Fluent Essays

Your submission must include the following information in the following format:Journal Article AnalysisJournalCultural influences to NegotiationDEFINITION: a brief definition of the key term followed by the APA reference for the term; this does not count in the word requirement.SUMMARY: Summarize the article in your own words- this should be in the 150-200 word range. Be sure to note the articles author, note their credentials and why we should put any weight behind his/her opinions, research or findings regarding the key term.ANALYSIS: Using 300-350 words, write a brief analysis, in your own words of how the article relates to the selected chapter Key Term. An analysis is not rehashing what was already stated in the article, but the opportunity for you to add value by sharing your experiences, thoughts and opinions. This is the most important part of the assignment.REFERENCES: All references must be listed at the bottom of the submission--in APA format. Be sure to use the headers in your submission to ensure that all aspects of the assignment are completed as required.Any form of plagiarism, including cutting and pasting, will result in zero points for the entire assignment. contentserver.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview DOES MEDIATION-ARBITRATION REDUCE ARBITRATION RATES? EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT MICHELE CAMPOLIETI AND CHRIS RIDDELL* To study the effect of the introduction of mediation-arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure on interest arbitration, the authors exploit a natural experiment in the arbitration institutions for police and firefighter sectors in the Canadian province of Ontario. They obtain estimates using a difference-in-difference estimator. Results show that the introduction of mediation-arbitration is significantly associated with increased use of arbitration by firefighters relative to the police. The article also draws on interviews with stakeholders to help explain the mechanisms that contribute to the increase in arbitration rates. M ediation-arbitration (med-arb) is a hybrid dispute resolution process that includes a mediation stage, in which a third-party attempts to resolve a bargaining impasse, and, if an impasse remains after mediation, an arbitration phase, in which an arbitrator issues a binding award that resolves the bargaining impasse. In collective bargaining, med-arb involves the neutral party (hereafter, neutral) playing both roles, the mediator and the arbitrator, a feature that helps give med-arb one of its nicknames, ‘‘mediation with a club.’’ Legislators have introduced med-arb as a dispute resolution procedure because it has been perceived as addressing some of the limitations of conventional interest arbitration without a mediation stage. In particular, researchers have hypothesized that stronger incentives for settlement will be present at the mediation stage since both parties will want to be seen as reasonable to the neutral since that same neutral will act as the arbitrator if necessary. Much like some of the theory behind final-offer *MICHELE CAMPOLIETI is a Professor at the University of Toronto. CHRIS RIDDELL is an Associate Professor at the University of Waterloo. An Online Appendix is available at https://uwaterloo.ca/scholar/c2riddel. For information regarding the data and/or computer programs utilized for this study, please address correspondence to the authors at c2riddel@uwaterloo.ca. KEYWORDs: public sector, collective bargaining, interest arbitration, mediation-arbitration, difference-indifference estimator ILR Review, 73(1), January 2020, pp. 211–235 DOI: 10.1177/0019793918810219. Ó The Author(s) 2018 Journal website: journals.sagepub.com/home/ilr Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions 212 ILR REVIEW arbitration, med-arb may therefore reduce extreme positions in bargaining because parties could be concerned that the arbitrator will view them as uncompromising and thus craft an award that favors the other party. Moreover, since the arbitrator would have been involved in the mediation stage, it has been hypothesized that awards (when necessary) may be more firmly grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, which could reduce longer-term reliance on arbitration (i.e., the narcotic effect). A great deal of debate surrounds the perceived merits of med-arb. Some legal practitioners and scholars have raised concerns that med-arb may involve coercion, and that awards, when necessary, may be unfair (see, e.g., Bartel 1991). Although there may be merit to both sides of the debate, it is not clear whether the perceived disadvantages of med-arb outweigh its perceived benefits on arbitration rates without considering empirical evidence on the effects of med-arb on bargaining behavior. Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted on the effects of med-arb that could inform the debate. The research that has been undertaken tends to be more qualitative or to rely on specific case studies (Lester 1984; Stern 1984). On the one hand, Lester (1984) concluded that, for police and firefighters in Wisconsin, med-arb was more successful in facilitating voluntary settlement compared to final offer arbitration because the arbitration rates were lower in med-arb. On the other hand, Stern (1984) concluded that the med-arb system in Wisconsin was not very successful in producing voluntary settlements (since only 50\% of disputes were settled in the mediation stage and this rate was lower than the benchmark set by mediation in other sectors). These conflicting conclusions make it difficult to determine the effects of med-arb on arbitration rates based on selected cases or qualitative evidence. Nonetheless, many observers view med-arb as an effective procedure for reducing arbitration rates (e.g., Lester 1984; Landry 1996; Devinatz and Budd 1997) and facilitating constructive labor relations (Lester 1984; Devinatz and Budd 1997).1 We provide empirical evidence on the effect of the introduction of medarb on interest arbitration rates using contract data from the Canadian province of Ontario for firefighting and police bargaining pairs. Our data comprise a census of all contract settlements for police and firefighters in Ontario from 1981 to 2015, so unlike earlier research our analysis is not on select cases. Our study focuses on a natural experiment created by a legislative change in Ontario. In particular, we exploit a major change in the collective bargaining legislation for firefighters—the Fire Protection and Prevention Act of 1997—that introduced med-arb as the dispute resolution procedure. Using police bargaining units, which were unaffected by this legislative change, as a comparison group, we adopt a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of these reforms on the likelihood of 1 Both Fuller (1962) and Devinatz and Budd (1997) wrote that med-arb is most effective when the mediator and arbitrator are not the same individual. DOES MEDIATION-ARBITRATION REDUCE ARBITRATION RATES? 213 requiring arbitration. Our research design includes a control group and has greater internal validity (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002) than some of the before–after comparisons in the existing literature (e.g., Lester 1984) that do not have control groups. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence based on interviews of various stakeholders in the police and firefighter sectors to help interpret our quantitative findings. Institutional Background: Interest Arbitration for Police and Firefighters in Ontario Bargaining pairs for both police and firefighters use binding interest arbitration as the dispute resolution procedure if the parties reach an impasse when bargaining. In this section we focus on the legislation itself and the dispute resolution procedure. We discuss the broader policy environment later in the article. The overall legislative environment during the period of our study was complex, with a newly elected Conservative government making sweeping changes (most going into effect in 1997); see the Online Appendix for additional details. Collective bargaining for police has been essentially stable since the Police Act was amended in 1972, which created the Ontario Police Arbitration Commission (hereafter the Commission). The Commission’s role is to oversee the dispute resolution process, including retaining the services of conciliators, maintaining a register of arbitrators, handling administrative matters, and maintaining a database of awards. The Commission is independently appointed and is responsible for both rights arbitration and interest arbitration. We emphasize that firefighters do not have an analogous institution. A key reason police were largely unaffected by the 1997 reforms was that the Commission was already established and its pivotal role in police collective bargaining was re-affirmed by the government.2 The original legislation covering collective bargaining for professional firefighters in Ontario was the Fire Department Act (FDA), which was enacted in 1949 and remained largely intact until the Fire Prevention and Protection Act (FPPA) of 1997. Under the original FDA, the dispute resolution method was conventional interest arbitration. No formal conciliation or mediation stage was specified. While not specified by the statute, firefighters typically adopt arbitration by tripartite panel. The FPPA introduced med-arb as the preferred dispute resolution method. Specifically, the new statute stated that if the parties could not agree on an arbitrator, the Minister of Labour would appoint an arbitrator (or, in the case of a tripartite panel, a chair), and the dispute resolution process would be either med-arb or mediation-final-offer selection. Although the final-offer threat was widely discussed in the literature (both 2 As stated by the Minister of Labour (Hon. Elizabeth Witmer) in the Standing Committee: ‘‘Also, our changes will ensure that police retain a separate and distinct arbitration regime.’’ We also note that the Police Act was not changed. 