Fluent Essays

This chapter discusses the relevance of diversity strategy while securing any set of national assets. Diversity in national infrastructure involves the introduction of intentional differences into systems such as vendor source, deployment approach, network connectivity, targeted standards, programming language, operating system, and software version. Two systems are considered diverse if their key attributes differ, and nondiverse otherwise. The requirement for physical diversity in the design of computing infrastructure is perhaps the most familiar of all diversity-related issues. The idea is that any computing or networking asset that serves as an essential component of some critical function must include physical distribution to increase its survivability. A national diversity program should be developed that would call for coordination between companies and governmental agencies in severalStart a discussion thread and discuss how the types of threats discussed in the article could impact our economy, and how implementing Diversity (as discussed in chapters 4) could help mitigate these threats. For additional information click the link below:https://www.resdal.org/Archivo/usa-home-prote.htmAttacks on our national infrastructure are already happening. And the expectation is that they will continue to increase at an accelerated rate. For this weeks discussion, well cover threats to our nations pipelines. To get started, read this article:https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054924After reading the article, start a discussion thread and discuss how the types of threats discussed in the article could impact our economy, and how implementing Diversity (as discussed in chapter 4 ) could help mitigate these threats. You must do this following:1) Create a new thread. As indicated above, discuss how the types of threats discussed in the article referenced above could impact our economy, and how implementing Diversity and Commonality (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5) could help mitigate these threats.2) Select AT LEAST 3 other students threads and post substantive comments on those threads. Your comments should extend the conversation started with the thread. ALL original posts and comments must be substantive. (Im looking for about a paragraph - not just I agree.)You must do this following:1) Create a new thread. As indicated above, discuss how the types of threats discussed in the article referenced above could impact our economy, and how implementing Diversity (as discussed in chapters 4) could help mitigate these threats.2) Select AT LEAST 3 other students threads and post substantive comments on those threads. Your comments should extend the conversation started with the thread. ALL original posts and comments must be substantive. (Im looking for about a paragraph - not just I agree.) cyber_attacks_chapter04_powerpoint_lecture_slides__1_.pdf text_book_emerging_threats_and_countermeasures.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed. Chapter 4 Diversity Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved 1 • The securing any set of national assets should include a diversity strategy • The deliberate introduction of diversity into national infrastructure to increase security has not been well explored • Two system are considered diverse if their key attributes differ • Diversity bucks the trend to standardize assets for efficiencys sake Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Introduction 2 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.1 – Diverse and nondiverse components through attribute differences 3 • Worm propagation is an example of an attack that relies on a nondiverse target environment • Worm functionality in three steps: Chapter 4 – Diversity Diversity and Worm Propagation – Step #1: Find a target system on the network for propagation of worm program – Step #2: Copy program to that system – Step #3: Remotely execute program – Repeat • Diversity may be expensive to introduce, but saves money on response costs in the long run Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved 4 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.2 – Mitigating worm activity through diversity 5 • Most individual computers run the same operating system software on a standard processor platform and browse the Internet through one or two popular search engines with the one of only a couple browsers • The typical configuration is a PC running Windows on an Intel platform, browsing the Internet with Internet Explorer, searching with Google • This makes the average home PC user a highly predictable target Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Desktop Computer System Diversity 6 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.3 – Typical PC configuration showing diversity 7 • Three Considerations – Platform costs – Application interoperability – Support and training Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Desktop Computer System Diversity 8 • Ultimate solution for making desktops more secure involves their removal Chapter 4 – Diversity Diversity Paradox of Cloud Computing – Not a practical solution • Cloud computing may offer home PC users a diverse, protected environment Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved 9 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.4 – Spectrum of desktop diversity options 10 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.5 – Diversity and attack difficulty with option of removal 11 • Modern telecommunications consist of the following two types of technologies Chapter 4 – Diversity Network Technology Diversity – Circuit-switched – Packet-switched • When compared to one another, these two technologies automatically provide diversity • Diversity may not always be a feasible goal – Maximizing diversity may defend against large-scale attacks, but one must also look closely at the entire architecture Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved 12 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.6 – Worm nonpropagation benefit from diverse telecommunications 13 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.7 – Potential for impact propagation over shared fiber 14 • Any essential computing or networking asset that serves a critical function must include physical distribution to increase survivability • Physical diversity has been part of the national asset system for years Chapter 4 – Diversity Physical Diversity – Backup center diversity – Supplier/vendor diversity – Network route diversity Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved 15 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 4 – Diversity Fig. 4.8 – Diverse hubs in satellite SCADA configurations 16 • A national diversity program would coordinate between companies and government agencies Chapter 4 – Diversity National Diversity Program – Critical path analysis – Cascade modeling – Procurement discipline Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved 17 Cyber Attacks “Dr. Amoroso’s fifth book Cyber Attacks: Protecting National Infrastructure outlines the challenges of protecting our nation’s infrastructure from cyber attack using security techniques established to protect much smaller and less complex environments. He proposes a brand new type of national infrastructure protection methodology and outlines a strategy presented as a series of ten basic design and operations principles ranging from deception to response. The bulk of the text covers each of these principles in technical detail. While several of these principles would be daunting to implement and practice they provide the first clear and concise framework for discussion of this critical challenge. This text is thought-provoking and should be a ‘must read’ for anyone concerned with cybersecurity in the private or government sector.” —Clayton W. Naeve, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Endowed Chair in Bioinformatics, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN “Dr. Ed Amoroso reveals in plain English the threats and weaknesses of our critical infrastructure balanced against practices that reduce the exposures. This is an excellent guide to the understanding of the cyber-scape that the security professional navigates. The book takes complex concepts of security and simplifies it into coherent and simple to understand concepts.” —Arnold Felberbaum, Chief IT Security & Compliance Officer, Reed Elsevier “The national