for example, purchased 80\% of its parts from 100 suppliers.28 Automotive suppliers were typically more profitable than automakers (Exhibit 8). Tier 1 suppliers were investing in new technologies in preparation for a future dominated by electric vehicles, which would require far fewer parts. An internal combustion car consisted of up to 30,000 discrete parts while an EV had about one-third as many components.29 This contrast was clearly evident when comparing the engines. An internal combustion engine (ICE) required hundreds of moving parts while the induction engine used in EVs had only a few. ICE cars had anywhere from six to 10 gears while EVs had one.30 Tier 1 suppliers were expected to capture a larger portion of a vehicle’s value by selling subsystems, such as advanced driver assistance systems and infotainment systems that enhanced safety and the driver’s experience.31 Suppliers of new technology and software were predicted to capture 11\% of profits by 2030, up from 4\% in 2015.32 In addition, because they provided the majority of fuel-saving technology in R&D and production capacity, Tier 1 suppliers were reaping the benefits of new fuel TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 5 economy standards and renewable fuel standards. One industry analyst predicted that between 2014 and 2025, automakers would spend $110 billion on fuel-saving technology, of which $90 billion would be paid to suppliers. 33 Customers Car Buyers In 2018, there were 113 million registered passenger cars in the United States.34 Average vehicle retention was at an all-time high of 11.6 years.35 Most of these cars spent 95\% of their time parked. Approximately 75\% of workers in the United States commuted alone by car.36 Millennials, a generation of 75 million people, had a lower rate of car ownership than previous generations at their age. One study found that 92\% of 20–24 year-olds had a driver’s license in 1983, a rate that had dropped to 77\% by 2014.37 While the 2008 Great Recession delayed their entrance into the car-buying market, Millennials were the fastest-growing segment of car buyers, and J.D. Powers predicted that by 2020 they would make up 40\% of new car purchases. Compact cars and some crossovers were their cars of choice. Before entering a dealership, they spent significant time on the internet researching makes and models, and conferring with acquaintances on social media.38 According to a study by Autotrader, they spent an average of 17 hours researching vehicles before making a purchase.39 As one industry observer noted: “Millennials buy cars more pragmatically. Maybe they missed that moment when you deeply fall in love with cars, or a car, or personal autonomous transportation. And they are forever going to be more on the pragmatic car-as-commodity, car-as- appliance part of the equation.”40 Millennials’ parents were also starting to think differently about car ownership. According to a 2015 Zipcar study, Baby Boomers - those born between 1946 and 1964 - were moving to the city in large numbers to take advantage of shorter commutes and the cultural experiences urban life offered.41 Eighty seven percent of the study’s respondents said that having a shorter commute was an important part of urban life while 65\% said that getting around without a car was a key attribute of urban living.42 Many relied on ride-hailing services as customers as well as a source of income. A 2015 Uber study determined that 39\% of its drivers who drove over 30 hours per week were 50 years and older.43 In making purchasing decisions, a survey of over 2,000 car buyers ages 18–64 found that safety, fuel efficiency, and high quality were the most important buying factors, whereas spaciousness, price, and brand were ranked least important (Exhibit 9). For Millennials, the top five desired features when looking for a car were navigation systems, satellite radio, Bluetooth, MP3 players, and mobile integration.44 Dealerships In 2018, there were over 18,000 new car dealerships in the United States, down from nearly 22,000 in 2007.45 Sales of new cars accounted for roughly 30\% of a dealership’s profits (dealers earned approximately 2\% of the purchase price of a new car in profit).46 Dealerships made between 45\% and 60\% of their profits through servicing cars and supplying replacement parts, although those TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 6 profits were expected to decrease significantly with EVs that required less service and fewer repairs.47 A 2016 study found that dealers steered customers away from EVs by not displaying them prominently, not having an EV available for a test drive, not mentioning available tax credits and rebates, or not having basic knowledge about EVs.48 Dealers were losing their allure with car buyers. The majority of American car buyers disliked going to the dealer and having to negotiate price with well-trained salespeople. A survey of 100,000 car consumers by Accenture found that 75\% would consider buying their car online, thereby bypassing the dealer altogether.49 Cox Automotive, an automotive industry marketer and research provider, predicted that up to 10\% of cars would be purchased online in 2019.50 Millennials were being credited with moving the car-buying process online.51 In addition to their reluctance to buy a car from a dealership, Millennials were also reluctant to work at one because of long hours, unstable pay, and the haggling with consumers that was required - auto dealers experienced a 50\% annual turnover among their Millennial employees.52 The Changing Face of Mobility In 2018, several changes were fundamentally reshaping the automobile industry. These trends included a shift toward EVs due to climate change concerns; a growing number of people moving to cities and choosing to be carless; the rapid growth of autonomous driving; and the rise of alternative