Fluent Essays

Full Discussion Question: Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas encourages a prescriptive narrative ethical theory (and practice). What seems positive or helpful about this approach to ethics? What seems problematic? Cite your sources from the textbooks and other course materials.At least 3-4 paragraphs or 12 -16 comprehensive sentencesPlease cite at least 2 sources.Book Source: Read Chapters 9 and 12 in Beyond Bumper Sticker Ethics. (find attached) chapter_9.docx Unformatted Attachment Preview 9THE MORAL OF THE STORY IS . . .Narrative Ethics IF YOU HAVE BEEN READING the last few chapters carefully, you may have detected a common theme in several of the ethical theories. In this pattern, which we will refer to as the Enlightenment or mod-ernist model, we are told that certain virtues, principles or strategies should be adopted because they satisfy the demands of rationality. In short, getting ethics right is mostly a matter of getting our thinking right. Then, once our ideas are squared away, we simply apply these rational rules or techniques to ethical problems and out pops the most moral option. In addition, modernists argue that their moral systems can be uni-versalized. One need not live in a particular time and location, belong to one specific religion or be resident of a certain territory for a theory to be valid. In fact, the unique features of our background, things like religious beliefs or cultural traditions, are considered obstacles to ra-tional thought. All particular convictions and commitments that are limited to our tribe or time must be set aside in order to arrive at uni-versal, rational ethical conclusions. In contrast, if one seeks counseling or psychological help with the goal of making some aspect of life better, we discover a different method. The first thing that happens is that the therapist will do a “history” or “narrative” that will focus precisely on the factors that are viewed as potential roadblocks for rational inquiry in modernism—pivotal life events, beliefs, family relationships, cultural background, religious commitments and similar factors. In this setting these par-ticularities are not considered as peripheral but essential to our identity. Moreover, it acknowledges a connectedness to our life. We didn’t just 148 Beyond Bumper Sticker Ethicswake up this morning and become who we are now, with a set of be-liefs, relationships and problems that may change completely when the alarm rings tomorrow morning. Our life is like a story whose present chapter cannot be understood apart from what we have experienced in previous chapters.This stark contrast between the modernist approach to ethics and the therapeutic model forms the basis for what we will call narrative ethics. Narrative ethics is critical of the Enlightenment paradigm; it argues that, in the quest for a better ethical life, the Enlightenment paradigm eliminates all that makes life, my life, what it is. After all, we never meet generic, universal human beings. We meet individual per-sons. And if we want to really know who a specific individual is, we do not seek a description that could be applied equally to every other mem-ber of the species homo sapiens. Instead, we will want to know where this individual came from and where she or he has been. The cultural pressures, economic circumstances, close relationships, religious as-sumptions and educational experiences that molded this individual in a particular direction are important for developing a deep acquaintance. We will want to learn the pivotal influences, the important books and the timing of life-shaping encounters and events that gave this person’s life its unique texture. In fact, it is not too much to say that we really don’t know another person until we know his or her story. As Robert C. Roberts puts it, “The idea of a self as something to which its history is merely accidental does not do justice to the concept of a self with which we daily do business.”1 A Story Within a StoryIn addition to the observation that our lives bear more resemblance to a story than a neat but bloodless list of rational beliefs, narrative ethics argues that our lives are stories within a larger story. No one is born into a moral or social void. Instead, we come into a world of competing value systems, economic interests and national traditions, and these preexisting moral forces provide a context within which we live and make our choices. Thus, two people could live next door to each other but interpret the world in vastly diffe The Moral of the Story Is . . . 