Fluent Essays

This research project requires you to tie together the key components of project management. Ensure all responses you provide (including numbers and facts) are supported with information from the journal, or where necessary, provide appropriate assumptions and additional information from external sources. However, facts from the journal will trump all external sources. This journal including all other external sources should be correctly referenced. Use effective APA in-text citation to help the reader know exactly where you are picking your facts from. Cleveland State University Cleveland State University [email protected] [email protected] Civil and Environmental Engineering Faculty Publications Civil and Environmental Engineering 6-2013 1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project Management 1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project Management Failure Failure Ashish Patel HWH Architects Engineers Planners, Inc, [email protected] Paul A. Bosela Cleveland State University, [email protected] Norbert Delatte Cleveland State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/encee_facpub Part of the Civil Engineering Commons, and the Construction Engineering and Management Commons How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! Publishers Statement © ASCE Original Citation Original Citation Patel, A., Bosela, P., and Delatte, N. (2013). 1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project Management Failure. J.Perform.Constr.Facil., 27(3), 362-369. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Civil and Environmental Engineering at [email protected] It has been accepted for inclusion in Civil and Environmental Engineering Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of [email protected] For more information, please contact [email protected] 1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project Management Failure Ashish Patel1 ; Paul A. Bosela, F.ASCE2 ; and Norbert J. Delatte, F.ASCE3 Introduction On May 12 . 1970 . ex tensive lobbyi ng and d ipl omacy by Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau paid off when Montrea l was awarded the 1976 O lympic Gam es over strong bids from Moscow and Los Angeles . Although both competing c ities provided fimmc iu l guarantees . Drapeau sialed thai the Games would cost il rnilximum of $ 124 million and that the hi story and reputation of Montreal would stand in p lace of a guarantee (Auf deT Maur 1976). For the next fe w years, very little was done. The original plan was scrapped. Mayor Drapeau became enamored with architect Roger Taill ibert s Pare des Princcs in Paris. Tellingly, the construction cost fo r thai stadi um had ballooned from the original estimated $9 million to a final cost of $25 mi ll io n. Drnpeau se[ected Taillibert without a com­ petition. Li ke T aillibert. Dmpeau had had previous problems with cost oveffilns. The Olympi c bid wa~ based in part on Montreal s successfu l hosting of the [967 Expo. However. the finul cost of the Expo was $430 million- much more thoo the 1964 estimate of $ 160 million. A new plan was laid ou t in a press conference on April 6, 1972. Almost 2 years o f preparation time had been wa>ted (Auf der Maur (976). In November [972. Drapeau gave a fi g ure o f $3 10 mil lion a~ the tOia l projec ted cost of the Olympic Games. Of the $250 million in capita l e xpenditures in the budget, $130.8 million was for the sta­ dium and $ 16.4 million fort he velodrome. The O lym pi c Village was listed undernoncapital expenditures as $5 mi llion. Howell teons th is Drapeau s kitc hen-tabl e budget that no one ever took serio us ly but that also no oneever gathered the data to challenge. It was suspiciou s from the stan , however, because the recenll y concluded Munic h Games had cost lh e equiv al en t of $600 million. Shortly afterward. in January 1973. Drapeau made hi s often-quoted (llIld often-derided) stat eme nt that the Monlreal Olympi cs ca n no more have a de fi ci t than a man cu n have a baby (Howel l 2009). Howell later observed that ··amazin g ly. evc ry tim e the Mayor rev ised hi s cost estimate. we believed thaI it was COITt!c t at last (Howe ll 2009). Drapeuu laid ou t u plan for $3 [0 million in financing. the bulk o f which wou ld come from the sa le of $250 million in Ol ympic com­ memo mtive coin s. The fedeml government of Cooada reviewed th e budget and thought that $ [00 million in coi n s:tl es would be more rc;l listi c. The federal government d id nOI want to ge t stuck with the bill fo r the construction or th e Games. The c it y of Mon lrcuJ had mude Ihe commitmcnt. and Cooada und the Province of Quebec did not w ish to be responsible fo r fu lfi ll in g that commitment. Strangely. they seemed to think that the construction cosl estimates were in the ball park. At thi s point in the process. Drapeau sugge sted at 11 news conference that the real proble m wou ld be figuring out how to spend the surp lus from the fi rst self- financin g Gam es in O lympic hi story (Howell 2009). The extensive construction o f the Ol ympi c fac ilities was justi ­ fied. in pan. on the idea that the facilit ie s co uld be used after the Games for other spons . speci fica ll y usin g the O lympic Stadium for the Montreal Expos baseball team. However. the potentia l users were not co nsulted during the pl:l11lling process (Howell 2009). T he suita bilit y of th e fu ci liti es for usc lifte r the Games ended will be di sc ussed later in th is paper James Neal begins hi s textbook. entit led COlI,rtm ctioll Cost Es- lill!