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http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1434/theories-of-nuclear-proliferation-why-do-states-seek-nuclear-weaponsI should think as a political leader while answering this question.Evaluate nuclear weapons. Do they make the world a safer or a more dangerous place? Why? How do perspectives on this matter different across countries? Do states see nuclear weapons differently depending on their status/size/power/etc.? _lecture.pptx core_reading.pdf exam_format.pptx states____motivations_to_acquire_or_forgo_nuclear_weapons__august_2016.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Question time “Do nuclear weapons make the world a more or less safe place?” 1 Lecture’s outline Nuclear weapons: • What are they? • Who has them? • Why states want them? • How is the proliferation of them controlled? 1. Nuclear weapons: What are they? Nuclear technology DUAL USE • Nuclear reactor • Nuclear weapon (fission/fusion) extremely complex to make a bomb! • enriched uranium or plutonium • knowledge and technology • delivery system • plane / missile / ‘dirty bomb’ The archetypal Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Fission – 10,000s TNT Fusion – millions TNT 1. blast 2. thermal radiation (heat) 3. nuclear radiation 2. Nuclear weapons: Who has them? Definitional Issues: • Full programme • Test • Ability First generation proliferators (tests): •USA 1945 •USSR 1949 •Great Britain 1952 •France 1960 •People’s Republic of China 1964 Second generation proliferators (tests): •Israel 1966 (alleged cold test) •India 1974 (‘Smiling Buddha’ - test) •Vela Incident 1979 (origin of ‘flash’ unconfirmed, but suspected joint South Africa-Israel test) •Pakistan 1998 Not signatories of the NPT! Third generation proliferators (tests): • Libya (nuclear program rolled back in 2003) • Iran (no evidence of nuclear activity though) • North Korea Signatories of the NPT! Disarmed: • Former Soviet states– Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus 1994 • South Africa 1989-93 Source here. 3. Nuclear weapons: Why do states want them? • Security: • Deterrence is the effort by one actor to persuade another actor to refrain from some action by convincing the opponent that the cost will exceed the rewards of the act. • post-cold war? • Prestige and power • UK/France? • Personality • Kim Jong-un • Jeremy Corbyn • State identity • India-Pakistan • Japan • Domestic politics • North Korea and COVID-19? 4. How is the proliferation of them controlled? • Limit horizontal proliferation – to other countries/entities • Limit vertical proliferation - size of arsenals universal disarmament vs. controlled possession The Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) • Detonated a device before 1 January 1967 • Are obligated not to proliferate. • Are obligated to Disarm. Non Nuclear weapon States (NNWS) • All others… • Are obligated not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. • Are allowed to enjoy peaceful nuclear technology. 191 parties: NOT India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan The Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) Critics • Proliferation continues – just withdraw • Weak enforcement • Unfair: ‘the grand bargain’ (proliferation is policed, disarmament is not). The Future •Globalisation – A. Q. Khan •Terrorism - NSA •Global zero (campaign 2008-) Question time “Do nuclear weapons make the world a more or less safe place?” 18 Lecture’s content •Topics •Assessment format •Revision tips •Marking criteria •Questions? Thinking as a political leader: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION • On Nuclear proliferation Evaluate nuclear weapons. Do they make the world a safer or a more dangerous place? Why? How do perspectives on this matter different across countries? Do states see nuclear weapons differently depending on their status/size/power/etc.? Lecture’s content •Topics •Assessment format •Revision tips •Marking criteria •Questions? “Open-book examination“ → assessment method that allows students to refer to either class notes and summaries, textbooks, and other approved material while answering questions (the Online Reading List in our case). Questions will not test superficial knowledge and memory. They will require you to answer in a more analytical way (e.g., reflecting on impact of factor x on variable y). 24 HOURS → but we expect you to spend no more than 3 hours on the exam ▪ The word limit for each answer is 400 words Lecture’s content •Topics •Assessment format •Revision tips •Marking criteria •Questions? 400 words = short answer Differently from an usual essay, a short answer does not require introduction and conclusions (still, please ensure that your first sentence introduces your ideas and your last sentence gives a sense of conclusion). Hence, go straight to the heart of the question. Revision tip: • Focus on breadth, more than intense depth. • Rather than memorising small details of the readings, make sure you understand the broader picture. ✓ e.g., What argument does Source X make? To what extent does this argument differ from what I read in Source Y? What are the implications of Factor X (e.g., inequality) for Issue Y (e.g., democracy)? • Make sure to study core and recommended readings of the Week outlined in the previous slide. Lecture’s content •Topics •Assessment format •Revision tips •Marking criteria •Questions? MARKING CRITERIA * Use of sources: Aim to refer to about 2/4 sources in each answer (depending on the question set). ** Academic conventions will not being considered by the marker. Lecture’s content •Topics •Assessment format •Revision tips •Marking criteria •Questions? Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1 (2016) Studies States’ Motivations to Acquire or Forgo Nuclear Weapons: Four Factors of Influence Sico van der Meer Introduction Since the invention and first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, predictions on the proliferation of these weapons have traditionally been overestimating. 1 Despite all gloomy forecasts, only nine states nowadays are considered to possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Although more states have operated nuclear weapons programmes at some point in the past 65 years – some experts argue that in total 39 states once engaged in nuclear weapons activities2 – most of them sooner or later gave up their ambition to acquire these weapons. Especially since the second half of the 1980s the number of states with nuclear weapons-related activities has become relatively low.3 Taking into account the historical trends, it looks like political and academic forecasts even nowadays tend to be overemphasizing the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the near Moeed Yusuf, Predicting Proliferation. The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons (Washington: Brookings Institution 2009). 