Fluent Essays

Using the typology provided by Arend Lijphart in his book Patterns of democracy (week 7 - Models of Democracy) as a basis of their assessment of Bulgarian democracy the students should:Individually apply the 10 criteria that Lijphart develops to the chosen by me political system.Deliberate on the common values that should be assigned to every component. Identify possible issues, problems, shortcomings with the application to any of these criteria for understanding the type of democracy. Based on the context evaluate the overall logic of the model developed by Lijphart. Deliver a short presentation in class.Upload the presentation in moodle prior to the class in question.Write a short (two-three pages long) essay justifying your view on the matters mentioned above. hristo_panchugov___political_parties_position_paper1.doc Unformatted Attachment Preview POSITION PAPER On Parties and Post-Communist Consolidation In chapter eight of his book “Party system change. Approaches and interpretations” (1997) Peter Mair focuses on the principal characteristics of the established party systems, on the identification of “the sorts of factors which have encouraged the stabilization and institutionalization of established party systems” thus trying to identify “the sorts of actors which are likely to be absent from emerging party systems, and from post communist party systems in particular” (Mair, 1997. 176). He identifies four stages of party system emergence and consolidation according to the nature of civil society, the strategies of mobilization and the requirements for institutional restructuring. The first stage is the emergence of party systems with “the establishment of universal and equal electoral democracy” (Rokkan, 1970:75)1 in early twentieth-century Europe. This process was a result of enfranchisement and introduction of universal suffrage it “usually involved little more than the opening-up of an already existing political system” (Mair, 1997. 179). The second stage is characterized with the reestablishment of the party system following the authoritarian rules in Germany and Italy in the late 1940s. The third distinct stage is constituted by the party systems emerging in Portugal and Spain from authoritarian rule in 1970s. And the fourth stage is marked by the party system emergence in postcommunist Europe. According to the author the post-communist party system consolidation process is different due to several reasons – the democratization process is different; there are differences in the electorate and the type of parties; the context and the patter of competition are different. The democratization process differs in a way that involves not only democratization but also marketization and economic transformation, as well as state building. This “triple transition” process involved a wholesale restructuring of the system as opposed to the “opening-up” process characterizing the western party system consolidation. The extend of power monopoly and the economic structure prevented the emergence of independent social organization or collective interest thus making the post-communist stage the first case in which there is an actual lack of civil society. Nevertheless in post-communist reality the “citizens had already been effectively “incorporated”, “mobilized”, “activated” and “politicized” under the previous nondemocratic regime” (Mair, 1997. p.180) Mair points out that it is exactly the high level of organizational mobilization in the different social groups that lead to their closure and hence the “freezing” of the party system in Western Europe. The fact that mass politics have already been established makes the inclination toward party system consolidation less probable thus enhancing intense political competition and system instability. These characteristics lead to the second important difference introduced by Mair and that is the relative openness and availability of the electorate in new democracies. The social structures are fluid and are “unlikely to constitute a stable pattern of alignments” (Mair, 1997. p.183) resulting in a clear cleavage structure that 1 Quoted in Mair, Peter. (1997), “Party system change. Approaches and interpretations”, p. 177 stabilizes the electorate. The emergence of such structure involves not only clear social identities, it is connected with their mobilization and transformation into political identities and creation of organizational networks aligning the electorate into partisan blocks, and thus freezing the system. While this fluidity of the electorate is a common characteristic of newly emerging democracy in all of the above mentioned stages the post-communist context differ to the extend that there is a lack of crystallization of political identities. Hence the role of the parties is crucial for consolidation of the system and this role differs in the post-communist democracies. Mair argues that these parties are mostly internally created, elitist organizations that are not willing to establish strong mass organizations “which might, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 51) put it “narrow the support market” (Mair, 1997. p.183). This will enhance the maintenance of elitist organizations and will prevent in medium term the development of strong cleavage structure. The third difference, as developed by Mair, between established party systems and newly emerging post-communist party systems concerns the context of competition, more precisely its uncertainty. Three factors shape that context, namely the lack of organizational loyalties in the elite, the institutional setting, and the structure of competition. The first factor is enhanced by the lack of clear organizational structure, thus preventing the possible sanctions for potential party dissidents. Furthermore because “the parent organization is unlikely to have any special legitimacy or standing in the eyes of the electorate, the fractious elites themselves would not be conscious of any great cost involved in breaking away” (Mair, 1997.p.188). The elites are inclined of pursuing electoral gains by engaging in short term alliances, “seceding and establishing separate parties, or by engaging in short-term merges and alliances with other parties” thus making the context of the competition uncertain and highly unpredictable. However while it is certainly true that the relative ratio of politicians switching alliances and party mergers and fission is higher than in the democratization process, characterizing the first and second stage of party system development, due to the existence of strong party organization and party identities, I think that this aspect is not that explicit. The presence of high polarization in the post-communist countries on some of the issues (economic development, international integration, certain policy issues), although not on an elaborate programmatic level (Kitschelt, et.al, 1999), as well as the strong opposition between communist and anti-communist parties may make the pursuing of certain electoral strategies unavailable. This might work as a factor that lessens the uncertainty of the competition and as a restrain on party and elite behavior. This role in the established party systems is given to the party ideology. Robertson analyses the restrains that the ideology may pose on the party competitive behavior. The second major factor that influences the structure of competition is the institutional setting. In the post-communist countries it is developed in the context of a wholesale political restructuring. “State institutions are assuming new roles and prerogatives under conditions of intense political struggle, rapid social change, and enormous legal confusion” Zielonka (1994: 87).2 This results in a struggle over the character of the major institutions, which makes them subject of a constant change, and thus further enhancing of the uncertain structure of competition. The last factor that shapes the structure of competition is the lack or the presence of such clear structure. The author distinguishes two different patterns. 