(IIillg COII epls and Their Appliw tiol1s (Neil 1979), with an eight-page case stud y of the Montrea l Olympi cs compl ex. Nick Auf der MaUL a newspaper columnist and me mber of the Montreal C ity Cou nc il. wrote The BiIlioll·Dollar Came: Jelln DrUpe(1II (m d the /976 Olympics about all the pro blems (Auf der Maur (976), In late July 1976, at the final session of the World Congress on Space Structures, a highly controversial panel discussion was held on the project, which was later documented in ASCE’s Civil En­ gineering magazine. It included some prominent consulting engi­ neers from the United States, such as Anton Tedesko and Lev Zetlin, and some engineers and architects from Canada and elsewhere. A sidebar to the article summarized some of the comments that had appeared in the Montreal Star newspaper under the title, “Cost-Be- Damned Attitude Brought on Olympic Woes” (Civil Engineering 1976). This paper has been assembled from a variety of sources rather than firsthand observations. As such, it could be subject to the biases of the authors of the source information and may be inadvertently slanted. Care has been taken to balance the opposing viewpoints as much as possible. Olympic Games, Politics, and Prestige The quadrennial Olympic Games are so prestigious that cities and countries commit substantial resources to bidding for the right to hold them and then invest heavily in the facilities in which to hold them. For the 1976 Games, Moscow and Los Angeles both bid against Montreal, and concerns about cold war politics weighted the scales in Montreal’s favor. Moscow would host the 1980 Games, boycotted by the United States and its allies, and Los Angeles would host the 1984 Games, boycotted by the Soviet Union and its allies, showing that the concerns about politics were well-founded. The Montreal Games also took place against the backdrop of the 1972 Munich Games and the hostage crisis that resulted in the death of Israeli athletes. After 1972, there were concerns about how the Games could go on, if they should, and how they could be kept safe. Kidd (1992) contends that the politics of Canada, Quebec, and Montreal played a large part in the difficulties of the 1976 Games. Much of the tension was brought about by the resurgence of Quebec’s Francophone nationalism and the succession movement. In addition, Montreal had long been dominated economically, po­ litically, and culturally by a small Anglophone elite that was at odds with the Quebec nationalism movement. The federal government of Canada supported Montreal’s bid reluctantly and ruled out direct financial support for the Games. Furthermore, Mayor Drapeau and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau did not trust each other. As a result, it took a long time to set up the Olympic lottery and coin and stamp program to support the Games, which cost 34 months of lead time. The program was slowed by unpaid bills until the Province of Quebec reluctantly agreed to accept responsibility for any deficit in early 1973. The potential embarrassment of missing the opening of the Games provided a fixed construction deadline. The planning started about 2 years too late, and scheduling fell apart because it was phy­ sically impossible to accommodate all the construction activities on the project site. The City of Montreal was too slow in preparing bid documents, so the work could not be competitively bid but was instead awarded to selected contractors. Double crews, double shifts, and overtime were used to attempt to increase productivity, but because of congestion, the increase in productivity was slight (Neil 1979). Political turmoil intervened during the Montreal Games. Canada refused to allow the Republic of China (Taiwan) to compete because Canada had recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970, despite the fact that the Republic of China was a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This caused considerable friction with the United States. A much larger issue came about involving New Zealand’s participation in the Games because the New Zealand rugby team had just played in South Africa, and South Africa was