Fluent Essays

In addition to the presentations, required readings, and other external sources consulted, consider chapter 2 sections on Structural Constants, Evolutionary Trends, and Thinking About the World. Which of these three theories (realism, neoliberalism, or constructivism) best accounts for the constants and trends of the international system? If each of them can account for at least some features of the system, then explain how. Advice: Pay close attention to behavioral assumptions behind the theories before seeking to apply them to features of the international system. Part II: Based on your understanding of IR theory, comment on whether or to what degree a particular theory is compatible with a CWV (Christian World View). 5 Most Influential Presidential Doctrines Welcome to the history doctors top five presidential foreign policy doctrines. What is a foreign policy doctrine by a President? Presidential doctrine is just a statement of goals that America has in its relationships with other countries. First, well share a broad overview of the top five. And then well break each one down. The number one most significant presidential foreign policy doctrine in our history was the Monroe Doctrine from 820 three, a 123 divided the world into Western and Eastern hemispheres and told the Europeans, keep out of our, of our neighborhood, of our backyard. So we divided the world into East and West. The second one is the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt, that is, at the turn of the last century, Roosevelt essentially announced that America was going to be the policeman of Latin America and South America. That America help for itself the right of intervention in the, in the finances and political affairs of our neighbors in Latin and South America. The third most important foreign policy doctrine is the Truman Doctrine. Thats 940 seven really was the benchmark of the policy of containment. Lets forward out to number four. In 1969, President Richard Nixon comes in with the Nixon Doctrine with the goal of getting us out of the Vietnam War simultaneous to South Vietnam, still standing as an anti-communist state. Lastly, were going to call it the Bush Doctrine of 2003. President Bush declared war on the Axis of Evil and gave America the political and moral authority to overthrow and regime change any nation in the world that Harvard and supported terrorists. The top number one foreign policy does the Monroe Doctrine. It was the brainchild of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. James Monroe announced to European powers that no longer would the Western Hemisphere be open ground, open opportunity for European colonialism. Monroe declared that the Europeans were to stay on their side of the world. And we would stay on our side of the world. And this is something that persisted really for hundreds of years. The Monroe Doctrine was invoked by later presidents. For example, in 845, John Tyler invokes the Monroe Doctrine as, as a reason for saying that Britain could not hold any possessions or territory in Texas. John Kennedy invoked the Monroe Doctrine in claiming that the Soviet Union could not have any kind of military presence in Cuba out 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt essentially declared that America would be the policeman of Latin America and South America. President Roosevelt gave America the authority, political and moral, to police the financial and political affairs of all of our neighbors to the south. Some nations in Latin and South America regard us with great suspicion as the big, powerful ******* of the North. Roosevelt Corollary did establish American dominance, financial dominance. And many times, since 1902, American marines were dispatched to some Latin or South American nation to restore order there after some tumbled. President Harry Trumans Truman Doctrine is the benchmark of containment. Essentially, the Soviet Union was threatening Greece and Turkey with internal revolts and insurgencies to bring down the pro-Western government, governments in those nations and install communist governments. Instead. The Soviet Union has a bleep in the Black Sea. The only way out of the Black Sea is through the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles, control by Greece and Turkey. If America controls Greece and Turkey or its friends do, then we can bottle up the Soviet Black Sea fleet and it cannot reach the Mediterranean. And then the Mediterranean will remain a place of American and NATO dominance. So, we were President Truman that is trying to keep the Soviet Navy out of the Mediterranean and enact policy. He was successful. Greece and Turkey stood as anti-communist States. And the policy of containment was established and sustained for decades to come through the Truman Doctrine. Number four is the Nixon Doctrine. America was embroiled in a bitter and divisive war in Southeast Asia. The American people wanted to bring the troops home. Nixon understood. If he withdrew the American troops all at once overnight, South Vietnam would collapse and North Vietnam would, would succeed in conquering. So, the Nixon Doctrine is synonymous with what we call Vietnam asean. The Nixon Doctrine essentially succeeded. Another painful point Id like to make about the Nixon Doctrine. If youre at the dentist, the dentist does not pull a tooth slowly. That would be agony for the American troops in South Vietnam. If 50000 go home neck this month, a soldier might say, well, I dont want to go out in the field to fight today. My unit might get withdraw next month. So understanding that we were no longer there to win meant we were there just to bring our troops home. A lot of our troops became demoralized. Under Nixon. They started using drugs to pass the time. They started resisting more aggressive officers that wanted to continue to fight the war. Who would want to be the last man to die in Vietnam if there was the chance that your unit was going home next month? The last foreign policy doctrine number five, in its importance will called the Bush Doctrine of 2003. The nation that Harvard and supported terrorists would be subjected to pre-emptive American attack. That would change the regime of that nation, would overthrow its leaders, is an int declared that America was at war with not just the nations in the states that did 9, 11, but with any Islamic radical regime, we were at war with a kind of regime. So, the Bush Doctrine led us to invade Iraq in 2003, evict its leaders, evict its government, and occupy control the nation until a stable government emerged. Today, we have the possibility of a Trump doctrine. What would a trumpet doctrine look? What might Donald Trump apply the Bush Doctrine to nation states like North Korea or Iran? Might he actually attempt a regime changing military effort in those states? As we all know, history isnt done with us yet. 2 2 Hi, Welcome to Module One, American foreign policy Problems and Contexts. This week we want to examine the basic problems in contexts of US foreign policy. This will be an important foundation moving forward. So, take note of some basic questions concerns, 1. How do we define US foreign policy? 2. Is there even an objective way to do this too? 3. Do We make a list of friends and enemies and go from there with the list be refined or qualify based on US capabilities, geopolitical facts? 4. Or are we committed to certain allies and policy is independent of costs, whether measured in financial material? For human terms, 5. How much of US foreign policy is the result of pragmatic compromise between ideals and interests are differently between ideals and real or perceived necessity? 6. Is there a kind of American exceptionalism or a providential hand allowing American policymakers to avoid the kinds of moral trade offs that have plagued all great powers in history? 7. Or do we face the same hard choices that all past empires, monarchies, or regional hegemon us have had to make, in short, for Americans to get what they think they want? Typically, through their representatives. They first must make choices, calculate interests, and assess costs. Before deciding matters of policy. Youll encounter the language of hard and soft power. Its become standard fair to compare these as broad categories of policy instruments. Hard power is the traditional use of all national assets and capabilities, military and economic, in the service of maintaining regime power and survival. If not, continuity of government in a crisis. Soft power is the use of non-coercive policy tools of persuasion, whether in the form of diplomacy, foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, cross-cultural exchanges, access to U.S educational institutions and opportunities. Exemplary ideals like democracy or religious liberty, or simply other non-coercive means of attracting allies rather than enemies? The questions to begin asking here are critical. 1. Does soft power require a bedrock of hard power to make it an attractive policy instrument? Or differently, 2. does hard power use, Co, use of coercive means tend to nullify the possibility or effectiveness of self-power appeal? You will decide this even if some time along down the road. To talk about hard and soft power is to speak of ways to achieve some broader vision of grand strategy. Many of you have heard from biblical verse that without vision, the people perish. This is likely true of many things in life, including foreign policy. While its critical to have hard and soft power capabilities, including an educated population. Without prioritizing the use of these assets, they can be wasted if not lost altogether in a failed policy. Not surprisingly, because so many assumptions are, the decisions must be made in the process of envisioning US grand strategy. Its no surprise to say that policy makers often debate and disagree with one another and deciding how and where to both maintain and position us strategic assets and capabilities. While no single course can resolve such issues. A good place to begin is with the eminent historian John Lewis Gaddis is work on grand strategy. One practical mirror into attempts at broader strategic policy has come to us via presidential foreign policy doctrines. Pay attention to these in terms of ideals. Hes in practices since they are statements signaling American friends and enemies of qi, qi US strategic priorities and policy red lines. As with most US foreign policy in history, whether they work as intended or not is arguable. But there is seldom any question of what the intent is in terms of both principle in practice. In these precedential policy statement, students who reflect on the distinction between rhetoric and reality through the prism of at least three critical questions. 1. Is the policy intellectually coherent? 2. How much of it was influenced by domestic politics rather than any grand strategic vision? 