Fluent Essays

I need assistce SHAWN MCKAY, MATTHEW E. BOYER, NAHOM M. BEYENE, MICHAEL LERARIO, MATTHEW W. LEWIS, KARLYN D. STANLEY, RANDALL STEEB, BRADLEY WILSON, KATHERYN GIGLIO Automating Army Convoys Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities C O R P O R A T I O N https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2406.html https://www.rand.org/ Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0039-0 For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2406 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. http://www.rand.org/t/RR2406 http://www.rand.org/pubs/permissions http://www.rand.org/giving/contribute http://www.rand.org iii Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled “Implementation of Autonomous Vehicles in the CS & CSS Force Structure,” sponsored by the Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support. The purpose of the project was to identify and assess the force implications and risks posed by the anticipated near- to mid-term opportunities for automating Army convoy trucks. A minimally manned bridging option leading to the use of automated Army trucks is developed in this report to address the current technical and tactical risks of concepts requiring the use of unmanned, automated trucks in Army convoys. This report may be of interest to individuals and organizations planning for or currently pur- suing autonomous vehicle technology. R AND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementa- tion guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by R AND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. government. This research was conducted within R AND Arroyo Center’s Forces and Logistics Program. R AND Arroyo Center, part of the iv Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities R AND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. R AND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. v Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Project Scope: Three Concepts for Army Automated Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Study Methods and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 CHAPTER T WO An Overview of Army Combat Logistics Patrols and Convoys . . . . . . . . . . 7 Combat Logistics Patrols and Convoy Operations Are Dull, Dirty, Dangerous—and Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 CHAPTER THR EE Three Potential Concepts for Automating Army Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Three Concepts for Army Automation: A Brief Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Minimally Manned and Partially Unmanned Convoy Employment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 CHAPTER FOUR Technological Assessment: How Close Is the Army to Realizing the Benefits of Automated Convoys? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 vi Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities Multiple Sources Informed Technical Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Commercial AV Developments Provide Insight, but Differences Must Be Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 AV Technology: Highly Dependent on Human Operators for Now . . . . . . 24 The Minimally Manned Concept Reduces Significant Technology Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Main Trade-Offs Between PU and MM Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 CHAPTER FIV E DOTmLPF-P Assessment: What Changes Will Automated Convoys Bring to Army Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Mixed Methods Were Used to Assess DOTmLPF-P Implications. . . . . . . . . . 41 Sociotechnical Implications of Autonomous Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 CHAPTER SIX Discussion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 vii Figures and Tables Figures S.1. Summary of AV Technology Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii S.2. Technical Risk Assessment of PU and MM Employment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv S.3. 88M MOS Pyramid with Key Positions by MOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii 2.1. Operating Challenges for PLS Convoys in Recent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1. Overview of Minimally Manned Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2. Overview of the Partially Unmanned Convoy Concept . . . . . . . . 17 3.3. Relationship Between PU and MM Employment Concepts . . . 19 4.1. Venn Diagram Comparing the Similarities and Differences Between Commercial Automated Vehicles and Army Automated Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.2. Survey of Commercial Truck, Commercial Passenger Vehicle, and Army Demonstrations of Automated Vehicle Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3. Map of Routes Traveled by EU Truck Platoon Challenge and Photo of One of the Platoons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.4. Technical Risk Assessment of PU and MM Employment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.1. The Traditional Sociotechnical Systems Approach as Applied to Examination of Autonomous Vehicle Convoy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.2. 88M MOS Pyramid with Key Positions by MOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 viii Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities Tables S.1. Personnel Reductions and Efficiencies Comparisons for Different Automated Truck Employment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . xii 2.1. Key Aspects and Examples of the Operating Environment for PLS Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1. Personnel Reductions and Throughput Efficiencies Comparisons for Automated Truck Employment Concepts. . . . 14 3.2. General Technology Requirements for the PU and MM Employment Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1. Reaction Time Comparison of HMI Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6.1. Benefits of the MM Employment Approach to Address Most Major Concerns and Ensure Program Success . . . . . . . . . . . 