barred from the Olympics during the apartheid era. Just before the Montreal Olympics started, 28 African countries walked out of the Games, joined by Guyana and Iraq (Strenk 1978). The issues of the politics and prestige of the Olympic Games have continued since Montreal. “There’s a myth growing, on this Olympic mess, that it all started with the tacky, overcommercialized Summer Games in Atlanta. Which led to all the bribes and greed of Salt Lake City. It’s a nice myth, but it’s wrong. The real sleaze got its start with Jean Drapeau and the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. There was the blueprint for corruption.” (Fotheringham 1999, p. 76). Montreal Olympic Complex The Montreal Olympic complex consisted of a main stadium, a ve­ lodrome (bicycle racing venue), roads, walkways, practice fields, an Olympic Village housing facility, and other structures and land­ scaping. The complex is shown in Fig. 1. Planning began in 1970, and preliminary estimates prepared at that time indicated a projected cost for the entire complex of $120 million, including a projected cost for the main stadium of $40 million. The final cost in 1976 was $1.5 billion, with $836 million for the main stadium. In addition to the cost overruns, there were considerable time overruns, which meant that the complex was al­ most not completed in time for the Olympics, and some of the final activities were still ongoing at the time the Olympics started. Major components originally planned, such as the retractable roof, were not begun until after the Olympics (Neil 1979). The original owner was the City of Montreal, Quebec, which contracted with architect Roger Taillibert to design the Olympic Park, including the Olympic Stadium and velodrome (Auf der Maur 1976). Mr. Taillibert lived and conducted business in Paris, France. Both the velodrome and Olympic Stadium were relatively unusual, unique artistic creations. The Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, has been criticized for an almost worshipful attitude toward Taillibert. The mayor rejected cuts that could have saved up to $146 million. He insisted on building the stadium of concrete rather than steel because Taillibert was a precast-concrete expert—although a steel stadium might have cost $100 million less (Civil Engineering 1976). Taillabert, who was to be paid $10–15 million for his work, did not help public relations with his lack of modesty, saying “That’s all Fig. 1. Olympic Stadium complex during the 1976 Olympic Games (Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) Canadians and North Americans talk about—money, money, money. It doesn’t interest me at all,” telling a reporter “Are you aware that the building of the stadium and velodrome constitutes a great moment in the history of architecture and technology?” (Civil Engineering 1976). Velodrome Prior to bidding for the Olympic Games, the City of Montreal had already committed to hosting the World Cycling Championships in the Olympic velodrome for the summer of 1974. Construction of the velodrome began in August 1973, a year in advance of the scheduled opening of the Championships on August 14, 1974. However, it turned out that the rocky subsoil was not solid enough to support the roof—a fact that had not been found by geologic soundings and subsurface tests. The location near the Saint Law­ rence River, however, hinted at probable subsurface difficulties. The foundation problems, along with labor union conflicts, ensured that the velodrome could not open in time for the Championships. A temporary facility was quickly built at the University of Montréal football stadium. The makeshift site had an excellent view of Mount Royal and would have served very well for the Olympic Games, although the spectator capacity would have been less. The incident highlighted the problems with the Olympic construction, but by this time there were less than 2 years left to go (Howell 2009). The contract for the velodrome construction was awarded to prime contractor Charles Duranceau with a $12 million bid, based on half-complete plans, in August 1973, and construction began later that year. It was the first and last contract of the Montreal Olympics issued through public bidding (Auf der Maur 1976). The velodrome consisted of three arches supported by abut­ ments. It was designed to have the appearance of a cycling helmet, as shown in Fig. 2. The structure consisted almost entirely of arches 171 m (560 ft) long and rising to 27 m (90 ft) high. The arches were made of precast-concrete sections positioned onto falsework on site and then posttensioned (D’Appolonia 1990). The horizontal component H of the arch thrust is given by qL2 H ¼ ð1Þ 8d where q 5 uniform load along the arch, L 5 span of the arch, and d 5 height of the arch. For a given span L, as the depth decreases, the horizontal force increases. The