Fluent Essays

Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response. Responses should be a minimum of 250 words and include direct questions. You may challenge, support or supplement another student’s answer using the terms, concepts and theories from the required readings. Also, do not be afraid to respectfully disagree where you feel appropriate; as this should be part of your analysis process at this academic level.Forum posts are graded on timeliness, relevance, knowledge of the weekly readings, and the quality of original ideas. Sources utilized to support answers are to be cited in accordance with the APA writing style by providing a general parenthetical citation (reference the author, year and page number) within your post, as well as an adjoining reference list. Refer to grading rubric for additional details concerning grading criteria.Respond to Patrick:Intelligence-led PolicingIntelligence-led policing (ILP) is the concept of collecting information and analyzing the information to identify threats (Carter & Carter, 2009). Once the threats are identified, law enforcement can develop preparedness or response plans to mitigate or prevent the threat from occurring (Carter & Carter, 2009). ILP emerged from the new era of homeland security that came in the aftermath of 9/11. In the 2002 meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, they recommended all levels of law enforcement adopt/develop an intelligence capacity (Carter & Carter, 2009). Intelligence has become the center of homeland security that influences the development of security/counterterrorism policies and military/ law enforcement operations both domestically and internationally. Pros to ILP Similarly to our discussion last week on community-led policing, local police officers are the ones out every day in the community and responding to various crimes and providing public safety. Police officers can provide first-hand information that they have witnessed and information provided to them by the community. Their involvement in the intelligence collection process is vital in preventing future acts of terrorism. The information they provide may appear mundane or irrelevant but analysis can potentially connect the dots. The intelligence analysis, “provides the decision-maker with a timely and accurate understanding of criminal threats and the components of the operational environment” (Alach, 2011, p.77). Advocates of ILP argue that the collected information can better identify threats which can influence policy decisions and allocation of resources (Alach, 2011). ILP also encourages the sharing of information which is a problem that has plagued law enforcement and intelligence agencies since inception (Carter & Carter, 2009).Cons to ILPILP does not have a universally accepted definition across U.S. law enforcement agencies which effects how it is being implemented (Carter & Carter, 2009). Policing intelligence lacks a framework in which it can be defined and generally understood (Alach, 2011). The impact of 9/11 revitalized this practice across local police forces without knowing how effective it is and evidence to support its success (Alach, 2011). The concept is not new to police as they take action based upon available information everyday but the formal analysis process is not something they regularly utilize (Alach, 2011). Without a conceptual framework, police units would have to develop their own ILP standard operating procedures. Local police are tasked with responding to events happening in real time 24/7 and cannot be expected to analyze small pieces of information. This concept becomes more complex when made specific for terrorism and how law enforcement is to carry out their additional counterterrorism responsibilities.Despite the misunderstanding of ILP, state and local law enforcement should develop a program that mirrors the intentions of ILP. Law enforcement naturally collects information in their daily duties and ILP frameworks look for a way to gather and analyze that information into intelligence reports. Analyzing information/intelligence reports for patterns and relevant information would require specific training and additional personnel. I don’t believe community police officers have the time to dedicate to intelligence analysis.ReferencesAlach, Z. (2011). The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth. Police Journal, 84(1), 75–97. doi:10.1350/pojo.2011.84.1.523Carter, D. & Carter, J. (2009, September). Intelligence-led policing: Conceptual and functional considerations for public policy. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20(3), 310-325. doi: 10.1177/0887403408327381 carter_carter2009.pdf carter_ialeia_journal_nov2012.pdf eack2008.pdf fuentes_njsp_ilpguide_010907__1_.pdf us_state_senate_staff_report_re_fusion_centers100312.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Criminal Justice Policy Review http://cjp.sagepub.com/ Intelligence-Led Policing : Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy David L. Carter and Jeremy G. Carter Criminal Justice Policy Review 2009 20: 310 originally published online 5 December 2008 DOI: 10.1177/0887403408327381 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cjp.sagepub.com/content/20/3/310 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Department of Criminlogy at Indiana University of Pennsylvania Additional services and information for Criminal Justice Policy Review can be found at: Email Alerts: http://cjp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://cjp.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://cjp.sagepub.com/content/20/3/310.refs.html Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy Criminal Justice Policy Review Volume 20 Number 3 September 2009 310-325 © 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0887403408327381 http://cjp.