Fluent Essays

Your article review: 12pt Times New Roman on a standard page with 1” margins, double-spacing, DO NOT include a header or heading or any other information on the top or bottom of the page. Your review should be no more than one page, though half of a page IS GREATResearch Question: What is the specific research question the authors seek to answer?Relevance: Have the authors demonstrated a need to answer this question? If they have, have they demonstrated that need in terms of the shortcomings of extant literature?Operationalization: How have the authors operationalized their concepts—that is, how have they measured the ideas they discuss?Method: What method do the authors use to test their hypothesis? Do they use a survey, an experiment, ethnographic interviewing, collection of extant data, etc.?Justification of Method How do the authors justify their method?Data: What kind of data do the authors collect, and how do they analyze that data?Conclusions What are the authors main findings?*you are expected to cite your article, APSA CITATION ONLY immigration_enforcement_and_the_redistribution_of_political_trust_immigration_enforcement_and_the_redistribution_of_political_trust_.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Immigration Enforcement and the Redistribution of Political Trust Author(s): Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll and Robert D. Wrinkle Source: The Journal of Politics , Vol. 77, No. 4 (October 2015), pp. 901-913 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/681810 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Sun, 19 Jan 2020 03:36:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Immigration Enforcement and the Redistribution of Political Trust Rene R. Rocha, University of Iowa Benjamin R. Knoll, Centre College Robert D. Wrinkle, University of Texas–Pan American Social construction theory argues that public policy creates powerful feedback effects and that groups burdened by policy feel alienated. We reevaluate this argument by examining how immigration enforcement policies affect Latino immigrants, native-born Latinos, and Anglos. Using data from a 2012 survey of Texas residents and government statistics on the Secure Communities program, we find that higher removal rates, especially among noncriminal populations, are associated with negative political orientations among native- and foreign-born Latinos. We also extend social construction theory by arguing that the attitudes of individuals outside the target group are affected by enforcement. Our findings show that Anglos living in high-enforcement contexts are the most trusting of government and externally efficacious. We conclude that immigration policy enforcement redistributes trust in government from resource-deprived immigrants to Anglos. Enforcement practices thus perpetuate existing political inequalities. I n 2008, the Bush administration began the Secure Communities program, an immigration enforcement initiative. The Obama administration expanded the program before replacing it with the largely similar Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2015. Now when an offender is booked in a US prison, his or her fingerprints are automatically crossreferenced with an immigration database operated by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE uses this process to identify, apprehend, and sometimes deport unauthorized immigrants. ICE prioritizes the removal of criminals and those who have committed multiple immigration violations (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012). From its inception through August of 2012, ICE received nearly 20 million sets of fingerprints and removed more than 220,000 individuals from the United States through Secure Communities. More than 75\% of deportees were convicted criminals. Approximately a quarter of these criminals were convicted of serious crimes, such as homicide, robbery, and kidnapping (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012). After a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, ICE released detailed data about Secure Communities enforcement. These data contain information on enforcement patterns across political jurisdictions, and ICE has never released similar identifiers alongside general enforcement data. The number of deportations is higher today than ever before and a source of controversy.1 Concerns include the mistaken arrest and removal of American citizens and recent efforts by some state and local governments to opt out of localfederal partnerships. A 2011 report by a task force on Secure Communities offered another worry: “The program [has] eroded public trust by leading to the detention of many immigrants who had not committed serious crimes, after officials said its aim was to remove ‘the worst of the worst’ immigrant criminals from the United States” (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2011). Immigrant interest groups Rene R. Rocha (rene-rocha@uiowa.edu) is associate professor of political science at the University of Iowa. He studies Latino politics and immigration policy. Benjamin R. Knoll (benjamin.knoll@centre.edu) is an assistant professor in the politics program at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky. His research covers American public opinion and voting behavior, with an emphasis on race and politics and religion and politics. Robert D. Wrinkle (rdwrinkle@gmail.com) is professor emeritus at the University of Texas–Pan American. His interests include public policy, political behavior, and Latino politics. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard .edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681810. 1. The number of removals peaked in 2013, and ICE has not released official figures for 2014 (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2014). The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 4. Published online July 7, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681810 q 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2015/7704-0002$10.00 This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Sun, 19 Jan 2020 03:36:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 901 902 / Immigration Enforcement and Trust Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll, and Robert D. Wrinkle have echoed this concern. Several public statements by these organizations express profound disappointment with President Obama for pursuing such an aggressive and punitive deportation program in the first few years of his presidency. What has been the effect of this immigration policy enforcement campaign? In this article, we examine whether Secure Communities has affected trust in government and political efficacy among Latino immigrants, native-born Latinos, and Anglos (non-Hispanic whites). Below, we discuss what scholars already know