low aspect ratio d/L of the arch, about 1:6, produced very high horizontal thrust forces. The arch was supported by four abutments, designated W, X, Y, and Z in Fig. 3. Abutments X and Y were founded on good rock, but the rock was of questionable quality at Abutments W and Z. Addi­ tional investigations showed that the rock was broken up to a depth of about 6 m (20 ft) and was over a thin layer of clay shale 150–600 mm (6 in. to 2 ft) thick. The thin layer represented a potential slip surface for the abutments, and as a result, tendons had to be driven through that layer into competent rock (D’Appolonia 1990) (Fig. 4). Abutment Z, unlike the other three abutments, takes the combined thrust of three arches and, as a result, has to resist the highest forces. A critical construction operation was the decentering, or re­ moval of the supporting falsework for the arches. The process would create the greatest loads on the abutments, about 32,000 tons on Abutment Z. A total of 36 jacks were used, each with a stroke of 25 mm (1 in.). Only 13 mm (0.5 in.) of displacement could be tolerated during decentering, and the operation was carefully mon­ itored (D’Appolonia 1990). The soil problem of low bearing capacity and the high loads on the abutments had resulted in substantial time delays and cost overruns for the foundation work. Although the foundation of the velodrome had been estimated to cost $497,576, the final cost was $7,171, 876 because of the extensive grouting and anchorage system shown in Fig. 4. A large part of the construction delay was because the contractor had to wait on Taillibert to finish the plans. Once the final plans were received, it was necessary to develop construction plans for the falsework. The work quickly fell behind, and it was Fig. 2. Velodrome, now a biodome (Wikipedia Commons, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Biodome_Montreal.jpg, photograph by PtitLutin) Fig. 3. Plan and elevation of velodrome (1 ft 5 0:3 m) obvious that the 1974 date could not be met. More workers were hired, and extensive overtime was authorized, but the extra workers mostly got in each others’ way. By late fall 1974, $34 million had been spent on the velodrome, and it was not complete. New subcontractors were hired. Given the time constraints, most of the construction contracts were cost plus rather than low-bid fixed-cost contracts. There also were a number of labor problems, such as tasks taking too long, strikes, overtime, and extra equipment, which themselves added about $12 million to the project cost (Auf der Maur 1976). The final cost for the 7,000-seat velodrome was approximately $70 million, compared with a $60 million cost for a 60,000-seat domed stadium in Seattle, Washington, at the same time. The cost per seat was 10 times as high. There also remained the concern that acrylic panels in the roof posed a fire hazard (Auf der Maur 1976). Anton Tedesko was known for his efficient thin-concrete-shell structures, epitomized by the Hershey Arena that spanned 67 m (220 ft) with a shell only 89 mm (3.5 in.) thick (Billington and Billington 2006). He was strongly critical of the velodrome, stating that it should have had a greater construction depth (or height) that would have greatly reduced the forces. As Eq. (1) shows, H is in­ versely proportional to d. It could also have been more structurally efficient if the dome and three-dimensional action had been con­ sidered in the design. Tedesko stated that the structures “do damage to the cause of concrete. Our young people should be told that these structures did not have to be done this way. As built, this gigantic demonstration project is almost an argument against the use of con­ crete and for the use of structural steel or aluminum under similar circumstances in the future” (Civil Engineering 1976, pp. 50–51). The velodrome was renovated starting in 1989 and transformed into a biodome managed by the City of Montreal in 1992. It is now part of the Montreal Nature Museum (Parc Olympique Quebec 2011). Olympic Stadium All the structures were dramatic, modern, and complex, none more so than the main stadium. The stadium may be seen in the upper Fig. 4. Typical arch abutment (Abutment Z) (1 ft 5 0:3 m) right of Fig. 1 and in its final configuration in Fig. 5. The stadium had a number of unusual features. It was intended to resemble an elliptical seashell with a handle, which would have a retractable fabric cover hanging from a tall mast over the opening. As Fig. 1 shows, the mast and cover were not in place at the time of the Olympics (Neil 1979). They were added later and may be seen in Fig. 5. The general structural form appears to be a large elliptical dome with an opening in the middle for the fabric roof. If it were, in fact, a thin dome with a compression ring, it would be an efficient struc­ tural form. However, it