149not just a collection of objects and people. It also includes value judg-ments that define how we evaluate the worth and priority of these things and people in our lives. Thus, if these two neighbors would both visit the hypothetical thera-pist at the beginning of the chapter, their divergent narratives would shape what they considered a problem or envisioned as a successful resolution. One might interpret a certain level of teenage independence as a serious revolt against parental authority, while the other would find it a normal and healthy stage of adolescent development. What one would view as signs of a healthy marriage might, to the other, be indi-cators of a relationship on the rocks. The point is that we are surrounded by broader stories. Depending on which narrative we own (or which narrative owns us), we will interpret the world differently. We could say, without too much overstatement, that in large part we live in dif-ferent universes.The role of the broader narratives in shaping our universe sheds light on why narrative ethics is critical of the Enlightenment’s quest for purely rational approaches; namely, they are not all that rational. What is a clearly rational decision in one narrative context will often seem the epitome of irrationality in another. To illustrate, in the opening number of Fiddler on the Roof, Tevye tells the audience, “Because of our tradi-tions, every one of us knows who he is and what God expects him to do.” Later in the play Tevye disowns his third daughter, Chava, when she marries a non-Jewish Russian boy. If Tevye’s decision is ripped from the context of his community and its traditions, his decision will seem irrational because he obviously loves his daughter deeply. However, if we look at this through the lens of Tevye’s social and religious tradition, we may well see his choice as completely rational. Indeed, his commu-nity might single him out as an exemplar—one who displays moral courage in the face of a wrenching decision.Ethics as If Life MattersBy drawing on this allusion to Fiddler on the Roof, I have actually en-gaged in the type of exercise commonly found within narrative ethics. Rather than applying abstract ethical rules to hypothetical 150 Beyond Bumper Sticker Ethicswe have shifted our moral considerations from the ethereal realm of abstract reasoning into a concrete time, place and social framework that situates moral choices in the midst of relationships and value-laden narratives. This close connection with life leads advocates of narrative ethics to highlight three particular advantages of this approach, which, to main-tain the spirit of narrative ethics, I will illustrate by reference to narra-tive of Socrates’ trial and death. First, narrative goes beyond intellect to touch us at the depths of our being. If you want to learn about courage and justice, Socrates’ words about these virtues are certainly worth pondering. Still, more than twenty years of teaching about Socrates has convinced me that students learn much more about justice and courage by observing what he does during a trial where his life is on the line. While he talks about these virtues briefly and indirectly during and after the trial, the fact that he exemplifies them in concrete ways com-municates in a more powerful way. When we are presented with pro-found ideas, we may or may not engage with them at a level that reaches our soul. However, when we see his example, it is hard not to place ourselves in the story, our own life at stake, and ask how we might handle the same circumstance. A second aspect of narrative ethics on display in Socrates’ story is the process by which we become the sort of people we want to be. The Enlightenment model’s “think right, do right” method seems to chop life into a sequence of dilemmas in search of rational analysis and deci-sion. However, this is out of sync with how we experience character development. Socrates did not walk into court and decide what sort of person he wanted to be that particular day. He had already “practiced” for the sort of situation in which life was in the balance by becoming a particular type of person who had developed certain virtues. As a re-sult, those who knew him were not surprised by his words or actions during the trial and in his later conversations while he awaited his ex-ecution. There is continuity to his character. Over time, he had devel-oped the sorts of dispositions that lent a high degree of predictability to future actions.Finally, narrative ethics argues that stories have a ring of authentic- The Moral of the Story Is . . . 151ity that we do not hear as clearly in cognitive approaches to ethics. Some readers will know that after Socrates is condemned to death at his trial, he is offered the opportunity to escape to a nearby city. Although he believes his sentence is unjust, he also argues that the laws of Athens are good and just. Therefore, he stays and allows himself to be executed rather than saving his life, because he does not want to under-mine the young’s respect for justice. Many people will say that they have moral values that are so true and important that they would remain faithful to them even at the cost of their life. But talk is cheap. Until this verbal commitment is tested in real-life situations, we have good reason to be skeptical of how deeply ingrained a person’s principles are. Socrates’ statements about justice gain deep credibility because they are backed up by his willingness to face death for them. To sum up, if narratives mirror the ways we engage moral questions most