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com David L. Carter Jeremy G. Carter Michigan State University, East Lansing Policing in the post-9/11 era is experiencing a philosophical change that is expanding community- and problem-oriented policing to include the broader philosophy of intelligence-led policing (ILP). Building on the British experience, the application of ILP to American policing has been complicated by a number of challenges. Although stimulated by 9/11, the movement toward ILP is being furthered by a number of federal public policy initiatives. As a result of these diverse demands, law enforcement must revisit operational policies and creatively adjust their organizations to reflect this new paradigm. This article provides insight on the conceptual background of ILP, public policy standards, and the integration of ILP with community policing. Keywords: intelligence-led policing; homeland security; law enforcement intelligence; homeland security intelligence; community policing olicing in the post-9/11 environment has entered what may be referred to as the homeland security era (Ratcliffe, 2008b). Specifically with respect to intelligenceled policing (ILP), there are a number of public policy factors that are shaping this new paradigm. The authors will discuss the conceptual foundation for ILP as influenced by the British experience followed by an examination of significant policy developments in the United States that are influencing the adoption of ILP by American law enforcement agencies. Although concern has been expressed by police leaders that intelligence activities may undermine community policing initiatives, the authors argue that ILP is a complementary expansion of the community policing concept. P British National Intelligence Model (NIM) and ILP1 When seeking to employ a new concept, policy makers often look to other models in an attempt to learn what works and adopt (or adapt) that practice. The British have a long and more sophisticated legacy in criminal intelligence than U.S. law enforcement, hence the value of examining the British experience. All 43 provincial British constabularies, as well as the London Metropolitan Police, have had some form of fairly long-standing intelligence function to deal with organized crime, drugs, and other complex crimes unique to their jurisdictions. 310 Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 Carter, Carter / Intelligence-Led Policing 311 At a national level, the National Drugs Intelligence Unit was created in the 1980s to deal with the significant increase in transnational drug trafficking and associated crime. In 1992, the drugs intelligence service was expanded and renamed the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) to deal with all forms of organized crime, not just illicit drugs. In particular, the NCIS evolved in response to the changing political environment associated with the European Union (EU), where, among other factors, immigration and customs checkpoints were eliminated for persons traveling between the EU member countries thereby making it easier for criminal enterprises to operate in Western Europe. In 2006, a new intelligence-led agency was created, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), that integrated the NCIS along with a national investigative body, the National Crime Squad (NCS), and the drug enforcement functions of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Service. As will be seen, these changes were influenced by government-wide philosophical changes that occurred over the previous decade. In the 1990s, the British government began implementing a business-plan philosophy for all elements of government service (Ratcliffe, 2002). This had two fundamental initiatives: either privatize portions of government service or apply a business model to remaining government services. This move had wide-ranging effects. For example, the British National Rail Service—BritRail—was sold in pieces to various private companies. Similarly, local governments privatized such functions as vehicle maintenance and janitorial services. The national police training function in England and Wales was also changed to a quasiprivate organization called Centrex, which has evolved once again to be part of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).2 The point to note is that the mandate to use business processes permeated virtually every aspect of British government, including the police. As part of this movement, in the late 1990s, the NCIS, with advice from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC),3 developed the British NIM, which was initially released in 2000 and formally adopted in 2002 as accepted policy by the British Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), which is a national police policy-making body. The NIM followed the government policy of using a business process model to deal with crime control and employed the ILP philosophy to introduce intelligence into virtually all aspects of the policing business plan. The adoption of the NIM by ACPO meant that the chief constables of the provincial police forces in England and Wales agreed to adopt the NIM and adapt it to meet the needs of their policing area—This change represented the transition between traditional intelligence processes to ILP.4 The intelligence function within the provincial constabularies largely deals with violent crime, football hooliganism, nonserious (local) organized crime, and unique local recurring crime problems. At the national level, the intelligence function of SOCA is responsible for transnational organized crime, terrorism, and other criminal threats to Britain that emerge from outside the United Kingdom. The British police adoption of ILP, as per the NIM, has not been easy. Many did not understand the concept; it required a reallocation of resources and added a significant analytic component to each police force. The NIM was criticized by many as being an Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 312 Criminal Justice Policy Review esoteric model that created a great deal of data and new processes that were not providing good value for money (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2005). Its full implementation has been much slower than anticipated, and as one might assume, some of the police forces have embraced the concept much more broadly than others. Despite these problems, there have also been