Fluent Essays

DISCUSSION POST Please scroll and contribute at least 2 posts to this Discussion Board on at least 2 distinct questions threads. Each post will be given points for the following:1) adequate length (approximately 200 words)2) clarity and good writing3) including a specific example4) including an in-text citation (to either assigned or extra material must use a proper citation format) - The citation should come from course readings, films, or outside sources (Prof Douglass lessons dont count).Example (author, page number)5) including a question that you are left with.To receive full credit, be sure to add something new to the thread and answer the question directly.You can review a list of the questions posted below.DISCUSSION REPLYPlease scroll and contribute at least 2 responses to your peers on this discussion board. Each post will be given points for the following:1) adequate length (approximately 150 words)2) clarity and good writing3) addressing the original prompt and the student response4) including an in-text citation (to either assigned or extra material must use a proper citation format) - The citation should come from course readings, films, or outside sources (Prof Douglass lessons dont count).Example (author, page number)5) including a question you are left with after reading your peers response ---These are the questions for Discussion Post #4 in Week 8. Please respond in your Discussion Section board. Remember that there are two parts to the assignment. Choose two of the questions below and post a response to each. Post two replies to other students’ responses.PLEASE RESPOND TO TWO OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:According to Weber, why did capitalism grow in Europe? What are the characteristics of modern capitalism? What does Weber mean by “the spirit of capitalism”? What are the differences between Weber and Blaut’s main arguments about the rise of capitalism in Europe. Does Weber’s argument reflect the “European Miracle Myth” discussed in Blaut? Why or why not?Weber observes that Protestants had greater participation in capitalism. How does he explain that tendency? (Outline his arguments about differences between Protestants and Catholics). Write about how time, money, and ethics are all connected through Protestant beliefs according to Weber. What is the purpose of an individual’s life according to Protestantism and capitalism? What do you think about that viewpoint?What is “traditionalism” and how does it work against the objectives of capitalism according to Weber? What must laborers believe in order to fulfill the objectives of capitalism? Think about your own beliefs and motivations. Imagine that you have a job that allows you to live comfortably. The company for which you work changes policies, so that you will now be paid for your productivity. You have two options: 1. You could work more hours in a day, produce as much as possible, and earn more money or 2. You could work fewer hours to make the same amount of money you were making previously and go home for the day once you reach that amount. What would you choose and why? What belief system does your choice reflect according to Weber?In the lesson, it mentions that Weber is an “idealist.” What does that mean (Please note that this definition may not be the same as our usual use of the word)? Give an example from the reading of his argument as an idealist. Do you consider yourself an idealist in this sense? Why or why not? Give an example of your beliefs and show how they are or are not idealist.What were major differences between Luther’s original intentions and beliefs and the ways his supporters who went to war took up his teachings? Include the beliefs of both regarding political and religious systems. What were 3 effects that were sparked by Luther’s actions. Give another example of a leader or action that has had unintended consequences (from this course, another class, or current events).What factors influenced the creation of the Church of England (Anglican Church)? When England became Anglican, how did religious authority shift? What were three effects of this change to the Church of England? We’ve seen other examples in this class of the ways political interests and religious interests intertwine. Compare and contrast the creation of the Church of England with another example of an event that involved both religious and political interests.What were John Calvin’s beliefs? How did they differ from the Church of England and Lutherans? How did beliefs of Calvinists support the basic principles of capitalism? How were wealth and poverty viewed morally and religiously by Calvinists? What were the consequences of these beliefs? Think about the beliefs of your family or the community in which you grew up (could be local, regional, or national). How are/were wealth and poverty viewed in religious or moral terms? What consequences do you see of those beliefs in the values and actions of your family or community?2 Posts need to be replied: Q1(1). In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber argues that, in short, Protestantism caused capitalism to grow in Europe. His argument is based on the idea that Western Europeans had superior rationality—an idea which Blaut believes is part of the European Miracle Myth and thoroughly disagrees with1—and that Protestants were especially likely to develop economic rationality (more so than Catholics), which he goes so far as calling it a “permanent intrinsic character of their religious beliefs.”2 Characteristics of modern capitalism includes this economic rationality as well as the need for continuous acquisition of wealth and profit. The spirit