about immigration politics and policy. We then sketch out a theory of how immigration policy enforcement affects political behavior and analyze data from a survey of Texas residents. The results show that immigration enforcement affects political orientations within each subgroup. IMMIGRATION POLICY ENFORCEMENT AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR Current literature tells us much about what factors affect immigration policy attitudes. Residential context (Hood and Morris 1997; Hopkins 2010), cultural and economic threat (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin and Sides 2008; Paxton and Mughan 2006), implicit attitudes (Ayers et al. 2009; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010; Perez 2010), media framing (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013), and demographic characteristics (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Fetzer 2000; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011; Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006) all shape preferences. We also know why lawmakers support reforms to current immigration policy. Constituency demographics, such as Latino and immigrant population size, matter (Casellas 2010; Fetzer 2006; Hero and Tolbert 1995). The characteristics of the legislators themselves, such as their race/ethnicity or partisanship, also predict positions on immigrationrelated legislation (Bratton 2006; Kerr and Miller 1997; Welch and Hibbing 1984). Studies of state and local politics emphasize that policy outcomes reflect citizen ideology (Hero and Preuhs 2007) and the power of industries that rely on immigrant labor (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011). In short, we have a good understanding of public perceptions toward immigrants, how elected officials represent those attitudes, and what kinds of policies eventually are adopted. This leaves one important gap: how policy, once implemented, affects politics. Is there a feedback effect? The social construction of policy design theory (Schneider and Ingram 1993) provides strong theoretical support for the belief that political orientations, specifically trust in government and political efficacy, are associated with immigration policy enforcement. The social construction of policy design theory (SCPDT) argues that groups are socially constructed to be associated with either positive or negative evaluations. Groups also have different amounts of power and can be classified as “advantaged” (high power 1 positive construction), “contenders” (high power 1 negative construction), “dependents” (low power 1 positive construction), or “deviants” (low power 1 negative construction).2 SCPDT predicts that groups with positive constructions will receive more government benefits than those with negative constructions. We thus see elites regularly and visibly advocating for policies such as veterans’ benefits, small business tax cuts, and government-mandated accommodations for the disabled and elderly. Those with positive social constructions internalize signals, which leads to higher levels of political efficacy, greater trust in government, and generally more positive attitudes toward politics and society. Members of negatively constructed groups internalize cues too. Deviants, SCPDT argues, are therefore the most likely to express feelings of alienation (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342). The possible spillover consequences of social construction– based policy decisions are not well understood. We want to know whether policy outcomes affect individuals outside of the target group. SCPDT predicts that political attitudes among foreign-born Latinos are affected by immigration enforcement because punitive practices send cues about the value of immigrants. But enforcement practices also send signals to those outside of the target population about whether the government is willing to allocate burdens onto a negatively constructed out-group. Seeing negatively constructed out-groups punished can reinforce faith in the political system. Perceiving the government as unable to penalize “deviants” may jeopardize trust. The implications are important. Previous research has demonstrated that Latino immigrants come to the United States feeling more efficacious and trusting of government than native-born residents (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Michelson 2003; Wenzel 2006). Trust in government is a key indicator of general support for or alienation from the political system (Miller 1974). Both trust and efficacy predict political participation (Easton and Dennis 1967; Pateman 1976; Pollock 1983). Possessing these psychological resources can compensate for common disadvantages Latino immigrants face, such as lower levels of income, education, and political mobilization (Barreto 2005; Leal 2002; Michelson 2005). 2. For a detailed explanation of this classification system, see Schneider and Ingram (1993). This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Sun, 19 Jan 2020 03:36:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Volume 77 Secure Communities has changed the way immigration law is enforced. Perhaps it has changed the way people who care about immigration feel about politics. If it has, one of the few resources immigrants have at their disposal—positive psychological orientations—is likely eroding. As the voice of the Latino immigrant community becomes soft, political inequality in America grows. HYPOTHESES We leverage the unusually detailed data on Secure Communities supplied by ICE to study whether enforcement has affected political attitudes among foreign-born Latinos, native-born Latinos, and Anglos. Specifically, we ask whether deportations initiated as part of the program are related to trust in federal and local government as well as political efficacy, both internal and external. Foreign-born Latinos Our first prediction is that foreign-born Latinos who live in communities with high levels of Secure Communities enforcement will have less trust in government and less political efficacy. This is because intense enforcement reinforces the negative social construction of immigrants. If foreignborn Latinos perceive that American society considers immigrants to be “deviant,” they will likely feel politically alienated. H1. Foreign-born Latinos who live in communities with high levels of immigration enforcement are more likely to express negative feelings toward the political system than those who live in communities with low levels of enforcement. No study has examined how policy outcomes affect immigrants’ political orientations, but Massey and Sanchez (2010) believe ethnic identity among immigrants is sensitive to policy outcomes. Immigration enforcement and social discrimination “promote the formation of a reactive identity that