directly, experience character development and test the credibility of moral statements, advocates of narrative ethics argue that ethical method must include narrative in a fundamental way. As Martha Nuss-baum puts it, Suppose one believes . . . that the most important truths about human psychology cannot be communicated or grasped by intellectual activity alone: powerful emotions have an irreducibly important cognitive role to play. If one states this view in a written form that expresses only intellectual activity and addresses itself only to the intellect of the reader . . . a question arises. Does the writer really believe what his or her words seem to state? If so, why has this form been selected above others, a form that itself implies a rather different view of what is important and what is dispensable?2 For this reason, narrative ethics looks to biography, literature and poetry as indispensable resources for moral development. The stories of others become mirrors in which we see exemplars of qualities we seek to develop in ourselves (or those we hope to avoid) and the processes and decisions that have shaped their character. Moreover, these narra-tives enable us to see more clearly the influence of a tradition or com-munity that shapes and supports our values. 152 Beyond Bumper Sticker EthicsWithin this process there is still an important role for the sort of philosophical analysis offered by more traditional forms of ethics. In fact, this sort of reflection is necessary to move from one specific situ-ation in another’s life to incorporation into our own moral inventory with its unique specificities. However, separating our analysis from a concrete story is a bit like trying to understand baseball by doing noth-ing but reading box scores and player stats. While these can illuminate certain aspects of the game, it is not the same as being in the stands and watching the infield shift to guard the third base line when a right-handed pull hitter comes up. And it is certainly nothing like being the third baseman when that hitter blasts a screaming line drive right at you.Description and PrescriptionTo this point our description encompasses a very broad and diverse family of moral approaches. This makes it impossible to offer an evalu-ation that does justice to every variation of narrative ethics. To allow such an analysis, I will focus on one specific version of narrative ethics as outlined by Stanley Hauerwas. His approach falls into a category that I will call prescriptive narrative ethics. Prescriptive versions of nar-rative ethics argue that, although our world offers a vast array of com-peting narratives and traditions, only one narrative possesses sufficient truth to guide us properly. That narrative thus prescribes the standards to which we must conform our life.Before we get to that, however, I want to note that others advocate a descriptive approach to narrative ethics. This variant also recognizes that our world presents a smorgasbord of narratives competing for our attention. However, it says that the task of ethics is not to make judg-ments about which narrative is true or false. In fact, it often argues that such evaluations make no sense in the absence of some sort of univer-sally objective reason that can judge between these competing stories. The moral task is instead to acquaint oneself with a variety of narra-tives, empathetically enter into the situations and decisions portrayed within them, and find ways forward in one’s own moral journey through the inspiration of those who act heroically. No one should or can em- The Moral of the Story Is . . . 153brace the values expressed in every narrative. It is, instead, the respon-sibility of the reader to choose from among these narratives, and even within specific narratives, the virtues they desire to develop.Under the descriptive approach, ethics takes on a radically different role from what is typically conceived as its task. Since we cannot count on an objective, universal rationality to determine what is right, we rely instead on each individual, with his or her own individual reasons, for owning or rejecting particular virtues. Rather than searching for ethi-cal truth, this model presupposes that there are innumerable stories that are potentially true and become actually true for us only if we choose them. While a particular story may motivate or inspire, what-ever tradition one might follow ultimately depends on the subjective inclinations of the reader. Because our subjective inclinations form the basis for truth, each person becomes the judge of ethics rather than being subject to its judg-ments. This makes the descriptive approach highly problematic from a Christian perspective because, like ethical egoism, it puts each indi-vidual in the “God position.” However, as we soon will see, prescriptive versions allow us to incorporate other features of narrative ethics rather smoothly.Christian Ethics as Narrative EthicsAccording to Stanley Hauerwas, “Narrative is not secondary to our knowledge of God; there is no ‘point’ that can be separated from the story. The narratives through which we learn of God are the point. Stories are not substitute explanations that we can someday hope to supplant with more straightforward accounts.”3 From the beginning, he signals his belief that, at its heart, Christian ethics is a narrative eth-ics. The story of God’s creative and redeeming work that stretches from God’s adoption of Israel through the death and resurrection of Jesus cannot be reduced to a set of propositions or abstract rules without dis-torting the Christian message. Moreover, it is a “constituting story.” Without this story there is no church. Because this is the case, we can-not separate Christian ethics from theology. This theology-ethics calls us to a new life that is defined by the story. 