of capitalism is a concept in which a culmination of historical events led to the greatest good,” the purpose of a man’s or woman’s life, as being constant accumulation of wealth.3 Blaut, on the other hand, argues that the rise of capitalism was a more gradual process that happened all over the world during the Middle ages (protocapitalism).1 Capitalism, however, became “centrated” in Europe due to colonialism, not the Protestant Reformation.1 Weber’s belief in intrinsic European rationality driving the growth of capitalism reflects the European Miracle Myth, in which it disregards the significance of the rise of protocapitalism that occurred around the world, as well as the wealth that Europe gained from colonialism and its devastating effects on the colonized. What is so rational about the pursuit of capital/wealth? Isnt that just rationalizing greed?ReferencesBlaut JM. The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History. Guilford Press; 1993.Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. University of Virginia American Studies Program; 2001.Ghosh P. What did max weber mean by the ‘spirit’ of capitalism? Aeon. Published 2018. Accessed May 20, 2020. https://aeon.co/ideas/what-did-max-weber-mean-by-the-spirit-of-capitalism.Q1 (2) Weber argues that Capitalism rose in Europe because it had had the free hand to alter the social distribution of the population according to its needs. Capitalism was a result of Religious affiliation (Protestantism), It was a result of greater relative participation of Protestants in the ownership of capital. The characteristics that lead to the rise of capitalism was the previous ownership of capital and an expensive education or material well being. Their characteristics also include inheriting a large sum of wealth from their predecessors. The spirit of capitalism is The connection of a religious way of life with the most intensive development of business. It is “that the spirit of hard work” (Weber) often classified by working administratively and not spending too much. For the people with the spirit of capitalism, the thought of the pious boredom of paradise has little attraction for their active natures; religion appears to them as a means of drawing people away from labor in this world. Business with its continuous work is the only possible motivation. The main difference between Weber and Blaut’s main argument about the rise of capitalism is that Blaut claims Protocapitalist centers were rising in various parts of all three continents and were interconnected in a single web or network, stretching from western Europe to southern Africa to eastern Asia. Weber argues it was because of the rise of protestant ownership of capital. Weber’s argument somewhat reflects the European myth as he says that capitalism arose in Europe because of the Protestants. The question I am left with, what was the significance of claiming capitalism as eurocentric? Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. University of Virginia American Studies Program; 2001. _james_m._blaut__the_colonizer_s_model_of_the_worl_z_lib.org_.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview T he C o l o n i z e r ’s of t h e W M odel orld Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History J. M. Blaut THE GUILFORD PRESS New York / London © 1993 J. M. Blaut Published by The Guilford Press A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc. 72 Spring Street, New York, N. Y. 10012 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Printed in the United States of America This book is printed on acid-free paper. Last digit is print number: 9 8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Blaut, James M. (James Morris) The colonizer’s model of the world : geographical diffusionism and eurocentric history / by J. M. Blaut, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-89862-349-9 (hard) — ISBN 0-89862-348-0 (pbk.) 1. History— Philosophy I. Title. D16.9B49 1992 901—dc20 93-22346 CIP To Meca, Gini, and Mother Acknowledgments any people contributed in many important ways to the writing of this book. Peter Taylor and Wilbur Zelinsky gave me great encouragement and wise counsel (not always heeded) during the years that I have been struggling with the issues and ideas discussed here. Among many others who contributed immensely to the book, and are happily given credit for many of the ideas it contains (the good ideas, not the errors), I wish particularly to mention Abdul Alkalimat, Samir Amin, William Denevan, Loida Figueroa, Andre Gunder Frank, William Loren Katz, José López, Kent Mathewson, Antonio Ríos-Bustamante, América Sorrentini de Blaut, and Ben Wisner. Over the years many other people have set me to thinking about the problems discussed in the book and have shown me the answers to some of these problems. Among these friends, teachers, and students, I would like to mention Chao-li Chi, Ghazi Falah, Fred Hardy, Fred Kniffen, Juan Mari Brás, Francis Mark, Sidney Mintz, Ng Hong, Doris Pizarro, Randolph Rawlins, Anselme Rémy, Waldo Rodríguez, Digna Sánchez, Howard Stanton, David Stea, and Lakshman Yapa. Peter Wissoker and Anna Brackett edited the book with patience and skill. A number of paragraphs in Chapters 3 and 4 and one in Chapter 2 are taken from an article in Political Geography (Blaut 1992b), and are reproduced here with the kind permission of the publisher of that journal, Butterworth-Heinemann. Contents c h a p te r i. History Inside Out 1 The Argument, 1 The Tunnel of Time, 3 Eurocentric Diffusionism, 8 Eurocentrism, 8 Diffusionism, 11 The Colonizer’s Model, 17 Origins, 18 Classical Diffusionism, 21 Modem Diffusionism, 26 World Models and Worldly Interests, 30 The Ethnography of Beliefs, 30 Diffusionism as a Belief System, 41 Notes, 43 CHAPTER 2. The Myth of the European Miracle Mythmakers and Critics, 52 Modernization as History, 53 The Critique, 54 The Countercritique, 58 The Myth, 59 Biology, 61 Race, 61; Demography, 66 Environment, 69 NastyTropical Africa, 69; Arid, Despotic Asia, 80; Temperate Europe, 90 Rationality, 94 The Rationality Doctrine, 95; Rationality and the EuropeanMiracle, 102 vii 50 viii CONTENTS Technology, 108 Society, 119 State, 119; Church, 123; Class, 124; Family, 124 Notes, 135 Before 1492 c h a p t e r 3. 