50 ix Summary The U.S. Army has thousands of ground vehicles and is interested in harnessing the potential benefits of emerging self-driving technol- ogy. In theory, automation could create efficiencies and save lives by reducing the number of personnel operating in combat zones. The use of automated trucks in convoys is of special interest: Recent combat operations have continually demonstrated the vulnerability of convoys due to their fundamental requirement for delivering sustainment sup- plies over long distances of unsecured routes. This operational reality of convoy missions makes them particularly vulnerable to attack and ambush. Given that fully automated convoys are not yet feasible, the Army research and development communities have been testing automated truck concepts in which manned and unmanned vehicles perform cooperatively in convoy operations. These concepts are promising because they have the potential to reduce the number of soldiers needed in a convoy, but the technical and tactical feasibility of these concepts need further examination. It is not fully understood what kinds of technological and operational changes these concepts of using auto- mated trucks in convoys will introduce. Thus, it is important that the Army carefully consider the state of the art and the potential changes this new technology may introduce in order to manage with foresight. Understanding the need for full analysis, the Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support (PEO CS&CSS) asked R AND Arroyo Center to assess the risks that automated truck acquisition may experience in development and wider Army operations. x Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities This research aims to determine the specific risks and risk mitigations for the development of automated trucks in the near to mid-term future (one to five years). The research team developed two research areas and related questions to address this problem: • Technology: How mature is autonomous vehicle (AV) technol- ogy for Army convoy operations? What are potential risks in deploying this technology through the medium term? • Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, per- sonnel, facilities, and policies (DOTmLPF-P):1 What effects will automated convoys have on Army force structure, operation planning, and execution? The team used multiple methods to address these questions, including subject-matter expert (SME) interviews, a review of Army and commercial test data, and sociotechnical systems (STeS) analy- sis. These efforts resulted in a new automation concept option for the Army to consider in the more immediate term, as well as several rec- ommendations for moving ahead in development and utilization more generally. Three Automated Convoy Concepts for the Army to Consider Many of the Army research and development activities in this arena have focused on a concept in which automated unmanned trucks follow the path of a manned truck in a convoy operation. We term this the partially unmanned (PU) employment concept. Because of some significant technical and tactical risks we discovered early in the study, we created a second concept for the Army to consider: the minimally manned (MM) employment concept.2 This concept is being used by 1 The tactical assessment covers select aspects of DOTmLPF-P but is not a full DOTmLPF-P assessment. For this reason, we use the general term tactical instead. 2 We explicitly use the term employment concept instead of concept to distinguish that these ideas differ mainly in how the automated trucks are used operationally. The PU and MM Summary xi many companies developing automated vehicles today and should be considered as a bridging concept between today’s human-operated convoys and the PU employment concept. The primary difference in the two concepts lies in the manning of the follower trucks. In the PU employment concept, the follower trucks are completely unmanned. In the MM employment concept, there is a single soldier in the driver’s seat to monitor the automated system and driving environment, but there is no passenger, as there is in traditional convoy operations. The third concept is a longer-term science and technology vision in which all the cargo trucks in the convoy are unmanned. In this concept, the Army trucks will be fully autonomous, greatly reducing the soldiers needed during the convoy operation. We term this the fully autono- mous (FA) employment concept. Analyzing these concepts gave more breadth to the analysis, but, more importantly, the MM concept offers the Army a feasible, and most likely necessary, way to reap the benefits of automated technology sooner. Because the FA employment concept is a long-term vision, we mainly focus on the MM and PU employment concepts. Personnel Reductions and Efficiencies Can Be Reached in the MM Employment Concept Table S.1 compares the personnel reductions and potential efficiencies that can be gained from the MM, PU, and FA concepts. As can be seen in Table S.1, there is only a difference of 9 percent between the MM and PU employment concepts. This marginal differ- ence is due to the need to carry backup drivers in the PU employment concept. The FA concept provides significant personnel reduction, estimated at 78 percent. These calculations are based on the assump- tion that the number of flatrack positions in the composite palletized load system (PLS) platoon convoy remains constant despite the person- nel reduction, creating a potential efficiency in throughput per soldier. employment concepts rely on the same basic technology requirements; it is the employment of these technologies that differentiates them. xii Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities The technology and DOTmLPF-P analyses, summarized below, sug- gest that the technology required for the FA and PU employment con- cepts is not yet mature and that significant force structure alterations will be required to realize this per-soldier throughput increase. Technology Assessment Results: PU Still Has Risks; MM Is a Better Option for Now The research team assessed information concerning AV technology maturity in fields in which a complex driving environment is an abso- lute. These vehicles include commercial trucks, buses, mining trucks, Army trucks, and