Fluent Essays

The presentation should cover the main questions that concern the design of your research proposal. Within the presentation the student should: presentation_for_cep__2_.ppt research_proposal__1_.doc example.txt Unformatted Attachment Preview Trade Unions and Labor Migration Issues in European Union. Comparative analysis of Germany, Spain and Italy HRISTO PANCHUGOV BASIC ASSUMPTIONS • One of the basic freedoms provided by EU membership is the opportunity for free movement of people and labor • The question of free movement of workers has been one of the main debates throughout the negotiation process with the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe • As a result transitional periods for free labor movement were imposed to the applicant countries BASIC ASSUMPTIONS • The key veto players are the trade unions - free labor movement will lead to lower and flexible wages, high unemployment THE PUZZLE • European Commission in its report in 2001 concluded that there will be no significant effect of the expected low migration on the labor market. • The experience of previous enlargements does not prove these assumptions previously made. • European Commission initially opposed the opportunity of transitional periods for free movement to be imposed on accession countries. THE PUZZLE • Contrary to Commission’s position and the evaluations that have been made a proposition for such measures has been initiated by some of the countries (Germany and Austria). • Some of the countries did not support that proposition. • The question is why? The Research Question • What is the role of trade union organizations in determining governmental decisions on free movement of labor issues in the process of EU enlargement? Hypothesis • The main hypothesis will state that the difference in the countries’ position on imposing transitional periods of the applicant states will be based on the ability of the trade union organizations to influence the government. – H1: The potential for successful lobbing efforts will be determined by the organizational structure of the labor unions and the institutional framework of the corporate system as well as by the political configuration. Hypothesis – H2: It will depend on the lobbing potential and the strength of the business organizations as the third participant in the corporate system. Alternative Hypothesis • There is no link between trade unions’ ability to influence government and its position on the issue of imposing transitional periods of the applicant states . Variables • The main hypothesis will be assessed through the public debate between government and trade unions over the labor migration issue. • As dependent variable will be considered the governmental position toward the imposition of transitional period on applicant countries. Variables • Independent variables: – trade unions’ position on the issue – National trade unions’ organizational structure – Institutional framework • Intervening Variables: – Ideological relations with the government (the currant governmental composition) – National business organizations – The degree of expected labor migration Case Selection Germany, Spain and Italy • GERMANY • The country that initiated the transitional period • around 500 000 immigrants in the time when negotiations were open • the expected migration was about 2/3 of all migration flaw from new member states after accession • Centralized labor • Spain • It opposed the transitional period • the immigrants were around 15 000 • the intensity of the migration flaw was not expected to be high • detailed regulatory framework for collective bargaining but not centralized labor Case Selection Germany, Spain and Italy • Italy • It did not accept the measure as necessary at the beginning • The immigrants were around 50 000 • There were estimations for a relatively high migration flow in Northern Italy. • Really complex framework of corporate relations. Divided national labor organizations Critique • The Hypothesis • The variables – introducing new variable -: constraints imposed by the EU on member states to adopt certain policies or even to propose them. • Operationalization – how the level of centralization of national labor organizations might be measured – influence of trade unions should be operationalized Critique • Sample Justification – I hope I justified it, if not please let me know • Data Needed – TRUE • Alternative Explanation – not the pressure from trade unions, but fear of losing next elections THE END THANK YOU Research Proposal Trade Unions and Labor Migration Issues in European Union. Comparative analysis between Germany, Spain and Italy. Comparative European Politics Lecturer – Zsolt Enyedi Student – Hristo Panchugov Introduction Corporatism and the strategies of collective bargaining are one of the main characteristics of the Western-European national political and economical structures. They involve into the social dialog trade unions, employers and national governments. This system is based on mutual trust and consensus. It gives opportunity to those interest groups to influence the government, and in return guarantees political legitimacy and effectiveness for governmental policies. It contributes to the political stability of the system. (Slomp, H., 2000). European Union’s common policy and single market regulations impose a number of difficulties on the system of collective bargaining. The possibility for market dumping and labor migration will cause “decrease in real wages and an increase in the rate of return to capital” (Hansen, B.) and is generally seen as one of the reasons for decline of the national trade unions’ positions. The right of free movement and work is guaranteed for the citizens of any member state country in any member state by articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless every stage of EU enlargement has been complemented by the fears of massive labor migration from the new member states, because of the wage differences, that will lead to drastic decrease in the wages and increase in the unemployment rates in the old member states. Thus the trade unions are seen as the main actors opposing future enlargement. They engage in various lobbying activities to convince national governments to restrict the access of citizens of the new member states to the labor market. The question of free movement of workers has been one of the main debates throughout the negotiation process with the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). This paper will try to analyze the influence that trade unions have over the governmental migration policies. Migration