152 Medieval Landscapes, 153 Protocapitalism in Africa, Asia, and Europe, 165 Notes, 173 c h a p t e r 4. After 1492 179 Explaining 1492, 179 Why America Was Conquered by Europeans and Not by Africans or Asians, 180 Why the Conquest Was Successful, 183 Europe in 1492, 186 Colonialism and the Rise of Europe, 1492-1688, 187 Colonialism and Capitalism in the Sixteenth Century, 187 Precious Metals, 189; Plantations, 191; Effects, 193 Colonialism and Capitalism in the Seventeenth Century, 198 The Centration of Capitalism, 201 Notes, 206 CHAPTER 5. Conclusion 214 Notes, 215 Bibliography 217 Index 237 CHAPTER 1 History Inside Out THE ARGUMENT he purpose of this book is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concern­ ing world history and world geography. This belief is the notion that European civiliza­ tion— “The West”—has had some unique histor special quality of race or culture or environment or mind or spirit, which gives this human community a permanent superiority over all other communities, at all times in history and down to the present. The belief is both historical and geographical. Europeans are seen as the “makers of history.” Europe eternally advances, progresses, modern­ izes. The rest of the world advances more sluggishly, or stagnates: it is “traditional society.” Therefore, the world has a permanent geographical center and a permanent periphery: an Inside and an Outside. Inside leads, Outside lags. Inside innovates, Outside imitates. This belief is diffusionism, or more precisely Eurocentric diffusionism. It is a theory about the way cultural processes tend to move over the surface of the world as a whole. They tend to flow out of the European sector and toward the non-European sector. This is the natural, normal, logical, and ethical flow of culture, of innovation, of human causality. Europe, eter­ nally, is Inside. Non-Europe is Outside. Europe is the source of most diffusions; non-Europe is the recipient.1 Diffusionism lies at the very root of historical and geographical scholarship. Some parts of the belief have been questioned in recent years, but its most fundamental tenets remain unchallenged, and so the belief as a whole has not been uprooted or very much weakened by modern scholarship. The most important tenet of diffusionism is the theory of “the T 1 2 THE COLONIZER’S MODEL OF THE WORLD autonomous rise of Europe,” sometimes (rather more grandly) called the idea of “the European Miracle.” It is the idea that Europe was more advanced and more progressive than all other regions prior to 1492, prior, that is, to the beginning of the period of colonialism, the period in which Europe and non-Europe came into intense interaction. If one believes this to be the case—and most modern scholars seem to believe it to be the case— then it must follow that the economic and social modernization of Europe is fundamentally a result of Europe’s internal qualities, not of interaction with the societies of Africa, Asia, and America after 1492. Therefore: the main building blocks of modernity must be European. Therefore: colonialism cannot have been really important for Europe’s modernization. Therefore: colonialism must mean, for the Africans, Asians, and Americans, not spoliation and cultural destruction but, rather, the receipt-by-diffusion of European civilization: modernization. This book will analyze and criticize Eurocentric diffusionism as a general body of ideas, and will try to undermine the more concrete theory of the autonomous rise of Europe. The first chapter of the book discusses the nature and history of diffusionism. Chapter 2 analyzes the theory of the autonomous rise of Europe as a body of propositions about European superiority (and “the European miracle” ), then tries to disprove these propositions, one after the other. Chapter 3 discusses world history and historical geography prior to 1492, attempting to show that Europe was not superior to other civilizations and regions in those times. Chapter 4 argues that colonialism was the basic process after 1492, which led to the selective rise of Europe, the modernization or development of Europe (and outlying Europeanized culture areas like the United States), and the underdevelopment of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Chapter 4 also argues that the conquest of America and thereafter the expansion of European colonialism is not to be explained in terms of any internal characteristics of Europe, but instead reflects the mundane realities of location. The chain of argument in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, as a whole, therefore, is an attempt to show that Europe did not have historical priority—historical superiority—over what we now call the Third World. This may seem to be too ambitious a project for one small book. I am really making just one claim. I am asserting that a fundamental and rather explicit error has been made in our conventional past thinking about geography and history, and this error has distorted many fields of thought and action. I am going to present enough evidence to show that the belief