3. . And has it been, or is it tailored to consistency of application? This week is also an important opportunity to examine at least key theory, three key theories of international relations. In particular, students will want to understand realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Sir, theories pay close attention to rhetoric and reality here as well. Since IR theory is a very contentious field of study, not only in the way that experts define and qualify the terms, but whether any of these matters to application of the theory to the real-world of policymaking. Consider a quote from a respected source and IR theory. Quote. There are a great many different theories and IRR. They can be classified in a number of ways. What we call a main theoretical tradition is not an objective entity. If you put four IR theorists in a room, easily get 10 different ways of organizing theory. And there will also be disagreement about which theories are relevant in the first place. End quote. Thats from Jackson and Sorenson introduction to international relations, theories, and approaches. Close, closely related to theory debates is the question of how best to characterize the behavioral pattern of the international system or the structural constants of system behavior. A good course on international relations would help here. But for now, we can only offer three broad features of system behavior. Namely, is it decentralized, mainly self-help in nature, and stratified in power and capabilities? Students will want to begin asking why realism has traditionally been the default theory most used to explain system behavior. And whether the system features mentioned can also be accounted for by the other two theories, if not others. Many believe that despite its popular default mode, realism is inadequate to explain evolutionary trends of system behavior. Like its greater diffusion of power, the proliferation of issues. Even great powers cannot control without empowering other system actors. The proliferation of international actors beyond the traditional focus of states. And finally, the fact of regional diversity. A good course on global governance will help elaborate on all of these evolutionary trends. But for now, pay attention to how and whether these trends will challenge of realism as the default theory explaining the international system. Most believe US foreign policy will express its aspirations and interests on a power spectrum somewhere between American hegemony at one end and globalization on the other. As always, you will find your way here as you invest more time and experience. These issues. Finally, note the over the horizon issues in each chapter Have a great week. 2 Constructivist Theory Realists and liberals share in common the idea that states are rational egoists. The latter concept refers to the idea that actors do not care much about the welfare of others as an end in itself. Neoliberal is, as we have seen, take this assumption and argue that it is not incompatible with long-term cooperation. But what is left unsaid here is that if act as judge, that cooperation is no longer serving their long-term interest, then they will have no compunction from exiting the cooperative arrangement. In short, irrational egoist view of the social world is a statement about an identity that does not change through interaction, communication, or institutions. So, our hunters in the stag hunt enter the hunters, rational egoists, and they remain rational egoists throughout the hand and all the others to follow. No bonding occurs around the campfire. No shared values develop, no common obligations of felt and no sense of friendship emerges. The point of departure for constructivism. Our third theoretical approach is that international politics, like stag hunt or social constructs. By a social construct, they mean that there is nothing natural given all inevitable about social practices. The classic example that peoples use to explain this idea is the idea of money. The bank notes we carry in our wallets, or at one level, nothing more than bits of paper and ink. In this sense, they have no intrinsic material value hasnt of themselves. So, what makes the bits of paper and ink a commodity that we can exchange for goods and services. Its the collective meanings that we give to these bits of paper. And if we stopped acting on this collectively agreed, albeit unspoken understanding than money would cease to have value. Applying this understanding of the social furniture we live with to international politics. How we act at any time is shaped by the social practices in which we are embedded, and which are actual and critically produce and reproduce in the same way as we produce and reproduce money every time, we go shopping. Actions dont speak for themselves. And why some actions are taken and not others on the global stage is critically dependent on the identities of the actors, which in turn are bound up with the roles and social practices in which actors find themselves. So, if you are in a relationship of enmity with another actor, as with the United States and Iran today, this cost you into a role which both constraints and enables the possibilities of action. Conversely, if you are the United States and the United Kingdom, you are in a relationship of MIT or friendship. And this opens up a very different menu of choices as to how you act. The core claim of constructivism is that none of these relationships are fixed in stone. Because identities are changeable. Prove interaction and communication. And enemies can become friends. Just as friends can become enemies. It is no part of constructivism to argue that social practices will always lead to cooperation. Gas chambers, cannibalism, and human sacrifice. Or just as much social practices as cooperation, love, and pace to bring our theoretical threads together. While realism and liberalism can also explain the rise and fall of cooperation between states. Given their fixed conception of state identities as rational egoists, they would reduce explanation solely to the level of material interests. Constructivists would respond that realists and neoliberal was only looking at the tip of the iceberg. It is identities constructivists argue that shape how we think about our interests. To finally we turn to the stag hunt. Constructivist would say that if youre hunting party, include your best friends, your spouse, or your parents, it is highly likely that as a result of the positive identifications you would normally feel for them, you will want to cooperate because of the shared values. This type of bonding creates a very different set of identities and hence collectively shared meanings for each of the hunters, than is the case in Waltzs original story, where all the hunters are assumed to be rational egoists. Interests vs Values in Foreign Policy There are two poles to the American foreign policy debate. One is values, essentially the quality of life within a countrys borders. And then theres interests. Interests, if you will, tend to be matters of economic or security or diplomatic importance. So, interests could be such things as investments. Interest can be access to raw materials. Interests can be stability. When you speak about values really runs arrange and it deals mainly though with the quality of life, the degree of opportunity, the degree of freedom. It can be the basic ability of people to survive, say, against a tyrannical regime. But it can also affect political freedom or religious freedom. Could also involves things about economics, standard of living, certain types of economic opportunity. This fault line of interest versus values can really be traced back over a century ago, say Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of World War 1. How much again should the United States focus on the right of so-called self-determination as opposed to it where to draw lines and how to keep countries from going to war. And if you look at so many of the current debates about American foreign policy, you deconstruct them. But you see someone essentially arguing, we should focus more on interests or more values. In this period of history, I would actually argue that its one of the more complex, that theres more countries that are neither, if you will, permanent friend or permanent foe, that it places a real premium on diplomacy in ways that we havent seen, say, in our earlier periods of history, which tended to be more fixed and less dynamic. And foreign policy again, you cant choose, if you will, what it is thats out there. The behavior of other countries, the nature of other countries simply arrives in your inbox. Youve gotta decide what to do with him. Take Egypt today, should the United States be focusing on the restoration or movement towards full democracy in Egypt. But shell be concern ourselves most with how the Egyptian government acts against terrorism, which willingness to embrace peace with Israel. So, there is always, I would argue, something of attention or tradeoff between interests and values. 2 Hi, Welcome to Module One, American foreign policy Problems and Contexts. This week we want to examine the basic problems in contexts of US foreign policy. This will be an important foundation moving forward. So, take note of some basic questions concerns, 1. How do we define US foreign policy? 2. Is there even an objective way to do this too? 3. Do We make a list of friends and enemies and go from there with the list be refined or qualify based on US capabilities, geopolitical facts? 4. Or are we committed to certain allies and policy is independent of costs, whether measured in financial material? For human terms, 5. How much of US foreign policy is the result of pragmatic compromise between ideals and interests are differently between ideals and real or perceived necessity? 6. Is there a kind of American exceptionalism or a providential hand allowing American policymakers to avoid the kinds of moral trade offs that have plagued all great powers in history? 7. Or do we face the same hard choices that all past empires, monarchies, or regional hegemon us have had to make, in short, for Americans to get what they think they want? Typically, through their representatives. They first must make choices, calculate interests, and assess costs. Before deciding matters of policy. Youll encounter the language of hard and soft power. Its become standard fair to compare these as broad categories of policy instruments. Hard power is the traditional use of all national assets and capabilities, military and economic, in the service of maintaining regime power and survival. If not, continuity of government in a crisis. Soft power is the use of non-coercive policy tools of persuasion, whether in the form of diplomacy, foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, cross-cultural exchanges, access to U.S educational institutions and opportunities. Exemplary ideals like democracy or religious liberty, or simply other non-coercive means of attracting allies rather than enemies? The questions to begin asking here are critical. 1. Does soft power require a bedrock of hard power to make it an attractive policy instrument? Or differently, 2. does hard power use, Co, use of coercive means tend to nullify the possibility or effectiveness of self-power appeal? You will decide this even if some time along down the road. To talk about hard and soft power is to speak of ways to achieve some broader vision of grand strategy. Many of you have heard from biblical verse that without vision, the people perish. This is likely true of many things in life, including foreign policy. While its critical to have hard and soft power capabilities, including an educated population. Without prioritizing the use of these assets, they can be wasted if not lost altogether in a failed policy. Not surprisingly, because so many assumptions are, the decisions must be made in the process of envisioning US grand strategy. Its no surprise to say that policy makers often debate and disagree with one another and deciding how and where to both maintain and position us strategic assets and capabilities. While no single course can resolve such issues. A good place to begin is with the eminent historian John Lewis Gaddis is work on grand strategy. One practical mirror into attempts at broader strategic policy has come to us via presidential foreign policy doctrines. Pay attention to these in terms of ideals. Hes in practices since they are statements signaling American friends and enemies of qi, qi US strategic priorities and policy red lines. As with most US foreign policy in history, whether they work as intended or not is arguable. But there is seldom any question of what the intent is in terms of both principle in practice. In these precedential policy statement, students who reflect on the distinction between rhetoric and reality through the prism of at least three critical questions. 1. Is the policy intellectually coherent? 2. How much of it was influenced by domestic politics rather than any grand strategic vision? 