2 Quoted in Mair, Peter. (1997), “Party system change. Approaches and interpretations”, p. 177 Closed and open party system. The first is characterized by stable rules of competition, “little or no change in the range of government alternatives or in the pattern of alternation, and with new parties finding it virtually impossible to break through the threshold of government” (Mair, 1997. p.191) thus representing consolidated party system. The open system in contrast faces different patterns of government alternation, frequent shifts in the “make-up” of governing alternatives, and with new parties gaining relatively easy access to office. I have already discussed to a certain extend the limitations that might exist in the process of creation of government alternatives however there are other problems that should be addressed. In the next chapter 9 of his book Mair discusses the different degrees of openness that can exist in relation to the western party systems. So it is confusing not to see this issue addressed in regards to the post-communist party systems. The Bulgarian party system might be regarded as relatively closed for a period of three elections with the same parties participating in the electoral contest and the government alternation closed within the pattern of two major alternatives. That does not change the wholesale logic of the system, as it was proven by the last elections, but nevertheless such a distinction can contribute to the comprehensiveness of the model. He does not consider the possibility that different patterns of transition may constitute different patterns of party consolidation (Kitschelt, 2002). Furthermore the author presents the party system change in the Denmark elections in 1973, regarding the Danish system as relatively open which leaves the reader wondering whether there is a difference between an established democracies and postcommunist such in regards to the closure of the party system and thus whether this factor could be outlined as a major one. Thus Mair argues that the combination of weak cleavage structure, and uncertain and volatile institutional environment and a very open and unpredictable structure of competition cannot enhance the prospect of rapid consolidation. The most important difference according to the author is the pattern of competition. The uncertainty of the competition due to the electoral volatility, the frequency of party fusion and fission, the uncertainty of the electoral threshold makes the competition extremely intense. The stakes of the competition – winner takes it all game, and the uncertainty of the competition lead to a politics of outbidding and lack of compromise. The author acknowledges that most of the characteristics of party system consolidation outlined above are common for every new party system. However he concludes that the “particularly underdeveloped character of civil society in postcommunist Europe, the continuing fractiousness of the political class, and the sheer intensity of political competition, all suggest that the varying obstacles which stand in the way of post-communist consolidation are significantly more pronounced than in any of these early clusters of democratizing polities, and it is this which is clearly worrying” (Mair, 1997. p.197). It is interesting to mind exercise to compare the incentives toward consolidation with the tendency outline by the author in chapter 9 – “formerly closed structures of competition might now begin to open and hence might well promote greater electoral uncertainty in the future” (Mair, 1997. 223) and what will be the impact on these tendencies on the post-communist party system consolidation. The uncertainty of the party competition in the post-communist states is also the major focus of the empirical study conducted by Marcus Kreuzer and Vello Pettai (2003). They analyze the changes of the electoral preferences and the organizational loyalties of politicians, by focusing on the interactions between them. Thus they outline distinct patterns of political change within the broader post-communist context, something that lacks in the Mair’s broader typology, arguing that the instability can have “patterns as distinct as those of stability” (Kreuzer & Pettai, 2003. p.78). The authors elaborate five types of organizational affiliation strategies available to the politicians: “staying put” – the politician remains affiliated with his party; “party switching” takes place when the politician switches to another existing political party; “fusion” involves merging of two or more existing parties to form a new one, “fission” – a minority of politicians breaks away to establish a new party; and the last strategy is “starting up” which is applied when previously unaffiliated individuals align to form a new party. Following the logic of the research Kreuzer and Pettai (2003) establish seven possible choices for voter affiliation, namely: vote for the same party for which they have voted on the previous elections; switch to another existing party; they can choose a new party (created through fusion, fission or start up party); they can spoil their ballot or they can abstain. These can be merged into three broader categories according to the “extend to which voters durably align themselves, realign themselves or de-align themselves (Kreuzer & Pettai, 2003. p. 80). The authors argue that the interaction between the “politicians’ organizational affiliations and the voters’ electoral choices” characterize the patterns of party system transformation. They develop three different patterns: alignment, realignment and dealignment patterns. The first pattern as developed by the text characterizes the consolidated party systems with deeply developed social cleavages and strongly organized parties. With regards to the developed model it implies a “growing number of politicians staying put… and increasing number of voters developing partisan affiliations” (Kreuzer & Pettai, 2003. p.82). Realignment patterns represent either restructuring of consolidated party systems or, new party systems going toward consolidation. It can be both voter and elite driven and results in both voters and politicians changing their affiliations but between existing parties. The de-alignment pattern thus involves the same characteristics but the actors change their preferences by choosing new rather than established parties. Thus this pattern represents either the de-consolidation of a party system or the continued lack of consolidation of a transitional party system. According to the developed model Kreuzer and Pettai (2003) conduct an empirical research of three transitional countries Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, concluding that “such distinct patterns of party system formation exist in post communist countries”. They argue that these are not easily detected by looking only at the fragmentation and volatility, which only show us that there is instability, without identifying the different patterns it may take. Thus we have to include the organizational preferences of politicians. Nevertheless it is arguable to the extend that was shown in the article whether actually a major change in the preferences of the politicians would be observed if there is no indication that it will be electoral rewarded. I consider the developed model an useful tool for empirical testing of postcommunist disparities, and it is generally good attempt to show that such disparities actually exist while trying to further develop the classification of the post-communist party systems. But there are problems with the generalization of the results since it is hardly able to detect the reasons for the occurrence of the changes – for example if a party system was classified as following a consolidating pattern and suddenly the electorate de-aligns along with the elite this model do not give us a predictive capacity to detect whether this will be a new tendency or just a temporal disruption of the previous pattern. ... Purchase answer to see full attachment