214 ILR REVIEW practitioner and scholarly) at the time and may have influenced behavior in the short to medium run, to date it has never been chosen as the dispute resolution procedure. Many of the early appointments made by the Minister of Labour were former judges and not traditional arbitrators from previously established lists of neutrals. These appointments were challenged through the legal system, and ultimately the Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that such appointments were patently unreasonable.3 The FPPA also made conciliation mandatory (as is the case under the Ontario Labour Relations Act) before arbitration can commence. Although med-arb appears, on paper, to be an option for resolving interest disputes for police because of the broad 1997 reforms, interest arbitration for police has largely remained unchanged. In particular, police were affected by these legislative changes only if they could not mutually agree on an arbitrator, and, as noted, the reforms stressed the Commission’s unique role in police collective bargaining. Arbitrator selection in the police sector was also unchanged. For example, the process of arbitrator selection for police is that if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the chair of the Commission (as opposed to the minister) will appoint one. Our interviews reveal, however, that the reality of an impasse for police is that the parties simply appoint an arbitrator from the Commission’s list based on who is available at the earliest date (and that conventional interest arbitration continues to be used to settle these impasses). The list contains approximately 30 arbitrators whom the parties (the local police services board and the union) have already agreed upon, and has been in effect, with the occasional addition or subtraction, for decades. We discuss additional details in our Online Appendix. Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Methodology The reforms mandated by the FPPA were viewed as highly controversial and were widely criticized by firefighters (Cole 2007). Here, we present a brief discussion of the reforms from a theoretical perspective as well as the intended effects of the policy. We then outline our empirical approach to estimating the effects of the reforms on arbitration rates. The first phase of med-arb involves mediation, in which the bargaining parties caucus privately with the mediator in an effort to reach a voluntary settlement. We note that neither the statute nor the regulations give guidance as to how mediation should take place. Based on our interviews, it appears that the norm in Ontario for firefighters is private caucus, though some scholars have suggested joint sessions for mediation would be more fruitful (Program on Negotiation [PON] 2010). Although no regulation states this, we also discovered in our interviews—and as supported by 3 Given the uncertainty around legal challenges, and the fact the original appeal was dismissed by the Divisional Court, this change may have influenced behavior for some years. We return to this issue later in the article. DOES MEDIATION-ARBITRATION REDUCE ARBITRATION RATES? 215 evidence in the awards—that the government’s practice was to mandate a minimum one-day mediation session. If an impasse remains after the mediation stage, the parties proceed to a binding arbitration hearing. Under the FPPA, the mediator and arbitrator (the neutral in the tripartite board) is the same individual, as is the nearuniversal practice in a collective bargaining context. In addition to the basic incentives to move the parties toward an agreement, med-arb has been argued to be attractive principally because: 1) mediation offers another opportunity for the parties to resolve the dispute and reach voluntary settlement; 2) if the mediator is trusted, the parties may view the award as ‘‘fairer’’ in the event arbitration is necessary; and 3) the time spent in mediation may—by giving the neutral the information they would normally need to compile in a hearing—reduce the time spent in the arbitration process. Elliot (1995) provided a review and legal analysis focused on the Canadian experience with med-arb, and reviews and commentaries on the US experience are provided in Henry (1987), Bartel (1991), and Vorys (2007). Some possible disadvantages of med-arb have been noted in the literature as well. Most of these disadvantages relate to the hybrid nature of medarb, and thus the inherent conflict between the role the neutral plays in each stage. Most (industrial relations) criticisms of med-arb revolve around the following: 1) incentives to share information—with the neutral playing both roles, there may an incentive to withhold information at the mediation stage if a party believes it will weaken its case in arbitration; 2) coercion—any settlement suggestion by the mediator may be perceived to be an imposed one thereby casting doubt on the ability of the mediator to mediate in the true interest of assisting with a voluntary settlement (i.e., the notion of med-arb being ‘‘mediation with muscle’’ or ‘‘mediation with a club’’); and 3) confidentiality—the notion that awards may be deemed as unfair if the neutral is perceived to utilize confidential information obtained in caucus (as would not occur under conventional arbitration). In the legal literature, perhaps the most significant concern comes from a natural justice perspective. For instance, in mediation the neutral privately caucuses with each side; in conventional arbitrations this action would typically result in the decision being overturned. If the neutral plays both roles, how can they not, by definition, incorporate private information into the arbitration? A few conceptual and theoretical frameworks may be used to consider the effects of med-arb on arbitration rates. The