3. . And has it been, or is it tailored to consistency of application? This week is also an important opportunity to examine at least key theory, three key theories of international relations. In particular, students will want to understand realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Sir, theories pay close attention to rhetoric and reality here as well. Since IR theory is a very contentious field of study, not only in the way that experts define and qualify the terms, but whether any of these matters to application of the theory to the real-world of policymaking. Consider a quote from a respected source and IR theory. Quote. There are a great many different theories and IRR. They can be classified in a number of ways. What we call a main theoretical tradition is not an objective entity. If you put four IR theorists in a room, easily get 10 different ways of organizing theory. And there will also be disagreement about which theories are relevant in the first place. End quote. Thats from Jackson and Sorenson introduction to international relations, theories, and approaches. Close, closely related to theory debates is the question of how best to characterize the behavioral pattern of the international system or the structural constants of system behavior. A good course on international relations would help here. But for now, we can only offer three broad features of system behavior. Namely, is it decentralized, mainly self-help in nature, and stratified in power and capabilities? Students will want to begin asking why realism has traditionally been the default theory most used to explain system behavior. And whether the system features mentioned can also be accounted for by the other two theories, if not others. Many believe that despite its popular default mode, realism is inadequate to explain evolutionary trends of system behavior. Like its greater diffusion of power, the proliferation of issues. Even great powers cannot control without empowering other system actors. The proliferation of international actors beyond the traditional focus of states. And finally, the fact of regional diversity. A good course on global governance will help elaborate on all of these evolutionary trends. But for now, pay attention to how and whether these trends will challenge of realism as the default theory explaining the international system. Most believe US foreign policy will express its aspirations and interests on a power spectrum somewhere between American hegemony at one end and globalization on the other. As always, you will find your way here as you invest more time and experience. These issues. Finally, note the over the horizon issues in each chapter Have a great week. 2 Joseph Nye - On Soft Power What power is the ability to get what you want from others? And you can do three ways. You can do it with coercion. You can do with payment, or you can do it with attraction, persuasion, coercion, and payment, I call hard power, the ability yet what you want through retraction persuasion is soft power. Well, probably the greatest example would be the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall went down. It did not go down under artillery barrage of hard power that went down under people wielding hammers and bulldozers. Mothers, their minds have been changed. Theyve been attracted and persuaded. And thats an example of soft power that was created by culture and values ideas. People on the eastern side had lost their faith and communism. And they basically were changed or those views or change the retraction and persuasion. Thats a good example of soft power as you could want. Well, if a country has a culture which is attractive to others, it may make other countries more willing to hear its views or to sympathize with its views. And countries spend a fair amount on that for the United States. State Department, under Secretary for Public Policy with a budget that supports people in different national capitals and other parts of countries to get American culture and ideas across. But probably the biggest source of soft power is not what the government does. Its everything from Hollywood, Harvard, Its American entertainment. The American universities. Probably more to convey American culture than anything else. Other countries like China are making major efforts to increase their soft power. Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress in 2007 that China had to invest more in its soft power and they spent billions and billions of dollars on it. The problem the Chinese have is they think the government create soft power and theyre not willing to let their civil society free to basically act internationally the way that Western European, or American civil societies able to do. And that sets limits on their soft power. Well, there totalitarian societies do well self-power. Adolf Hitler was a master of the propaganda cinema. So its not as though democracies alone, well talk power. But its true that in a world in which you have modern communications, revolution and more openness. If you have societies that are open, that may help in terms of increasing the numbers channels of soft power. Thats why when we talk about public diplomacy, were not talking about diplomacy between states to states. Were talking about diplomacy in which you communicate the public in another country. And it may not be that communication from government one to the public and state number two, it baby, communication between public and state number 1 to the public and state number two, this is sometimes called nowadays Twitter diplomacy. And its a factor to consider. It might members Soviets had a good deal of soft power in 945. In Europe, for example, the Soviet Union was regarded as very attractive because it stood up to the fascism. Hitler had the fascism, mussolini. And when you had elections in Italy and in France, communist one, very large numbers coming close to majorities. And I think in that sense the Soviets had a good deal of soft power. They lost that soft power with time as people began to realize how repressive Soviet society was internally. And as they saw the invasion of Hungary to repress a popular revolt and hungry Soviet soft power began to erode. And so by the time you got to the late sixties and early seventies, ironically, Soviet hard power had increased the number of missiles and the size of the armies and so forth. But Soviets soft power was in severe decline. Not necessarily. Its soft power is the ability who tracked. And you can make efforts to make yourself attractive. But basically, if it rests, countrys culture, values and policies. Culture and values are long-term propositions. Policies can change within an administration where a leader, but culture and values tend to be longer in duration. Well, remember hes soft power. Doesnt just here enlarge country. Small countries can use soft power as well. Norway. It is a country of only about 5 million people, and its not part of the European Union. But it is followed policies such as being seen as a peacemaker, such as giving 1\% of its gross domestic product to overseas development assistance, which are attractive to others. So Norway has indeed use policies to enhance its soft power. Under addition to that, Norway is regarded as a well-ordered society and attractive society the way they implement their values at home. And that adds Norway soft power. Well, you can see it in the invasion of Iraq. The United States went into Iraq without the legitimacy of a second the United Nations resolution. And when you look at public opinion polls, you see that the US lost about 20 to 30 points of attractiveness on public opinion polls scales in western Europe. But an even more dramatic example is Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim country in the world. In the year 2000, the United States was attractive to 75\% of Indonesians. After the invasion of Iraq, that drops to 15 percent. 15. Thats a huge loss of soft power. No, it can be regained, for example, when the United States helped or use the Navy ships to help provide tsunami relief. After the 2000 45 tsunami. Then youve got an appreciation of the attractive aspects of the United States. And the poll show the United States going back up into about 40\% range and Indonesia. Yes, in fact, soft power is not a zero-sum game. For example, if Chinas sets up a Confucius Institute to make Chinese culture more attractive in the United States. Presumably that can enhance Chinas soft power. The US, they have US uses an exchange program to make the United States more attractive inside China. That increases American soft power inside China. If were both interested in avoiding conflict between the United States and China, which I think we are, that increase in soft power attractiveness of each country to each other is a win-win. Oh, absolutely. If, if our culture is unattractive to others than a given cultural artifact doesnt produce soft power. They produce the opposite. They produce revulsion. So you take an American TV program or American film in which women are shown running around and bikinis and divorcing their husbands and working. And you show that in Saudi Arabia or Iran, thats not attractive to the religious conservatives who rule those countries. But there is an interesting dimension to that. If you ask, is they watch attractive to the Molas who run Iran. Clearly not, doesnt create nice soft power. But if you ask, what do young Iranian teenagers want? They want to see an American video in the privacy of their homes. So you can attract some people and repulse or repel others at the same time. Well, I think a lot of the reputation of a country or its attractiveness goes deeper. Cultural value issues that governments dont control. But certainly if governments do things that are unattractive, can, can counter veil those, those attractive aspects. Take the 1950s, when Africa was becoming independent. The United States culture was quite racist. Me we had formal segregation in many states in the United States. And at the same time we are trying to attract leaders. Of newly independent African countries. And the ad, if they were going to travel to the US and wanted to take a bus ride from Washington DC, Richmond, Virginia, or Macon, Georgia. They couldnt go into the same restaurants are the same recitations that whites could. Well, that did not increase American attractiveness of the newly independent states of Africa. And so theres an example in which culture and policies undercut our soft power. Like American diplomats who accurately project American culture in general, are able to have a beneficial effect that made some of the successful diplomats are ones who, who have exhibitions of American films who bring but modern American art and culture who range, who travel, who get outside the embassy. Dont just talk to other government officials, but meet people in different settings who express something about the, the openness of American culture. Well, Brazil is, is a very attractive, not just in South America, but in lieu. So culture of the Portuguese language. So there are parts of South America which you are Spanish-speaking, which are not necessarily attracted by Brazil. But if you look at Angola, Mozambique, or Portugal and so forth, you find that theres strong ties there. And even within the Spanish-speaking parts of Latin America, theres some rivalry between some Spanish speaking countries like Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. There are many South America who admire Brazil and Brazils culture of football and carnival and so forth, are universal. They tracked a lot of people in North America as well. Well, in the Cold War, we not only had broadcasts like Voice of America, an exchange programs that the government sponsored, but in general, you found American popular groups, rock musicians, for example, going to Russia. And in both the music and the lyrics, you are able to express values of freedom which and openness, which I think further eroded the belief and communism and made America look attractive. So they exchange programs, culture programs, so forth. These all help in terms of promoting soft piRNA a, an active diplomacy has to have this cultural diplomacy as part of its public diplomacy. Well, if the Americans are wise in the way we pursue our power, we realize that a smart power strategy combines hard and soft power. And you cant accomplish everything with soft power alone, which can accomplish everything with hard power low, most effective policies are those which successfully have hard and soft power reinforce each other. The example of a failure there was, I think gives me mentioned earlier the invasion of Iraq. Where do we relied on heartbeat harden it undercut our soft power. But I think you can argue that a smart power strategy for the United States in the future, before it takes a step, well say, how do I make sure of that? Hard and soft power reinforcing each other? Well as smart diplomat is able to do vote for me. A diplomat is going to have to convey messages from government to government. Sometimes its very high levels, very private, not at all public. But that same diplomat who may have gone to call on the prime minister or president at 11 AM ME that afternoon at four PM, have a showing of an American film or may go to whats called an American Corner where you have American books and culture being displayed and a local library. So a good diplomat learns to both. A successful diplomat is somebody who can represent his or her country. And that means that they not only can be inaccurate and faithful messenger and reporter and interpreter of whats conveyed in these messages. But also an accurate representative or faithful representative of the culture of their country. So they want to be both a good messenger at the highest levels, but also a good representative at the Broad and pop your levels. Foreign Service, which is an admirable group of people when I worked in the state part my highs and pressed and how good they were and how hard they worked with the amount of credit they got. I think the hard thing will be adjusting to a modern communications revolution. To realize that some of the traditional skills of being a good, accurate messenger, reporter and analysts have to be supplemented by a greater capacity to represent and communicate to broad audiences. 