2 Benoît Pelopidas, ‘The Oracles of Proliferation. How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation’, Nonproliferation Review 18, 1 (March 2011): pp. 297-314, see p. 306. 3 Harald Müller &Andreas Schmidt, ‘The Little-Known Story of Deproliferation. Why States Give University PressNuclear Weapon Activities’, in: William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century. Volume 1: The Role of Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 124-158. 1 ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2016 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES future, for example by predicting nuclear domino effects if new nuclear weapons powers would arise and cause other states to develop nuclear weapons as well.4 The difficulties in forecasting nuclear weapons proliferation can be explained by one key factor: it is still unclear among academics and policymakers why exactly states start nuclear weapons programmes or refrain from them. What makes nuclear weapons attractive or unattractive to the leadership of any state? True, many theories exist. The problem with all existing theories on motivations for states to acquire or not to acquire nuclear weapons is that supporting evidence may be found, but opposing evidence as well. When studying nuclear weapons (non-)proliferation, one could consider any state in the world as an individual case, each with its own international and domestic circumstances, and with all the changes herein during history. It is, therefore, not surprising that specific explanations of nuclear behaviour are repeatedly considered inadequate because they fail to account for all cases – currently more than 190 states. Without understanding what are the motivations of states to aim for or refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, it is not only complicated to forecast nuclear proliferation dynamics, but even more important: it becomes difficult to develop policies aimed at influencing these dynamics – there is a risk of treating the symptoms while ignoring the disease. This article aims at contributing to answering this key question in the field of nuclear weapons proliferation: why do states wish for nuclear weapons – or not? This will not be achieved by developing a new theory, but by increasing the insights in the large amount of existing theories on nuclear proliferation motivations. For this purpose the many theories developed in the past decades will be grouped into four overarching groups. This analysis could be helpful to future researchers and policy makers who got lost in the current richness in theories and their critics. Grouping existing theories on nuclear (non-)proliferation motivations has, to a limited extent, been done before. Considering the general lack of unanimity in this research field, it is not surprising that these groupings also differ. To give some examples: a rather early study on proliferation motives by George Quester, dating from 1973, counted three groups of them: 1) military motives; 2) political motives; and 3) economic Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare. The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 108; Johan Bergenas, ‘The Nuclear Domino Myth. Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenario’s’, Foreign Affairs, 31 August 2010; William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘In Search of Proliferation Trends and Tendencies’, in: William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century. Volume 2: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 337-353. 4 210 | P a g e VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1 (2016) motives.5 Scott Sagan in 1996 also developed a grouping of three ‘models’ explaining why states wish to build nuclear weapons: 1) security; 2) domestic politics; and 3) norms. 6 Assembling (non-)proliferation into four groups is also possible, as study from 2010 by William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, shows. Summarized, Potter and Mukhatzhanova group all theories on nuclear weapons (non-)proliferation motivations into these four categories: 1) security; 2) international institutions; 3) international norms; and 4) domestic circumstances.7 Etel Solingen some years earlier (2007) defined the same four groups, but also added a fifth one: democracy versus autocracy. 8 And to mention only one more possible classification: Joseph Cirincione in 2007 also defined five motivations for states to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons: 1) security; 2) prestige; 3) domestic politics; 4) technology; and 5) economics.9 These are just some examples to show that not only the amount of theoretical groups differs, but also their content. Nevertheless, some similarities can be noticed; although not every author mentions the same motivational factor theories, some overlap can obviously be noticed. This article groups the existing theories on motivations for nuclear weapons (non)acquisition in four factors: 1) Capabilities; 2) Security; 3) International Norms & Perceptions; and 4) Domestic Political Context. The article will discuss what they incorporate (including criticism) and why is chosen to group them in this manner. In conclusion some implications and recommendations for further research regarding nuclear (non-)proliferation dynamics will be presented. Capabilities The first group of incentives and disincentives for nuclear weapons (non-) proliferation is summarized here as ‘capabilities’. Under this umbrella are brought George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973). 6 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security 21, 3 (Winter 1996/1997): pp. 54-86. 7 William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “An Introduction to Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century. Volume 2: A Comparative Perspective, edited by William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 3-9. 8 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics. Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 1-20. 9 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, p. 47. 