policy will be operationalised as governmental position towards transitional periods for free labor movement in the negotiation process for EU enlargement. Recent study has analyzed the successful lobbying efforts of the German labor in that direction (Bohle/Husz, Forthcoming). This research will focus on comparative analysis of three countries – Germany, Spain and Italy in an effort to discover what were the reasons behind this success? The research will try to discover whether there is general link between the governmental position for transitional periods and the trade union’s strength to influence the decision making process in the new realities of EU. Furthermore based on these findings it will make some generalizations about the role of the trade unions as political actors. Thus the project will focus on the main factors that will have an impact over the trade unions’ political capital seen as “significant union intervention at a political level” (Rigby, Smith and Lawlor, 1999, p. 24). Two factors that are going to be considered in this research are the structure of the national trade union organization and the institutional framework in which they operate. This research will assume that each country have certain informal political demands that have to be fulfilled for an actor to be able to exercise influence over governmental policies. The project will try to prove that the “significant intervention” will depend on the structure of the national trade union organization in a way that more centralized it is, more easy it will overcome the barriers for political involvement. In this case the barrier will be the rational cost and benefit analysis of the labor migration impact on the national labor market. More centralized national labor organization will be more suitable for governmental lobbying activities, and thus will be in better position to influence the outcome of the negotiations over the transitional periods within EU. Second factor of importance for the aim of this proposal the structure and the role of business organizations, as the third actor in the collective bargaining, in the three cases selected for the research. Business is usually seen as the main factor that drives the EU enlargement, and the actor that benefits most of the process. It is considerate to be in favor of “a liberal migration regime” that will lead to the “flexibilization of labor market and social security systems” (Bohle/Husz, Forthcoming). At last but not least we should consider the fact that there is possibility for the different member states to be exposed to different intensity of migration which will affect the overall outcome of the lobbying activities. Here issues like geographical proximity of the country, peoples’ expectations about future migration flows and the salience of the issue should be addressed as well. THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS Just to summarize what has been said before in the introduction, the following basic assumptions will be made: • One of the basic freedoms provided by EU membership is the opportunity for free movement of people and labor - articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome. • The question of free movement of workers has been one of the main debates throughout the negotiation process with the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The concerns about an increase in labor migration flow and hence an increase of the unemployment rates was based on the higher wages and the difference in GDP between member states and applicant countries. • As a result transitional periods for free labor movement were imposed to the applicant countries. • The key veto players are the trade unions - free labor movement will lead to lower and flexible wages, high unemployment The Context of the Enlargement Negotiations (THE PUZZLE) The result of the enlargement negotiations consists of the following elements (European Commission, 2002): • A two year period during which national measures will be applied by current Member States to new Member States. Depending on how liberal these national measures are, they may result in full labor market access. • Following this period, reviews will be held; one automatic review before the end of the second year and a further review at the request of the new Member State. The procedure includes a report by the Commission, but essentially leaves the decision on whether to apply the acquis up to the Member States. • The transition period should come to an end after five years, but it may be prolonged for a further two years in those Member States where there are serious disturbances of the labor market or a threat of such disruption. • Safeguards may be applied by Member States up to the end of the seventh year. • Austria and Germany have the right to apply flanking national measures to address serious disturbances or the threat thereof, in specific sensitive service sectors on their labor markets, which could arise in certain regions from cross-border provision of services. The transitional periods were introduced, as part of the conditions, by the European Commission only after they have been requested by Germany and Austria. The initial position of the Commission based on the migration forecast made by a “consortium of EU research institutes (Brücker and Boeri 2000), seems to confirm the results from other research that the overall impact on the EU labor market should be limited, both on the negative and positive side” (European Commission, 2001). The report estimates the annual worker’s migration flow of be around 70 000 people – 200 000 if the non-worker migration is included. The enlargement towards Bulgaria and Romania will produce another 50 000 workers annually (135 000 persons). The study estimates the long-term migration potential (in 2030) to be around 1\% of the population of EU 15.” This report “The free movement of workers in the context of enlargement” concludes that there will be no significant effect of the expected low migration on the labor market. Other studies that address the benefits of the migration. Based on these assumptions European Commission initially opposed the German and Austrian position for transitional periods for free movement. But after one month, without introducing “any economical justification for the measure” (Bohle/Husz, Forthcoming), the Commission proposed flexible transitional arrangements, due to the strong pressures from those two countries. At the beginning of these negotiations most of the other countries did not introduce such measures, and Spain, Portugal and Greece even opposed. The question that naturally