Fluent Essays

For your thread, answer at least 1 of the following questions of your choice (you can discuss as many as you like): 1. From your personal outside research please briefly compare and contrast the relationship between private prisons and their union experience at it relates to the earlier chapters in this course on unions in general. 2. Compare and contrast criminal justice organizations with nonprofit organizations. 3. Telework, that is sometimes known as working from home or from a mobile setting outside the usual office etc., can be a very flexible opportunity for many employees and in some cases very positive for an employer. Discuss the possible advantages of such a system as well as its negative pitfalls. PRIVATIZATION from  Dictionary of Prisons and Punishment Privatization – or ‘contracting out’ – refers to a process whereby the state hands over, under contract, the delivery of new or existing penal services to private operators. Sometimes private operators are global, profit-making organizations, sometimes local, non-profit making bodies, often registered as charities. The political genealogy of privatization The state has rarely operated a complete monopoly in the delivery of penal services in modern Western democracies, and private providers have therefore never been wholly excluded from the business of inflicting punishment. To acknowledge this, however, is not to deny there has been a renewed interest in encouraging private operators to deliver more penal services in North America, Europe and Australia since the late 1980s. This new interest was partly driven by the rise of the new Right which sought to reduce the role of government across a whole range of activities, encouraging private companies rather than the state to finance, build and manage not only new prisons but also new hospitals and new schools. The argument was that private involvement would enable governments to reduce the overall burden of public taxation, leaving it to the private sector to provide these key services, preferably in direct competition with public service providers, which would further help to reduce costs. The fact that some private operators would make a profit from their operations was not considered to be a problem. Indeed, the ‘profit motive’ was thought to provide the necessary incentive to secure high-quality services. Forms of privatization There is no single model of privatization. In some countries (e.g. France and, on a smaller scale, Germany), the state still finances, builds and owns prisons but has handed out the management of some facilities to the private sector. In Britain, the USA and in some Australian states, on the other hand, private operators have in some cases taken over the whole burden of financing as well as building and managing new prisons. The advantage this has for the state is that, during the current period of tight fiscal discipline, it can keep the immediate capital cost of building new prisons off its balance sheet. This cost is initially borne by the private contractor, who then claws it back by entering into a long-term contract, lasting for up to 25 years, with the state which guarantees to send its prisoners there at a negotiated per diem cost. The operation of such contracts is monitored, and companies have been fined for not meeting their contractual conditions (e.g. for not providing adequate educational provision for inmates). Private contractors have sometimes lost entire contracts, and several private institutions have been returned to the public sector. In most cases, on-site government monitors are responsible for overseeing the contracts, offering the state another lever of accountability. Attempts to compare the overall performance of these private prisons with state-run prisons – which still constitute the vast majority of prisons in all the countries mentioned – are as frequent as they are contentious. Ancillary services, such as prisoner escort services, have also been put out to private tender. In the UK, for example, the transfer of all prisoners between prisons, and between prisons and the courts, is undertaken by private companies. Other UK companies have contracted to provide prison food; still others are responsible for the electronic monitoring of offenders released from prison into the community. At the shallow end of the penal system, the government has also encouraged the involvement of private, non-governmental agencies in helping to provide community supervisions. Guidelines governing how these services are to be competitively tendered, to ensure ‘value is added’, have been drawn up by government for use in the newly formed National Offender Management Service (NOMS). While efficiency gains are paramount, the encouragement of non-governmental agencies at this end of the system is also driven by the acknowledgement by governments that managing offenders in the community cannot just be left to state but is the responsibility of all civic groups. Critics of privatization There has been some criticism of private sector involvement at the shallow end of the system. It is argued, for example, that through new public management techniques the state now exerts more control over the emerging disaggregated, semi-private (or mixed) penal system than ever before; that both hard-working voluntary and for-profit organizations are being constrained by rigid national standards and over-optimistic performance targets. However, it has been the decision to hand over prisons for profit to private companies in North America, Europe and Australia that has prompted the most controversy. Some critics of private prisons argue that they are morally repugnant. The argument is that, while all societies have rules, and those who break those rules must be punished, it is morally wrong to make those who deliver this pain on our behalf ever