isn’t. The main structural members are com­ plex precast concrete ribs, shown in Fig. 6. The ribs cantilever out over the stadium, and although the hollow ring inside the roof carries lighting and other support systems, it is not designed to carry com­ pression forces. Because of the gentle slope of the roof, each pair of ribs is a different size. The ribs were glued and posttensioned. They proved to be very difficult to erect, so misalignments of the ribs were as much as 150 mm (6 in.). This was a problem because the posttensioning cables had to be threaded through tubes in the ring. During the winter, some empty posttensioning ducts became full of ice, and considerable time and expense were involved in removing Fig. 5. Olympic Stadium (Wikipedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/File:Le_Stade_Olympique_3.jpg) Fig. 6. Ribs of the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) the ice (Neil 1979). It has been estimated that if all the ribs had been the same size, $20–30 million could have been saved (Civil Engi­ neering 1976). Furthermore, the stadium design did not consider construct- ability and did not leave room for interior scaffolding. Many cranes were used instead, some holding ribs, and others holding workers, tools, and materials. Fig. 7 shows the congestion of cranes in the stadium. At one point, 80 cranes were used in the main stadium, and it was estimated that doubling the number of cranes only increased productivity 25\% because they could not work effectively given that they were in each other’s way (Neil 1979). “At one stage, there was a forest of 200 building cranes on the stadium site, some from as far as Calgary, while gravel truck drivers gleefully drove in, collected their fee, and then drove out the other end, unloaded, and just went around the block again. Skilled workers, at seven 10-hour shifts a week, pulled down $1,500 weekly by doing only 2 hours a day of actual work” (Fotheringham 1999, p. 76). Although epoxy-glued, posttensioned construction had been used successfully in Europe, it was new to the North American contractors. As with any new technology, there was a difficult learning process (Neil 1979). With the time constraints on this project, the use of an unfamiliar technique was not a good idea. Taillibert did not deliver the plans and specifications for the Olympic Stadium until the late summer of 1974. He had already gained a reputation for late delivery of construction documents. The contract to build the Olympic Stadium was awarded to Desourdy and Duranceau, as cost plus $9 million profit with a $1 million bonus if the site were ready on time. The contract was awarded without public tenders. It was a strange choice of contractor, given that Duranceau was already buried in difficulties with the velodrome. The Province of Quebec forced the hiring of Lalonde, Valois, Lamarre, Valois & Associates (known as Lalonde, Valois) as project manager over Drapeau’s resistance. The cost estimates of Lalonde, Valois proved to be no better than any of the others (Auf der Maur 1976). At the beginning of 1975, the Olympic Organizing Committee (referred to as COJO from Comité de contrôle des Jeux olympiques) was very concerned about completion of the stadium and began to look for alternatives, such as finding or building a cheaper stadium nearby. Mayor Drapeau called an elaborate press conference to explain the cost projections and provide assurances that the stadium would be ready on time. He referred to a funding gap of $200 million, Fig. 7. Cranes at work in the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) refusing to call it a deficit. The alternate-stadium concept was scrapped (Auf der Maur 1976). Very generous terms were given to the precasters who built the concrete ribs, including a $230,000 rental of one plant for Olympic construction and a $500,000 extension built onto another plant with public funds, plus $685,000 in cash bonuses and honoraria. Pre- casting costs rose from $16 million to $42 million (Auf der Maur 1976). Late in the game, Taillibert insisted on adding a water cascade to the top of the parking garages connected to the stadium, adding at least $8 million to the cost. The parking garages, originally budgeted for an extravagant $25 million, cost $60 million, or about $13,000 per parking space. The water cascade also would require 113 million L (30 million gal) of water (Auf der Maur 1976). Mayor Drapeau, with no engineering or architecture qualifica­ tions, had spent much time poring over plans and going to the construction site to give orders, which confused the workers. Then, on December 13, 1974, Drapeau sent a representative to a meeting to say that the stadium construction would cost substantially more. The project continued to be troubled by labor demonstrations and strikes. Finally, on November 19, 1975, the Province of