Fluent Essays

Answer each of the following questions in your initial response:1. Provide an example of a law enforcement agency in the United States that has implemented effective operational security (OPSEC) procedures since 9/11? 2. What were the OPSEC procedures?3. Describe what problems you envision the lack of an effective OPSEC program could hold for a local, county, state, tribal, or federal law enforcement agency. Objective:Instructions: You must utilize APA 6th edition format in your response. Additionally you need to include at least one (1) referenced source. All forum responses need to be 500 words and include two (2) substantive feedback posts to your peers of 250 words. Student ResponsesStudent #1 StevenGood Morning class,This week, we are tasked with providing an example of a law enforcement agency in the United States that has implemented effective operational security (OPSEC) procedures since 9/11.Due to the attacks of 9/11 in New York City, NYPD increased work shifts to 12 hours to increase the police presence on the streets (Bornstein, 2005, p. 52). Though this was a good idea in theory for police presence to aid in reducing crime and possibly preventing any further terrorist attacks, it has become a safety issue with police officers health concerns. Officers knew that 12 hour days would actually constitute to 14 to 16 hour work days (Bornstein, 2005, p. 52). In a 24 hour day, 16 hours of work means that these officers would have only 8 hours remaining to eat, sleep, and spend personal and family time. A more expanded police presence patrolling the streets was welcomed by some citizens of the U.S. as a greater means of security, while others feared greater policing is political opportunism and tyranny (Bornstein, 2005, p. 53).2. What were the OPSEC procedures?The 9/11 attacks has impacted the OPSEC world for NYC citizens in the form of an increase of racial and ethnic discrimination due to policing. Among the increase in workloads for the NYC police force, anti-terrorism measures included a campaign that saw anti-terrorism telephone hotline ad campaign on busses and subways, building a high-tech counter terrorism center, and a jump in investigators from 20 to 120 (Bornstein, 2005, p. 54). The NYPD also conducted a language survey that proved that there were 27 members of the force that was proficient in the Arabic tongue. Youi can only imagine the issues this caused with those community members who were Muslim. It was reported that only 2 months after the 9/11 attacks, the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee reported over 700 violent incidents involving Arab/Muslim Americans (Bornstein, 2005, p. 55). Other procedures seen to increase OPSEC were increased surveillance and immigrant targeting.3. Describe what problems you envision the lack of an effective OPSEC program could hold for a local, county, state, tribal, or federal law enforcement agency.Depending on problems that may or may not have previously existed in local, county and tribal areas, I envision that there will not be much of a difference in the quality of life. Now for some states and the even on the federal law enforcement level, not having an effective OPSEC program could see the possibility of more Boston Marathon bombing incidents, Commercial Plane hijacks, and the possibility of an increase in illegal immigration from Middle East territories. Also due to a very strong and effective OPSEC program, the results of aggression toward law enforcement could be just as brutal. The notion that OPSEC programs could target specific groups could cause an uproar among the group toward law enforcement. So it may seem evident that with a strong OPSEC program or a not-so-strong OPSEC program, there could be a host of problems that can occur. The best things that can be done to avoid certain problems is to remain vigilant and remove discrimination from the job.ReferencesBornstein, A. (2005). Antiterrorist Policing in New York City after 9/11: Comparing Perspectives on a Complex Process. Human Organization, 64(1), pp. 52-61. doi:10.17730/humo.64.1.mf00296tl98bk2l5Student #2 John1. Provide an example of a law enforcement agency in the United States that has implemented effective operational security (OPSEC) procedures since 9/11? Since the September 11th attacks the enemy has used more and more sophisticated methods of striking at the homeland. Wars are not only fought in city’s and with guns anymore. Think about all the valuable information we put online now. Our entire countrys infrastructure is run by remote access online. Law enforcement departments around the country now utilize cyber security protocols to protect valuable information. Congress also created the Department of Homeland Security, which has wide-ranging responsibilities for border protection, immigration, supporting local response to terrorist attacks, and protecting critical infrastructure. (Protecting What Matters : Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11). The department of homeland security holds the responsibility of tracking Opsec violations regarding hacking. While collecting information is seen as an offensive capability, being able to defend the information is a key defensive tactic. Most of the recent trends in fighting crimes, at all levels, has at least something to do with cyber security. Even if its just the information being stored to prosecute the criminals. 