richer according to the quantum of pain they deliver. A contingent moral argument is that private operators will lobby for more prisons, thus delivering more pain by promoting the expansion of the deep end of the penal system. On a more practical level, critics claim that the idea of private prisons was sold by the new right on the untested assertion that they would reform offenders more effectively than state-run prisons, where recidivist rates have historically been notoriously high. On the matter of costs, the arguments are more complicated. For example, critics argue that, where operating costs appear to make savings for government, it is almost entirely down to reducing staff costs. The claim is that, routinely, fewer guards are employed in private prisons and that those who are employed have poor conditions of employment and less job security. For these reasons there is much trade union opposition to private prisons. Claims of financial manipulation have also been levelled at one private sector company in the UK that successfully renegotiated its insurance liabilities on one of its prison operations without passing these savings to government. Advocates of privatization Proponents of private prisons rebut most of these arguments. They claim that some of the objections are ideologically motivated, emanating from left-wing critics who remain committed to an over-centralized, high-spending nanny state. They claim that private contractors have always been involved in delivering punishment as builders of prisons, and that during periods of prison expansion they have increased their profits. What is new in principle, or morally questionable, about contracting out? As for the claim that, if they were to manage prisons, private contractors would inevitably put their legal duty to maximize profits before the interests of prisoners by cutting corners, this is surely something that would quickly be spotted by external audit, or by on-site monitors? Indeed, rather than cutting corners, efficient, cost-conscious private operators argue that their practices will force up management standards in the public sector. As to the fear that private operators might drive up the prison population by demanding longer prison sentences, they ask for the evidence, pointing out that the factors involved in rising prison rates are very complex, often reflecting wider social and political insecurities over which they have little control. True, private companies make no secret of the fact they have lobbied for the chance to finance, build and manage the new prisons that both politicians and public are demanding. But supporters would say: what is wrong with that, not least if it helps to reduce evident and widespread overcrowding that prison reformers take such exception to? Where we are now While the introduction of private prisons has been a striking innovation, their spread has been less spectacular than their advocates anticipated. For example, the private sector’s forecast in 1996 that it was on course to be managing 25 per cent of all UK prisons looks optimistic. Furthermore, although privatization has gathered momentum in individual American states, the dramatic rise in the prison population has meant that the overall proportion of American offenders held in privately owned or managed facilities is still very modest. Critics of privatization find no difficulty in explaining this limited progress. They argue that private prisons have yet to demonstrate that they can either discipline or reform prisoners any more effectively than state-run prisons and that, relatedly, there is no reliable evidence that their competitive challenge has forced the public sector prisons significantly to raise their performance. Critics further argue that short-term operational cost savings, even where they can be demonstrated, need to be set against the fact that using such mechanisms as the Public Sector Finance Initiative (PFI), which enables the private sector to pick up the initial capital cost of building new prisons, only encourages governments to build more, which in the end the government still has to pay for through taxation. The privatization of penal services mirrors a major reconfiguration of other branches of the criminal justice system – for example, policing, where a whole range of duties once regarded as traditional policing functions are now being ‘hived off’ to the private sector. However, this process has met resistance from professionals and others who argue that, in sensitive areas of social regulation such as policing and punishment where the state sanctions the use of ‘legitimate force’ the use of private operators, if not objectionable in principle, at least requires robust scrutiny. Related entries Accountability ;  Audit ;  Electronic monitoring ;  National Offender Management Service (NOMS) ;  New public management (NPM) . Key texts and sources  Coyle, A., Campbell, A., Neufeld, R. and Rodley, N. (2006) Capitalist Punishment: Prison Privatization and Human Rights. London: Zed Books.   Harding, R. (1997) Private Prisons and Public Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press.   James, A., Bottomley, A. K., Liebling, A. and Clare, A. (1997) Privatizing Prisons: Rhetoric and Reality. London: Sage.   Logan, C. (1990) Private Prisons: Pros and Cons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.   Mehigan, J. and Rowe, A. (2007) ‘Problematizing prison privatization: an overview of the debate’, in Jewkes, Y. (eds) Handbook on Prisons. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.   Price, B. (2006) Merchandizing Prisoners: Who Really Pays for Prison Privatisation? Westpoint, CT: Praeger.   Ryan, M. and Ward, A. (1989) Privatization and the Penal System: The American Experience and the Debate in Britain. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.   