Fluent Essays

Brief the case of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-476, 584 U.S. ___ (2018). Your brief may be no longer than 2 pages single-spaced. While the case that you have to brief is attached, I strongly encourage you to do some research on Nexis Uni about the case.Please take a look at the three handouts that I have attached here. The first handout outlines how to brief a case with a detailed explanation of each part of the case brief. The second handout provides an example of a properly done case brief. The third handout is a copy of the i-rubric that I will apply when grading the case brief. If you would like to read the case briefed in the model case, please find the case on Lexis at Delanhanty v. Hickley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989). While carefully considering these materials, please remember that you need to brief Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-476, 584 U.S. ___ (2018) case for submission.Remember that case briefs are used to highlight the key information contained within a case for use within the legal community as court cases can be quite lengthy.When writing case briefs, all information must be properly cited. Make sure you are not copying and pasting from your source. Most of the material should be paraphrased; quotations should make up no more than 10\% of the brief. Note: since the purpose to is highlight and summarize key information, merely copying and pasting from the case does not accomplish this goal. You must summarize the facts in your own words, using quotations sparingly.Remember to proof read your work! Also, remember to (1) put your name and student number on it, and (2) submit your assignment for grading!Good luck. murphycasebrief.pdf casebriefi_rubric.pdf howtobriefacasehandout__1_.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MURPHY, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 16–476. Argued December 4, 2017—Decided May 14, 2018* The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) makes it unlawful for a State or its subdivisions “to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on” competitive sporting events, 28 U. S. C. §3702(1), and for “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” those same gambling schemes if done “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,” §3702(2). But PASPA does not make sports gambling itself a federal crime. Instead, it allows the Attorney General, as well as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring civil actions to enjoin violations. §3703. “Grandfather” provisions allow existing forms of sports gambling to continue in four States, §3704(a)(1)–(2), and another provision would have permitted New Jersey to set up a sports gambling scheme in Atlantic City within a year of PASPA’s enactment, §3704(a)(3). New Jersey did not take advantage of that option but has since had a change of heart. After voters approved an amendment to the State Constitution giving the legislature the authority to legalize sports gambling schemes in Atlantic City and at horseracing tracks, the legislature enacted a 2012 law doing just that. The NCAA and three major professional sports leagues brought an action in federal court against New Jersey’s Governor and other state officials (hereinafter New Jersey), seeking to enjoin the law on the ground that it violates —————— * Together with No. 16–477, New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Assn., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. Syllabus PASPA. New Jersey countered that PASPA violates the Constitution’s “anticommandeering” principle by preventing the State from modifying or repealing its laws prohibiting sports gambling. The District Court found no anticommandeering violation, the Third Circuit affirmed, and this Court denied review. In 2014, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the law at issue in these cases. Instead of affirmatively authorizing sports gambling schemes, this law repeals state-law provisions that prohibited such schemes, insofar as they concerned wagering on sporting events by persons 21 years of age or older; at a horseracing track or a casino or gambling house in Atlantic City; and only as to wagers on sporting events not involving a New Jersey college team or a collegiate event taking place in the State. Plaintiffs in the earlier suit, respondents here, filed a new action in federal court. They won in the District Court, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the 2014 law, no less than the 2012 one, violates PASPA. The court further held that the prohibition does not “commandeer” the States in violation of the Constitution. Held: 1. When a State completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports gambling schemes, it “authorize[s]” those schemes under PASPA. Pp. 9–14. (a) Pointing out that one accepted meaning of “authorize” is “permit,” petitioners contend that any state law that has the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or partially repealing a prior prohibition, amounts to authorization. Respondents maintain that “authorize” requires affirmative action, and that the 2014 law affirmatively acts by empowering a defined group of entities and endowing them with the authority to conduct sports gambling operations. They do not take the position that PASPA bans all modifications of laws prohibiting sports gambling schemes, but just how far they think a modification could go is not clear. Similarly, the United States, as amicus, claims that the State’s 2014 law qualifies as an authorization. PASPA, it contends, neither prohibits a State from enacting a complete repeal nor outlaws all partial repeals. But the United States also does not set out any clear rule for distinguishing between partial repeals that constitute the “authorization” of sports gambling and those that are permissible. Pp. 10–11. (b) Taking into account the fact that all forms of sports gambling were illegal in the great majority of States at the time of PASPA’s enactment, the repeal of a state law banning sports gambling not only “permits” sports gambling but also gives those now free to conduct a sports betting operation the “right or authority to act.” The interpretation adopted by the Third Circuit and advocated by respondents Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 Syllabus and the United States not only ignores the situation that Congress faced when it enacted PASPA but also leads to results that Congress is most unlikely to have wanted. Pp. 11–13. (c) Respondents and the United States cannot invoke the canon of interpretation that a statute should not be held to be unconstitutional if there is any reasonable interpretation that can save it. Even if the law could be interpreted as respondents and the United States suggest, it would still violate the anticommandeering principle. Pp. 13–14. 