2. What were the OPSEC procedures? Most of the opsec procedures are classified right now. However, having formally worked in intelligence I know that the level of knowledge is vast. We are able to identify bad actors and either identify them or shut them down. In most cases there is a trail of information left behind from the attackers. The post September 11th world has seen Department of Homeland and several other key agencies also reach out to private sector partners for help. Congress and the administration have urged owners of critical private sector cyberinfra structure to report suspicious activities, with few outcries from the public. (Protecting What Matters : Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11). 3. Describe what problems you envision the lack of an effective OPSEC program could hold for a local, county, state, tribal, or federal law enforcement agency. The problem with not having an effective OPSEC program, is ultimately the information gathered or stored will fall into the wrong hands. This is true whether we are talking about international terrorist organizations are street level common criminals. Think about if a local police department is planning a drug raid on a known dealers location. Without good OPSEC that information might get back to that individual. Now all the hard work of the investigation, the chance to get illegal drugs of the street and the lives of officers and informants are in danger. I always tend to think of it like playing poker, you never want to show your cards until you have to. Just having one chink in the amour could impact the departments ability to ever regain the confidence of the community. Works cited: Protecting What Matters : Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11, edited by Clayton Northouse, Brookings Institution Press, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=3004453. contentserver.pdf contentserver__1_.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Notes The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet: Preserving Operational Security and Servicemembers Right of Free Speech* I. Introduction Traditionally, courts have viewed the military as a specialized society that entitles servicemembers to fewer free speech rights than civilians. Consequently, they have historically deferred to the military, permitting it to restrict the speech of servicemembers as it deems necessary to preserve order and discipline. Increased Internet access and online communication pose a new and great threat to the interests that the military attempts to protect through speech restrictions. The Internet allows servicemembers to reach millions of people anonymously and almost instantaneously, making it difficult to identify those speakers who violate a law or regulation. However, unlike restrictions that only affect servicemembers while they are on duty or in uniform,^ restrictions on servicemembers speech on the Internet affects all communications: The military code has always been applied to soldiers both on- and off-duty; military office has always been conceived to be a 24-houra-day job,^ Because the Internet is quickly becoming the dominant method of communication, restricting a servicemembers ability to communicate over the Internet means restricting a servicemembers ability to communicate at all.^ * I would like to thank Professor David Anderson, who provided invaluable guidance throughout the writing process, and Professor David Rabban, whose class provided the inspiration for the judicial solution 1 suggest, I also thank the staff and Editorial Board of the Texas Law Review for their efforts in editing this Note, particularly Aron Israelite, Kevin Richardson, Rachael Novier, and Emily Falconer, 1, Parker v. Levy, 417 U,S, 733, 743 (1974), 2, See, e.g.. Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces, Dept of Def, Directive No, 1344,10 (Feb, 19, 2008), available at http;//www,dtie,mil/whs/directives/corres/pdl7134410p,pdf (prohibiting political participation by servicemembers while in uniform), 3, John G, Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV, L, REV, 1697, 1762 (1968), 4, For example, an officer in a bar who is off duty and out of uniform eould violate Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whieh forbids commissioned officers from using contemptuous language against officials. See 10 U,S,C, § 888 (2000) (Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Seeretary of Defense, the Seeretary of a military department, ,, shall be punished as a eourt-martial may direct,). In contrast, communication on the Internet may be linked back to the speaker more easily. Comments made online may be traced back to the speaker, and they also remain forever in cyberspace. See The Internet Archive, http;//www,archive,org/index,php (maintaining an archive of almost the entire World Wide Web), There is some protection in anonymous speech on the Internet; however, new military regulations may prevent anonymous speech on the Internet by servieemembers. See infra subpart 1V(C), 464 Texas Law Review [Vol. 87:463 In the face of new threats to operational security posed by the Internet, the military has crafted new regulations on Internet use by servicemembers. Part II discusses these regulations and their impact on servicemembers speech rights. Part III addresses courts, especially the Supreme Courts, deference to military restrictions on speech. Part IV analyzes three