For the Prison Privatisation Report International, see http://www.psiru.org/ppri.asp.  Prisons, Private from  Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice Ethics Private prisons are detention places where control of those who have been sentenced is awarded or contracted out to a nongovernmental entity (i.e., private company). At least two situations may be at play with private prisons. A public or government detention facility allows the private company to assume control over the existing building containing prisoners; or a private corporation may build a new prison to house prisoners that the government allocates to the corporation to manage. Of all state and federal prisoners in the United States, currently about 8 percent are managed by private prisons. Given the tenfold increase in the number of prisoners over the last 40 years, along with the fourfold increase in the imprisonment rate, there have been a number of corresponding challenges to confining prisoners. Issues challenging private prisons range from economic to legal and moral and by no means are straightforward. History Private prisons in the United States go back as early as colonial times with private and public partnerships involving prisoners. Local businesses around the time of the American Revolution would pay for prisoners in order to harness and take advantage of their labor. During the Civil War, local businesses such as furniture producers and coal mining companies tried to use prisoner labor to expand their profits. The governments from which these local businesses contracted prison labor often needed the quick cash afforded to them by these arrangements. During the mid-1980s, private prisons experienced a resurgence. This time, however, instead of local/small-scale businesses contracting the use of prisoners for their labor, it was large national or multinational corporations partnering with government to manage prisoners or detention facilities. From the 1980s until 2000, there was a tremendous growth of private prisons, although expansion leveled off thereafter. Major Companies That Run Private Prisons A few major corporations manage nearly three-fourths of all private prisons. Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) started in the early 1980s, taking over a single correctional facility in Tennessee and expanding nationwide. The GEO Group (originally Wackenhut Corrections Corporation) is a publicly traded company. In 2005, it acquired Correctional Services Corporation, selling off its juvenile services to Youth Services International. Like CCA, GEO is a multinational organization. Cornell Companies, another major player in the private prisoner industry, was acquired by GEO in 2010. Its focus is on rehabilitation for both juveniles and adults. Arguments in Favor of Private Prisons Private prisons are believed by proponents to have lower costs, relative to state or federal prisons, associated with managing prisoners. Part of the reason for these lower costs is due to less overtime and fewer benefits for private workers than for public service workers. Performance by private prison personnel is another factor viewed favorably over that thought to be demonstrated by non-private prison personnel. The companies that run private prisons claim that because they are awarded the opportunity to manage prisoners, this then carries with it the pressure to execute their performance in a manner better than public service workers. Private prisons offer government the ability to transfer certain prisoners out of government facilities to create more space and reduce overcrowding. Additionally, private companies that build their own prisons potentially have greater flexibility in the design of the facility. Privately constructed detention facilities can be expanded or modified more easily than government-run prisons. Because private prisons often times manage less violent prisoners and run prisons with lower security levels, they are better able to alter the structure of the prisons they operate than government-run prisons, which tend to be older and must maintain a higher level of security. Proponents also argue that because private companies build prisons, local economies benefit from jobs created by the construction process. Arguments Against Private Prisons To counter private-firm-based studies that claim that private prisons save money, government based studies point out that private prisons tend to weed out high-cost inmates, sending them to government-run prisons while accepting management of the low-cost prisoners. Moreover, other government based reports suggest that private prisons pursue cost reduction (i.e., less staff and lighter training) at the expense of security. The evidence highlights higher violence rates within and various escapes from private prisons. Private prisons are believed to be challenged when it comes to transparency. Being profit-driven is considered to be a barrier to revealing completely all that is going on inside a private prison. The responsibility of passing on the punishment function of a prison to private workers is a topic of considerable debate. Because one of the core functions of a prison is to deliver punishment, the corporations that run the private prisons do not have policy history or experience in this regard, given that their policies have focused on regulations and on the delivery of benefits to their clientele. Longer sentencing and other “get tough on crime” strategies (e.g., “three-strikes” laws) along with a profit motive are believed to influence private prisons in such a way as to have them hold on longer to prisoners than would be the case in government run prisons. Three states have issued bans on the privatization of prisons because of the above-mentioned considerations. Recommendations In comparing private versus public prisons and detention