2 International Relations – Liberal Theory Liberalism is a theory of international politics that believes the fundamental force in world politics is globalization. And globalization is interdependence between the interests of groups in different societies. And those groups then go to their governments and ask them to regulate globalization in different ways. And those vary demands that come from groups in different societies lead those governments to act in different ways. So that leads to a world system that has states with quite varied state preferences about what they want the ultimate outcome of international politics to be. So you can think of liberalism as a bottom up theory where globalization drives different state preferences and those different state preferences drive what states do. Liberal theories of international relations start with individuals and groups. In society is the basic actors. They represent their interests to states. Now you could think of those states as cities, even tribes, empires, any kind of political actors. Although in the modern world, most such political actors are states, you believe is liberals do that the fundamental force in international politics is the distribution of social and state preferences. Then that leads you to look in a particular place for the basic forces that drive state behavior. And there are three kinds of liberal theory that helps you do that. The first is commercial liberal theory, and it directs you to look at the material interests of states, particularly their economic interest in managing interdependence in a way thats profitable to the dominant groups in a society at a given time. The second is ideational, interdependent. Ideational liberalism that focuses you on the ideals and beliefs of groups in society and their effort to realize those ideals in international relations. And the third is Republican Liberalism that focuses you on domestic institutions. And domestic institutions help select which groups it is in society whose interests and ideals are represented by the state at any point in time, you put these three things together, interests, ideas, and institutions. And you get a comprehensive view of the different factors that influence what the preferences of states are. And therefore, in the liberal view, what they want and therefore what they do. Some people think that liberal theory is on parsimonious. They say, youre trying to explain preferences, then youve got these three types of preferences, commercial, Republican, and ideational liberalism and then sub theories within it. Isnt that very complicated. Im sure my friend John Mearsheimer, who talks about realism, well say, Ive just got five principles. I can do it much more simply. I think a theory needs to be as simple or complicated as the material its trying to study. The world is a diverse place. We need a theory that can handle that. The test of a good theory is whether or not it generates particular mid-range claims at the level of things like the democratic peace hypothesis or theories of trade or explanations of how countries comply with international organizations that are relatively simple and relatively powerful based on that criterion. And the liberal theory is a powerful and relatively simple theory. And thats the criterion I think is most pragmatic useful. And so, when I use a distinctive aspect of liberal theory is its ability to explain a wide variation in outcomes that we actually see in the international system. So liberal theories are extremely powerful in explaining cooperative outcomes in the international system because it can predict the conditions under which countries have convergent interests. For example, in the post-war international economic system, where countries had expanding interests in mutually beneficial trade. Weve seen the growth of international organizations to manage international trade such as the WTO, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to do that job. Also, able to explain, as I mentioned before, are the democratic peace phenomena that democracies tend to cooperate amongst each other and not go to war with each other at the same time. Its capable of explaining in a very differentiated way when states go to war to predict circumstances under which they do, for example, liberals would predict that democratic and non-democratic states are states with opposed ideologies, say communist and noncommunist states. Or states with different competing visions of religious future for the world would be more likely to go to war and other sorts of states. This is in contrast to a realist. Theory, if you compare realism to liberalism, realism argues that the causes of war and peace can be seen in the distribution of power. Realists such as Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer argue that the causes of war and peace can be explained by the distribution of coercive power. Notice that liberals are quite different. They argue that the causes of state behavior lie in the distribution of state preferences. This is something that realists affirmatively deny. They argue that it really doesnt matter what motivation states have, what intentions they have, what domestic regimes they have, what in what ideologies they have, states will act the same on the basis of what distribution of power exists in the international system. Thats quite a radical hypothesis. That Stalins Russia, Hitlers Germany and Franklin Roosevelts United States, and Churchills Britain will all act the same, given the same amount of power, liberals find this absurd. We believe that in fact those domestic differences really matter, and history does barris out. Its often thought that realists theories are systemic theories and liberal theories are domestic theories. This is a distinction that Kenneth Waltz introduced into the literature. I disagree with this distinction. Both liberal theories and realist theories or systemic theories in the sense that waltz use the term, what is a systemic theory? Its a theory that says that the causes of state behavior lie in the configuration of characteristics of states. The only difference between realists’ theories and liberal theories in this regard is the, is the particular characteristic that these theories choose to emphasize. For realists theories that characteristic is coercive power. And the distribution of coercive power across the international system is what determines what each state does. For liberals, the critical characteristic is the distribution of social preferences and state preferences across the international system. The critical difference is that one is about coercive power and the other one is about social preferences. What might think that US China relations, great power, superpower relations is a last place we should look for liberal theory to be effective. But in fact, I think it works very well in this case, if we look at Western policy toward China, the first thing to note about it is that the main line of Western policy, the major emphasis of it is engagement. Our bet with regard to China in the United States and in the Western world, that by trading with China, by opening China up, we will make China Amore Pacific country, a country thats easier to deal with because it will become richer, more educated, and more agreeable in every regard. Thats the main line of Western policy. Now its true that Western policy also has certain elements that might be better explained by other theories. For example, we do balanced China to a certain extent than a realist. My point that out, we do try to integrate China into international organizations and an institutionalist might point that out. Do we even try to socialize Chinese officials into thinking a different way about international relations? And a constructivist might try to point that out. But the main wager that were placing with regard to China is that economic development, domestic regime changes and changes in ideas, fundamental ideas about legitimacy in China will make it a country that we can deal with over the long-term. In fact, thats how the whole process got started. We didnt really start dealing with China as a partner that we could deal with across the full range of policies until Mao was replaced by Deng Xiaoping. And that was a domestic change in China, a fundamental change in the purposes of that regime, which led to a change in our relationship with it. I dont think realists or institutionalists, or constructivists can really give a coherent account of that. But it gives, it follows directly from liberal theory, which tells you that when regimes fundamentally change their purposes, foreign policy changes follow. Get moved from the city. Check out the links on screen now. 2 Realism vs Idealism I want to say a few sentences about how I looked at the will. Because in the American public discussion deaths, often the argument, should one look at the world from a realistic point of view or from an idealistic point of view. I think that is a false dichotomy. One have to begin with an assessment of the situation as it is. If one cannot do that, one cannot make any predictions about the future. But one cannot rest on the situation as it is. Because what happens, especially in times of turmoil, its the challenge of moving the world from where it is debated heads, not GAAP. And that requires vision. And idealism. Structural Realism: International Relations Basically, what I am is a structural realist. Im a person who believes that its the structure of the international system. Its the architecture of the international system that explains in large part how states behave. Another way to say that is, I do not believe that domestic politics, I do not believe that the composition or the makeup of individual states matters for very much, for how those states behave on a day-to-day basis and international politics. And to be a bit more specific about this, I believe the fact that states live in what we call an anarchic system. Thats a system where there is no higher authority that those states can turn to if they get into trouble. That fact, coupled with the fact that states can never be certain that they wont end up living next door to a really powerful state that has malign intentions. All of that causes states to do everything they can to be as powerful as possible. And again, the reason that you want to be very powerful, that you want to pursue power, that you want to dominate your region of the world is because in that situation, there is no other state that is capable of hurting you. If youre small and youre weak. In the international system, that means youre vulnerable. You dont have a lot of power. What happens is the big, powerful states in a position where they can take advantage of you. And again, because the system is anarchic, because theres no higher authority that sits above States. Theres nobody that you can turn to. Theres no night watchman that you can call, telephone to come and help you. So youre in a very vulnerable situation. And the way to avoid that is to be very powerful. And to give you a good example that really highlights this, think about the United States of America in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is by far the most powerful country in the western hemisphere. It has the Canadians on its northern border. It