transportation, including car-sharing and car-hailing services (Zipcar, Uber, Lyft), urban bike rentals (Zagster, Lime), and electric scooter-sharing services (Bird, Lime). Some consumers viewed a car less as a mode of transportation, and more as a “computer on wheels.”53 Automakers, in response, were attempting to recast themselves as software-fueled “experience providers.”54 Electrification In 2017, roughly 200,000 EVs were sold in the United States, a 25\% increase over 2016 sales, putting the total number on the road at roughly 760,000.55 The Nissan LEAF was the first mass-market electric vehicle to be sold in the United States. It debuted in late 2010 with a price tag of $32,780, or $25,280 after a $7,500 federal income tax credit. The car’s 24-kilowatt hour (kWh) battery had a range of 100 miles. The LEAF experienced a bumpy rollout, and missed sales projections - 2012 sales were half of the projected 20,000 units56 - which led Nissan to lower prices to boost sales. Government subsidies to consumers were helping to drive EV adoption, which provided the scale required for EVs to become economically viable for manufacturers.57 Buyers of EVs were entitled to a $7,500 federal tax credit up until December 31, 2018. Between January 1 and June 30, 2019, the credit would decrease to $3,750 and then to $1,875 until December 2019. A number of states offered additional tax credits or rebates to EV buyers, including California ($2,500), Connecticut ($3,000), and New York ($500 for EVs over $60,000 and $2,000 for those under $60,000).58 The most expensive part of an EV is the lithium-ion battery. The battery pack on Chevrolet’s Bolt EV cost $10,000–$12,000, accounting for 33\% of the final price of the car.59 Fortunately for EV TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 7 manufacturers, battery prices had fallen 80\% between 2010 and 2017 (Exhibit 10). Batteries on EV models varied in their capacity (based on kWh), the time it took to charge the battery (about 35 hours to completely charge a Nissan LEAF using 110V and 7.5 hours with 220V), and range (how many miles could be driven per charge).60 The price of electricity in the United States averaged $0.11 per kWh.61 Over 60\% of battery sales were shared by three companies: Panasonic (Japan), BYD (China), and LG Chem (South Korea).62 GM and Ford were preparing to introduce multiple EV models. GM entered the EV market with the Chevy Bolt in early 2017, six years after launching the hybrid Chevy Volt. GM planned to offer a fleet of 20 electric vehicle models by 2023, including electric SUV/light trucks, a segment which Tesla was also expected to enter.63 The company, in partnership with Honda, was also investing in proprietary battery and fuel cell technologies.64 Ford entered the EV market in 2012 with an electric version of the Focus. In early 2018, the company announced that, over the following four years, it would be phasing out most of its passenger internal combustion models to focus on light trucks and EVs.65 It was investing $11 billion and planned to roll out 24 hybrids and 16 EVs, including a 300-mile range Mustang-inspired SUV, by 2022.66 Toyota, which lagged behind its competitors in rolling out EVs, planned to have 10 EV models by the early 2020s. In late 2017, the company announced it was in talks with battery maker Panasonic to form a joint venture in Japan to make batteries for EVs.67 BMW launched its first EV, the i3, in 2015. Its EV crossover, the iX3, with a range of 250 miles, would arrive in 2021. Recognizing a future need for easy access to batteries, in 2018, the company signed a $1.1 billion contract with China-based CATL, to build a battery factory in Europe.68 With electrification came the need for public charging stations. In order for consumers to feel comfortable about switching to EVs and avoid “range anxiety,” they needed reassurance that the public charging infrastructure was in place when away from their home charging outlet. There were 16,000 public charging stations and 43,000 individual charging connectors in the United States compared to 112,000 gas stations.69 Building and maintaining charging stations was unprofitable, and different stakeholders, including automakers, power companies, third-party charging companies, and governments, debated who should be responsible for these stations.70 Since 2015, BMW and Nissan had partnered with EVgo, the nation’s largest public direct current (DC) fast-charging operator, to build a network of fast-charging stations, which were publicly available for all EV drivers. A fast-charging station could add 60 to 100 miles of range in just 20 minutes.71 As part of its diesel emissions settlement with the U.S. government, Volkswagen would be installing 2,000 fast-charging stations in 17 U.S. cities by 2019. Utilities were beginning to eye the EV charging infrastructure market, and several were running pilots and experimenting with different business models. As industry watchers noted, it was the duty of TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 8 utilities to serve the public interest.72 Industry experts warned about the stress EVs might put on the electric grid if owners charged their cars at home during peak hours (early evening). Some believed additional fossil fuel-fired plants would need to be built to meet the demand unless drivers could charge their cars during off-peak hours or by using renewable power sources such as solar.73 Autonomous Driving There was debate about how long it would take until the first fully automated, self-driving vehicle would be on the road. (See Exhibit 11 for five autonomous levels ranging from “hands on” to “steering wheel optional.”) Some industry observers believed driverless cars, which were equipped with either LiDAR, a laser technology that uses light waves, or radio wave technology to transmit information on a car’s surroundings, would become fairly