facilities, a robust array of valid and reliable performance measures are required. The ethical concerns of prison management must be fairly measured. To achieve a useful evaluation, there must be controls in place. Prisons being compared should be at the same level of security. Additionally, the prisons should be similar in the age of their structures. The management style overseeing the prisons should be taken into consideration. When cost is investigated, this should include an assessment of indirect costs as well as direct costs. Costs for medical care and other health-related services (e.g., hospital security) need to be taken into account. In addition to ensuring that controls are in place when making comparisons between private prisons and public prisons, researchers and prison professionals must focus on how well facilities meet the purposes of incarceration, including the rehabilitation of prisoners. prisoners safety and basic human rights must also be demonstrated to be secure. See Also: Prison Abolition; Prison Industrial Complex; Prison Overcrowding; Prison Unions; Prisoner Rights Further Readings  Hallett, Michael. Private Prisons in America: A Critical Race Perspective. University of Illinois Press Urbana, 2006.   Logan, Charles H. Private Prisons: Cons and Pros. Oxford University Press New York, 1990.   Lukemeyer, Anna; Richard C. McCorkle. “Privatization of Prisons: Impact on Prison Conditions”. American Review of Public Administration, v. 36/2 (2006). doi:10.1177/0275074005281352.   Makarios, Matthew D.; Jeff Maahs. “Is Private Time Quality Time? A National Private-Public Comparison of Prison Quality”. Prison Journal, v. 92/3 (2012). doi:10.1177/0032885512448608.   Price, Byron Eugene. Merchandizing Prisoners: Who Really Pays for Prison Privatization. Praeger Westport CT, 2006.  John M. Hazy Youngstown State University  © 2014 SAGE Publications, Inc · APA · Chicago · Harvard · MLA Hazy, J. M. (2014). Prisons, private. In B. A. Arrigo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice ethics. Sage Publications. Credo Reference: http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/sagesrmnjuet/prisons_private/0?institutionId=5072 Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice Ethics Previous Article Next Article The Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice Ethics includes A to Z entries by experts in the field that explore the scope of ethical decision making and behaviors within the spheres of criminal justice systems, including policing, corrections, courts, forensic science, and policy analysis and research. Editor(s): Bruce A. Arrigo Edition: 1st Articles: 391 Images: 135 People: 24 Prisons, Privatization of from  The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice This entry on the privatization of prisons provides a thorough overview of private prisons. It focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of moving from a public forum to a private enterprise, as well as on the impetus for moving from public to private; it evaluates the literature regarding the success (i.e., cost savings) of the movement; and gives some examples of private companies that have moved into the public domain. · capitalism · corrections · prisons A private prison is a correctional facility that is operated by a business and has a contract with a government agency. This can include taking over an existing facility or building and operating a new prison for a profit. The contract stipulates that the business will provide most of the services needed for operating the facility, including staff, food, and medical care. Many of these facilities are built to house out-of-state offenders and the business is paid per diem for each inmate. Several of the companies that operate private prisons are publicly traded (Chang and Thompkins 2002). In 2003 the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that private prisons held a small percentage of all state prisoners (about 6\%) and a slightly higher percentage of federal prisoners (about 12\%). New Mexico, Alaska, Montana, Wyoming, and Oklahoma hold at least a quarter of their inmates in privately operated prisons. As early as the 1600s British prisoners were transported to America to work for private industry. In the 1800s, private companies operated numerous penitentiaries. Most noted is the Louisiana state prison and New Yorks Auburn and Sing Sing prisons (Gillette 1999). The use of prison labor to subsidize costs and make a profit was common. States like Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee, and California all leased prison labor to prevent financial losses (Schneider 1999). In time, these arrangements were met with opposition from businesses, who opposed the unfair competition this type of labor presented. In 1842, New York legally restricted the use of prison labor and eventually other states did so as well. Private prisons as we know them today began in Texas in 1983 after the Percy Amendment of 1979 was enacted to legalize privatization (Price and Riccucci 2005). The Percy Amendment focused on prison industry projects and required that certain conditions be afforded inmates before projects could be approved. These conditions focused on wages—paying inmates fairly, taxing income—voluntary participation, and consulting with unions about fair wages. The Percy Amendment was expanded by the Crime Control Act of 1984 (also referred to as the Prison Industries Enhancement Program), which supported several new projects (Walker 1996). Shortly thereafter, Florida and Tennessee opened privately operated prisons. The 1980s were met with an increasing prison population due in large part to the war on drugs. During this period drug arrests increased 87.6\%, and from 1990 to 2000 increased 45\% (Mitchell and Lynch 2011). By 2000, the United States had more than 2 million people