speech rights that are likely affected by the new regulations—the right to private communication, the right to criticize the govemment and military officials, and the right to anonymous speech. Finally, Part V proposes technical solutions that the military should implement to reduce the impact of the new regulations on the speech rights of servicemembers while still preserving operational security. Additionally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a balancing test to determine when the military has impermissibly restricted these rights. II. A. Military Internet Regulations The Internet and Operational Security Due to the increased servicemember access to communication tools made possible by the Internet, the military faces new challenges in preserving operational security (OPSEC). As one Army veteran noted, [T]be Army has been flooded with young soldiers who have laptops, iPods, digital cameras, recorders, and that has put the fear of god into some of the generals.^ Additionally, the Internet and blogs are becoming an evergreater source of open source infonnation for adversaries.* According to the Department of Defense (DOD), as a result of changes in the global information enviromnent, open-source material has become a significant source of intelligence for adversaries.^ This open-source information is inexpensive to collect and can be procured with very little risk.^ DOD estimates that the United States adversaries can satisfy eighty percent of their intelligence needs through open sources.^ DOD has taken advantage of open-source intelligence as well, mining blogs for intelligence as a part of the War on Terror. 5. Dan Frosch, Pentagon Blocks 13 Web Sites from Military Computers, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A16 (quoting Army veteran and blogger Matthew Burden). As a result of this increased access to communication tools, family and friends of servicemembers now have a greater expectation that they will be able to stay in touch when their loved ones are deployed, some even going so far as to send computers to deployed loved ones because they felt communication had been insuffieient. See Moni Basu, Georgias Guard: The 48th: Georgia GIs in Iraq Often Without Net, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 4, 2005, at A6 (discussing an effort to send used computers to Iraq). 6. Operations Security, Army Reg. 530-1, E-3.a(2)(b) (Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://blog. wired.coni/defense/files/anny_reg_530_l_updated.pdf 7. Id. E-3.a(2). 8. /rf. E-3.a(2)(a). 9. Id 10. William J. Sharp, Blogs Study May Provide Credible Information, U.S. DEPT OF DEF. TRANSFORMATION, June 29, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/articles/2006-06/ta 2008] The Military, Freedom of Speech, and tbe Internet 465 Communication on the Internet threatens more than operational security. One of tbe leading online problems for the military is tbe posting of photos of servicemembers in uniform while making sexually offensive or racist remarks. Anotber major concem is the posting of criticisms of DOD online.^ Tbus, military speech restrictions also protect the integrity of tlie Armed Services. As a result, members of the military may be subject to disciplinary action for using offensive language or posting inappropriate images on social-networking sites sucb as My Space or Facebook. B. Online-Posting Regulations Despite tbe risks posed by the Intemet and blogs, military blogs are an important source of infonnation about military activities and a useful tool to help servicemembers stay in touch witb family and friends while stationed overseas.^ Military blogs gained popularity during tbe current conflict in Iraq,^ and as a result DOD created its first policy regarding online communications. 062906b.html. In addition to using blogs as a source of intelligence information, DOD has recognized the value of blogs as a public-relations tool and has used them to its advantage. It has created the Bloggers Roundtable, a page on its Web site that provides source material for bloggers and online joumalists. DefenseLink Bloggers Roundtable, http://www.defenselink.mil/Blogger/ index.aspx. Similarly, Central Command (CENTCOM) has ereated a blogger-oulreaeh program to get more accurate infonnation to bloggers. Steve Alvarez, CENTCOM Team Engages Bloggers, DEFENSELINK NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id= 15287. 11. Rules Restrict Posting of Images, Words Online, AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND NEWS SERV., June 6, 2007, http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=l23056023. 12. Id. 13. Id. 14. Id. DOD has also blocked computers that are connected to the military network from accessing thirteen Web sites. Frosch, supra note 5, at A16. These Web sites include YouTube, MySpace, and other photo-sharing and music Web sites. Id. The military has identified both OPSEC and bandwidth concerns as the rationales for this policy. K.C. Jones, Military Blocks Soldiers Access to Internet Radio and Social Networking Sites, INFO. WK., May 14, 2007, httj):// www.reclaimthemedia.org/broadband_cable/military_bloeks_soldier.s_acces\%3D5232. However, as one blogger noted, there are no gaming sites on the prohibited-site list, and those use a significant amount of bandwidth. Id. The policy only restricts access to these sites on military computer networks; servicemembers are still permitted to aeeess these sites from Internet cafes and personal computers. Froseh, supra note 5, at A16. However, servicemembers use of sites such as YouTube and MySpace may still be limited by the April 2007 OPSEC regulati(5ns. See infra section II(B)(2) 15. See Katherine C. Den Bleyker, Note, The First Amendment Versus Operational Security: Where Should the Milblogging Balance Lie?