has the Mexicans on its southern border. It has fish on its eastern border and fish on its western border. No American ever goes to bed at night worrying about another country attacking it. And the reason is because the United States is so powerful. So the ideal situation for any state in the international system is to be as powerful as possible, because thats the best way to survive in a system where there is no higher authority, no night watchman, and where you can never be certain that you wont end up living next door to another country that has malign intentions. Now a lot of military power in the world, the realism, there are basically two sets of theories there. What one might call the human nature realist theories, structural realists theories. The human nature realists and Hans Morgenthau, Of course, would be the most prominent example of this school of thought. Believe that human beings are hard wired with what Morgenthau called an animist dominant undying. To put this in slightly different terms, Morgenthau was saying that all human beings are born with a type a personality. And when they get into power, what they want to do is pursue power as an end in itself. So in that story, its human nature. Its the way human beings are born that causes all this conflict in the international system. Thats a very different way of thinking about the world than the structural realist argument. Structural realists like me and like Ken Waltz believed that it is the structure of the international system. It is the architecture of the system, not human nature that causes states to behave aggressively. Thats what causes states to engage in security competition. Its the fact that theres no higher authority above States. And that states can never be certain that another state wont come after them militarily somewhere down the road. That drives the states to engage in security competition. So although both real as schools of thought lead to the same form of behavior, which is a rather aggressive kind of competition. The root causes are different in the two stories. Again, on one side, you have the human nature realists who focus on the way human beings are hard wired. And on the other side you have the structural realists who focus on the basic way that the system is organized. My view is that. The most important questions in international politics or what a theory should be concerned with. And there are really only a few big questions out there that matter. And these questions largely involve ward piece. And I think one of the great advantages of realism is that it has a lot to say, doesnt provide perfect answers, but it has a lot to say about the big questions in international politics. And one of the attractions of realism is that it is a parsimonious theory, which is a sophisticated way of saying its a simple theory. Realism is easy to understand. The handful of factors are said to describe why the world or to explain why the world works in particular ways. Why you get these very important events like World War One and World War two. And I think that thats the most important thing the theory can do is to provide simple explanations for very important events. This is not to say that we shouldnt have theories that explain minor actions or minor considerations or peripheral situations in the international system. But the most important theories by definition, are going to be those theories that deal with the big questions. The theories that are going to matter the most. And I believe this is why structural realism matter so much of those theories that are nice and simple, that are parsimonious. I believe that if China continues to rise economically, that it will translate that economic me into military might, and that it will try to dominate Asia, the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. I think that China, for good realist reasons, well try to become a hegemon in Asia. Because I believe the Chinese understand now and will certainly understand in the future that the best way to survive in the international system is to be really powerful. The Chinese understand full well what happened to them between 850 and 950 when they were very weak? They understand what the European great powers, the United States and the Japanese did to them. And they want to make sure in the future that theyre going to be very powerful. So I think theyll try to dominate Asia. The United States, on the other hand, does not tolerate what we sometimes called peer competitors. The United States does not want China to dominate Asia. In the United States will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from dominating Asia. And of course, Chinas neighbors. This includes Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, India, and Russia will not want China to dominate Asia. So, they will join with the United States to try to contain China. Much the way our European and Asian allies joined together with us during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union. The same thing I believe will happen with China. So you will have this intense security competition between China, which is trying to dominate Asia, and the United States and Chinas neighbors, which are trying to prevent China from dominating Asia. With regard to this question that lots of people are talking about today, can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. And my answer is based on my theory because theres no way you can predict the future without a theory. Get more from the university, check out the links on screen now. https://youtu.be/RXllDh6rD18 2 The United States Geographic Challenge The United States of America encompasses territory spanning from the Arctic Circle and Central Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico and the North Atlantic. The greater Mississippi basin is the United States has core and serves as the underpinning of its role as a global superpower. The base and hosts an extensive network of navigable rivers that overlay the worlds largest contiguous piece of arable land. This naturally interconnected river system facilitated integration among settlers and allowed for cheap transport of goods. Providing the United States with the ability to feed itself efficiently and rapidly build up industry and capital to expand west. The Midwestern core gave early America strategic depth, while an expanding US coastline naturally indented with deep harbors, provided its opening to the world. After reaching the Pacific Coast in the mid-19th century, the US found itself insulated by two oceans. On the continent itself. Geography again has worked in the countries favor Lakes to the North and deserts to the south. Insulate the United States as population centers. With both Canada and Mexico facing too many natural constraints of their own to seriously rival it. This unparalleled level of wealth and protection gives the United States options that no other country can claim. For one. The United States has used its wealth and security to build the worlds largest Navy. Control of the worlds major sea lanes gives the United States the power to facilitate or deny trade to allies or rivals of the day. The onus, therefore, is on the United States to carefully manage its engagements abroad and build up strategic allies to protect its overseas interests and preserve its strength at home. Stephen M. Walt: What Went Wrong with Liberalism? Today, liberalism is under threat on multiple fronts. Roger cone of the New York Times writes, the forces of disintegration are on the march. The foundations of the post-war world are trembling. The World Economic Forum says the liberal world order is being challenged by powerful authoritarian movements and anti-liberal fundamentalists. Democracy expert Larry Diamond at Stanford points out that between 2000 and 2015, democracy broke down in 27 countries. And many already authoritarian regimes became even less open and or less responsive to their citizens. Efforts to build stable democracies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans mostly failed. The Arab Spring quickly turned into an Arab Winter almost everywhere. Britain has now voted to leave the EU, signaling disenchantment with the most ambitious liberal project in Europe, turkey, Poland, Hungary, Israel, all headed in illiberal directions, or right-wing party in Germany beat Angela Merkel coalition in local elections last week. And not to forget, the Republican Party in the United States has nominated a presidential candidate who openly disdains the tolerance that is central to liberal societies, repeatedly expresses racist beliefs and cottons to baseless conspiracy theories. So the question is what went wrong between 93 and today? I blame this on several interrelated factors. The first is that we over-promise what liberalism could deliver. They argued, promoters of the liberal experiment argued that spreading democracy, spreading human rights, spreading open markets, and all of these things would guarantee peace and prosperity everywhere and largely for everyone. But of course, that turned out not to be the case. Just thinking of how the spread of markets works, it creates winners, often far more winners and losers, but it does create some losers. People who do not do well, at least in the short-term. As a result, the ladder are rarely happy about it, and the latter can use the same institutions of democracy to make that discontent known. To make matters worse, liberal elites in a number of places made some serious policy blunders. My favorite list, apart from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the creation of the Euro in Europe widely forecast to be a disaster and proven to be indeed mismanaging the American economy, leading to the financial crisis of 2008. And then especially in Europe, overdoing the politics and the policies of austerity after 2008, therefore, prolonging the economic crisis. Third, some liberal states used non-liberal means to try and spread liberal values with a predictable lack of success. And here are the classic example is the Iraq war. But its also true of the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. Mckee lesson to draw from that is that military force turns out to be a terrible tool for spreading liberal values. Finally, although liberals are generally supportive of the idea of national self-determination, they failed to appreciate just how persistent and powerful nationalism would be and how these local identities of various kinds would remain even in the midst of the liberal project, the European Union supposed to transcend nationalism, create a new pan-European identity. Where national identities would really only emerge, say, during the European Soccer Cup or something like that. But its clear, of course, in 2016 that this did not happen. The United States failed to appreciate that creating the formal institutions of democracy was not enough to create a liberal society without norms of tolerance and other imbedded social values. And again, thats especially true if you try to do that with armed force. Finally, it turns out that many people in many places care as much about national identities, historical entities, territorial symbols, traditional cultural values as they do about freedom, or as they do about purely economic benefits. And that those sentiments I think loom especially large when change is very rapid and when mostly homogeneous societies are forced to assimilate people whose backgrounds are different in a very short span of time. Again, we, I think we know for American History, which we always extol as the successful melting pot. But we know that in fact, there have been many moments of tension when new arrivals have experienced resistance. And that blending cultures within a single polity has never been particularly smoother simple when that happens and especially when its happening rapidly. It provides grist for populous leaders who promise to defend traditional values or make the country great. Again, nostalgia aint what it used to be, but it is still a very formidable political motivation. And then finally, I would play some blame on ruling elites in a number of liberal societies, especially the United States, where the operation of money in our politics and special interests have created not to be candid and essentially corrupt political class that is increasingly out of touch with ordinary people interested in enriching