passenger cars. The driving environments are sum- marized in Figure S.1. The left column in Figure S.1 shows different types of driving environments. These are ordered according to increasing complexity, ranging from test tracks to off-terrain trails. The assessment results suggest that the technology needed to put the PU employment con- cept into action might reach deployment readiness for highway driv- ing in 2019, at the earliest. For full automation, the FA employment concept will take much longer. The MM employment concept, on the other hand, is ready for Army adaptation and deployment in urban and Table S.1 Personnel Reductions and Efficiencies Comparisons for Different Automated Truck Employment Concepts AT Employment Concept \% Decrease in Soldiers (Versus Status Quo) \% Increase in Per-Soldier Throughput Status quo None None MM 28\% 38\% PU 37\% 59\% FA 78\% 350\% NOTES: AT = automated truck. One of the constraints in the MM and PU scenarios is that there must be sufficient drivers with the 88M military occupational specialty (MOS) for all of the PLS trucks. Su m m a ry xiii Figure S.1 Summary of AV Technology Demonstrations Future concept C o m p le x it y Level of autonomy Minimally manned concept Current PU concept Driving environment Automated driving with persistent human monitoring and some moderate intervention Automated driving without human monitoring and limited human intervention FA driving with no human driver NOTES: CAD = capabilities advancement demonstration; ITS = intelligent transportation system; JCTD = joint capability technology demonstrator; KONVOI = convoy [in German]; SARTRE = Safe Road Trains for the Environment; SUMET = small unit mobility enhance- ment technology; SwRI = Southwest Research Institute; TAP = temporary auto pilot; TARDEC = Tank Automotive Research, Develop- ment and Engineering Center; UGV = unmanned ground vehicle. Controlled environment (test track, dedicated lane, private roads, limited routes) Highway (high speeds, traf�c jams, cut-ins) Urban and highway (collision mitigation, automated cruise, lane-keeping, obstacle avoidance, etc.) Trail (off-terrain travel, river forging, tall grass, etc.) • SARTRE • Chauffeur • Commercial Truck Energy ITS • KONVOI (2,000 miles, 4 trucks) • SARTRE (124 miles, 4 vehicles) • Tesla (1.5 million miles) • Google (1.3 million miles) • Volkswagen TAP • China Bus (20 miles, 1 bus) • TARDEC JCTD (~10,000 miles) • SwRI SUMET (Ft. Benning trail demonstration) • Volvo DriveMe • Ford • Toyota • Daimler Inspiration Truck • Mercedes-Benz C-Class Truck • Rio Tinto (8 million miles, 73 trucks) • CityMobil2 (15,000 miles, 12 vehicles) • TARDEC CAD1/2 (100 miles) • Google self-driving car • SwRI UGV Commercial maturity predicted 2019–2025 Commercial maturity predicted 2028–2032 xiv Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities highway environments. Moreover, a demonstration by the Southwest Research Institute’s Small Unit Mobility Enhancement Technology at Fort Benning suggests that the technology can be developed for trail driving today. This analysis shows that the human operator provides a level of redundancy and robustness required to compensate for the cur- rent shortcomings in automated technology. A technology risk assessment, drawn from a review of test data and input from SMEs, suggests that there are several major technol- ogy shortcomings that will likely encumber the development of the PU employment concept. The MM employment concept also contains technical risks, but these risks are more manageable. These risks are summarized in Figure S.2. The risks were classified into seven general categories. Each category ranks the severity of the risk and its probable effect on the development program within the Army. Red risks were assessed to be severe developmental risks due to technology immaturity (technology readiness level [TRL] < 6) or other significant program- matic risks. Orange risks were assessed to be significant developmental risks due to some uncertainty in technology maturity (possible TRL = 6) or other significant programmatic risks. Yellow risks were assessed to have some potential technical and programmatic issues. Automated Trucks Will Require Convoy Tasks, Training, and Organization Structure to Adapt Automated convoys will bring about a dramatic change in the way the Army conducts its combat logistics operations. A qualitative STeS approach was used to guide a structured examination of the likely tac- tical and force impacts of employing automated trucks in Army convoy operations. This analysis revealed that soldiers who remain in the convoy could have higher cognitive loads as they perform additional tasks. In particular, the span of control might reduce for the convoy commander but increase for the crews of lead vehicles that must manage unmanned following trucks. Lastly, automated trucks will create greater demands for more-senior drivers and fewer demands for entry-level drivers. It is Su m m a ry x v Figure S.2 Technical Risk Assessment of PU and MM Employment Concepts Critical technical risk Sensors/data fusion: Inability of sensors/software to correctly interpret and react in complex driving environments Sustainment/maintenance: Inadequate sustainment funds may prevent necessary software upgrades Safety/testing: Impossible to test LF with con�dence that it will meet current safety and performance requirements Cyber: Inadequate cyber mitigation strategies in architecture may increase vulnerabilities and costs to sustain Communications: Intermittent or lack of communication between leader and followers will cause instability in followers Convoy integrity: Default conformity to following of the leader’s path may cause unintended accidents due to degraded driving surface Human-to-machine interface (HMI): Ineffective HMI will not allow soldiers to safely and effectively manage automated vehicles PU Automated technology ability to correctly perceive and react to hazards remains a major technical risk Inadequate sustainment funds may limit the software and hardware upgrades necessary to improve capabilities Millions of miles required for adequate testing, unlikely to occur in