explicitly rejects self-identification as American” (2). This relationship may be an example of a broader trend because blacks express a stronger sense of racial identity in areas where they are most disadvantaged (Gay 2004; Welch et al. 2001). Our argument, therefore, fits with the broader literature on residential context and attitudes. Number 4 October 2015 / 903 connected to the fate, success, and interests of a wider group (Dawson 1994). According to the 2006 Latino National Survey, the majority of native Latinos report that their “doing well” depends at least “some” or “a lot” on other Latinos doing well (Fraga et al. 2006). Non-Latinos may treat native- and foreign-born Latinos similarly (Rocha et al. 2011). If the native-born Latinos experience worse interactions with political institutions in anti-immigrant environments, their attitudes may also change. However, we predict that the effect will be smaller than that observed for foreign-born Latinos. This is because the social networks of native-born immigrants are less likely to be directly affected by immigration enforcement (Fix and Zimmerman 2001), making perceptions of enforcement less closely aligned with actual removal rates.3 This leads us to our second hypothesis: H2. Native-born Latinos who live in communities with high levels of immigration enforcement are more likely to express negative feelings toward the political system than those who live in communities with low levels of enforcement, but this effect will be smaller in magnitude than what is observed for foreign-born Latinos. Anglos Removals, we argue, make Latinos less trusting and efficacious, but they should make Anglos feel positive. People support punishing negatively constructed groups with policy-induced burdens. Because Anglos are more likely to negatively construct unauthorized immigrants (Rocha et al. 2011), high enforcement rates should increase Anglo faith in the policy process. Social construction theorists have not fully explored group-based differences in policy feedback, and most empirical studies document effects among target populations (Mettler and SoRelle 2014). This argument helps expand our understanding of how policy feedback forces penetrate many parts of American society. H3. Anglos who live in communities with high levels of immigration enforcement are more likely to express positive feelings toward the political system than those who live in communities with low levels of enforcement. Hypothesis 3 is compatible with other theories. We could arrive at the same hypothesis via racial threat theory by as- Native-born Latinos Although not directly subject to immigration enforcement, native-born Latinos still may be affected by policy feedback because of linked fate or group consciousness. Linked fate is the perception that one’s fate and self-interest are strongly 3. Unfortunately, our survey data do not allow us to distinguish between second- and third-generation Latinos. We suspect that the negative effect of enforcement on trust and efficacy would be smallest among thirdgeneration Latinos. This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Sun, 19 Jan 2020 03:36:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 904 / Immigration Enforcement and Trust Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll, and Robert D. Wrinkle suming a link between policy enforcement and Anglo perceptions of immigrant group size. High levels of Secure Communities enforcement in their areas may lead Anglos to infer that the proportion of foreign-born Latinos is large or on the rise. Latino population size and growth predict attitudes and policy preferences (Newman 2013). The result may be increased support for a government that is perceived to be actively enforcing immigration law. In either case, there are significant normative ramifications. Cynicism toward government among native- and foreignborn Latinos is a possible and undesirable consequence of immigration enforcement. Immigrants enjoy few political advantages, and this relationship threatens valuable psychological resources. But what if enforcement also increases these same psychological resources among Anglos, a group that enjoys numerous political advantages relative to Latinos? The effect of enforcement would be to redistribute psychological resources from an already-disadvantaged group (Latino immigrants) to an already-advantaged group (Anglos). DATA AND METHOD We test our hypotheses using data from a public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Survey Research at the University of Texas–Pan American. This survey was in the field during the summer of 2012 and used random digit dialing, including cell phone numbers, to sample Latinos and Anglos living in Texas. The response rate, computed using the AAPOR RR3 method, was 8\%. Spanish translations of the instrument were available, and native Spanish speakers administered Spanish surveys. Quota sampling was used to ensure an adequate number of Latino respondents. Latinos made up 31\% of our final sample and Anglos comprised 69\%. The total number of respondents was 470. A small number of non-Latinos and non-Anglos were sampled (27 blacks, 4 Asian Americans, and 4 American Indians), and we exclude these groups from our analysis. Although the data were collected exclusively from Texas residents, we argue that the sample is well suited for studying the effect of immigration enforcement on political orientations among Latinos and Anglos. Texas has the third-largest immigrant population in the United States, ranking only behind New York and California. Furthermore, ICE officials implementing Secure Communities have been more active in Texas than in all but two states: California and Florida (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012). Still, we replicated our analysis with the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) and unofficial estimates of immigrant removals. We describe this check in more detail at the end of our write-up. Our dependent variables measure political orientations. We rely on four questions that separately capture trust in different levels of government, external efficacy, and internal efficacy. They are: 1. How often can you trust local government to do what is right? (Never, Some of the Time, Most of the Time, Always) 2. How often can you trust government in Washington to do what is right? (Never, Some of the Time, Most of the Time, Always) 3. Public officials don’t care much what people like me think. (Disagree Strongly, Disagree Somewhat, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree Somewhat, Agree Strongly) 4. Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on. (Disagree Strongly, Disagree Somewhat, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree Somewhat, Agree Strongly) These original survey ... Purchase answer to see full attachment