Fluent Essays

Reading two scholarly articles and then write a 200-300 word response in which they compare and contrast both the arguments and the sources used by the two authors. ._petersen_in_search_of_equilibrium.pdf ._sarantis_waging_war_in_late_antiquity.pdf model_1.docx Unformatted Attachment Preview Boydell and Brewer Boydell Press Chapter Title: In Search of Equilibrium: Byzantium and the Northern Barbarians, 400–800 Chapter Author(s): Leif Inge Ree Petersen Book Title: Journal of Medieval Military History Book Subtitle: Volume XV: Strategies Book Editor(s): LEIF INGE REE PETERSEN, MANUEL ROJAS GABRIEL Published by: Boydell and Brewer, Boydell Press. (2017) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt1wx91w8.6 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Boydell and Brewer, Boydell Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Medieval Military History This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Map 1: Byzantium and the North, 400-800 AD This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 2 In Search of Equilibrium: Byzantium and the Northern Barbarians, 400–800 Leif Inge Ree Petersen Understanding late Roman and early Byzantine long-term strategy towards the northern barbarians is a problematic endeavor. Recent historiography on late Roman frontier dynamics proposes a systematic Roman practice of building up a belt of client rulers, in the process profoundly changing societies brought within the Roman orbit. In return, these clients provided the Romans with extra sources of manpower and layers of security that stretched far beyond the frontiers.1 Unsurprisingly, the Classical frontier system of small client polities under Roman hegemony has attracted relatively little attention after it is assumed to have broken down in the north with the Gothic victory at Adrianople, the invasion of 406, and the subsequent establishment of federate groups within Roman territory. Arguably this was a problem the Romans brought upon themselves by integrating barbarians into their political structures and then involving them in Roman civil conflicts. The death knell for the Classical system of recognized client rulers in the north was the Hunnic hegemony that subverted what remained of the Roman client system.2 In contrast to its Roman predecessor, early Byzantine client management strategy has until recently been treated as rather reactive and ad hoc, with relations with barbarians regarded as an aspect of inter-state diplomacy.3 Obolensky 1 2 3 See C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire. A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore, 1994); Peter Heather, “The Late Roman Art of Client Management: Imperial Defence in the Fourth Century West,” in The Transformation of Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed. Walter Pohl, Ian Wood, and Helmut Reimitz (Leiden, 2001), pp. 15–68; Michael Kulikowski, “Constantine and the Northern Barbarians,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine, ed. Noel Lenski (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 347–76. See in general Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568 (Cambridge, 2007). Byzantinist contributions have until recently tended toward the more minimalist side in the “grand strategy” debate. Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East (Oxford, 1990) is rightly critical of many of Luttwak’s conclusions, but underestimates Roman control beyond the frontier (see works cited in n. 1 above). Cf. John Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565–1204 (London, 1999), pp. 34–44 and passim; Byzantine Diplomacy, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1994), especially the contributions by Alexander Kazhdan, “The Notion of Byzantine Diplomacy,” pp. 3–24; and Evangelos Chrysos, “Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 300–800: Means and Ends,” pp. 25–40. For a comprehensive overview of late This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 38 Leif Inge Ree Petersen identified a Byzantine system of satellite or allied states north of the Caucasus, Black Sea, and lower Danube that were deliberately cultivated to secure the Empire’s northern border, a system that persisted for centuries and gave rise to the Byzantine Commonwealth.4 However, his overall framework has not been further developed despite new archaeological and textual evidence, methodological advances, and a flourishing historiographical environment that have far advanced our knowledge. The focus of research has rather been Byzantine relations with particular geographical regions or barbarian groups, such as the Heruls, Gepids, Lombards, Avars, or Slavs, with fairly strict chronological delineations appropriate for each.5 Long-term developments are rarely followed much after the early seventh century, which becomes notoriously difficult due to the complex transition from the late Roman Empire to her medieval Byzantine successor, and to the extremely fragmentary nature of the sources, as is often pointed out with regard, for example, to Byzantine–Khazar relations.6 While Byzantine relations with the Khazars can hardly be described in terms of client politics, they undeniably constituted a successful strategic alliance against the Umayyads. For our purposes, they also had an important role in displacing Old Great Bulgaria, a very large Byzantine client state north of the Black Sea in the 660s, a process which led to the rise of multiple lesser Bulgarian groups, one of which disrupted Byzantine efforts to regain control of the Balkans in the late seventh and eighth centuries, and famously went on to become a long-term challenge.7 Even though the sophistication of early Byzantine political and diplomatic efforts against any number of polities or ethnic groups, such as Bulgars or Slavs, is well recognized, the conceptual framework within which to treat these efforts over time and space varies according to the interest and focus of the individual researcher. Thus scholars often interpret the sources’ description of events on 4 5 6 7 Roman and early Byzantine research, see Conor Whately, “Strategy, Diplomacy and Frontiers: A Bibliographic Essay,” in War and Warfare in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives, ed. Alexander Sarantis and Neil Christie (Leiden, 2013), pp. 239–54. Dimitri Obolensky, Byzantium and the Slavs (Crestwood, NY, 1994), especially the essays “The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy,” pp. 1–22, and “The Empire and its Northern Neighbors 565–1018,” pp. 23–74. Alexander Sarantis, “The Justinianic Herules: From Allied Barbarians to Roman Provincials,” in Neglected Barbarians, ed. Florin Curta, Studies in the Early Middle Ages 32 (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 361–402; idem, “War and Diplomacy in Pannonia and the North-West Balkans during the Reign of Justinian: the Gepid Threat and Imperial Responses,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 63 (2009), 15–40; Walter Pohl, “The Empire and the Lombards: Treaties and Negotiations in the Sixth Century,” in Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity, ed. Walter Pohl (Leiden, 1997), pp. 75–134; idem, Die Awaren: ein Steppenvolk im Mitteleuropa, 567–822 n. Chr. (Munich, 1988); Florin Curta, The Making of the Slavs (Cambridge, 2001). Thomas Noonan, “Byzantium and the Khazars: A Special Relationship?” in Byzantine Diplomacy, ed. Shepard and Franklin, pp. 109–32; James Howard-Johnston, “Byzantine Sources for Khazar History,” in The World of the Khazars: New Perspectives, ed. Peter Golden, Haggai Ben-Shammai, and András Róna-Tas (Leiden, 2007), pp. 163–94. See most recently Panos Sophoulis, Byzantium and Bulgaria, 775–831 (Leiden, 2011). This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Byzantium and the Northern Barbarians 39 a particular frontier within a reactive ebb-and-flow model, in relation to the strength of the Empire and the intensity of challenges elsewhere. In such a view, Hunnic, Slav, and Avar raids on the Balkans during the sixth century indicated imperial overstretch punctuated only by a few short-term successes during the early years of Justinian, whose conquest policies exacerbated structural weaknesses. His appeasement of the Huns towards the end of his reign only further paved the way for the Lombard invasion of Italy and Avar and Slav encroachment in the Balkans in the years which followed it.8 Even if the later years of Maurice (582–602) saw significant success in driving out the raiders, he was famously deposed because of his policy of taking the war beyond the frontiers while the Empire’s finances could not sustain pay and equipment for the troops.9 The ensuing civil war in the early seventh century, along with Avar and Slav pressure, led to a total collapse of the Balkan frontier, giving way to a much weaker, but still occasionally effective, diplomatic approach towards the northern peoples, with military means only employed when Arab pressure was relieved, although some groups, such as the Balkan Slavs, were barely even worthy of notice until c. 800.10 In all cases, however, recent research has produced a much more nuanced picture. The Byzantines’ influence on their neighbors was profound, the strategic benefits of their presence significant, and very often their activities and movements can be directly tied to internal Byzantine conflict, which lends a whole new dimension to Byzantine relations with the northern barbarians. In fact, when the northern ethnic groups and polities from the Caspian Sea to the Balkans are examined within a consistent framework, a pattern of continuous and largely successful client management emerges. Despite the inevitable ebb and flow of pressure and relief, recognizable steps were consistently taken by Byzantine authorities, very often leading to the same long-term results: potential threats were contained, favored groups were allowed orderly settlement on Byzantine terms, and those safely within the Byzantine orbit were groomed for service and eventual integration into the Empire’s political structures. Of course there were serious challenges to this system. Some of these arose from external factors, such as political and military events beyond Byzantine control, especially in Central Asia, while others were of the Byzantines’ own making, through civil wars or usurpations. However, regardless of the potential severity of crises or their origins, the Byzantines were quick to respond and find a new equilibrium that ensured long-term Byzantine political and military goals were achieved. Furthermore, it is precisely during crises and ruptures that our scant sources, often infused with invective relevant to political conflict lines within Byzantine society which must be taken into account, reveal the mechanisms of Byzantine–barbarian relations. When read in the wider historical 8 9 10 E.g., John Moorhead, Justinian (London, 1994), passim. See in general Michael Whitby, The Emperor Maurice and his Historian: Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare (Oxford, 1988). Warren Treadgold, The Byzantine Revival 780–842 (Stanford, 1988), pp. 70–72. This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 40 Leif Inge Ree Petersen context, such evidence illuminates not just the failures, but also the normal functioning of an effective system of client management and alliances that had its roots in the late Roman Empire, and was maintained with more success than is normally assumed through the eighth century and beyond. In many respects the Classical “toolkit” remained in use throughout the early Byzantine period, although the changed strategic situation of the fifth century created a number of new challenges as well as potential instruments. The basic diplomatic, ideological, and military repertoire consisted of imperial permission granted to client groups to settle on a frontier or (after the fifth century) within former Roman provinces, along with recognition of their rulers through inclusion in the imperial hierarchy of honors and offices. Some of the latter were symbolic, conferring prestige in varying degrees; others were of practical import, often in recognition of past or future service in imperial armies, and opening the road to settlement within the Empire and full integration into Byzantine administration and society. The line between the two types was often blurred, depending on the success of Byzantine long-term policies, and both included prestige gifts, subsidies in money or kind, trade rights, and a share in the glory of Byzantine power, still a coveted honor in the eighth century.11 However, there were significant modifications to Classical client management in the fifth and sixth centuries. The Huns and subsequent new nomadic groups represented an empire-building tradition that had arisen in