infrastructure, which is now vital to communication, commerce and entertainment in everyday life, is highly vulnerable to malicious attacks and terrorist threats. Today, it is possible for botnets to penetrate millions of computers around the world in few minutes, and to attack the valuable national infrastructure. “As the New York Times reported, the growing number of threats by botnets suggests that this cyber security issue has become a serious problem, and we are losing the war against these attacks. “While computer security technologies will be useful for network systems, the reality tells us that this conventional approach is not effective enough for the complex, large-scale national infrastructure. “Not only does the author provide comprehensive methodologies based on 25 years of experience in cyber security at AT&T, but he also suggests ‘security through obscurity,’ which attempts to use secrecy to provide security.” —Byeong Gi Lee, President, IEEE Communications Society, and Commissioner of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure Edward G. Amoroso AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier Acquiring Editor: Pam Chester Development Editor: Gregory Chalson Project Manager: Paul Gottehrer Designer: Alisa Andreola Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier 30 Corporate Drive, Suite 400, Burlington, MA 01803, USA © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions policies and our arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: www.elsevier.com/permissions. This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher (other than as may be noted herein). Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods or professional practices, may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information or methods described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Amoroso, Edward G. Cyber attacks : protecting national infrastructure / Edward Amoroso. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-12-384917-5 1. Cyberterrorism—United States—Prevention. 2. Computer security—United States. 3. National security—United States. I. Title. HV6773.2.A47 2011 363.325⬘90046780973—dc22 2010040626 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed in the United States of America 10 11 12 13 14 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For information on all BH publications visit our website at www.elsevierdirect.com/security CONTENTS CONTENTS Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Botnet Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 National Cyber Security Methodology Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Implementing the Principles Nationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Chapter 2 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Scanning Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deliberately Open Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discovery Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deceptive Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exploitation Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Procurement Tricks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exposing Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interfaces Between Humans and Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Deception Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 37 39 41 42 45 46 47 49 v vi CONTENTS Chapter 3 Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 What Is Separation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Functional Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Infrastructure Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DDOS Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SCADA Separation Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Physical Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Insider Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Asset Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multilevel Security (MLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 55 57 60 62 63 65 68 70 Chapter 4 Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Diversity and Worm Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Desktop Computer System Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Diversity Paradox of Cloud Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Network Technology Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Physical Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Diversity Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 77 80 82 85 87 Chapter 5 Commonality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Meaningful Best Practices for Infrastructure Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Locally Relevant and Appropriate Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Culture of Security Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Infrastructure Simplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Certification and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Career Path and Reward Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Responsible Past Security Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 National Commonality Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Chapter 6 Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Effectiveness of Depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Layered Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 Layered E-Mail Virus and Spam Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 CONTENTS Layered Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Layered Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Layered Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Program of Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 120 122 124 126 Chapter 7 Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Trusted Computing Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Through Obscurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Information Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Obscurity Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organizational Compartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Discretion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 133 135 137 139 141 143 Chapter 8 Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Collecting Network Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Collecting System Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Information and Event Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Large-Scale Trending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tracking a Worm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Collection Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 150 154 156 159 161 Chapter 9 Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Conventional Security Correlation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quality and Reliability Issues in Data Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Correlating Data to Detect a Worm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Correlating Data to Detect a Botnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Large-Scale Correlation Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Correlation Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 169 170 172 174 176 Chapter 10 Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Detecting Infrastructure Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Managing Vulnerability Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 viii CONTENTS Cyber Security Intelligence Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Risk Management Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Awareness Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 188 190 192 Chapter 11 Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Pre- Versus Post-Attack Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indications and Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Incident Response Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forensic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law Enforcement Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Response Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 197 198 201 203 204 206 Appendix Sample National Infrastructure Protection Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Sample Deception Requi ... Purchase answer to see full attachment