important successes attributable to the NIM. There are many lessons learned from the British experience that can be adopted in the United States, and there is a unique body of model practices, including analytic models, that are available from the HMIC. However, American law enforcement agencies have a significantly different experience in law enforcement intelligence that prohibits wide-scale adoption of British ILP, with some notable exceptions in the predominantly larger U.S. major urban areas. Some perspective will provide greater understanding. The creation of Britain’s 43 police forces was a product of amalgamating many smaller police agencies in the 1960s. The smallest of these constabularies has around 900 sworn constables who are policing sizeable geographic areas with both urban and rural characteristics. Most of the provincial police agencies have 1,200 to 1,600 sworn personnel. Although not a national police force, there are national standards that apply to all of the agencies for training, promotion, operations, and salary (Bayley, 1992). Indeed, personnel may laterally transfer between the constabularies. Given the size of these police forces and their reasonable operating budgets,5 all have the resources to hire analysts and the flexibility to reassign personnel to meet the needs of a comprehensive new initiative such as ILP. This is not meant to infer that the constabularies are flush with money and personnel; rather, one finds significantly more flexibility, resources, and diverse expertise in large agencies than in the small departments typically found in the United States. Moreover, having a solid history of sophisticated law enforcement intelligence, the British police service was able to adopt the NIM and, consequently, ILP with greater ease than in the United States. The American Experience With Law Enforcement Intelligence Historically, the vast majority of American law enforcement agencies have had no intelligence capacity or training on the intelligence process—Intelligence was typically viewed as something only needed by the largest agencies. For many American agencies that did have an intelligence capacity, the legacy has also been somewhat problematic. Early law enforcement initiatives typically had no analysis and essentially consisted of dossiers kept on individuals who were suspicious or were deemed to be threats of some sort, often based on intuitive, rather than empirical, threat criteria (Carter, 2004). In the 1960s and 1970s, many agencies were sued under federal civil rights legislation for maintaining intelligence records on people who had not committed crimes but were engaged in expressive behaviors and ideologies that were deemed to be unconventional or un-American. Although these practices generally no longer exist, the legacy lives on, with many members of the public remaining suspicious of current law enforcement intelligence initiatives (German & Stanley, 2007). Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 Carter, Carter / Intelligence-Led Policing 313 Beyond the civil rights issues, the intelligence function was often ill-defined, typically remaining out of the mainstream of state and local law enforcement activities. There were few analysts and many of these were poorly trained, often inheriting the title of analyst as a result of longevity, not expertise. Hence, it was often difficult to distinguish what the intelligence unit, as an organizational component, contributed to the total law enforcement mission. Although there were certainly exceptions to this characterization, this was the status quo for many American law enforcement agencies. Although this has changed dramatically, history remains a difficult obstacle to overcome. Comparing U.S. and U.K. Law Enforcement Intelligence In comparison to the British police structure, the roughly 16,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies, most of which have 10 or fewer sworn officers, have diverse policing standards both between and within states. They often have limited budgets, all of which typically come from local funds with some exceptions in the form of short-term federal grants. Federal standards and recommendations are largely unenforceable unless tied explicitly to special conditions of a grant. In light of these radical differences and the significantly different history of law enforcement intelligence, when one compares U.S. and U.K. policing, it is unreasonable to assume that the basic practices of the NIM, as found in the United Kingdom, and, by extension, ILP can be effectively implemented in the United States on a short-term wholesale basis. In the United States, law enforcement needs to start at a far more basic level. A functional model of ILP must be developed that has both the flexibility and applicability to the U.S. law enforcement landscape. At the outset, ILP should be viewed as a philosophy, not a process (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Indeed, American law enforcement agencies should rely on this philosophy to develop new intelligence-based processes that functionally balance each agency’s jurisdictions, characteristics, and resources (Ratcliffe, 2005). The lessons learned from community policing can be a valuable guide (Carter, 2002). Developing ILP in a law enforcement agency requires two developmental activities. One activity is to devise the information collection framework to manage threats within a jurisdiction, and the other is to develop the organizational infrastructure to support the ILP initiative. The foundation for these two changes has been laid in post-9/11 intelligence developments. Post-9/11 Changes to Law Enforcement Intelligence In the post-9/11 era, law enforcement intelligence experienced a rapid change. In October 2001, about 6 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, at the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) annual meeting in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, the Police Investigative Operations Committee discussed the need for state, local, and tribal Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 314 Criminal Justice Policy Review