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 407 (2007) (listing reasons given by servicemembers for starting their blogs, which include publishing important war stories left out of newscasts and keeping friends and family members updated on their activities). Military bloggers are often referred to as milbloggers. td. at 403. Many view military blogs as an important voice to combat what they perceive as one-sided reporting by the mainstream media. Id. at 407. Instead of relying solely on reports from professional joumalists, servicemembers are able to provide firsthand accounts of military life and activities. See id. at 407 n.23 (comparing the account of a roadside bombing by a milblogger with that of the official statement released by the Army). Thus these blogs represent a variety of viewpoints, which, in tum, allow the general public greater access to information so they can draw their own conclusions about military activities. 16. Id. at 406. 466 . Texas Law Reyiew [Vol. 87:463 7, 2005 Blogging Policy.—In 2005, DOD issued a policy memorandum that restricted online communications by servicemembers stationed in Iraq. The policy required servicemembers to register their blogs with their unit commanders, but it did not require servicemembers to receive clearance prior to posting.^ The policy required officers to examine the contents of the registered blogs on a quarterly basis to ensure compliance, but forced them to take action only when, in their judgment, the risk ofthe released infonnation outweighed the benefits of posting online.^ Servicemembers were required to clear photos with their public-affairs officers prior to posting,^ and the policy only applied to blogs and Web sites—it did not apply to e-mail.^ Any servicemember who violated the policy faced punishment or administrative action,^^ ranging from shutting down the blog, to paying a fine, to being demoted in ^^ 2, Current Regulations.—In April 2007, the military promulgated new operational security regulations that impose much greater restrictions on servicemembers speech than ever before.^* The regulations require servicemembers to consult with their unit OPSEC officer for an OPSEC review prior to posting anything in a public forum.^^ Public forums include: letters, résumés, articles for publication, e-mails. Web site postings, blog postings, discussions in Internet forums and message boards, and other discussion forums.^^ These regulations apply to active-duty military, civilians employed by the military, contractors, and servicemembers families. A violation of a 17, Memorandum from Lt, Gen, John R, Vines, Headquarters, Multi-National Corps—Iraq 1 (Apr, 6, 2005), available at www,mediabistro,com/fishbowlDC/original/iraqblogrules,pdf, 18, Id at 2-3, 19, Id. at 3, However, the poliey made it clear that it was the responsibility of [servicemembers] to ensure that any personal web sites and web logs d[id] not contain prohibited infonnation as defined in [the] policy, Id. The Army maintained a Web site with examples of blogs that met the requirements ofthe poliey and some that did not, in order to help servieemembers make this determination, Bleyker, supra note 15, at 411, 20, Bleyker, supra note 15, at 410, 21, Memorandum from Lt, Gen, John R, Vines, supra note 17, at 3, 22, Id. at 4, 23, Id. at 3; see Bleyker, supra note 15, at 411-12 (discussing the punishment of three highprofile military bloggers), 24, See generally Operations Security, Army Reg, 530-1, Summary of Change (Apr, 19, 2007), available at http://blog,wired,com/defense/files/army_reg_530_l_updated,pdf. Ironically, although the regulations are marked For Official Use Only, they have been posted on the Internet, Id. 25, Id. at 4. 26, Id. 27, Noah Schactman, Army Squeezes Soldier Blogs. Maybe to Death, WlRED,COM, May 2, 2007, http://www,wired,coni/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers. The regulations also provide for an Army Web Risk Assessment Cell (AWRAC) to review the Armys publicly accessible sites to make sure that they comply with DOD and Army policies and best practices. Operations Security, Army Reg, 530-1, 2-21, AWRAC also checks blogs for the disclosure of critical or sensitive information. Id. at 2-21,a. 2008] The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Intemet 467 lawful military regulation is punishable under 10 U.S,C, § 892,^^ and could result in court-martial or administrative, disciplinary, contractual, or criminal action.^ The intent of the new OPSEC regulations was not to require servicemembers to clear every posting with their commanders, Major Ray Ceralde, the author of the regulations, recognized that it is not practical to check all communications, especially private communications,^ and that [s]oldiers have a right to private communications with their families,^^ However, Major Ceralde noted that unit commanders could require the clearance of private communications if they believed it was necessary, Due to the difficulty of monitoring online communication, another possibility is that Intemet communications will be banned altogether, as many commanders will feel like they have no choice but to forbid their soldiers from blogging— or even using email.