development Jamming of communication and GPS likely will require convoy to stop and reload drivers from other vehicles Maintaining conformity to prescribed path has technical and safety issues Cyberattacks may go unnoticed until signi�cant issue occurs Need to design commander control device (CCD) to help increase awareness and decrease cognitive load of leader TC MM Single operator will be available in the cab to monitor and take over when necessary Army can still reduce soldier risk with MM concept if funding is curtailed Single operator allows for accumulation of data fundamental for safety validation MM concept will have single driver in cab to take over if linkage is lost Follower driver will need to follow leader without bene�t of truck commander (TC) as additional observer Driver can recognize potential compromise and take back control of vehicle HMI technological design and tactical operation with the HMI system is critical for safe and effective single-driver operation NOTE: GPS = Global Positioning System; LF = leader-follower. xvi Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities anticipated that this shift in personnel demand will change the force structure requirements, training, and recruiting for convoy soldiers. Convoy-Specific Tasks: Fewer Personnel Mean Higher Expectations Convoy tasks are likely to undergo a redistribution of functions from humans to machines in both MM and PU concepts. These realloca- tions are of particular concern because there will be far fewer soldiers to execute all functions not conducted by the automated truck system or when the automated truck system is not fully functioning. Many of the affected tasks involve sensing and decisionmaking, which could impose exces- sive cognitive burden on the remaining soldiers in the convoy. With fewer soldiers to execute all remaining tasks in the automated truck- enabled convoy, technology should be identified to help manage cogni- tive load limitations of the remaining personnel in the convoy. Convoy Organizational Structure: Reporting Structure and Control Will Change Changes brought about by automated technology will also affect the organizational structure of the convoy for the MM and PU employ- ment concepts—to a greater extent for the PU employment concept. A particular issue that will result from the PU employment concept is related to the direct reporting relationships and their associated span- of-control implications. Currently, almost all trucks have communica- tions capabilities so that truck crews can communicate directly with the convoy commander (CC) or assistant convoy commander (ACC). The addition of unmanned automated truck technology will reduce the number of manned trucks with which the CC and ACC must coordinate. However, the trucks leading the automated unmanned trucks in the convoy will have to provide oversight and management of these unmanned trucks. Although the span of control for the CC and ACC will be reduced, the span of control (and associated cognitive load) for crews in the lead trucks will significantly increase. Personnel: Skills Will Change, as Will Training Needs The proficiencies required for the personnel operating Army convoys with automated technology will also change. Because almost all person- Summary xvii nel within the PLS convoy are from the 88M MOS, the introduction of automated trucks will significantly affect the 88M career progression over time. The 88M MOS has four levels that represent progressively increasing levels of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs). Figure S.3 depicts the four MOS levels with the roles generally performed. The roles listed in red text are ones that are likely to have significant impacts from the introduction of automated truck technology. The vast majority of in-convoy personnel reductions will occur at the 10-level and 20-level 88M positions, with little or no savings among 88M senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) at the 30 and 40 levels.3 These changes will reduce the number of soldiers at risk 3 These anticipated reductions in personnel needed are only during the actual convoy operation. These soldiers also have responsibilities before and after the convoy operation that will not benefit from the automated technology. The automated technology may actually increase the before and after tasks required to be completed by these soldiers. Figure S.3 88M MOS Pyramid with Key Positions by MOS • CC • ACC • ACC • Squad/chalk leader • Senior vehicle driver/ TC • Security team leader • Senior vehicle driver/ TC • Gunner (on gun trucks) • Vehicle/truck driver • Gun truck driver • Security team dismount • Gunner (on gun trucks) General shape of 88M personnel savings for LF-enabled convoy Career “pipeline” for remaining 88Ms 10 -le ve l 2 0- le ve l 3 0- le ve l 40 -le ve l xviii Automating Army Convoys: Technical and Tactical Risks and Opportunities but will not directly enable generation of additional convoys and over- all throughput increases. Additional shifts will require reorganization of existing transportation company force structure to increase the 30- and 40-level 88Ms relative to the 10- and 20-level personnel. These demands will eventually change the fundamental structure of the 88M MOS career pyramid and possibly require alternative approaches to training and recruitment for developing senior 88M personnel. The MM and PU employment concepts will have nearly equal effect on these force structure changes. Recommendations Despite the potential pressures and risks associated with being one of the Army’s first major automated vehicle programs, the Army should continue pursuing the automated truck technology for convoy opera- tions. This leading, large-scale automation of Army vehicles will be a pivotal effort because robotics are anticipated to be a major force enabler in the future. As such, we provide the following five recom- mendations to help guide this effort. Execute the MM employment concept as a necessary bridg- ing strategy to achieve the full PU employment capability. Current sensor and software technologies do not have the maturity to success- fully manage the complex combat …