Fluent Essays

After reading the article Big Questions About Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them? by Kincaid and Stenberg, choose two of the questions from the article that intrigued you the most. Then in 750-1,000 words, do the following:Explain whether the questions still need answering or if they have been addressed by government since the article was published.If they have been answered, explain why and how. If they have not been answered, explain what government can do to start finding answers to them.Describe the importance of the questions as they relate specifically to state and local governments.Use three to five scholarly resources to support your explanations.Below is the Big Question About Intergovernmental Relations and Management intergovernmental_relations.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview John Kincaid Lafayette College Carl W. Stenberg University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Intergovernmental Management Symposium “Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them? Fiscal, administrative, and political tensions among the partners in the federal system have not eased, and perhaps have grown, since the demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, deliberation, and policy formulation. S ince the death of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1996, important intergovernmental issues have remained on the country’s agenda. Shortly after the 2008 presidential election, for example, the Federal Systems Panel (2008) of the National Academy of Public Administration delivered an “Intergovernmental Agenda” to the incoming administration asserting a need to “restructure intergovernmental management across the federal system” on the basis of “collaboration rather than command and control.” The agenda cited such policy challenges as health care access (e.g., Medicaid) and cost reductions, housing, natural disasters, terrorism, energy consumption, unemployment, and infrastructure. The agenda disappeared in the bowels of the White House. Yet continuing intergovernmental process issues deserve attention. These include, among others, fiscal pressures on all governments; declining federal aid for such place-based functions as infrastructure and economic development; escalating social welfare costs for state and local governments; increasing conditions of federal aid; the proliferation of grants to more than 900; federal programs designed poorly for efficiency, effectiveness, and equity; coercive intergovernmental regulations and federal preemptions; unfunded and underfunded federal and state mandates; tensions in state–local jurisdictional and fiscal relations; impediments to multistate and substate regional collaboration; the nationalization of state criminal law; federal restrictions on state and local taxes; and federal court orders (Kincaid 2008; Posner and Conlan 2008). 196 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011 The following 15 questions—which are not exhaustive and do not include constitutional questions such as those posed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and by calls to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment—are derived from the contributions to this symposium as well as recent literature. In framing these questions, it is difficult to distinguish consistently between intergovernmental relations (IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM). In the main, we take “intergovernmental relations” to be a term that encompasses all types of interactions between elected and nonelected officials of federal, state, and local governments. The especially important dimension of IGR is policy making—both lawmaking and regulation promulgation—in which elected officials and agency heads are important actors. We take “intergovernmental management” to be a less comprehensive term, encompassing the implementation and management of intergovernmental policies. Politics cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but the especially important dimension of IGM is administration, in which nonelected officials from agency heads to street-level bureaucrats are prime actors. We do not seek to answer the following questions, but rather to pose them, sometimes provocatively, for discussion. 1. Can intergovernmental relations generate more effective and efficient policies and implementation without restoring the primacy of the “governmental” in intergovernmental? The U.S. ACIR was founded on the democratic premise that elected government officials legitimately represent the people. The ACIR also was founded on the constitutional premise that American democracy is federal. The people’s democratic representatives, therefore, are principally the elected executive and legislative officials of the nation’s general-purpose federal, state, and local governments, with federal and state officials each presiding over a sovereign order of government. Consequently, intergovernmental initiatives should be formulated and overseen by elected federal, state, and local officials. In this respect, assembling these officials (and from both political parties) in a peak intergovernmental advisory organization made eminent sense. The ACIR reflected the sine qua non of the idea of cooperative federalism. late 1990s, local governments were relegated, perhaps, to a back seat in Washington, D.C. Even though about 63 percent of federal aid is dedicated to social welfare benefits for individuals, which is predominantly a state responsibility, the health of “places” remains vital to the social welfare of all citizens. As a [T]he rise of “governance” as Canadian initiative put it, “We are rediscova theoretical perspective and ering that economic competitiveness, social empirical reality brought into well-being, and ecosystem resilience depend, play a competing organizational in large part, on collective behaviour in specific dynamic rooted in the private ‘places’” (Shugart and Townsend 2010, 4). sector. . . . in which government Furthermore, some other federal countries have strengthened the intergovernmental roles is one among many actors and of local governments, and several have even in which government officials recognized local, usually municipal, governenjoy no presumption of ments as the third order of government in their primacy, even though they are constitution (Steytler 2009). However, the rise of “governance” as a theoretical perspective and empirical reality brought into play a competing organizational dynamic rooted in the private sector. This dynamic reflected disenchantment with government as well as enchantment with the thought of a more porous, pluralistic polity made wiser, more effective, and more democratic by networks of “governing” organizations in which government is one among many actors and in which government officials enjoy no presumption of primacy, even though they are the only democratically elected representatives of the people within governance networks. the only democratically elected 3. How will efforts to induce national Furthermore, because the federal government representatives of the people economic growth and remedy the interis the preeminent source of fiscal and regulawithin governance networks. governmental system’s unsustainable fiscal tory resources for such networks, it is not clear condition affect state and local revenues that the governance paradigm even values state and services? Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Ofand local officials and, thereby, intergovernmental relations. Given fice (GAO), Congressional Budget Office, Peterson Foundation, that state and local governments are entrenched constitutionally, National Academy of Public Administration, and others point to intergovernmental relations remain a necessary—and perhaps, for the unsustainability of current federal, state, and local spending. the paradigm’s proponents, a lamentably frictional—component of governance, but not a component necessarily valued as a principle of The GAO (2010b) has projected a $9.9 trillion fiscal gap between state and local expenditures and revenues for 2009 to 2058 that democratic self-government and multigovernmental negotiation to could require state and local spending reductions or tax increases of enhance policy outcomes. about 12.3 percent every year for the next 50 years. Under current policies, the GAO also expects that demographic changes (mainly a 2. Should local governments have a more prominent seat at the growing senior citizen population), rising health care costs, and defiintergovernmental table? Although local governments are not cit spending will require the federal government’s major entitlement constitutional partners of the federal system, as a practical matter, programs, plus net interest payments, to consume “93 cents of every they are vital to IGR and IGM. Local governments gained a seat at the intergovernmental table during the New Deal, largely because of dollar of federal revenue” by 2030 (2010a, 6). These projections, if accurate, have grave implications for intergovernmental programs their Democratic political clout, especially that of big-city mayors. and state and local finances. In turn, the possibility of reviving a Hence, federal aid often flowed directly to local governments, and program such as General Revenue Sharing (e.g., Shiller 2010) is local officials cooperated and competed with their state superiors in virtually out of the question. the federal arena. Local officials sometimes distrusted state governors and legislators, and they argued that federal funds for local, No agreement has been reached on solutions, although Medicare, especially urban, needs and the poor would not reach their targets Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and deficit spending have been if they were passed through state agencies. This concern triggered identified as prime targets for federal budget reform. Given the a debate, which was addressed by the ACIR, about whether federal high-profile politics associated with these budget items and the aid bypassing state capitals was beneficial or detrimental to federalism and public policy, and under what conditions federal aid should “sacred cow” status of the major programs, lower-profile programs could bear the brunt of initial cutbacks. For example, discretionary go through the states. spending for both place (e.g., infrastructure) and person (e.g., social services) functions carried out by states and localities could be reHowever, three developments largely unseated local governments duced. Also, the federal government could enact new taxes, such as a from being influential intergovernmental lobbyists. First, President national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT). A federal consumption Ronald Reagan and subsequent Republican presidents defined IGR as primarily a federal–state relationship. Democratic presidents have tax likely would place downward political pressure on state and local sales tax rates. Conceivably, the states could be pressured or manbeen more attentive to local governments, but only insofar as it has dated to abolish their sales taxes and join a national VAT regime, been politically advantageous to do so. Second, after 1987, federal which would make them dependent on revenues distributed by the aid shifted sharply from places to persons, significantly reducing federal government from its VAT. The tax-exempt status of state and federal funding for local place functions such as economic devellocal bonds could be reduced further, too. There is a need to identify opment, urban renewal, housing, education, transportation, and and measure the possible impact of such federal initiatives on state government operations. Third, the ACIR was eliminated in 1996. and local finances. Local governments occupied 27 percent of the ACIR’s seats. By the “Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 197 4. What design features should accompany federal economic stimulus programs, health care and financial regulation reform, and other national policy initiatives in order to facilitate more effective state and local implementation in times of austerity? Federal responses to the 2007–9 national recession, banking and securities failures, stock market collapse, housing crisis, and soaring health care costs have focused more on money than on management. While this is understandable, little attention has been given to the implementation of national remedial actions by state and local governments, many of which have reduced managerial capacity in the wake of retirements, hiring freezes, and personnel cutbacks. For example, from September 2009 to September 2010, state and local government employment declined by 1.3 percent, while federal employment grew by 3.4 percent (Cauchon 2010). Traditional channels for awarding funds have usually been followed, producing delays and distortions, and performance measures have been modest or nonexistent, as exemplified by the sole metric of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): the number of jobs created by stimulus funds, an indicator developed by auditors, not managers (Posner 2010, 26–27). The success of these national initiatives is largely in the hands of state and local public administrators who are operating with minimal guidance and support, whose ranks are stretched thin, and whose oversight abilities are diminished. Having an organizational capacity to anticipate and prepare for the IGM dimensions of national policy making could improve implementation and avoid micromanagement and “horror stories.” In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform recommended eliminating income tax deductions for state and local taxes. Most state and local officials oppose the elimination. This issue has a partisan dimension, though: in 2005, for instance, the average state and local tax payment in Democratic states was $7,487, compared to $4,834 in Republican states (Maggs 2005). Because most state income taxes are coupled to the federal tax code, state officials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax cuts and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues. Federal officials feel no obligation to coordinate tax policies with state and local officials. At the same time, many state and local governments have been less than fiscally responsible. The GAO found, for instance, that tax increases boosting state and local own-source revenues increased faster than the growth of personal income in 43 states during 1977–2007. State and local general expenditures increased faster than personal income growth in 47 states during 1977–2007 (GAO 2010b). Although most states are formally complying with their balanced budget rules, some are making questionable choices or unwarranted fiscal assumptions in order to do so. Many states also have exhausted their “rainy day” funds. It has become evident, as well, that most state and local governments have underfunded pension programs and health care benefits for their employees, placing a potentially huge fiscal burden on taxpayers in future years. There is a need to monitor the complex interactions of federal and state tax laws and revenues, as well as trends in funding commitments and capacities to meet obligations. The experience with ARRA also suggests that the federal government has not developed a capacity to provide effective countercyclical aid to states and localities. Generally, ARRA’s economic outcomes are consistent with analyses of previous federal efforts to assist states and localities during recessions, which suggest that such programs are less than optimal because they are not usually timed well, triggered adequately, or targeted effectively (Mattoon 2009). 5. How can state and local governments be viable intergovernmental partners without greater fiscal capacity and fiscal responsibility? One characteristic of contemporary federalism is federal preemption of state taxes through legislation and judicial action usually undertaken pursuant to the commerce clause, beginning especially with the enactment of limits on tax-exempt private activity bonds in 1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet services and interstate mail-order sales are among the most prominent constraints. In October 2007, President George W. Bush signed a seven-year extension of the moratorium on state and local taxation of Internet access. 6. Should functional responsibilities be “sorted out” with turnbacks or partial de-intergovernmentalization in order to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness? Attempts to “divide the job” of service delivery among intergovernmental actors originated in the early days of cooperative federalism, but efforts to do so have not been undertaken since President Reagan’s unsuccessful “swap” initiative in 1981–82. Some observers contend that “sorting out” is futile because of the comOne characteristic of plexity of intergovernmental management, the resilience of functional picket-fence silos, the contemporary federalism is widely varying appetites for taxes and services federal preemption of state taxes via legislation and judicial among states and localities, and the lack of political rewards. Others contend that sorting action usually undertaken out is unrealistic because of the complex interpursuant to the commerce governmental interdependence of most policy clause, beginning especially functions. Still others add that “bigger is not necessarily better.” with the enactment of limits on tax-exempt private-activity bonds in 1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet services and interstate mailorder sales are among the most prominent constraints. A number of states negotiated the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect taxes on interstate mail-order sales. The agreement was implemented voluntarily among consenting states in October 2005. Although several large retailers comply voluntarily with the agreement, Congress has not sanctioned the agreement or otherwise authorized states to require sales tax collections by out-of-state vendors. 198 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011 To these skeptics, consolidation or integration of services and better coordination among state, regional, and local agencies are more practical and promising ways to bolster the performance of governmental functions. Yet these modest steps might not be sufficient. If revenue constraints and spending cutbacks prove to be long-term IGM conditions that cause public officials to fundamentally rethink their service delivery strategies, then bold “idea federalism” studies could help challenge the status quo and highlight innovations from across the world for consideration by federal, state, and local policy makers. Although the federal government has a poor track record of approving turnbacks, they are still worth considering. For example, some observers have long regarded surface transportation (and motor fuels taxes) as a prime candidate for a federal turnback to the states (see, e.g., ACIR 1987a). Nothing intrinsic to federalism requires a federal role. In Canada, for example, since 1867, “the provision of highways has been mainly a provincial responsibility, with only a small role played by the federal government” (Turgeon and Vaillancourt 2002, 179). Is education a candidate for partial de-intergovernmentalization? (Kincaid 1992). Since 1965, the federal regulatory role in K–12 education has increased tremendously, while the federal fiscal role has grown modestly; yet education outcomes remain unacceptably low, and President Barack Obama acknowledged on NBC’s Today Show in early October 2010 that “our per-pupil spending has gone up during the last couple of decades even as results have gone down” (quoted in McGurn 2010, 10). To what extent has the federal role increased the bureaucratization, legalization, unionization, and nationalization of education to the detriment of the state- and, especially, local-specific factors associated with better outcomes, such as teacher qualifications, rewards for good teaching, principal and superintendent leadership, challenging curriculum, and parental involvement? By contrast, K–12 and postsecondary education are predominantly provincial responsibilities in Canada (Simeon and Papillon 2006) and ... Purchase answer to see full attachment