themselves and largely immune to accountability. The sense, in short, that the game is rigged in favor of the 1\%. Its where a lot of this populist anger comes from. And I think is reflected not just in the Trump campaign, but was also reflected in surprising success of Bernie Sanders. On the other end. Like to welcome you to this session of Hudson Institute conversation about strategy, national strategy. I expect well be doing some more of these, particularly since weve had such a, such a good response to this one. We have today. Some of this is this actually a very special day for Hudson Institute and even for American foreign policy as a whole. And that we have in one room today. One of the great legends of American foreign policy, General Scowcroft, who is also the holder of the Jimmy Doolittle Award, the highest award the Hudson Institute in its power to, to offer. Its now known as the Herman Kahn award, I should say. And fortunately, that change happened before prime minister ABE of Japan received the award. I see some of us in the audience are old enough to know what that might mean. In addition, we have to General Scowcroft, we have two of, I think, the finest minds in the rising generation of scholars and analysts of American foreign policy professors. How brands and Charles II, del, both of whom have written very important books on the future, on American foreign policy, history and strategy. And in between, sandwiched between these eminences, we have Professor Elliot Cohen who again is, needs no introduction, is one of the most powerful, significant voices in American foreign policy and perhaps needed now more than ever in a, in a very critical time. Were going to have a great discussion and Id like to invite Professor Cohen to open it with sort of introduction to his recent book, which commits the terrible heresy of saying that hard power may still be important in the future. Who could believe such a thing? Great. Well, thank you. Its, its a great pleasure to be here. Its an honor to have General Scowcroft and the audience has been a really an inspiration to several generations of people who both study and practice foreign policy and a lot of other old friends. And I am delighted if somewhat apprehensive, to have my colleagues sitting here to my left, how brands and Charlie, I dont, of course, my genial host, Walter Russell Mead. So the book is called The Big Stick, limits of soft power and the necessity of military force. The title at least has the virtue of being unambiguous. The title, of course comes from Roosevelt, Teddy Roosevelts famous dictum, speak softly and carry a big stick. Id like to remind people when he used that expression. It was a speech he gave when he was vice president at a Minnesota State Fair. The title of the speech was national duties. And let me just read a sentence from it. He said we can be certain of one thing, whether we wish it or not. We cannot avoid hereafter having duties to do in the face of other nations. All that we can settle, whether we shall perform those duties well or ill. And one of the reasons why Theodore Roosevelt was so interesting is I do believe he is the first of our presence presidents at a global conception of the American role and as always, since colonial times been plugged into the international system, the idea that wasnt as absurd. But he really did have a much bigger conception of the American role in the world, which is one of the reasons why painted the United States Navys battle fleet white and send it around the world to let them know that weve just shown up. Two weeks after he gave that speech. President McKinley was shot, or rather x was four days. He was shot. And then two weeks later, Roosevelt became president. Since that time, the American global role has cost something like 626 thousand dead. About twice as many wounded, trillions of dollars in expense. And of course, we have a military establishment and intelligence establishment that is literally an order of magnitude larger than anything that Theodore Roosevelt even imagined. And in some ways the question underneath this all was, well, why was it worth it? Is it worth it today? I wrote the book for three reasons. First, it seemed to me that could be apart to participate in a belated debate, that there should have been a debate about the American role in the world triggered by the end of the Cold War. After all, the basic consensus about the need to confront the Soviet Union in a global way, which involved a global military. The kind we had never really had before. Sacrifices which we hadnt made in peace time before. That debate did not happen. And it didnt happen, I think because first of the 990s, predominance of hegemony, whatever you want to call it, look cheap. After all. Other people paid for the first Gulf War. Casualties were extremely low. That pattern basically repeated in the 1990s in Yugoslavia. So the issue didnt really arise in the early 2000s. Of course we have 9, 11 and everything that flowed from that. And I think that absorbed a lot of the energy that wouldve otherwise gone into a first principles kind of debate. And so now a quarter of a century later we are having that debate. I would argue not under the most favorable circumstances, but, but there it is. And thinking that that was going to be upon us, I wanted to write the book. Secondly, it seemed to me that frequently and the kind of public discourse about military power, there is a kind of a false dichotomy between military options and diplomatic options. As if these are really two completely different ways of thinking about foreign policy. In point of fact, military power works together with diplomacy in the service of foreign policy. And related to that is, it, it seemed to me over time the community of people interested in defense policy is really drifted pretty far apart from the people who think about foreign policy. There are different kinds of communities concerned about different kinds of things. They publish in different places. I wanted to bring those two back together because thats what we have military power. And the, the, the third thing is that seem to me, George W Bush did not expect to become a wartime president in a different way, neither did Barack Obama. And in yet a different way, neither really as Donald Trump. Yet theyve all been wartime commander-in-chief. And I believe theres need to sort of think through what does that mean? What, what sorts of considerations should go into the actual use of military power. So thats what the book is about. Just very briefly. It is built around basically a chapters that starts with the question why the United States. And I tried to address as seriously as I can and as respectfully as I can, the various arguments that have been advanced for why the United States should not play a global role that involves the use of force either that basically were in a, Despite what it looks like were entering a much more peaceful period. Thats the Steven Pinker argument. Or that the United States is simply in competent to play this role. Thats an argument that my my friend Andy base of it she has made. And there are others. Second chapter deals with 15 years of war. What is it that we should learn from our experiences of the war with various Islamist movements in Afghanistan, in Iraq. That was a hard chapter to write it, among other things, involved taking a hard look at Iraq War, which I favored, in which I conclude in a measured way I should be very clear, was a mistake. But it does seem to be very important for us to look back as hard as we can on those, the lessons of those 15 years. Theres then a chapter on the American hand. What is the sense of a poker hand? Was the United States bring to the challenge of global leadership and not just militarily, but also in terms of other resources. And then four chapters which really built around what I consider to be the great strategic challenges that we face. China. What I loosely called the jihadi challenged, because its not just Al-Qaida. The problem of dangerous states, that is to say States eager to append at least regional balances of power. So that would be Russia, Iran, North Korea. And then fourthly, the challenge of ungoverned space or the great comments. And when I say add ungoverned space and the great comments, I include things like cyberspace and an outer space. And then the last chapter is called the logic of hard power. And it has a number of things in it. But among them is my attempt to go after Caspar Weinberger is famous six principles for using military power, which he expressed in a speech at the 980 forth Press Club. And I try to show that that really isnt going to work in that I offer my own alternatives. Theres a lot more in the book, but I think we want to get to the general discussion. Ill just conclude by saying that Ive, now that the Obama administration is over. Ive found myself reflecting a lot on it. Then I was quite critical of the Obama administration and I remain critical of it. But I certainly give President Obama credit for being sincere in both wishing and expecting to completely finish off the Iraq war, which he unopposed to begin with, and the Afghan war and actually pretty much terminate the conflict with Al-Qaeda, aside from some mopping up here and there. And more generally to retrench from the use of force. I think those were his objectives and he thought he could do them. And I believe he was entirely sincere. And yet, when we look back on the Obama administration, what do we have? He launched the third Iraq war because thats what were engaged in. Now. He doubled down and Afghanistan, that is not over. He presided over the largest campaign of assassination, or if you prefer, targeted killing than has ever been waged by a state in which still is clearly not. We killed Osama bin Laden. We didnt even kill off Al-Qaida, let alone other movements engaged in a war in Libya in ways that many of us would have expected. Way that created more, more turmoil Or reintroduced as substantial American military forces into Europe. Confronting possible Russian aggression there. And order the United States Navy to begin sailing pretty close to a bunch of man-made Chinese islands in the South China Sea. And I think its worth reflecting on that fact. Not because it is necessarily implies a criticism of the Obama administration though it may, but rather it tells you something about the logic of the world that he found himself in and that we find and find ourselves in. And so Ill just conclude by saying I agree with Theodore Roosevelt. Duties are going to be out there. We will end up performing them. And the choice is really as Theodore Roosevelt put it, are we going to do the, well? Are we going to do them poorly or were going to do them with a minimum of bloodshed and expense. Are we going to do them belatedly? Nestle and bluntly? Well, thank you for that. Lan its a brilliant discussion of a very rich book. I had to happiness to, to read in order to review it in the Wall Street Journal. And its difficult to do justice to everything that is in that book in a, in a short space, but did a pretty good job Just now. Let me just say at this moment, we do have a couple of chairs down front. If there are people standing in the back who would like to take a seat. I see 123 maybe four seats on this side. If you want to stand up, thats fine, but theyre there. Okay. Well, lets before we dig into a particular area of controversy between Elliott and some of our other panelists. What Charlie, what were your what was your kind of risk? What do you think was the single most valuable thing you saw in Eliots book? Well, the thing that Elliot hasnt discussed and you didnt give justice to is you can learn a lot about how someone thinks by what theyre reading. What is on Eliots night shelf. And if you read this book, youll know that he reads John Updike, Graham Greene, Tom Wolf, and more restroom. And for those of you who dont know the final, this is the inspiration for George RR Martins Game of Thrones, but its much bloodier. Now, the thing that struck me most before a couple of comments on the book was if there was anything, even though Elliot was very even-handed right now on his assessment or his presentation of an assessment of the Obama administration, clearly ticked you off more than anything else. Was the removal of the Churchill bust from the office of the book is framed by