Fluent Essays

Requirement: Research THUNDER RUN IN BAGDAD in the attached 16 cases of mission command that demonstrates the commander’s use of the Principles of Mission Command found in the attached ADP 6-0. Write a 5-6 page (body of text) paper that briefly describes the battle and thoroughly describes the commander’s use of mission command principles. Address at least four of the six Principles of Mission Command in your analysis. Discuss how the commander’s use of those principles affected the outcome of the battle, and whether or not the commander executed good or bad mission command. Use 2 additional peer reviewed outside sources. Structure: a. Introduction paragraphb. History of the Battle (one or two paragraphs)c. Analysis of the use of Principles of Mission Command (80\% of the paper)d. Conclusion paragraphFormatting: a. Microsoft Word documentb. Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) or TurabianMUST BE PEER REVIEWED. adp_6_0.pdf sixteen_cases_of_mission_command.pdf Unformatted Attachment Preview This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). *ADP 6-0 Army Doctrine Publication No. 6-0 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, D.C., 31 July 2019 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces Contents Page PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO MISSION COMMAND ............................................................ 1-1 The Nature of Operations .......................................................................................... 1-1 Unified Land Operations ............................................................................................ 1-2 Mission Command ..................................................................................................... 1-3 Principles of Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-6 The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command ..................................................... 1-14 Command and Control ............................................................................................ 1-16 The Command and Control Warfighting Function ................................................... 1-19 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 1-21 Chapter 2 COMMAND................................................................................................................ 2-1 Nature of Command .................................................................................................. 2-1 Elements of Command .............................................................................................. 2-1 The Role of Commanders in Operations ................................................................. 2-12 Guides to Effective Command ................................................................................. 2-16 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 2-24 Chapter 3 CONTROL ................................................................................................................. 3-1 Nature of Control ....................................................................................................... 3-1 Elements of Control ................................................................................................... 3-3 Control Measures .................................................................................................... 3-10 Guides to Effective Control ...................................................................................... 3-14 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 3-17 Chapter 4 THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ............................................................ 4-1 Command and Control System Defined .................................................................... 4-1 Organizing for Command and Control ..................................................................... 4-13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 4-15 SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes ADP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012. ADP 6-0 i Preface INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1 Figures Introductory figure-1. Logic map ........................................................................................................ x Figure 1-1. Levels of control .......................................................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-2. Combat power model ................................................................................................ 1-20 Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding ............................................................................................. 2-4 Figure 2-2. The operations process ............................................................................................. 2-13 Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process ..................................................... 2-14 Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization ....................................................................................... 2-15 Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement ......................................................................................... 2-19 Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control ........................................................................................ 3-4 Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation ......................................................................... 3-12 Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations ...................................................................................... 3-13 Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system ......................................................... 4-1 Tables Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms ....................................................... ix Table 3-1. Operational variables .................................................................................................... 3-5 Table 3-2. Mission variables .......................................................................................................... 3-6 Vignettes Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik ....................................................................................................... 1-4 Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864 ......... 1-9 Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily............................................................................................ 1-13 Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-15 Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army ........................................................ 2-2 Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam.................................................. 2-8 Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement ........................ 2-18 Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik ................................................................................ 3-2 Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War ....................................................................... 3-10 Control in Austerlitz ...................................................................................................................... 3-11 ii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019 Preface ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides a discussion of the fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment. To comprehend the doctrine contained in ADP 6-0, readers should understand the nature of operations and the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0, Operations. Army leadership attributes and competencies are vital to exercising command and control, and readers should also be familiar with the fundamentals of leadership in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and FM 6-22, Leader Development. The Army Ethic guides decisions and actions while exercising command and control, and readers must understand the ideas in ADP 6-22. As the operations process is the framework for exercising command and control, readers must also understand the fundamentals of the operations process established in ADP 5-0, The Operations Process. The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures. For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications. The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession. The Army historically fights with joint and multinational partners as part of a coalition, and ADP 6-0 is nested with joint and multinational doctrine. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint capabilities to conduct operations, or serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters, should also refer to applicable doctrine concerning command and control of joint or multinational forces. ADP 6-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 2199, Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the Army Ethic, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10 for a discussion of the law of war.) ADP 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. ADP 6-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of ADP 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 6-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. 31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 iii This page intentionally left blank. Acknowledgements The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source Notes lists other sources of quotations and photographs. Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E. Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 2004 by Princeton University Press. Quotes reprinted courtesy B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Copyright © 1974 by Signet Printing. Copyright © renewed 1991 by Meridian. Excerpts from War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by MG George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright © renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press. Quote courtesy Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We Are the Mighty, 8 April 2016. Online http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12. Quote courtesy Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953. Excerpts from Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956 by Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956 The Curtis Publishing Company. Reprinted by permission of Andesite Press, 2017. Quote courtesy Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Copyright © 1999. Quote courtesy Field Marshall Carver, cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Copyright © 2017 by British Ministry of Defence Crown. Excerpts from William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History. Copyright © 1959 by Field-Marshal Sir William Slim. Reprinted 1962 by Orion Publishing Group. Excerpts from William M. Connor, “Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement of the Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience. Edited by Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press. Quote courtesy Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2. Edited by William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely. Copyright © 1990 by Literary Classics of the United States. Quote courtesy Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. Edited by Harold Lamb. Copyright © 1927 by Harold Lamb. Reprinted, New York: Doubleday, 1956. All rights reserved. Quote courtesy Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1953 by B. H. Liddell Hart. Excerpts from Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France. Copyright © 1990 by Robert A. Doughty. Quote courtesy Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii. Copyright © 1987 Brassey’s Defence. Quote courtesy George S. Patton, Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605 1885 – 1945. Edited by Charles M. Province. Copyright © 2002 by the George S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society. All rights reserved. 31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 v Acknowledgements Quote reprinted courtesy Erin Johnson, “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at Symposium,” The Daily Universe, 21 October 2001. Online https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopfspeaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/. Quote courtesy Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, “Address to Canadian Junior War Staff Course, 24 April 1941.” Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-nationaldefence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-historylineages/reports.html. vi ADP 6-0 31 July 2019 Introduction This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control, but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities. Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command, which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations. Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control. Command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants. Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. The nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command. Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik (literally, mission-type tactics). Auftragstaktik was a result of Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian army by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1809. Reformers such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von Gneisenau, and Helmuth von Moltke sought to develop an approach for planning campaigns and commanding large armies over extended battlefields. At the heart of the debate was a realization that subordinate commanders in the field often had a better understanding of what was happening during a battle than the general staff, and they were more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if they were allowed to make decisions based on this knowledge. Subordinate commanders needed the authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the plan. After decades of debate, professionalization of the army, practical application during the Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870, Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation. In Auftragstaktik, commanders issue subordinate commanders a clearly defined goal, the resources to accomplish the goal, and a time frame to accomplish the goal. Subordinate commanders are then given the freedom to plan and execute their mission within the higher commander’s intent. During execution, Auftragstaktik demanded a bias for action within the commander’s intent, and it required leaders to adapt to the situation as they personally saw it, even if their decisions violated previous guidance or directives. To operate effectively under this style of command requires a common approach to operations and subordinates who are competent in their profession and trained in independent decision making. Aspects of mission command, including commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and mutual trust, have long been part of U.S. Army culture. The most successful U.S. Army commanders have employed elements of mission command since the 18th century. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and understanding based on mutual trust. (See the vignette on page 1-9.) When addressing operations orders, the Army’s 1905 Field Service Regulation contained the following passage that served as an early discussion of mission orders: 31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 vii Introduction An ... Purchase answer to see full attachment