commonplace by 2020.74 Others weren’t as optimistic and believed it could be decades before consumers trusted autonomous vehicles and were ready to replace their current cars.75 Several companies were testing different levels of autonomous vehicles with mixed success. Tesla, Uber, and Waymo (a subsidiary of Google’s parent company Alphabet Inc.) had all experienced crashes that resulted in serious injuries and, in some cases, fatalities.76 While Tesla experimented on its own cars, Uber and Waymo tested their self-driving technology on Toyotas and Fiat Chryslers.77 Like Waymo and Uber, Apple looked to OEMs to supply the vehicles for their autonomous vehicle initiative. Apple was equipping Lexus SUVs with LiDAR, radar sensors, and many cameras. By May 2018, Apple was testing 45 cars, more than the number being tested by Waymo and Uber.78 GM, which received a $2.3 billion investment from SoftBank for its self-driving division GM Cruise Holdings, was the most active of the car manufacturers in testing autonomous vehicles. The company’s test fleet of 180 autonomous EVs was providing taxi-like services for company employees in San Francisco. (A human was on board in all vehicles during the testing phase.) Industry observers predicted that either GM or Waymo would win the race to bring the first fully autonomous vehicle to market.79 Self-driving cars, many believed, would make traveling by car safer by eliminating human error and distraction.80 In addition to safer roads, driverless cars would enable ride sharing, thereby reducing private car ownership. As one industry observer noted, “In the past, cars were primarily about driving and secondarily about content consumption. With autonomous cars, that prioritization will be reversed. Fully automatic cars will be battery-powered living rooms on wheels.”81 The speed of adoption to self- driving cars would depend on regulations - only 6\% of the largest cities had language about autonomous vehicles in their long-term transportation plans82 - and consumer acceptance.83 Connectivity With a growing segment of society craving continual connection with the world around them, car manufacturers were investing in digital connectivity. As defined by the automotive practice of consulting firm PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), a “connected car” had access to the internet and a variety of sensors that were able to send and receive signals, sense the environment around them, and interact with other vehicles or entities, such as in-home virtual assistants like Alexa.84 The key elements of a connected car were adaptive driver assistance systems, infotainment, human-machine interfaces TESLA’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY Donald Sull and Cate Reavis May 1, 2019 9 (e.g., touchscreen or any device enabling continuous communication between driver/passengers and the car/outside world85), and vehicle services (e.g., safety and vehicle management services, over-the- air software updates).86 As cars became more connected, R&D investment by OEMs was expected to move from hardware (the car itself) to software solutions integrated into the vehicle, a shift that would require automakers to hire more software engineers.87 A McKinsey & Company report estimated that the United States alone would require up to 100,000 additional software engineers to work in its automotive industry.88 The profits automakers reaped in the future would depend on the type of connectivity “packages” that OEMs sold with their cars.89 The CEO of LeEco, a Chinese conglomerate, noted in an interview that he would eventually be able to offer his company’s electric car, the LeSEE, for free, earning money from the myriad services the company sold to customers.90 How OEMs would profit from connected cars, and whether they would try to do so by building, buying, or partnering, was not clear. As PwC put it, “The risk is that they [OEMs] will become mere manufacturers of increasingly commoditized vehicles - dumb pipes on wheels - through which the truly valuable connected and mobility services pass.”91 Connected car revenue was expected to surge from $53 billion in 2017 to $156 billion by 2022 (Exhibit 12). In 2017, premium models captured nearly two-thirds of the connected car revenue. But a shift was expected to take place and by 2022 the mass-market vehicles, such as the Ford Focus and Honda Accord, were expected to account for 50\% of revenue. Seventy-five percent of connected car packages would be sold as part of smaller, less expensive cars, and the prices for the packages would be lower.92 Prices and services included in connected car packages varied considerably among OEMs as did the level of price transparency. GM’s OnStar Safety and Security Plan, which included automatic crash response, stolen vehicle assistance, and navigation, was $24.99 a month after a six-month free trial.93 Toyota’s Safety Connect – a standard feature on all models that provided emergency assistance, stolen vehicle locator, and crash notification – was $8 a month after a three-year free trial. Navigation services were sold separately with the basic service costing $24.99 a year after a free trial.94 Alternatives to Private Car Ownership Some industry observers believed that electrification, autonomous driving, and connectivity would alter, but not fundamentally change, the traditional business model of selling cars that OEMs had pursued for decades. Others argued that consumers’ views of transportation were fundamentally shifting. Owning cars would give way to a “mobility-as-a- service” model, whereby consumers would purchase the mobility they needed, when they needed it. In this scenario, consumers would buy miles rather than vehicles.95 A 2017 transportation study by a Stanford University economist predicted that by 2030, 95\% of U.S. passenger miles could be served by on-demand autonomous electric vehicles and …