^ Even if commanders do not take this drastic step, many bloggers may decide to quit blogging rather thiin subject themselves to review and possible punishment,^^ Regardless of the course of action commanders choose, it is likely that the regulations will have a tremendous effect on servicemembers ability to communicate over the Intemet, III. The Deference Doctrine: Judicial Protection of Freedom of Speech in the Military Courts have significantly limited the First Amendment rights of servicemembers,^^ The Supreme Court has long recognized that the 28, The statute provides, Any person subject to this chapter who , , , violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation , , , shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, 29, Schactman, supra note 27, at, 1 (citing Operations Security, Anny Reg, 530-1, 2-1 ,a(3)), 30, Ask Before You Tell on Blog, Military Says, N,Y, TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A20, 31, Schactman, supra note 27, 32, Ask Before You Tell, supra note 30, at A20, 33, Schactman, it/pra note 27, at 1, 34, ¡d. (quoting Jeff Nuding, recipient of a Bronze Star for service in Iraq), 35, Id. (citing a blogger who says the regulations are probably the end of his blogging), 36, For an excellent discussion of the role of courts in this context, see Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N,Y,U, L, REV, 855, 863 (1987), Civilian courts have limited jurisdiction to review decisions from the military court system, which features an extensive system of appeals. See 10 U,S,C, §§ 862, 866869 (2000) (laying out the system of appeals). The LJnited States Supreme Court has approved the enforcement o f , , , military customs and usages by eourts-martial from the early days of this Nation, Parker v. Levy, 417 U,S, 733, 744 (1974), The initial decision to subject a servicemember to court-martial is usually made by the commanding officer. See 10 U,S,C, § 822 (establishing who may convene courts-martial). The commanding officer must choose between three types of courts-martial depending upon the type of infraction. See id. § 816 (describing the three types of courts-martial). The Court of Criminal Appeals can then review both the law and the facts of court-martial decisions. Id. § 866, The highest court in the military system is the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, a civilian court that reviews errors of law in courtsmartial. See id. § 867(c) (The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces shall take action only with respect to matters of law,); id. § 942(b) (Each judge of the court shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate , , , ,), The United States 468 Texas Law Review [Vol. 87:463 military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. Thus, the rights of those in the military must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.^^ Due to the special characteristics of the military community and its mission, the Supreme Court applies a different First Amendment standard with regard to the protection of servicemembers speech.^^ Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, the OPSEC regulations look like an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, but military speech is constitutionally unprotected if it undermines the effectiveness of response to command. In Parker v. Levy, the Court considered the free speech rights of Army Captain Howard Levy, who made public statements to enlisted personnel at his Fort Jackson, South Carolina post, condemning the United States involvement in Vietnam.*^ Levy said that he would refuse to go to Vietnam if ordered to, that colored soldiers should refuse to go to Vietnam because the United States discriminates against them, and that Special Forces personnel are liars and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and children.^ The Court held that Levys conduct, because it urged military personnel to refuse to obey orders that might send them into combat, was unprotected under the most expansive notions of tbe First Amendment.* The Courts deference to the military has resulted in a variety of restrictions on the speech of servicemembers, and courts have allowed military commanders to restrict speech of both civilians and servicemembers on military bases.^ For example. Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) prohibits officers from using contemptuous words toward officials, such as the President or Congress.* While prosecutions under this provision have been infrequent, due in part to the relatively high bar for Supreme Court then has limited review of decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by writ of certiorari. Id. § 867a (limiting Supreme Court review to cases that meet the criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2000), and specifically excluding review of Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces refusal to grant a petition for review). A servicemember may challenge the result of a court-martial in the federal court system through a writ of habeas corpus when constitutional rights are involved. Bums V. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953). 37. /a/-ter,417U.S. at743. 38. Burns, 346 U.S. at 140. 39. Partef, 417U.S. ... Purchase answer to see full attachment