154 Beyond Bumper Sticker EthicsThe Hauerwas quote also hints at why he is critical of modernist ethics and especially critical of those who attempt to frame Christian ethics within the assumptions of a universal rationality. As the En-lightenment’s influence spread, faith traditions were considered local-ized and idiosyncratic at best, and superstitious or dangerous at worst. In this context Christian ethics increasingly looked like the guardian of a tradition, founded on blind faith and unable to withstand the rigors of rational inquiry. As a result many Christian ethicists succumbed to the pressure to reframe ethics in rationalistic terms, arguing that Chris-tianity offers superior ethical ideas that are logically defensible, thus escaping the charge of particularity and obscurity. For example, many such ethicists would identify the Ten Command-ments as the heart of Christian ethics and then proceed to demonstrate the rationality of living according to these moral rules. However, Hau- erwas says, “The Decalogue [Ten Commandments] is part of the cov-enant of God with Israel. Divorced from that covenant it makes no sense. God does indeed command obedience, but our God is the God who ‘brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage’ (Deut. 5:6).”4 The exodus is not just historical information about a pe-ripheral event leading up the “real deal”—the giving of the Ten Com-mandments, which provides a distillation of God’s moral will for all people. Instead, the exodus creates a community who knows and is bound by covenant to a particular God with particular aims for his people. These commands can only be truly understood within the con-text of this covenant.The exodus is a key episode in a story that brings Israel’s calling to a climax in the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is in this story that sal-vation is found and our understanding of goodness follows the contours of a Christian theology about salvation. In short, Christianity does not have an ethics, as if ethics is like a condiment added on top of its doc-trines; Christianity is an ethics. Thus Hauerwas rejects modernism’s attempt to isolate ethics from the particularities of Christian theology. As he puts it, “The more we try to mine Scripture for a workable ethic, the more we are drawn to separate such an ethic from the understanding of salvation which makes such an ethic intelligible in the first place.”5 The Moral of the Story Is . . . 155The close connection Hauerwas draws between salvation and ethics offers another angle to understand his dislike of the Enlightenment model. The latter, which he sometimes refers to as “decisionism,” is primarily about clearing up our foggy moral thinking with the aim of making right choices. In contrast, Christian morality is about being transformed into a new kind of people. This transformation is not pri-marily a better way of understanding, deciding or doing. Instead, Hauer- was says, “Ethics is first a way of seeing before it is a matter of doing. The ethical task is not to tell you what is right or wrong but rather to train you to see.”6 This “seeing” is, again, not primarily cognitive but relational. More precisely, Hauerwas says, “We know ourselves truthfully only when we know ourselves in relation to God.”7 Moral knowledge is not mastery of ideas or moral tactics, but self-knowledge, an awareness that simul-taneously “helps me place myself as a creature of a gracious God” and “exposes the unwelcome fact that I am a sinner.”8 Seeing the world in this way has two important ramifications. First, we are not autonomous beings set free to choose from among a spectrum of diverse narratives. Instead, we are creatures of a God who stakes a claim upon us and of-fers us salvation. Second, this perspective does not leave room for a morality that exists apart from theology. The Christian narrative is a moral claim about the nature of reality. Scripture and the ChurchOf course, it is within Scripture that we encounter the story of God’s activity in history. However, Hauerwas quickly adds two important qualifiers about what it means to take the Bible as the source of Chris-tian ethics. First, we know this story correctly only when we read the Bible as Scripture rather than as text. When we approach the Bible as te ... Purchase answer to see full attachment