2. PASPA’s provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling schemes violates the anticommandeering rule. Pp. 14–24. (a) As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The anticommandeering doctrine that emerged in New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, and Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, simply represents the recognition of this limitation. Thus, “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’ ” New York, supra, at 161. Adherence to the anticommandeering principle is important for several reasons, including, as significant here, that the rule serves as “one of the Constitution’s structural safeguards of liberty,” Printz, supra, at 921, that the rule promotes political accountability, and that the rule prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States. Pp. 14–18. (b) PASPA’s anti-authorization provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. The distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event. Pp. 18–19. (c) Contrary to the claim of respondents and the United States, this Court’s precedents do not show that PASPA’s anti-authorization provision is constitutional. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505; Reno v. Condon, 528 U. S. 141; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, distinguished. Pp. 19–21. (d) Nor does the anti-authorization provision constitute a valid preemption provision. To preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private 4 MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. Syllabus actors. There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private actors. Pp. 21–24. 3. PASPA’s provision prohibiting state “licens[ing]” of sports gambling schemes also violates the anticommandeering rule. It issues a direct order to the state legislature and suffers from the same defect as the prohibition of state authorization. Thus, this Court need not decide whether New Jersey’s 2014 law violates PASPA’s antilicensing provision. Pp. 24–25. 4. No provision of PASPA is severable from the provisions directly at issue. Pp. 26–30. (a) Section 3702(1)’s provisions prohibiting States from “operat[ing],” “sponsor[ing],” or “promot[ing]” sports gambling schemes cannot be severed. Striking the state authorization and licensing provisions while leaving the state operation provision standing would result in a scheme sharply different from what Congress contemplated when PASPA was enacted. For example, had Congress known that States would be free to authorize sports gambling in privately owned casinos, it is unlikely that it would have wanted to prevent States from operating sports lotteries. Nor is it likely that Congress would have wanted to prohibit such an ill-defined category of state conduct as sponsorship or promotion. Pp. 26–27. (b) Congress would not want to sever the PASPA provisions that prohibit a private actor from “sponsor[ing],” “operat[ing],” or “promot[ing]” sports gambling schemes “pursuant to” state law. §3702(2). PASPA’s enforcement scheme makes clear that §3702(1) and §3702(2) were meant to operate together. That scheme—suited for challenging state authorization or licensing or a small number of private operations—would break down if a State broadly decriminalized sports gambling. Pp. 27–29. (c) PASPA’s provisions prohibiting the “advertis[ing]” of sports gambling are also not severable. See §§3702(1)–(2). If they were allowed to stand, federal law would forbid the advertising of an activity that is legal under both federal and state law—something that Congress has rarely done. Pp. 29–30. 832 F. 3d 389, reversed. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined as to all but Part VI–B. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined in part. Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ Nos. 16–476 and 16–477 _________________ PHILIP D. MURPHY, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS 16–476 v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL. NEW JERSEY THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN’S ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER 16–477 v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [May 14, 2018] JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of New Jersey wants to legalize sports gam­ bling at casinos and horseracing tracks, but a federal law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, generally makes it unlawful for a State to “authorize” sports gambling schemes. 28 U. S. C. §3702(1). We must decide whether this provision is compatible with the sys­ tem of “dual sovereignty” embodied in the Constitution. I A Americans have never been of one mind about gambling, 2 MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. Opinion of the Court and attitudes have swung back and forth. By the end of the 19th century, gambling was largely banned through­ out the country,1 but beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, laws prohibiting gambling were gradually loosened. New Jersey’s experience is illustrative. In 1897, New Jersey adopted a constitutional amendment that barred all gambling in the State.2 But during the Depression, the State permitted parimutuel betting on horse races as a way of increasing state revenue,3 and in 1953, churches and other nonprofit organizations were allowed to host bingo games.4 In 1970, New Jersey became the third State to run a state lottery,5 and within five years, 10 other States followed suit.6 By the 1960s, Atlantic City, “once the most fashionable resort of the Atlantic Coast,” had fallen on hard times,7 and casino gambling came to be seen as a way to revitalize the city.8 In 1974, a referendum on statewide legalization failed,9 but two years later, voters approved a narrower measure allowing casino gambling in Atlantic City alone.10 At that time, Nevada was the only other State with legal —————— 1 See Nat. Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report, p. 2–1 (1999) (Final Report); S. Durham & K. Hashimoto, The History of Gambling in America 34–35 (2010). 2 See Atlantic City Racing Assn. v. Attorney General, 98 N. J. 535, 539–541, 489 A. 2d 165, 167–168 (1985). 3 See Note, The Casino Act: Gambling’s Past and the Casino Act’s Future, 10 Rutgers-Camden L. J. 279, 287 (1979) (The Casino Act). 4 Id., at 288; see also N. J. Const., Art. 4, §7, ¶2(A); Bingo Licensing Law, N. J. Stat. Ann. §5:8–24 et seq. ( West 2012). 5 See State Lottery Law, N. J. Stat. Ann. §5:9–1 et seq.; The Casino Act, at 288; N. J. Const., Art. 4, §7, ¶2(C); Final Report, at 2–1. 6 Id., at 2–1. 7 T. White, The Making of the President 1964, p. 275 (1965). 8 See D. Clary, Gangsters to Governors 152–153 (2017) (Clary). 9 See The Casino Act, at 289. 10 See ibid.; N. J. Const., Art. 4, §7, ¶2(D). Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court casinos,11 and thus for a while the Atlantic City casinos had an east coast monopoly. “With 60 million people living within a one-tank car trip away,” Atlantic City became “the most popular tourist destination in the United States.”12 But that favorable situation eventually came to an end. With the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq., casinos opened on Indian land throughout the country. Some were located within driving distance of Atlantic City,13 and nearby States (and many others) legalized casino gambling.14 But Nevada remained the only state venue for legal sports gambling in casinos, and sports gambling is immensely popular.15 Sports gambling, however, has long had strong opposi­ tion. Opponents argue that it is particularly addictive and especially attractive to young people with a strong interest in sports,16 and in the past gamblers corrupted and seri­ ously damaged the reputation of professional and amateur sports.17 Apprehensive about the potential effects of —————— 11 Clary 146. at 146, 158. 13 Id., at 208–210. 14 Casinos now operate in New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. See American Gaming Assn., 2016 State of the States, p. 8, online at https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/2016\%20 State\%20of\%20the\%20States_FINAL.pdf (all Internet materials as last visited May 4, 2018). 15 See, e.g., Brief for American Gaming Assn. as Amicus Curiae 1–2. 16 See, e.g., Final Report, at 3–10; B. Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 5, 7 (1992); Brief for Stop Predatory Gambling et al. as Amici Curiae 22–23. 17 For example, in 1919, professional gamblers are said to have paid members of the Chicago White Sox to throw the World Series, an episode that was thought to have threatened baseball’s status as the Nation’s pastime. See E. Asinof, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and 12 Id., 4 MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. Opinion of the Court sports gambling, professional sports leagues and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) long opposed legalization.18 B By the 1990s, there were signs that the trend that had brought about the legalization of many other forms of gambling might extend to sports gambling,19 and this sparked federal efforts to stem the tide. Opponents of sports gambling turned to the legislation now before us, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA). 28 U. S. C. §3701 et seq. PASPA’s proponents argued that it would protect young people, and one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, a former college and professional basketball star, stressed that the law was needed to safeguard the integrity of sports.20 The Department of Justice opposed the bill,21 but it was passed and signed into law. PASPA’s most important provision, part of which is directly at issue in these cases, makes it “unlawful” for a State or any of its subdivisions22 “to sponsor, operate, —————— the 1919 World Series 5, 198–199 (1963). And in the early 1950s, the Nation was shocked when several college basketball players were convicted for shaving points. S. Cohen, The Game They Played 183– 238 (1977). This scandal is said to have nearly killed college basket­ ball. See generally C. Rosen, Scandals of ’51: How the Gamblers Almost Killed College Basketball (1978). 18 See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection, S. Rep. No. 102– 248, p. 8 (1991); Hearing before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copy­ rights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 21, 39, 46–47, 59–60, 227 (1991) (S. Hrg. 102–499) (statements by representatives of major sports leagues opposing sports gambling). 19 S. Rep. No. 102–248, at 5. 20 S. Hrg. 102–499, at 10–14. 21 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 16–476, p. 225a. 22 The statute applies to any “governmental entity,” which is defined Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on” competitive sporting events. §3702(1). In parallel, §3702(2) makes it “unlaw­ ful” for “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or pro­ mote” those same gambling schemes23—but only if this is done “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.” PASPA does not make sports gambling a federal crime (and thus was not anticipated to impose a signifi­ cant law enforcement burden on the Federal Govern­ ment).24 Instead, PASPA allows the Attorney General, as well as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring civil actions to enjoin violations. §3703. At the time of PASPA’s adoption, a few jurisdictions allowed some form of sports gambling. In Nevada, sports gambling was legal in casinos,25 and three States hosted sports lotteries or allowed sports pools.26 PASPA contains “grandfather” provisions allowing these activities to con­ tinue. §3704(a)(1)–(2). Another provision gave New Jer­ sey the option of legalizing sports gambling in Atlantic City—provided that it did so within one year of the law’s —————— as “a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an entity or organiza­ tion . . . that has governmental authority within the territorial bound ... Purchase answer to see full attachment