incarcerated and facilities were 20\% over capacity (Beck and Karberg 2001). The cost for housing state and local inmates was estimated at $43 billion a year and localities started to look to private companies to help save money (Schiraldi and Greene 2002). The general wisdom was that corporations could run and build prisons with the same or better quality for less money. This conventional thinking that businesses could do any job cheaper, faster, and more efficiently than a government agency was a part of the American desire for market-economy solutions. It also echoed a general distrust of government and was a mainstay of politics, with President Ronald Reagan leading the charge to privatize. By 1988, there were 20 private facilities in nine states and bed counts ranged from less than 100 beds in smaller facilities to as many as 600 beds in larger ones (see Lundahl et al. 2009). Likewise, the classification of private prisons changed from mostly minimum security to those with medium and maximum levels. It appears that the use of private facilities was on a steady increase from the 1980s through 2000. Since that time the growth in prison populations has been at the federal level and the use of private facilities has steadily increased. Private prisons not only exist in the United States but around the world. According to the Prison Privatisation Report International, private facilities can be found in countries, such as Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Canada. In 2004, Australia had 17\% of prisoners in private facilities, the United Kingdom had 10\%, and the United States had 7\% (Gran and Henry 2007–2008). The debate over private prisons has been highly politicized and much of the research has been inconclusive. Some of the arguments for private prisons include cost-effectiveness, innovative approaches to rehabilitation, their ability to provide higher-quality services, their role in helping to alleviate overcrowding, and the success of privatization in other areas—many of which are also found in corrections, such as food service. Likewise, arguments against privatization include the ethical conflict of interest, the lack of evidence supporting cost-effectiveness or higher quality of service, and the lack of long-term obligations which private companies have to communities. While the research has failed to produce conclusive judgments about whether private facilities are better than public ones, some of the findings have supported both sides of the argument. Public facilities are more likely to offer education programs. Harlow (2003) indicated that 12.4\% of private prisons lacked educational programs compared to 8.8\% of state facilities and all federal prisons had programs. In addition, private prisons were less likely to offer other types of programming, including psychological and sex offender counseling (Wright 2010). Moreover, a 1998 report concluded that there was no evidence that private prisons would offer greater quality services (McDonald et al. 1998). The cost benefits of private prisons have been stated to yield 20\% savings. The promise of saving state and local governments money has been the central argument for proponents. In 1996 the General Accounting Office (GAO 1996) reviewed studies of private and public prisons and found that there was little difference and did not result in substantial savings. In a subsequent study in 2001 the Bureau of Justice Assistance reported similar findings, and concluded that the average savings from privatization were only about 1\% and that much of those savings were due to lower wages and fewer benefits. In 2004 Blakely and Bumphus reported that private prisons had 50\% more assaults on inmates and staff than public prisons (Blakely and Bumphus 2004). Creating a safe environment is largely dependent on a stable, high-quality staff. Other states report that private prisons save money because they can “cherry-pick” which prisoners they want. Private prison contracts often limit the types of inmates to those who are less of a security risk and have fewer health or mental problems. This selection process allows private facilities to save money by not offering additional services necessary for these inmates. Public facilities do not have the opportunity to select which inmates to care for and are therefore forced to provide services that private prisons can avoid. The result is that public prisons have medical costs that can be as much as a third higher than those of private prisons (Oppel 2011). Others argue that there is an inherent conflict of interest when private companies benefit from imprisoning people. They contend that making money is in direct opposition to the goals of human service and rehabilitation of offenders (Ogle 1999). If private prisons make money based on a per diem, then it is in their best interest to house more inmates and to keep them there longer. There is also the consideration of what happens when the private company no longer wants to be in the prison business. In 2000, Littlefield, Texas built a detention center that was operated by a private company. When state budgets were cut, the out-of-state inmates that were generally housed in the facility for a fee were no longer available and the private company decided to end its operations contract. This left Littlefield with more than 100 job losses and an empty detention facility, in which the taxpayers still have a monthly $65,000 mortgage (Burnett 2011). The taxpayer burden has also been a topic of opposition. When states and localities decide to build a new correctional facility there is taxpayer input because citizens must vote on the funding. Private prisons do not require taxpayer input because they handle the financing through private revenue. This leaves the taxpayers with the burden of the expenses through the contract obligation