Quebec created the Régie des Installations Olympiques (RIO) to complete construction of the Olympic Park and take over as owner. Drapeau and Taillibert were now off the site. In assuming control from the City of Montreal, however, Quebec also assumed the expense (Howell 2009). Quebec advanced $200 million for the project but in return had to delay other important construction in Montreal, such as the subway and a sewage treatment plant. At that time, Montreal was one of the few cities in the Western world still dumping raw, untreated sewage into a river. Bills were paid, and construction continued, with no better cost control than before (Auf der Maur 1976). The final cost for the stadium was approximately $13,000 per seat, compared with approximately $2,400 per seat for the Super- dome in New Orleans, Louisiana, constructed at approximately the same time (Neil 1979). The stadium was nicknamed the Big O because of its name and shape, but it later became known as the Big Owe (“Quebec’s” 2006). Tedesko and consulting engineer Lev Zetlin both criticized the stadium. Tedesko noted that anyone familiar with match-cast post- tensioned precast-concrete construction would have predicted the difficulties encountered. Zetlin stated that a large-span structure should be light, permit a large margin of error in the field, and use construction methods that were as simple as possible, and the Montreal Olympic Stadium violated all these principles. He further criticized the heavy roof as a dead weight on top of the building (Civil Engineering 1976). After the 1976 Olympics, the Olympic Stadium saga continued. It was found that the tower could not be completed as planned in concrete without major structural work because it would be too heavy and that the tower would be overstressed by the Canadian standard (“Court” 1983). The tower was completed in steel and was damaged by a fire during construction (“Fire” 1986). The roof and tower were completed, but the retractable Kevlar roof was not in­ stalled until 1986 and was stored in France and then Montreal at a cost of several million dollars. In 1989, the roof developed huge tears because of air pressure (“Experts” 1989). In 1991, a 55-t chunk of the roof fell after support beams snapped, forcing an extended closure. Fortunately, there were no injuries. All 33 beams had to be reinforced at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars. The failure may have been because of the use of an improper (e.g., not corrosion- resistant) type of steel or poor welding (“55-ton” 1991; “Suspect” 1991). Finally, RIO decided to replace the roof (“Fixing” 1993). The new roof tore again in the winter of 1999, forcing the cancellation of an auto show and a subsequent boat show (“Stadium” 1999). Olympic Village The Olympic Village project began in 1970, when at the presen­ tations to win the Olympic bid in Amsterdam, Jean Drapeau an­ nounced that the Olympic Village would be a low-rise structure that would be placed just to the east of the Olympic Stadium and Velodrome. The mayor said that the village would be used to pro­ vide for 4,000 low-cost housing units after the Olympics were over, serving up to 14,000 tenants. The concept would fit in well for his self-financing Olympics because the Central Mortgage and Housing Commission (CMHC) would provide 95\% of the clearance cost and 75\% of the construction cost (Auf der Maur 1976). There was a great debate on both where to place the Olympic Village and whether the village would be centralized or spread out. There were many protests against placing the complex in Viau Park because it would take away green space from a city that didn’t have much of it. However, at the end of 1972, Mayor Drapeau announced that the Olympic Village was going to be built in the park and that the village would be centralized, over all objections. The city also destroyed 125 elm trees on the site after promising not to remove any (Auf der Maur 1976). “In January 1974, a group from Montreal arrived in Baie des Anges, on the Côte d’Azur in southern France, the site of a spec­ tacular pyramid-shaped condominium complex designed by archi­ tect André Minangoy. The visitors, who included Montreal developer Joseph Zappia, told the sales director of the Baie des Anges project that they had been selected to build the Olympic Village for 1976. This was odd because the deadline for tenders was not until March 1, almost two months in the future” (Auf der Maur 1976). When the project went out to bid, 53 different groups or com­ panies had paid the $100 to pick up the preliminary specifications and requirements. However, as the March 1 deadline came and went, the city announced that there were no suitable proposals and that the deadline was going to be postponed indefinitely. As time went on, many of the bidding companies never heard anything at all from the city …