in Eurocentric diffusionism and Europe’s historical superiority or priority is not convincing: not well grounded in the facts of history and geography, although firmly grounded in Western culture. It is in a sense folklore. HISTORY INSIDE OUT THE TUNNEL OF TIME If you had gone to school in Europe or Anglo-America 150 years ago, around the middle of the nineteenth century, you would have been taught a very curious kind of history. You would have learned, for one thing, that every important thing that ever happened to humanity happened in one part of the world, the region we will call “Greater Europe,” meaning the geographical continent of Europe itself, plus (for ancient times only) an enlargement of it to the southeast, the “Bible Lands”—from North Africa to Mesopotamia—plus (for modern times only) the countries of European settlement overseas. You would have been taught that God created Man in this region: the Garden of Eden was mentioned as the starting point of human history in typical world history textbooks of the period, and these textbooks placed Eden at various points between the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the mountains of Inner Asia. Some of your teachers would have also claimed that only the people of this region are really human: God created the people of other places as a different, nonhuman, or rather infrahuman, species. And all of your teachers of science as well as history would have agreed that non-Europeans are not as intelligent, not as honorable, and (for the most part) not as courageous as Europeans: God made them inferior. If you had asked your teachers why Europeans are more human and more intelligent than everyone else you would perhaps have been chastised for asking such a question. You would have been told that a Christian God created and now manages the world, and it would be both silly and blasphemous to suggest that He might show the same favor to non-Europeans, non-Christians, that He does to those people who worship the True God and moreover worship Him with the proper sacrament. If you had been studying geography as well as history back in the middle of the nineteenth century, you would indeed have learned something about the non-European world. The people living in Africa and Asia would have been depicted not only as inferior but as in some sense evil. They are the people who refused to accept God’s grace and so have fallen from His favor. Africans are thus cruel savages, for whom the best possible fate is to be put to useful work, and Christianized. Chinese and Indians for some unknown reason managed to build barbaric civilizations of their own, but because they are not Europeans and not Christians, their civilizations long ago began to stagnate and regress. And, for all their splendor, these never were real civilizations: they are cruel “Oriental despotisms.” Only Europeans know true freedom. 3 4 THE COLONIZER’S MODEL OF THE WORLD Ideas of course change, and if you had gone to school some 50 years later, around the turn of the century, you would have been taught a much more secular form of history, and it would have had a strongly evolutionary (though not yet Darwinian) flavor. You would have learned that the earth is very old, that life is old, and that our species itself has been around for a long time. But everything important still happened in Europe (that is, in Greater Europe). The first true man, Cro-Magnon, lived in Europe. Agriculture was invented in Greater Europe (perhaps in the continent, perhaps in the Bible Lands, Europe’s self-proclaimed cultural hearth). You would have been told in world history class that the first barbaric beginnings of civilization occurred in the Bible Lands. There in the Bible Lands emerged the two Caucasian peoples who make all of history. The Semites invented cities and empires, and gave us monotheism and Christianity, but stopped at that point and then sank back into Oriental decadence. The Aryans or Indo-Europeans, freedomloving though backward folk, built on these foundations, migrating from southeastern Europe or western Asia into and through geographical Europe, and creating the first genuinely civilized society, that of ancient Greece. Then the Romans raised civilization to its next level, and thereafter world history marched inexorably northwestward. If your school was in England you would have been told that History marched from “the Orient” (the Bible Lands) to Athens, to Rome, to feudal France, and finally to modern England—a kind of westbound Orient Express. By now a secular picture of the geography of non-Europe had begun to be taught in European schools. Africans continued to be described as savages and Oriental societies as decadent and despotic. But important changes had taken place in the relations between Europe and non-Europe during the course of the nineteenth century, and by 1900 a particular theory about this relationship had become fixed in popular discourse and was now taught in schools as standard world geography. This was the theory (described later in this chapter) according to which nonEuropeans can and do rise to a civilizational level, if not equal to that of Europeans at least near that level, under European tutelage, that is, under European colonial control. Suppose we move forward another half century, to the history and geography taught around the end of World War II. Not much change. The first True Man is still the Cro-Magnon of Europe. Agriculture was invented in the Bible Lands; so too was barbaric civilization. True civilization still marches from Athens to Rome to Paris to London, and perhaps sets sail then for New York. Non-Europeans do not contribute much to world