law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies to reengineer their intelligence function; for more law enforcement agencies to develop an intelligence capacity; and the need for national leadership to establish standards and direction for the intelligence process in these agencies. From this meeting, the IACP, with funding from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), held an Intelligence Summit in March 2002. The summit made a series of recommendations including development of a criminal intelligence sharing plan and the adoption of ILP (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2002). The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), a formal advisory group funded by the Office of Justice Programs, was already in existence with the charge of developing processes and standards to efficaciously share information across the criminal justice system. In response to the IACP Intelligence Summit recommendations, Global created a new subgroup: the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). The purpose of the GIWG was to move forward with the recommendations from the summit. The first GIWG product was the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The intent of the NCISP was to provide SLTLE agencies (particularly those that did not have an established intelligence function) with the necessary tools and resources to develop, gather, access, receive, and share intelligence. To accomplish this, the plan established a series of national standards that have been formally recognized by the professional law enforcement community as the proper role and processes for the contemporary application of law enforcement intelligence (Carter, 2004). The plan is having a significant effect on organizational realignment, information sharing philosophy, and training in America’s law enforcement agencies. One of the key recommendations from the NCISP was for American law enforcement agencies to adopt ILP “to provide public safety decision makers the information they need to protect the lives of our citizens” (Global Intelligence Working Group [GIWG], 2003, p. v). Ironically, although the plan extensively discusses the need and importance of ILP, it neither defines the concept and identifies the components of ILP nor explains how the concept should be implemented. At virtually the same time the NCISP was created, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was developing plans to meet its mission, mandated in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, “to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies” (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2003, p. h). A critical part of this initiative was to define critical knowledge, skills, abilities, and processes—that is, capabilities—that were necessary for law enforcement and emergency services personnel to perform these tasks. These capabilities have been articulated in detail in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). Intended to protect the nation from all hazards, “the TCL is a national-level, generic model of operationally ready capabilities defining allhazards preparedness” (DHS, 2007, p. 1). The list is broken down into different areas associated with prevention and response. In the prevent mission area there are two Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIV on August 9, 2010 Carter, Carter / Intelligence-Led Policing 315 specific intelligence-related target capabilities: information gathering and recognition of indicators, and warnings and intelligence analysis and production. The importance of these developments was that a new component of intelligence was added to the ILP mission: Homeland security intelligence is defined as follows: [It is] the collection and analysis of information concerned with non-criminal domestic threats to critical infrastructure, community health and public safety for the purpose of preventing the threat or mitigating the effects of the threat. (Carter, in press) These new intelligence responsibilities have emerged within the homeland security framework—that intelligence activities at the state, local, and tribal levels must assess threats posed by all hazards. Although there are certainly gray areas within this framework, the key challenge is for law enforcement agencies to focus on threats posed by hazards that have implications for public safety and order-maintenance responsibilities in addition to criminal threats. Thus, another component was entered into the ILP equation. A final element in the evolution of law enforcement intelligence as related to the current discussion was the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) as required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Although this legislation focused on the intelligence community, nearly one third of the action steps in the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan is also directed toward SLTLE agencies. The ISE seeks to “implement an effective, widespread culture of information sharing, balanced with a need for security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties” (Program Manager—Information Sharing Environment [PM-ISE], 2007, p. 63). The Implementation Plan provides a detailed process and action plan that indicate significant expectations for SLTLE to be participants in the ISE. The heart of information sharing and generation of raw information at the state, local, and tribal levels is intended to be via ILP. The Concept of ILP The ILP is envisioned as a tool for information sharing both within law enforcement agencies and between all participants in the ISE. The concept aids law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent those threats from reaching fruition in America’s communities (IACP, 2002). Despite the demand for increased partnerships for information sharing among agencies being emphasized (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007), there remains a common misunderstanding of how this will be achieved. The challenge, however, is that there are differing views of the ILP concept and its applica ... Purchase answer to see full attachment