5 211 | P a g e JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES together both the technological and economic capabilities of states to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not easy to develop, nor are the materials that are required cheap and commonly available. Technologically and scientifically the most challenging and costly is the production of fissile materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium). Transforming the nuclear materials into reliable and deliverable weapons is another challenge that requires highly advanced technological expertise, and the same applies to developing the delivery systems for the weapons – in this regard, nowadays states generally prefer ballistic missiles.10 It is often argued that the technological and financial capabilities required for developing nuclear weapons are an effective barrier especially to less developed countries without an advanced scientific and technological infrastructure and without the financial strength to afford the investments needed to start a nuclear weapons programme.11 Since Pakistan and North Korea – both relatively poor countries – acquired nuclear weapons in 1998 respectively 2006, this argument has generally faded away from the debate. Actually, the theoretical assumption that capabilities influence the motivation of states to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons, is fading away itself from the academic debate since, approximately, the early 1990s. The capabilities theory is dating back from the first decades of academic research into nuclear motivations and gradually became less popular. In the first decades of nuclear weapons existence, it was generally assumed that any state would like to have nuclear weapons, simply because these weapons were the most advanced and powerful military tools available. Stephen Meyer in 1984 summarized the consequences of this assumption as follows: ‘If one presumes that the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons are ever present – that all countries would like to have nuclear weapons – then the only determining factor becomes technology.’12 One could also describe the capabilities motivation as a ‘why not’ principle. When a state has the means available to build nuclear weapons, why should it refrain? When it is, for example, rather easy to convert civilian nuclear technology programmes into military ones, the costs of nuclear weapons may become relatively low enough that the perceived Stanley A. Erickson, “Economic and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review 8, 2 (Summer 2001): pp. 40-54. 11 Recent examples of this vision are: Cirincione, Bomb Scare, pp. 74-76; Zachary Keck, “Why Countries Build Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” The Diplomat, 3 July 2013. 12 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 10. 10 212 | P a g e VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1 (2016) benefits – obtaining the most powerful weapons that exist – easily outweigh the negative consequences.13 Proponents of the capabilities theory regularly claim that scientists often play a crucial role in this process. Ralph Lapp, for example, in 1970 argued that ‘research and development has become an almost unchallenged force in directing the nation to arms. We may speak of this as technological determinism.’ 14 Hans Bethe in 1985 also pointed at ‘the technological imperative’ with regard to nuclear weapons development, mentioning the feeling among scientists and government officials ‘that we must use this new technology’.15 In this respect, often an encompassing quotation of Robert Oppenheimer, one of the founders of the nuclear weapons programme of the United States, is presented about developing the hydrogen bomb (an improved kind of nuclear bomb): ‘When I saw how to do it, it was clear to me that one had to at least make the thing. [...] The program in 1951 [to develop the H-bomb] was technically so sweet that you could not argue about that.’16 The main evidence that the capabilities theory is not explaining nuclear weapons (non-)proliferation adequately is the fact that many countries have become technologically and economically able to develop nuclear weapons, but never did so. The technological ‘pull factor’ leading to a wish for nuclear weapons often seems nonexistent, at least not autonomously. These last two words, ‘not autonomously’, are important, because it may be assumed that the capabilities factor is still important in determining motivations to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons, even though it may not be a decisive factor on its own. In certain circumstances, the availability of capabilities to develop nuclear weapons may compel the leadership of a state to start a nuclear weapons programme even if it would not have done so when these capabilities were not available. On the other hand, a lack of technological and / or economical means may force state leaders with a wish for nuclear weapons to abstain from starting a nuclear weapons programme – although this is still a choice with its own motivations, because it could Steven J. Baker, “The International Political Economy of Proliferation,” in Arms Control and Technological Innovation, edited by David Carlton & Carlo Schaerf (New York & Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 70-101, see pp. 97-98. 14 Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt. The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New York: Cowles Book Company, 1970), p. 173. 15 Hans A. Bethe, “The Technological Imperative,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, 7 (August 1985): pp. 34-36. 16 Cited in Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 2, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1993): pp. 192-212, 195; Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Security Studies 4, 3 (Spring 1995): pp. 463-519, see 480; Cirincione, Bomb Scare, p. 73. 13 213 | P a g e JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES always be a possibility to start acquiring the capabilities needed, even when this requires tough choices on how to spend limited state budgets.17 In this regard, the capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons may perhaps be considered a necessary, but at itself insufficient cause for nuclear weapons proliferation.18 Even today, there is no unanimity among scholars on the influence of capabilities on nuclear (non-)proliferation behaviour by states. A striking example of this lack of unanimity can be found in one and the same recent book: in an edited volume on nuclear forecasting, dating from 2010, two contributions come to opposite conclusions on the capabilities factor. A chapter by Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt concludes that the hypothesis that nuclear weapons proliferation is capability driven (‘capability may be defined in economic or technological terms’) cannot be validated at all. The authors state: ‘[...] economic factors are almost completely irrelevant for the initiation of nuclear weapons activities. Rather, it is a question ... Purchase answer to see full attachment