history, although they begin to do so as a result of HISTORY INSIDE OUT European influence. (Colonial peoples learn from their tutors; Japanese imitate successfully, and so on.) Europeans are still brighter, better, and bolder than everyone else.2 We can sum all of this up with an image that will prove quite useful in this book. This is the idea that the world has an Inside and an Outside. World history thus far has been, basically, the history of Inside. Outside has been, basically, irrelevant. History and historical geography as it was taught, written, and thought by Europeans down to the time of World War II, and still (as we will see) in most respects today, lies, as it were, in a tunnel of time. The walls of this tunnel are, figuratively, the spatial boundaries of Greater Europe. History is a matter of looking back or down in this European tunnel of time and trying to decide what happened where, when, and why. “Why” of course calls for connections among historical events, but only among the events that lie in the European tunnel. Outside its walls everything seems to be rockbound, timeless, changeless tradition. I will call this way of thinking “historical tunnel vision,” or simply “tunnel history.” The older form of tunnel history simply ignored the non-European world: typical textbooks and historical atlases devoted very few pages to areas outside of Greater Europe (that is, Europe and countries of European settlement overseas plus, for ancient history and the Crusades, the Near East), until one came to the year 1492. Non-Europe (Africa, Asia east of the Bible Lands, Latin America, Oceania) received significant notice only as the venue of European colonial activities, and most of what was said about this region was essentially the history of empire.3 Not only was the great bulk of attention devoted to Greater Europe in these older textbooks and historical atlases, but world history was described as flowing steadily westward with the passage of time, from the Bible Lands to eastern Mediterranean Europe, to northwestern Europe. This pattern is readily discernible if we notice the salience of places mentioned in these sources, that is, the frequency of place-name mentions for different regions at different periods. For the earliest period, place-name mentions cluster in the Bible Lands and the extreme eastern Mediterranean. For successively later periods, place-name mentions cluster farther and farther to the west and northwest, finally clustering in northwestern Europe for the period after about A.D. 1000: this is the “Orient Express” pattern to which we referred previously. After World War II, however, history textbooks began to exhibit another, more subtle, form of tunnel history. The non-European world was now beginning to insert itself very firmly in European consciousness, in the aftermath of the war with Japan and in the midst of the intensified decolonization struggles, the Civil Rights movement in the United 5 6 THE COLONIZER’S MODEL OF THE WORLD States, and the like. Most newer textbooks enlarged the discussion of non-European history, and said something about the historical achieve­ ments of non-European cultures. Most textbooks gave a flavor of historicity, of evolutionary progress, to non-European history, thus departing from the older pattern, which dismissed these societies as stagnant and nonevolving. Asian societies were now described as having had an evolutionary motion, though a motion slower than that of Europe. Africa was still described as stagnant, history-less, prior to the colonial era. More salience was given to Asia. However, Africa and the Western Hemisphere still received little mention for eras prior to 1492. The pattern of place-name mentions in most (not all) texts and historical atlases still suggested a flow to the west and northwest, from the Near East to western Europe. And tunnel history dominated most textbooks in the most important matter of all, the question of “why,” of explanation. Historical progress still came about because Europeans invented or initiated most of the crucial innovations, which only later spread out to the rest of the world. So the textbooks depicted a world in which historical causes were to be found basically inside the European tunnel of time, although historical effects were to be seen basically everywhere.^ Textbooks are an important window into a culture; more than just books, they are semiofficial statements of exactly what the opinionforming elite of the culture want the educated youth of that culture.to believe to be true about the past and present world.5 As we have seen, European and Anglo-American history textbooks assert that most of the causes of historical progress occur, or originate, in the European sector of the world. Textbooks of the early and middle nineteenth century tended to give a rather openly religious grounding for this Eurocentric tunnel history. In later textbooks the Bible is no longer considered a source of historical fact; but causality seems to be rooted in an implicit theory that combines a belief that Christian peoples make history with a belief that white peoples make history, the whole becoming a theory that it is natural for Europeans to innovate and progress and for non-Europeans to remain stagnant and unchanging (“traditional”), until, like Sleeping Beauty, they are awakened by the Prince. This view still, in the main, prevails, although racism has been discarded and non-Europe is no longer considered to have been absolutely stagnant and traditional. Schools are always a little behind the time when it comes to the teaching of newer topics and ideas. I wish I could report ... Purchase answer to see full attachment