Churchill speeches at the beginning and at the end. But its actually not really a useful framing of the book because its really more link Konya by that sense. Famously in 858, when Abraham Lincoln is debating Stephen Douglas and he makes a seeming misstep, an error is political advisors have their hair on fire. And Lincoln comes down, he says, Im after much larger game. And I think its really important when you approach this book, even with the title thats laid out. This is not or its a misreading of the book. Has I think Eliot just laid out to understand this as simply an argument for the use of and thinking through under what conditions military force should be used as only just laid out. This is a much larger argument about the role that the United States should play in the world. A much deeper and engage roll and situates itself right in the middle. What disrupting be an enormous debate right now. So a couple of I, if Im a three thoughts at this kind of engendered and then three questions, either for Eliot or that we can kinda shove aside later. So the first thought is, I imagine for most people watching this presidential campaign, watching this presidency, thus far, what Donald Trump said as a candidate, if you have no historical consciousness, if you have no historical memory, is not crazy. Its just vulgar. Think about this for a second, right? Because if you were to explain to someone who doesnt understand well and viscerally through lived experience. The history of the 20th century. Why is it that the United States is forward positioned around the world? Why is it that we have an extensive system of alliances? Why is it that we have open markets, open commerce with our allies, at times of which have not been fully than official to us in a straight up and up line. Although really good historical answers for this. But again, if you erase that memory or if it begins to recede into the haze of memory, it makes much less sense. And so one thing that Ive noticed now having been a transplant in Washington, the most overused phrase in the world is one variant or another of liberal international order. The rules-based order, the Washington led to order, the post-World order, which I think is very low purchasing ability once you get outside of Washington, both where it comes from, what it means, what happens when it goes away. And so one of the things that really struck me from this book is this book is absolutely an argument for, that is how to employ it, particularly with the use of hard power. What the book is not though, or at least its a contribution, is how you build a domestic, domestic political consensus to utilize that book is obviously a contribution in that line. But how is it that you can build in a very different setting, a enduring bipartisan consensus to use American power in the world. I should say that the parallel, as Ellie talked about the 1980s, there are great parallels. When you think about the 1930s to write there was multiple, there were multiple pressure groups arguing for sustained American engagement in the world, particularly as the international environment darkened. The punchline, of course, is that none of them really have any impact until Pearl Harbor, right? When the politics catch up with the policy. Second thought of the book is that I really like this. Eliot uses the term strategic pixie dust and strategic silliness. And there are actually two different concepts as I understood them in the book. So one is, I think theres pretty good argument. You talked about that we fast-forward through the argument that maybe we should have had about first principle questions in the 1990s. But we can also say that our strategic muscle memory has atrophied there. Things that we dont think very hard about, that we used to think hard about all the time and let me kind of, let me call up three that I think the book really highlighted in important ways. One, deterrence. And you can say du turns a lot, but understanding both intentions and capabilities and signaling the willingness to use force and having the right force in place matters enormously. And just saying that were going to deter an adversary or a competitor without those two elements in place cannot happen. Second one, spheres of influence. So concept that we talked about a lot, but I think is maybe less understood in political discourse now than it was about what happens and why it is such a threat to American, not to global order, but to American security and prosperity when you begin to have spheres of interests in regional hedge months. The third one, and you take this unrolling the first chapter when youre talking about strategic fallacies, I think this is really a realist argument and certain degree is this idea that there is a natural balance of power that exists in the world. That if that natural balance is upset, organically, states will understand that someone has disturbed this. They will band together and there might be some violence, but eventually we will get back to stasis on this idea that theres no such thing as natural orders, right? And without leadership, without determination, allies will probably not naturally do things. Third, that I would just add that I pulled from the book is I know that a long time ago he taught up in Newport at the Naval War College. Im about to go back to teaching up there. And my favorite case study that I teach there. I dont know if you taught this whenever there is. As I tell the officers, its the only case study without a major war. Its great. But in between the wars in the inter-war period, the punchline, as I tell them before they even start reading, is what makes sense in 999, from Londons point of view, will make sense in the 1920s and even has to happen, makes less and less sense in the 1930s. And of course, if youre looking at, assessing and reassessing the international environment that youre in as competitors grow their power. This only this reevaluation and this entire book is really an exercise in assessment. That assessment of our strengths, other strengths. How do you get to a fundamental reassessment without there being a really big bang. Write really big strategic surprise that realigns us is that is, I think the critical question that we have. Three questions Id throw out for you that you can take up or not. First is in the book, you said and Im not sure which parts of the book or drafted at what point, Elliot. But this sentence this paragraph, I take it to happen during the GOP primary, that Trump presents a coherent, if not majoritarian viewpoint that combines isolationism and belligerents. And Id be really curious to hear your thoughts about how coherent that is and its implications. I dont mean that tongue-in-cheek. Thats a serious question. Second one, were doing a net assessment of American strengths. The American hand, Elliot drawing ON clause of it says, look when we count American strengths, there are things that we can count, but there are lot of things that you cant count that are intangible. And part of this is Americas sense of social cohesion. Our belief in our government, our style of government. The fact that we have an open door to innovate of immigrants. And my question is an obvious one, but do you still believe that? And is it still a strength and what will get us to it being a strength again? Final question I just throw out is, oh, it says that in some ways the United States is the most unpredictable of powers, right? Because we believe things. We dont just play real politic and that unsettles the world. So the question is, if the United States, like I think you can say that being more unpredictable in certain situations is a good thing, right? Tactically, it can be a very good thing. But for a president who has said that he wants to be less predictable as a style. You can only communicate with one player at a time. So what might be actually very good tactically and unwanted, it might be very good vis-a-vis certain competitors also communicated to our allies and partners. And I guess this is not a critique. This is not intended as a critique of the White House, but rather, if we go back and forth as you lay out between strength and weakness, between being engaged and pulling back somewhat up and down even over the past 70 years that were drawing from, is that likely to change? And what does unpredictability when we become the most unpredictable factor and world politics. How does that change things? Alright? Alright, How? So my comments actually track fairly closely with Charlies. And the book raised three or four issues for me. All of them clustered around this question of, do we have enough today? Because I think thats one of the motivating questions of the book. If hard power is critically important to American statecraft, American security and international order, do we actually have enough today? And so there were four things I suppose that, that occurred to me in this context. And so the first is this odd duality of the American position the day. Because in Eliots chapter on what he calls the American hand, I think he does a wonderful job of outlining the extensive US military lead, particularly in global power projection capabilities which wont be matched for decades. Even if then all of the economic and social factors that underpin American strength. And the fact that over the long-term, the United States actually probably has an edge over most any of the competitors you can think of. Uh, and so in a global overall net assessment sense, I think you would say that you might be fairly optimistic about where the United States its heading. But the duality is that when you look at the picture in regional settings, which is really where the rubber hits the road. Geopolitically, these days, the situation is much dire and in fact, its, its getting considerably worse in many cases. So in East Asia, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait looks fundamentally different today than it did 20 years ago. And I think there are real questions about whether the United States could actually effectively defend Taiwan in a crisis if you project out another five to ten years, I think there are real questions about how much the United States could do in a number of contingencies in East Asia. If you look at Eastern Europe, the United States and nato are only beginning to grapple with what it would actually take to defend the Baltic states in a crisis. And so on the one hand, you have a country that has immense global leads. On the other hand, you have a country that is going to have increasing difficulty, I think, sustaining its regional commitments over time. And that gets to a second, which is this question of strategic solvency. The question of whether the United States actually today has sufficient military power to make good on its international commitments. And the reason this has become a pressing issue is that over the past number of years, weve seen two trends heading in opposite directions. On the one hand, the international environment has become considerably more threatening, both with respect to the sort of threats that were used to in the post-Cold War era. So jihadist terrorism, ungoverned spaces, that sort of thing. But also with respect to great power competition, which is back and multiple regions. But at the same time, the level of US military power in an absolute sense has been declining. Fairly rapidly. In fact, in percentage terms, we have just had the steepest descent disinvestment and defense that we have had since the end of the Korean War. And so there was a question about, at what point do these trends become irreconcilable? At what point do we become unable to actually make good on the commitments we have? And this ties back into the first, I think that point is actually much closer, much closer to that point today than we might like to think. And that gets to a third which I think ties in with something that Charlie mentioned, which is that the United States has gone through these cycles of ambition and retrenchment numerous times before, during the post-war period and even before that. And at some point something always happens that sort of snaps us out of the funk that weve been in after the prior conflict and wakes us up to the fact that there are still responsibilities we have to take care of in the world and that there was a bare minimum of military power that is needed to that. But the