Fluent Essays

part1: For this chapter, review the text and powerpoint materials and give your peers an honest answer, if you suffered a cybercrimewhat crime would it likely be and how much harm would you have to suffer to make it worth reporting to a law enforcement agency?part2: For this chapters discussion, comment about your observations of your loss of privacy and the benefits you derive from the willing surrender of that privacy. When you go to Amazon, do you have to log in? If not, Amazon has stored a cookie identifying you and your browser may also have stored your password. Its great to have easy access and it may be worth the loss of privacy, but had you considered that Amazon tracks and sells that data (as does every other website, especially Facebook) and identifies you based on information provided and your browser fingerprint?Post one comment about the privacy you have surrendered to obtain the benefits of shopping, easy access to social media, news services, or similar sites and your perception of whether you felt any choice in sharing that data, losing that privacy, and making your life that much easier. yar___steinmetz10.pdf yar___steinmetz11.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview Cybercrime and Society, Third Edition © Majid Yar & Kevin F. Steinmetz Chapter 10 Policing the internet Introduction • The police – a central element in the response to cybercrime – Criticisms and challenges • Formal and informal organization and control – “Pluralization” or “fragmentation” of policing • Focus on the wide range of policing activities and their challenges 3 Discussion • What are some factors that may limit public police responses to cybercrime? 4 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Expectations of the role of the police – Prevent crimes – Maintain public order – Detect and investigate crimes – Source of public information, advice and reassurance • In short – increasing demands and limited resources • Specialized tasks of computer forensics – Challenges requiring extensive time, resources, and expertise 5 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Expectations: police should investigate an entire range of internet-based offenses • Reality: resources target those offenses deemed most serious in terms of scale and harm – The “de minimis trap” (Wall, 2007, p. 161) – Focus of police resources determined by “hierarchies of standing” (Yar, 2013, p. 494) • Additional obstacles: officers’ lack of understanding and knowledge, and the established culture and ethos of policing 6 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Increased law enforcement capacity to deal with cybercrime – UK – development of specialized units or shared across units • Birth of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) in 2001 in the UK – Later absorbed by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) – 2009 – the Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU) – All housed under the National Cybercrime Unit (NCU) 7 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Specialized units in the U.S. – Exists, but unevenly distributed at state, local, and federal levels – Likelihood of having specialized units – Federal level – split between NWC3, FBI, and DHS 8 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Canadian enforcement – Lead by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) including their Integrated Technological Crime Units (ITCUs) and Technical Investigation Services (TIS) • Australian enforcement – Investigations under the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and its cybercrime operations team • Countries also employ standardized training programs – E.g. the Law Enforcement Cyber Center in the U.S. – E.g. “Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence” in the UK 9 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Most challenging to law enforcement – transnational nature of Internet – Poses issues when traditional enforcement strategies are used • Growth of cross-police and cross-jurisdictional cooperation – Epitome of transnational police cooperation – child pornography 10 Public policing and the cybercrime problem • Challenges – Linguistic diversity – Variations in policing cultures – Asymmetries of resources and levels of expertise – Legal pluralism and statutory variations • Remedy attempts via treaties, conventions and agencies 11 Digital forensics • Digital data as evidence in criminal cases • “The collecting, analysing and reporting on digital data in a way that is legally admissible” (www.forensiccontrol.com) • Challenges and procedures – Preserving and not altering evidence; “Faraday bags” – Copying the data as to not alter the original • Increasing importance for law enforcement – Use of multiple tools (e.g. Child pornography – RedLight scanner) – The idea – to allow law enforcement to do their job efficiently 12 Discussion • What are some ways that non-state actors are involved in policing the Internet? 