but without voter approval (Burnett 2011). The vast majority of the literature on private prisons focuses on whether they are cost-effective and provide better levels of service. Some of the most cited studies include Perrone and Pratt (2003), Pratt and Maahs (1999), and Segal and Moore (2002). Pratt and Maahs (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of the cost-effectiveness of private and public facilities. They found that while modest savings existed at the private prisons, the amounts were not substantial enough to provide budgetary relief. Perrone and Pratt (2003) investigated the quality and cost-effectiveness in a systematic review of nine studies. They found that when taking into account indicators such as conditions in the facility, management, security, and a variety of other variables, neither private nor public prisons appeared to be clearly advantageous. The systematic review by Segal and Moore (2002) found that private prisons were overwhelmingly more cost-effective and provided higher-quality services. These results have been questioned because they deviate so drastically from what a host of other studies have shown, and some question the lack of complexity in their analysis (Lundahl et al. 2009). There are also some studies that contend that private and public facilities cannot be properly compared due to differences in their physical structure and inmate populations, thereby making it impossible to determine which is more cost-effective (Price and Riccucci 2005). The two private companies that provide the majority of private prison management in the United States are Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group. CCA is a publically traded company that was established in 1983 and provides services to federal, state, and local agencies (www.cca.com). CCA provides prison construction and management of correctional facilities. According to their website, CCA is the fifth largest corrections system in the nation, with exception only to the federal government and three state systems. They have more than 60 facilities and the majority of them are company owned. CCA employs more than 17,000 people and the company website boasts their recognition for being among “Americas Best Big Companies” in Forbes magazine and ranking as a “Top 50 Military-Friendly Employer” in G.I. Jobs magazine. CCA earned $1.67 billion in 2010 with 50\% from state contracts and 43\% from federal contracts (Corrections Corporation of America Annual Report 2010). The GEO Group is a private corporation that also specializes in corrections management. GEO was founded in 1984 and was formerly known as Wackenhut Corrections Corporation. As Wackenut they gained their first corrections contract with the Bureau of Immigration and Custody Enforcement in 1987 (www.geogroup.com). In 2002, Group 4 Falk (now G4 S) acquired Wackenhut and a year later they repurchased their shares. Subsequently, Wakenhut Corrections Corporation changed its name to the GEO Group, Inc. in 2003. According to their website, they operate 118 facilities in the United States, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. In 2010, they earned $1.27 billion in revenue and 66\% of that was from US contracts (GEO Group Annual Report 2010). In August 2010, GEO Group purchased Cornell Companies, another private corrections company. The acquisition of Cornell shifted the majority of private prisons in the United States to either GEO Group or CCA (McDonald et al. 1998). While the data do not conclusively find that private prisons are any better or show significant financial savings, CCA and GEO Group both stress their commitment to quality services and fiscal efficiency on their websites. CCA lists guiding principles that reflect the companys dedication to quality, safety and security, innovation, and cost-effectiveness amongst other things. They also indicate that they offer a variety of rehabilitation and educational programs including those focusing on addiction, preparation for the General Educational Development test (GED), and life and employment skills. CCAs website also indicates the economic benefits their company provides to localities, such as paying an array of taxes and providing jobs. GEO Group, on the other hand, go a little further on their website by not just stressing the quality of services and commitment to being a good services provider, but also actually listing projected savings. On GEOs Partnership Advantages website, they indicate that partnering with their company can save 20–30\% on facility development in part because projects are completed in less time and they utilize fixed-price contracts. They also project 10–20\% savings in facility management based on the ability to promote competition for services. The number of private prisons has grown in recent decades as a result of increases in the number of arrests. The latter, however, has recently started to decline. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, at the end of 2009 the rate of imprisonment had decreased for the second year in a row, from 506 per 100,000 in 2007 to 502 per 100,000 in 2009. Such decreases have been seen in larger states like Texas and California as well. California reported the largest decline, which was four times that of other states (Glaze 2010). The decline in inmates can largely be attributed to decreasing probation and parole violations, diversion of low-level offenders, quicker release times for low-risk offenders, and a plethora of reentry programs. These decreases in inmates can create problems for localities that have facilities with empty beds but still need to make payments. For example, Hardin, Montana defaulted on bond payments due to the decrease in inmates in their minimum-security prison (Burnett 2011). It appears that private prisons in some capacity are here to stay. In 2001, Representative Ted Strickland of Ohio introduced the Public Safety Act to Congress, which would ban the use of private prisons for federal prisoners. Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin also introduced a companion bill in the Senate. As of 2003, the bills have been referred to subcommittees but no further action has been taken. Although there has been a decline in the number of inmates across the United States, this decline is mostly at the state level. The federal government has implemented immigration policies that will increase the number of inmates. In 1996, the Immigration Reform Act was passed and expanded the number of deportable offenses for noncitizens. Likewise, the 2010 Arizona immigration legislation increases the power of law enforcement to question and detain any person that cannot prove citizenship. These types of policies will undoubtedly increase the number of immigration detainees, thereby increasing the need for private prisons. SEE ALSO: Illegal Immigrants and Corrections; Prison Administration; Prison Work; Prisons. References  Beck, A. J.; Karberg, J. C. (2001) Prison and jail inmates at midyear 2000. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs Washington, DC. http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf, accessed January 24, 2011.   Blakely, C. R.; Bumphus, V. W. (2004) Private and public sector prisons: A comparison of selected characteristics. Federal Probation 68(1), 27-31.   Burnett, J. (2011) Private prison promises leave Texas towns in trouble. National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134855801/private-prison-promises-leave-texas-towns-in-trouble, accessed January 24, 2013.  Chang, T. F. H.; Thompkins, D. E. (2002) Corporations go to prisons: The expansion of corporate power in the correctional industry. Labor Studies Journal 22, 45-69.   Corrections Corporation of America. www.cca.com, accessed January 24, 2013.  Corrections Corporation of America (2010) Annual Report. http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-reportsannual, accessed 24 January, 2013.   General Accounting Office (GAO) (1996) General Accounting Office, Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service. General Accounting Office Washington, DC. www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf, accessed January 24, 2013.   GEO Group (2010) Annual Report. http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irol-reportsannual, accessed January 24, 2013.   GEO Group, Inc. www.geogroup.com, accessed January 24, 2013.  Gillette, B. (1999) Ethical considerations cant be dismissed in privatization process. Mississippi Business Journal 21. www.msbusiness.com, accessed January 24, 2013.   Glaze, L. (2010) Correctional Populations in the United States, 2009. Bureau of Justice Statistics. http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus09.pdf, accessed January 24, 2013.   Gran, B.; Henry, W. (2007-2008) Holding private prisons accountable: A socio-legal analysis of “contracting out” prisons. Social Justice 34(3-4), 173-194.   Harlow, C. W. (2003) Education and Correctional Populations. US Department of Justice Washington, DC.   Lundahl, B. W.; Kunz, C.; Brownell, C. et al. (2009) Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice 19, 383-394.   McDonald, D.; Fournier, E.; Russell-Einhorn, M.; Crawford, S. (1998) Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of Current Practices. Abt Associates Cambridge MA.   Mitchell, O.; Lynch, M. J. (2011) Criminal justice, race and the war on drugs. In Parsons-Pollard, N. (ed.), Disproportionate Minority Contact Current Issues and Policies. Carolina Academic Press Durham NC, pp. 139-158.   Ogle, R. S. (1999) Prison privatization: An environmental Catch-22. Justice Quarterly 16, 579-600.   Oppel, R. A. (2011) Private prisons found to offer little in savings. The New York Times (May 18), p. A1.   Perrone, D.; Pratt, T. C. (2003) Comparing the quality of confinement and cost-effectiveness of public versus private prisons: What we know, why we do not know more, and where to go from here. The Prison Journal 83(3), 301-322.   Pratt, T. C.; Maahs, J. (1999) Are private prisons more cost-effective than public prisons? A meta-analysis of evaluation research studies. Crime & Delinquency 45, 358-371.   Price, B. E.; Riccucci, N. M. (2005) Exploring the determinants of decisions to privatize state prisons. American Review of Public Administration 35(3), 223-235.   Schiraldi, V.; Greene, J. (2002) Cutting Correctly: New State Policies for Times of Austerity (Policy Report). Justice Policy Institute Washington, DC.   Schneider, A. L. (1999) Public-private partnerships in the US prison system. American Behavioral Scientist 43(1), 192-208.   Segal, G. F.; Moore, A. T. (2002) Weighing the watchmen: Evaluating the costs and benefits of Outsourcing Correctional Services. Part II: Reviewing the Literature on Cost and Quality Comparisons. Reason Public Policy Institute Study no. 290. http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/reason/50b944ab1f7 d1cb15 d8943c0c334df56.pdf, accessed January 24, 2013.   Walker, J. T. (1996) Ashurst-Sumner Act. In M. D. McShane; F. P. Williams (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Prisons. Garland Publishing, Inc New York, pp. 41-43.   Wright, K. (2010) Strange bedfellows? Reaffirming rehabilitation and prison privatization. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 49, 74-90.  Further Readings  Culp, R. F. (2005) The rise and stall of prison privatization: An integration of policy analysis perspectives. Criminal Justice Policy Review 16, 412-442.   Shichor, D. (1995) Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/Public Concerns. Sage Thousand Oaks CA.  