Central Asia from Chinese, Iranian, and autochthonous steppe traditions. While most of the groups encountered are regarded as ethnically Turkic, they often represent hybridizations with various ethnicities, including nomadic Iranians and Mongolians. This capability to build hybrid political structures was routinely applied in later empire-building efforts. Possessing both a sophisticated ideological foundation for and a well-developed political tradition of forming large confederations from disparate ethnic groups, political traditions, and economic systems, such groups were uniquely capable of challenging Roman hegemony. This certainly left a profound imprint on successors, such as the Gepids, who controlled former Roman territory and were far less amenable (though not impervious, as we shall see) to Byzantine client management efforts.12 The loss of erstwhile Roman provinces to such groups would in part be offset by the presence of large sub-Roman populations stranded by military setbacks or deported from Roman provinces, especially in the fifth and seventh centuries. These populations played a significant role in shaping many of the ethnic 11 12 For the Classical means of client management, see references in n. 1 above; for Byzantine examples, see below generally. Hyun Jin Kim, The Huns, Rome, and the Birth of Europe (Cambridge, 2013); Peter Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East (Wiesbaden, 1992); Iver B. Neumann and Einar Wigen, The Steppe Tradition and Eurasian State Building, 4000 BCE–2017 AD (forthcoming). I thank Einar Wigen for a copy of the manuscript in preparation and our fruitful discussion on Turkic empire-building. This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Byzantium and the Northern Barbarians 41 groups and polities that arose in the Balkans, allowing for an accelerated pace of integration or even assimilation into Byzantine cultural, economic, and political structures; thus many seemingly independent barbarian groups operating on the fringes of Byzantine territory were just as likely to (re)join the Empire in the right circumstances. Conversion to Christianity was not yet fully developed as a tool, but was increasingly applied to try to formalize Byzantine hegemony north of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, in the latter case often aided by local Christian client rulers. In return, the Byzantines acquired buffers against further nomadic threats, strategic allies in warfare, pools of manpower that could be raised for defense or internal power struggles, and a deep fringe territory that could be and indeed was (re)integrated into the structure of the Empire as resources and circumstances allowed. In sum, these policies formed a coherent strategic vision with consistent outcomes in the seventh and eighth centuries, ensuring that no largescale threat emerged in the north despite existential threats from the east and south. These measures could backfire and had to be recalibrated during periods of acute internal or external crisis; it was rather the very success of consistent policies, however, that led to the rise of Bulgaria as a real threat around 800, due to her close integration into the Byzantine political system. But even this threat was contained, and the subsequent recalibration of Byzantine policies in the ninth century, based on tried and tested means developed since the late Roman Empire, was so effective as to allow for the creation of the Byzantine Commonwealth. The Long Afterlife of the Classical Client System The cultural and political formation of barbaricum north of the Rhine, Danube, and Black Sea was largely the result of deliberate Roman client management over the course of centuries. As opposed to an inherently antagonistic view of barbarians as a threat to the Roman Empire, the weight of scholarship now recognizes a deep frontier zone beyond the borders that was largely under careful Roman supervision and management. While Roman control varied with distance, the minor, favored polities on the frontier, the “inner band” in Heather’s terms, stretching approximately 100 km out from the frontier, were within striking distance of Roman frontier garrisons and were thus held to high standards of loyalty.13 The most important means and ends were, as noted, subsidies, prestige gifts, access to markets, and Roman diplomatic recognition. These established the various minor chieftains and petty kings against other, competing barbarian groups with less favorable positions, further away from the frontier and with less access to political and economic advantages available with support from Roman authorities. The groups on the frontier were responsible for security, introducing 13 Heather, “Late Roman Art.” This content downloaded from 132.174.252.67 on Sat, 07 Dec 2019 18:24:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 Leif Inge Ree Petersen or funneling in newcomers, and raising mercenary or auxiliary contingents that might eventually be integrated into the regular army. This also meant that they frequently played a role in civil wars, as the Franks and Goths did in the early fourth century during the conflict between Constantine and Licinius.14 There were of course severe consequences if things went wrong, as Roman retribution could be swift and merciless. The small client polities’ precarious position on the frontiers was well within Roman grasp (as noted by Bernard Bachrach in this volume regarding most of the invading groups of the third century), so they ran great risks in backing the wrong side in a civil conflict, as the Goths did during the revolt of Procopius in the 360s. Another aspect of the precarious position of petty rulers and statelets was that they were completely dependent upon Roman subsidies and recognition to maintain their status. If the client system temporarily broke down or was controlled by different parties, this would have unpredictable effects in barbaricum, as Romans could use barbarians against each other, while less-favored groups tried to exploit the situation by staging plundering attacks, either to acquire captives with skills that increased their economic basis, to blackmail Roman authorities into paying ransoms or subsidies, or even to win diplomatic recognition and a place in the client system as a result of demonstrated military prowess. This is probably one explanation for ... Purchase answer to see full attachment