13 Pluralized policing • Wide range of quasi-state and non-state actors in policing • Greater part of Internet policing – private sectors • Culture of the Internet tended to favor self-regulation – Communal forms of formal and informal social controls – Dispersed mechanisms rather than “top-down” state control • Clinton Administration and the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) – Testament to the multi-party character of Internet regulation 14 Pluralized policing • Internet content regulation – highly contested – Fears of state censorship and the defence of free speech • The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in 1990 – To preserve free speech online and to combat censorship via litigation • Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) in 1994 – Protection of user privacies and civil liberties online • Rise of Internet-based crime = growth in extra-state actors 15 Pluralized policing: Child pornography • Considerable attention in monitoring the Internet • Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) in 1996 (UK) – Involvement of many state and private actors – To combat child pornography – Establishment of “hotlines” – “Blacklisting” of websites and “hash list” of illicit images • Controversy – E.g. IWF and Wikipedia’s “The Scorpions” page – Questions of private policing vs. public accountability 16 Pluralized policing: Hate speech and IP • Groups combating hate speech – Even more so for anti-Muslim content post-9/11 – E.g. the Simon Wiesenthal Centre monitoring anti-Semitic websites • Strategies organizations use – Exposing hate speech online – Pressuring ISPs to remove content – Mounting legal challenges • Groups representing commercial intellectual property (IP) rights – Reaction to growth of illegal file sharing 17 Pluralized policing: Online vigilantism • Individuals or groups helping to solve crimes and catch criminals – “Online vigilantism,” “e-vigilantism,” etc. – “Digilantism” – “politically motivated practices outside of the state that are designed to punish or bring others to account, in response to a perceived or actual dearth of institutional remedies” (Jane, 2017, p. 3) o Some may assist law enforcement (e.g. Reddit and the Boston Marathon bombing) o Online groups – Perverted Justice 18 Pluralized policing: Online vigilantism • Downsides to digilantism – Mistaken identification – Differential ideas of justice and fairness o E.g. GamerGate 19 Privatized “for-profit” policing • Commercial provision of goods and services aimed at crime prevention, detection and resolution – Safeguarding the integrity and operations of systems – Controlling access to systems – Protecting the data content of systems from theft 20 Privatized “for-profit” policing • Forms of services offered Security services Design and provision of software for user authentication Design and provision of software for countering “hacking” Design and provision of software for detecting “malicious” software Provision of systems for safeguarding sensitive data Training for organizations and employees 21 Privatized “for-profit” policing • Financial gains of the private sector – One estimate – $89.13 billion in 2017 o Security services ($57.7 billion) o Infrastructure protection ($17.5 billion) o Network security equipment ($11.7 billion) o Consumer security software ($4.75 billion) o Identity access management ($4.67 billion) – Globally – exceeds $120 billion 22 Privatized “for-profit” policing • Increased government spending • Best tool from consumer perspective – preventative software 23 Explaining pluralization and privatization • A neo-liberal mode of capitalism – Significant changes in the provision of policing and crime control – The encouragement of protecting oneself from victimization – Placing the responsibility on potential victims expected to purchase security goods 24 Explaining pluralization and privatization • The concept of “governance” – A self-organizing network of actors (i.e. “nodal governance”) – Responsibility falls on extra-governmental actors – The New Right – the market is more effective than bureaucracies 25 Critical issues about private policing of the Internet • Accountability – Balance between upholding authority of the police and ensuring their accountability to the public o Mechanisms of accountability o E.g. Police and Crime Commissioner – No mechanisms exist in private policing o Concern over which actions reflect the wider public interest 26 Critical issues about private policing of the Internet • Equity – Freedom from criminal predation – right of all citizens o Evidence suggests inequity among certain populations – Privatized provisions of policing – different principles o Commodity-driven: the means of affording protection o A possible extension of the “digital divide” 27 Cybercrime and Society, Third Edition © Majid Yar & Kevin F. Steinmetz Chapter 11 Cybercrimes and cyberliberties: Surveillance, privacy and crime control Discussion • Think of some ways our day-to-day uses of the Internet are subjected to surveillance. What are they? 3 Introduction • Tension between surveillance and monitoring online content and the protection of users’ privacy and confidentiality – Offenders and privacy enhancing technology – Actors of the criminal justice system wants to reduce abuse of Internet privacy via greater surveillance 4 Introduction • Critics vs. authorities – Risk of losing control over our personal information – There exists a legitimate need to access such information – Political dissidents and electronic surveillance • Reducing consumer access to online privacy protection – risk of criminal threats 5 From surveillance to dataveillance • Rise of “surveillance studies” • Emergence in the 1970s – Foucault’s panopticism o Surveillance – key instrument in discipline and control o Emphasis on observation and inspection to normalize suspect populations o Sites include the prison, the hospital, the school, etc. • Today – a “society of control” o Monitoring for purposes of inclusion and exclusion o Growth of the “electronic eye” (Lyon, 1994) 6 From surveillance to dataveillance • Historically, surveillance has taken shape around the visual monitoring of physical persons • Now – the “space of flows” (Castells, 1996) – Virtual territories (Internet being the most prominent) • From surveillance to dataveillance – Observing and collecting digital footprints – Seizing technologies that “informate” (Zuboff, 1984, p. 10) o People and experiences → data o Commercial use of data trails and “data exhaust” (Zuboff, 2015, p. 79) o Fears of its use to sort, classify, control, and exclude 7 The development of internet surveillance • Original architecture of the Internet – no tracking – Netscape Navigator and the introduction of “cookies” (1996) o A record of the users’ activities • Collection, analysis and distribution of user data – big business – The digital “gold rush” for commercial sectors – Google and its revenue from target advertising o Routinely surveils its user base 8 The development of internet surveillance • Rise of “information brokers” or “data brokers” – Creating datasets and selling them to companies – “Big Data” and the kinds of information collected 9 The development of internet surveillance • Growth of new social media platforms – Purely based upon selling personal information to third parties – Facebook – $40 billion in revenue; Twitter – $2.4 billion in revenue – Data brokers routinely scour social media for user data o E.g. Nielsen accused of “data scrapping” in 2010 o E.g. Cambridge Analytica in 2018 10 The development of internet surveillance • Cause for alarm? – Data protection and privacy laws – The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) o To regulate the use of personal information for commercial sectors o Ability to ask companies how their data is being used (empowering individuals) 11 The development of internet surveillance • Businesses and regulatory bodies in the UK have had to adjust and include these privacy rules – U.S. – individual data protection laws are more piecemeal o E.g. HIPAA, FCRA, and COPPA 12 The development of internet surveillance • Critics of the over-reliance on statutory measures – Regulations do not cover situations where the individual gives “consent” – Differences in legal provisions/legal pluralism • Leaving privacy to business self-regulation and consumer choice – possibilities for exploitation where it is commercially advantageous – Insecure repositories of personal information (e.g. Equifax breach) – “People searches” (Gallagher, 2018) – Other security risks 13 The development of internet surveillance • Surveillance and data collection by government agencies – Not always separated from commercial trade of personal data • Governmental surveillance and “data mining” – E.g. post-9/11 U.S. and UK • U.S. – most stored histories regarding surveillance programs – ACLU’s explanation of the PATRIOT Act o Expands “records searches,” “secret searches,” “intelligence searches,” and “trap and trace” searches – Historical issues surrounding the Fourth Amendment 14 Discussion • Can citizens trust states when it comes to their privacy? 15 The development of internet surveillance • Pentagon launch of the “Total Information Awareness” project (2003) – To integrate information technologies for collecting, collating, and cross-matching intelligence data – Discontinued due to privacy concerns • Report one year later – evidence of “ubiquitous” government data mining – Little oversight and accountability – Carnivore search system 16 The development of internet surveillance • The “ECHELON” project – The search of worldwide e-mails for triggers – Controversial power and scope of usage 17 The development of internet surveillance • The case of Edward Snowden – Revelation of the massive harvesting of data of the NSA – The PRISM program and “XKeyscore” – International outrage over surveillance measures • The wider development of a “network of policing” – Private companies regularly receive request of information from government actors o E.g. Facebook information requests 18 The development of internet surveillance – Some companies have resisted these requests over two major concerns o Inclusion of law enforcement may set companies against their customers o Retention of data means a massive increase in storage capacities and costs 19 The dilemmas of surveillance as crime control: Encryption • Encryption clashes between state surveillance and user privacy – Documented uses of encryption and criminal activity – The “Going Dark” problem • How encryption works – The reordering of data according to a pattern specified by a “key” – “Brute-force” possible, although unlikely – Today’s 256-bit encryption and its growth and accessibility 20 The dilemmas of surveillance as crime control: Encryption • Growth of encryption = concern for law enforcement – Ongoing battle of subjecting encryption to statutory regulation – UK – “key deposit” system and law enforcement’s requirement of disclosure (Akdeniz, 1997) – U.S. – repeated attempts at “backdoor” installations until 9/11 21 The dilemmas of surveillance as crime control: Encryption • Efforts to regulate encryption may be counterproductive – Criminal awareness means alternative methods may be used • Encryption and challenges within government • The need to establish greater information security (e.g. ecommerce) – Businesses need to invest in “technical controls” (NCSC, 2017, pp. 18-19) 22 The dilemmas of surveillance as crime control: Encryption • Resistance to anti-encryption laws and the computer security industry – Regulation of encryption could mean stunted economic growth 23 Discussion • If it comes to a choice between security and liberty, on which side should we err? 24 ... 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