Nicolle Parsons-Pollard Laura J. Moriarty  Copyright © 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. · APA · Chicago · Harvard · MLA Parsons-Pollard, N., & Moriarty, L. J. (2014). Prisons, privatization of. In J. S. Albanese, Wiley series of encyclopedias in criminology and criminal justice: The encyclopedia of criminology and criminal justice. Wiley. Credo Reference: http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileycacj/prisons_privatization_of/0?institutionId=5072 The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice Previous Article Next Article This encyclopedia offers a state-of-the-art survey informed by the very latest theory and research. It combines this breadth of coverage with the authority and international perspective of an experienced editorial team, creating a definitive reference resource for students, scholars, and professionals in these interdisciplinary and dynamic fields. Author(s): Jay S. Albanese Edition: 1st Articles: 550 Images: 9 People: 604 Watch: Privatized Prison Unions and Justice Organizations as Nonprofits Welcome to this weeks module. And this week were going to be changing a little bit of our rhythm in terms of looking at a couple of items that you normally wouldnt look at, perhaps in a criminal justice organization. But they may well affect you in periphery that you may not think of and theyre going to be privatized prisons and the unions that go with them. And also looking at justice organizations as they relate to non-profit organizations. Let me read for you a worldview in regards to this entire course. It has been based and looking at issues of truth in ethics. And well be looking at that somewhat in this particular module. But I want to read you just a very brief item from, from John 831 to the Jews had believed to the Jews who had believed him. Jesus said, If you hold of my teachings, you are really my disciples, then you will know the truth and the truth will set you free. Keeping that in mind, not only in this module, but in the module that will follow later. When youre dealing with the issues that you may be having as administrator, you may work for a department or you may work for an organization in your criminal justice, feel that for whatever reason, perhaps probably to save money, you may be having to let out a contract or you may have to be the person that actually supervises the owner of a privatized jail or prison. So we want to look at the issues even though weve discussed unions before. In another section, we want to look quite frankly at how a privatized prison that doesnt have the, what we say as the government rules of how a union does and does not work. We want to look at that because that could very well affect you if youre administrating this and youre trying to deal perhaps with a union issue. And the rules again, quite frankly are different, so we need to look at that. Heres something quite unusual, particularly for those of you that are involved in community-based policing or community-based government. When you think about it, a sheriff, a regional state police officer, even a local police officer, jails a number of different groups, all deal every day with non-profits and non-profit items. Course, when you think of criminal justice itself is a non-profit, but were talking about things of what you normally we think of as charities or youre sitting on a board of a local arts council or something of that nature. If you do community service in terms of really getting involved in your community where they understand what you do, then its a two-way street. And many times you are, your personnel will be asked to sit on boards. So its very, very important since board sometimes I ask personnel questions and ask persons who sit on those boards to serve and personnel issues, particularly in hearings. If a non-profit has a paid employee that has done something that they need to be relieved of their duty, then that may be something called upon you. And the rules again will be different because this is not a government organization as you may be used to your internal discipline. So again, you may not have people that are involved. I can tell several people to wear their chiefs and or directors have asked him to be a part of the community by joining two or three private boards or joining something like a rotary or a tan or something of that nature. There are many, many groups out there and I just happened to think of elks. And then again, there are Community Action boards as community education boards, all kinds of things that quite frankly youre serving for free. But the purpose of getting your people in those things is to have that inner community contact and to know each other back and forth. Theres nothing any better than a police officer answering a particular column. And when he or she gets there, they actually know the people who were asking for service met each other before they in college or the First Name. That quite frankly is what community-oriented policing government, any of that may be in regards to, because we all interact with the public sector in private when were not working and also when we are working in regards so again, those are the two issues that were going to look at. And Im sure you may have people that that coach little league baseball or softball or anything such as volleyball, football, youth soccer. Those things have rules. And unfortunately, if people know that you work for chroma justice organization, they may want you sometimes to actually serve on that board or you may be the one who has to mitigate something. Again, thats not overly encouraged or under curves. The point being is it can happen and we want to have you prepared for it. So again, its a little bit of a different departure. It has the same type of topic, but it is something that you may or may not be involved in that we want to make sure that youre exposed to it in this particular module. And I look forward to working with you.