arises is what are the reasons that can explain the difference. I think that it is easy to be understood that one of the most important factors with relation to this problem is the composition and the strength of the domestic “veto” players. These assumptions naturally highlight the research question that will be addressed in this research proposal and in the future research, namely - What is the role of trade union organizations in determining governmental decisions on free movement of labor issues in the process of EU enlargement? Since, after the transitional periods were requested from Germany and Austria, the outcome is influenced by the inter-state bargaining on EU level, this research will restrain itself to the beginning of these negotiations. What will be considered is the position that governments initially took when the measure was requested, as well as why it was those countries that requested it. THE HYPOTHESES The main hypothesis will state that the difference in the countries position on imposing transitional periods of the applicant states will depend on the ability of the trade union organizations to influence the government. Stated this way the hypothesis expresses the believe that this study will be able to locate labor unions’ lobbying efforts on the issue of labor migration in any of the countries within the timeframe defined before. Furthermore it implies that the outcome will be determined by the capabilities of the union organizations to “intervene” as political actor in the decision making process. A distinction should be made between the role of the trade unions as political actors and their participation in the collective bargaining process. The literature looks at the corporate system as bargaining process between social actors (unions and business) in which government has meditative role. “The government main function is to facilitate compromise by offering tax facilities, training funds, and active employment policies, as well as to integrate the conference results in a new legislation if the partners so wish” (Slomp, H., 2000). Slomp (2000) identifies three levels of collective bargaining, namely branches, economic sectors and nation wide. There is of course different degree to which the state interferes in the bargaining process but the literature seems to agree on the fact that the involvements in political activities and in collective bargaining are two different types of activity. “Participation in social and political activity often involves a different, campaigning, style from that associated with integrative, enterprise-based bargaining” (Rigby, et. al, 1999, p.37). Boreham and Hall (1994)1 bring the concept of political unionism, which incorporates in one strategy the efforts of the unions, both on political level and that of the enterprise. They argue that the political unionism will be “most effectively be implemented by a relatively centralized and unified union movement, pushing beyond the economistic aspirations…” (Rigby, et. al, 1999, p.25). However this research will try to identify the factors that shape the ability of the trade union organizations to influence the government. Having in mind what has been said before two hypotheses can be developed as part of and to complement the main one: • H1: The potential for successful lobbing efforts will be determined by the organizational structure of the labor unions and the institutional framework of the political and corporate system they operate in. • H2: It will depend on the lobbing potential and the strength of the business organizations. An alternative hypothesis of course should be kept in mind while conducting the research and it will state that there is no link between trade unions’ ability to influence government and its position on the issue of imposing transitional periods of the applicant states. This means that the outcome will be attributed to the difference in estimations of the intensity of migration flow in each country and the salience of the issue. The alternative hypothesis implies that in cases where almost no migration is expected, it will not be considered as a threat by the trade unions and they will not get involved in activities to influence their government on the matter. THE VARIABLES The main hypothesis will be assessed through the public debate between government, trade unions and business organizations over the labor migration issue. The positions of the different actors will be compared and analyzed. The research will try to determine whether the issue is considered to be of primer importance; whether different alternatives (except transitional periods) for dealing with the problem have been discussed and who brought them into the Mike Rigby, Roger Smith and Teresa Lawlor, 1999, “European trade unions. Change and Response”, London, Routledge p.25 1 debate; and whether the rational cost and benefit analysis and the initial position of the European Commission have been addressed and in what way. As dependent variable will be considered the governmental position toward the imposition of transitional period on applicant countries in each of the cases chosen for this research. Since a difference in the dependent variable among the sample is observed this project will focus on determining which factors shape these differences. As independent variables will be considered: • Trade unions position on the issue • National trade unions’ organizational structure • The legal and institutional framework that they operate in. The first independent variable will be addressed in relation with what is trade unions’ response to different alternative solutions for limiting migration, like double taxation and early cross-boarder cooperation, and how justified it is in economic or political terms. The second independent variable has already been addressed on several occasions. The literature seems to agree that “the type of response which unions develop is constrained by the structure and organization of the unions themselves” (Rigby, et. al, 1999, p. 20). Rigby, et. al (1999) quote Crouch (1986) who “argues that a union movement which becomes completely decentralized loses the capacity for strategic action… the unions will need to renew and strengthen their political involvement” (Rigby, et. al, 1999, p. 24). As was stated before this research will try to prove that centralized national union organization will be more able to develop response of the pressure exerted by the transnational factors as EU enlargement, and to influence government decision. This variable will be measured through the type of nationa ... Purchase answer to see full attachment