Farber and Katz (1979) model of arbitration offers some insights on the effects of med-arb on arbitration rates. More specifically, as noted by Devinatz and Budd (1997), since mediation requires the parties to share information with the arbitrator prior to an arbitration hearing, they may become more familiar with the arbitrator’s decision-making processes. Using Farber and Katz’s model, an implication of this familiarity is that it can remove some of the uncertainty 216 ILR REVIEW associated with the arbitration phase and thus increase arbitration rates.4 More recently, Ross and Conlon (2000) argued in their theoretical framework for hybrid dispute resolution procedures that med-arb could make the parties less cooperative if the neutral plays both roles. That is, the parties would reveal less information during private caucus with the mediator, and this could contribute to increases in impasse rates. Thus, both of these frameworks suggest that the introduction of med-arb would be associated with an increase in arbitration rates. Note that these theoretical predictions were not the hypothesized effects of the reforms from the perspective of the Ontario government. The changes in the FPPA were expected to decrease arbitration rates. Certainly, the threat of mediation-final-offer early on in the reforms and the uncertainty around arbitrator selection were part of the policy tool. Indeed, the Minister of Labour stated in the Standing Committee proceedings: The idea here is to create deliberately some uncertainty for the parties as they enter into this process to encourage them to negotiate an outcome rather than to rely on arbitration. The idea here is that both parties should face some risk if they enter into this process, if they give up on negotiation, in a sense, and turn to the interest arbitration system for resolution of their collective agreement, that they should face some uncertainty as to how exactly it would be resolved. (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 1997) The government’s view was that mediation in general, and med-arb in particular, would play a key role in decreasing reliance on interest arbitration to resolve negotiating impasses. A priori, there are arguments in both directions as to the hypothesized effects of med-arb on the use of arbitration. Consequently, the effect of med-arb on arbitration rates is better determined by an empirical analysis of the data. We estimate the quantitative effects of these changes in the FPPA on the firefighter sector using the police sector as a comparison group. As discussed earlier, Cole (2007) noted a high degree of similarity in bargaining between police and firefighters historically in Ontario. The two sectors tracked each other in terms of bargaining outcomes—especially on wages and benefits—and multiple arbitrators over several decades have written that it is appropriate to consider the two sectors as close comparators (e.g., see the discussion in Cole 2007). Furthermore, because the two sectors are so highly regulated, they both have few non-economic issues on the bargaining table. We acknowledge from the outset that our analysis of the effects of the FPPA reforms are designed to estimate the effects of the entire reform package; for example, we cannot separate the immediate impact of the 4 Another view with the opposite prediction, based on the early economic models of strikes such as Hicks (1963), is that if there is certainty about the outcome under disagreement (a strike in the classic model but under arbitration in our setting) then disagreement should not occur; it is only under information asymmetries that disagreement emerges as an equilibrium. DOES MEDIATION-ARBITRATION REDUCE ARBITRATION RATES? 217 change to med-arb from the arbitrator selection issue. Note, however, that the length of our sample period allows us to distinguish between short-run effects and longer-run effects. In particular, we make some efforts to exploit the change in the arbitrator selection issue in 2003 when the Supreme Court ordered (as part of their ruling on the broader reforms) that the Minister of Labour refrain from appointing individuals (such as former judges) who were not on the established list of neutrals. To estimate the effects of the FPPA reforms on the use of arbitration, we consider the standard difference-in-difference specification: ð1Þ Arbit = a + bFirefighteri + gAfterPolicyChanget + dFirefighteri 3 AfterPolicyChanget + Xit0 X + mit where Arbit is a dummy variable that indicates whether arbitration was used to settle the contract; Firefighteri is a dummy variable for firefighters; AfterPolicyChanget is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the changes in legislation; X 0 is a vector of control variables for bargaining unit characteristics; mit is a residual; and i and t index bargaining units and time, respectively. The control variables we include in X 0 include dummy variables controlling for bargaining unit size (since dispute costs can fall as bargaining unit size increases, e.g., Ashenfelter and Currie [1990] and Currie [1989]), type of workers in the bargaining unit (part-time, full-time, seasonal) as well as dummy variables for regions, since there can be regional differences (urban versus r ... Purchase answer to see full attachment