problem is the thing, the things that wake us up usually tend to be disasters. Whether that is the outbreak of World War Two and then Pearl Harbor, whether thats the outbreak of the Korean War, 950, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. And so the question for the United States has always been, I think continues to be today. Can we get back onto a better trajectory without the disaster happening? Or do we have to wait for the next disaster in order for that to happen? And then that brings me to the fourth question. Which an IO Elliot you would, you would fundamentally agree with this. I dont mean this as a critique of the book, but as important as military power is to upholding American foreign policy and international order. Its clearly not enough and that has become increasingly evident today, I think because you can sketch out a scenario where 48 years from now, the United States is actually significantly stronger and a narrow military sense because we have once again open the floodgates on military spending. Or if not open the floodgates at least gotten some, some decent marginal increases. But in this scenario, we might still be weaker in an aggregate sense than we were before, because we will have alienated our allies. We will have isolated ourselves from international public opinion. We will have torn up free trade deals, which constitute an important part of this international order that we are committed to defending. And so will come out worse off than we were before. And so I would just say when I read the book, my reaction when it came to the end was yes, absolutely. Yes to hard power. Yes. The big stick, but yes to all of the other things that are traditionally made, the United States the great superpower as well. Well, I hope after this you guys can see why I think were in the presence of three of the most luminous and interesting mines in, in American foreign policy today. And how much we, much we should be glad that a new generation of thinkers is coming along that, that as the sort of capacity and balance to, to look at these important trues that many of us were afraid would be lost in a new generation and to articulate them in our current circumstances. But having said all that, Ellie, you want to defend yourself quickly? Well, I was afraid of much worse. Oh, its coming. I think Im sure itll go. First thing. In all sincerity, I completely agree with what you said. Its, you know, were both at that stage where you begin looking behind you say, Is there anybody back there? And there really is. And that is actually a very important thing. You tell me that youve been teaching Shakespeare? Yes. So what type of person behind you are looking at or we call it, right. I dont wanna go down that route right now. Look, I thought those were very insightful sets of remarks, particularly the complements. Let me just start with your first question, Charlie, I think you and I I didnt make these two passing references to Trump and I and I did use the words isolation and belligerence. I just double-checked. And then way to the, to the given topic that were supposed to discuss. I think those are instincts, not doctrine, not even a concept. Its just who he is. I think so much of that. There are elements of Trump that are semi consistent, but in this case, I think these are just impulses. So Im sure well go more deeply into the shallows of Trumps foreign policy thinking, but and thats really how I would portray them. You raised a very good issue about American, American strengths. I like a lot of people. I have been somewhat shake and not just by the election, but by some of the things that have followed him. And I do think putting evidence, and Im sure people here realize I have not been the greatest admirer of Mr. Trump for quite awhile. At the end of the day, I will still bet on those fundamental American strengths. When I look at what the reaction was to that extremely ill advised. Competently executed executive order. The kind of outrage and the pushback, which did not just come from the left, was reassuring. And I think youre, youre, I guess Im inclined to think that were more likely to get incoherence in fighting push back some disturbing stuff than dystopia. As per say David froms article in the latest issue of the Atlantic. And the reason why is I think, because of the nature of the United States. And indeed, I even think in the long run we may very well come out stronger for all this. I really do. I think there are a lot of young people who are … Understanding the Global Community - Liberalism/Neoliberalism So moving on to other forms of international relations theory, lets look at liberalism and neoliberalism. Liberalism is actually one of the earliest forms of international relations theories. It was created shortly after the First World War, what was then called the great war to prevent another, when scholars, thinkers and decision-makers got together and decided to question, what can we do to prevent another great war. So they started to focus on issues like common interest. How can we emphasize common interest among great powers, among global actors? How can we perhaps promote democracy as a way to prevent war? This leads us to a more contemporary notion that we call the democratic peace. Today. Theorists suggest that democracies dont fight one another. This is the closest we come to a law and international relations. There are very few, if any, cases of democracies actually going to war with one another. So why, why does democracy matter? There are two factors that matter when we talk about the democratic peace. Democratic institutions like checks and balances, elections, separations of power. Those types of factors help us prevent or mitigate against decisions to go to war. Democracies cant just willy nilly decide one day Im going to go to war. They have to go through a process. Elections elected leaders allow the electorate who of course pays the cost of war and suffers the consequences of war, allows the electorate to determine whether their leaders are, are fit to make those decisions. Separations of power. The fact that, that both the President and the Congress have to play a role in decision-making when it comes to war with suggests that they check and balance each other, right? So the separation of power, a check and balance that comes with that, and the ability to elect democratic leaders really all work against, or at least mitigate in some way against decisions to go to war. That doesnt mean that democracies are less war prone. It just means they have to go through a process. It isnt as easy as non-democracies or a non-democratic leader to choose to go to war. The other factor that matters in the democratic peace or Democrat, we call democratic norms, particularly the norm of a peaceful resolution of conflict within democratic societies, particularly stable democratic societies, we resolve our conflict peacefully. What do we do? If we have a problem with our neighbor? We have a problem with somebody thats that we believe has harmed us in some way. We sue them, right? We use our court system, will in the global community, that type of process doesnt necessarily exist where it certainly isnt stable enough to prevent war. So this democratic institution of the peaceful resolution of conflict is something that works against decisions to go to war. So these two factors working together, democratic institutions like elections, checks and balances and separation of powers, and democratic norms of the peaceful resolution of conflict. Those really matter and are part of this liberal international relations theory. Now, democratic peace theory is not without its critics. As I mentioned before, democracies are not necessarily less war prone. Theyre just less war prone with each other. So theres this dyadic effect of democratic peace. It usually means to democracies are more than one democracy working together. Democracies and non-democracies actually still do go to war together far too often. So thats one criticism of the democratic peace theory. Other suggests that the process of democratization is extremely bloody. So democratic peace theory would lead us to a policy of democratization. We would seek to, to establish democracy around the world, suggesting that itll be a more peaceful world. The more democracies we have. Yet that process of democratization transitioning from non-democracies to democracy, as weve seen in far too many cases, is a very difficult and bloody process. So democratic peace theory, its useful and its used often to help us understand the global community, but its still fraught with challenges. So newer forms of liberalism, what we might call neo-liberalism, emerged as an indirect response as a critique of realist theory. Neoliberal is believed that realists are actually too narrow in their focus. They focus strictly on great powers and issues of power relations. This to a neoliberal, misses a lot of international relations. If were going to understand the global community, we need to understand more than just military security relations. We need to understand social relations, economic relations, scientific and technology exchange. Theres a lot more going on in the global community, according to a neoliberal scholar. More specifically, neoliberal suggests that states often do cooperate a lot more than a realist might suggest. Were realists tend to focus on conflict and the global community. Neoliberal tend to focus on cooperation and the ways in which states come together to mutually resolve common problems. To do that theyll develop international organizations, international laws, international treaties. These mechanisms allow states to mutually address their common interests and their individual self-interest through collective action. Now the rules and regulations that emerge at the international level through this process actually create expectations for behavior. They layout standards of how states should operate. Think about treaties regarding protecting the seas and pollution in the sea, or pollution in the air, or any other kind of environmental agreement, any other type of collective international agreement that addresses a problem that transcends borders. This is a way that states create expectations and constrain each others behavior. Now, of course, a realist response. What do you do if somebody breaks the rules? How do you enforce these rules? Therein lies the problem. Nonetheless, neoliberal are concerned that we need to capture all of the global community when we look at international relations and not just small aspects of it. Not just power relations, not just military security, but larger issues like economics, prosperity, science, technology, social relations, environmental concerns. They are much more varied in their agenda. States are much more varied in their agenda. And neoliberal capture that. So as weve done before, now that weve explored liberal, a neoliberal theory, put on those sets of lenses and look at the global community and see how you view issues like democracy promotion and Afghanistan. How would you understand that if you are a liberal or a neoliberal and wearing those sets of lenses, how might you view global economic crisis or specifically economic crisis in Europe? If youre a liberal or a neoliberal looking at it with those sets of lenses. And then finally, how about piracy, maritime security? How would you view the regulations and the various laws and treaties that had been emerging in that issue area. If youre a liberal or neoliberal, what do you think? 2 Criteria Ratings Points Thread: Content 18 to >16.0 pts Advanced Posts display clear content mastery while analyzing/evaluating each of the assigned prompts. Posts are critical in their approach to each of the assignment prompts, providing evidence of clear thinking, analytical insight, and relevant research. 16 to >13.0 pts Proficient Posts address each of the assigned prompts, yet with modest evidence of subject mastery or analytical insight. Posts are satisfactory, but do not provide evidence of clear reasoning or critical analysis based on careful research or current literature 13 to >0.0 pts Developing Posts are loosely related to or neglect 1 or more of the assigned prompts. Posts do not effectively develop the discussion or move beyond minimal or superficial understanding of the topic. 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