Fluent Essays

1 Branch Davidian Standoff Alonso Davis Columbia Southern University MCJ 5390 Critical Analysis of Criminal Justice Administration Dr. Charles T. Kelly 7/21/19 Branch Davidian Standoff The Branch Davidian was one of the groups that continued Victor Houteff’s mission of pressuring the United States federal government to implement specific reforms of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. On February 28, 1993, Branch Davidian was part of the Davidian Seventh-day Adventist Church, which was attacked by the United States by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), leading to the death of four federal agents. After this incident, a lengthy standoff between the mentioned group and key government agents was created (Pitts, 2000). The strife came to an ultimate end when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents attempted to enter the group’s headquarters at the Mount Carmel near Waco, Texas, following the fire that was burning the compound. Consequently, the group’s leader, David Koresh, together with 80 members of the group, perished.              During the Stand-off siege, the factor of police negotiation was quite notable. Contrary to claims that some of the Branch Davidian’s members died from gunshot wounds, police never shot anyone during the entire standoff that lasted for approximately fifty-one days. Arguably, the police were involved in a negotiation by the group’s leader, David Koresh, following rumors that he intended to orchestrate a mass suicide to demonstrate the group members’ absolute faith in SDA’s principles (Pitts, 2000). Through this negotiation, the police established that suicide was actually against the group’s religious beliefs. However, the conduct of the police during this process partially led to failure in achieving desirable results. For instance, the police prioritized the need to ensure the safety of FBI agents over core negotiation considerations.            The non-law enforcement personnel, such as compound residents and the media, impacted the FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) efforts to mitigate the standoff siege. Reportedly, the compound residents fired at the FBI, making efforts to achieve an effective negotiation process futile. Besides, the incredibility of the FBI agents impaired the success of negotiation efforts (Wright, 2019). Most of the non-law enforcement workforce perceived the FBI and ATF to be using pressure tactics to get them out of the compound. For this reason, they were a great incredibility for the negotiators to the extent that they did not want anyone to access the compound. Notably, the compound residents led by their leader, David Koresh, were so determined to confront the FBI authorities to the extent they could not recognize and figure out Koresh’s primary objective of using them to accomplish his apocalyptic prophecy.             In retrospect, the FBI and TFA could have pursued a top-secret mission to produce a different and better result of the siege. The most notable mistake happened when the two highlighted authorities informed the press about the raid to keep everything on record. However, the two journalists would poorly misjudge the situation and, in the process, jeopardizing the crucial law-enforcement activity. Apart from the press, the news regarding the raid was also known to a dispatcher for a local ambulance ATF had hired to stand by if the agents were injured (Wright, 2019). This person then informed the cameraman, who would later disclose the secret to a mail carrier. Unfortunately, the mail carrier happened to be a member of the Branch Davidian, implying that Koresh and other followers got notified and prepared for the attack immediately. Another thing that the FBI and TFA could have done differently to become successful during the standoff siege was to cancel the mission and re-strategize another raid. Despite knowing that all media houses were well informed of their ambush plan, the FBI and TFA supervisors ordered the raid to be implemented as was planned initially. Due to this arrogance, more than 20 FBI and TFA lost their lives. Besides, the FBI could not have contracted negotiators who used pressure tactics that resulted in no benefit apart from undermining their efforts to impact an effective negotiation with the Dravidians. In this case, it could be better for the FBI and TFA to prioritize core negotiating considerations over any other goal.            Arguably, desirable results would be achieved if the Davidian’s standoff siege was to happen today. This aspect is partly due to the current changing police styles that have become handy in enhancing the ability of law enforcement to adapt to changes in society. Currently, police strategies, especially those involving the use of different technologies to detect new forms of crime, are coherent for changes in society calling for law enforcement solely founded on community engagement. Notably, the most common reason why the FBI and TFA failed in their mission during the siege was their inability to engage the Davidians in a productive negotiation process (Wright, 2019). On the same note, changing police styles, such as the incorporation of new and improved policing strategies, have significantly enhanced the ability of law enforcement to adapt to various changes in society. The adaption is crucial because of the current law enforcement environment characterized by numerous demographic and technological trends. The current law enforcement is not restricted to police departments. Instead, the changing police styles have extended the operations of law enforcement to communities and technology providers. In this way, law enforcement has stayed ahead of many changes in society.      References Pitts, W.L. (2000). Changing views of the millennium in the Davidian tradition. The Journal of Religious History, 24 (1), 1-17. Wright, S. A. (2019). Waco after twenty-five years: media reconstructions of the federal siege of the branch Davidians. Nova Religio, 22(3), 108-120. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/737595/summary Californias Department of Corrections Alonso Davis Columbia Southern University MCJ 5390 Critical Analysis of Criminal Justice Administration Dr. Charles T. Kelly Jr. 7/29/21 1 Californias Department of Corrections Correctional facilities operate under a formalized organizational structure comprising interlinked departments. Each section is responsible for maintaining the prisoner’s welfare by implementing tasked roles per the agency’s mission and goals. The California Department of Corrections (DOC) and Rehabilitation operates one such facility consisting of four central departments: Secretary, health services, administration and offender services, and operations. Each section utilizes underlying subsections to manage imamates. While the organization structure of California DOC presents a detailed layout of subsections, the charts in the book have fewer subdivisions and varied formations to enhance facility effectiveness through personnel roles. The best universal structure for maximum organization effectiveness adapts to changes in population and considers the security and welfare of prisoners. Part 1 Figure 1 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Organization Structure Part 2: Review of Organizational Charts The Comparison of Charts 10-1, 10-4, and 10-6 With California DOC Chart Differences in the Models and Organization Efficiency Variations in the charts depend on each organization’s overall efficiency. Figure 10-1 presents the organizational structure for a correctional central office. The charts’ main features include the Board of Prison Commissioners and the director of corrections. The board harmonizes decisions made before tasking the director with the implementation role. The chart is different from the California DOC, which relies on a secretary as the sole decision-maker. While the secretary represents over 3 million people in the state, the decisions made are less subject to bias. Additionally, chart 10-4 shows a jail serving 250,000 people, with an effective organizational structure, including two sheriff assistants and an admin secretary. Besides, it has the training department to improve the personnel’s functional skills when handling the high population compared to California DOC. The third chart 10-6 has seven direct departments under a chief and deputy chief. The individuals speed task delivery compared with California’s DOC and rehabilitation, which accumulates the roles on the secretary. Numerous organization models for correction facilities facilitate efficient service delivery depending on the role of the institution. According to O’Hare (2018), some corrections demand more activities, leading to employee burnout if a universal structure is adopted. For example, the regional parole and probation center in 10-6 is more engaging than the structure in correction central office 10-1. Hence, each facility works best with its model. Most correction personnel work by reporting to seniors. An alternation in the organization structure might slow task performance and interfere with work schedules. Hence, the change will confuse employees and cause redundancies. For example, a line officer in 10-6 might have challenges working when introduced to the 10-1 structure due to the lack of direction over the chain of command. Additionally, a nurse tasked with serving inmates might find it challenging to deal with operation supervisors in parole and probation centers. Hence, changes in organizational structures disrupt efficient service delivery. Part 2: A Universal Organization Structure of Corrections Correctional facilities can operate on universal organization structures. The design incorporates changes in location, demography, and population. The suggested structure is the example given in 10-4. This facility performs the role of accepting inmates and rehabilitating them. Convicts require essential services involving eating, monitoring, and health protection. The jail structure for the 250,000 people can accumulate resources to serve either a lower number or a more significant number in comparison to the stipulated capacity. This jail structure is suitable to function universally compared to California’s DOC. Specifically, the latter handles operations and administrative services. It lacks guidance on essential services, including line security in charge of monitoring convicts and cooks to ensure food supply. Duwe (2017) recommends the inclusions of educational programs in corrections to improve literacy, enhance rehabilitation, and prevent repeat offenses. The 10-4 models accommodate this requirement by providing libraries and learning programs in jails. Paroles and probation centers can also adopt this structure to improve the quality of rehabilitation for a better nation. Hence, the 10-4 structure can fit in various correction facilities in the United States. The United States government deserves a functional universal organization structure comprising medical and security watch guards. The nurses and medical officers attend to prisoners by providing healthcare to mitigate mortality due to injuries. The individuals responsible for mitigating risks of uprisings, chaos, and riots are watch guards. Under the leadership of lieutenants and training personnel, any correctional facility can manage inmates depending on the area population and demographics. Therefore, this universal organization structure considers individual welfare to deliver quality correctional services. Conclusion Overall, the three given organization chart models differ from California’s DOC and rehabilitation framework. Universal organizational structures might work efficiently for differing correctional facilities, although it sometimes works when effectively designed to consider essential prisoners’ needs. The two crucial mandatory elements aimed at facilitating rehabilitation include education and safety. The California DOC’s organization structure might lack guidance on such features, but they are required. Hence, the best universal design for the United States facilities is the 10-4, which demonstrates the quality service delivery necessary to produce change. References Duwe, G. (2017). The use and impact of correctional programming for inmates on pre-and post-release outcomes (Vol. 48). US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. OHare, K. (2019). Impact of organizational structure in corrections: Recommendations for correctional leaders. [Masters Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Platteville]