Fluent Essays

Physical Security Practical Connection : Topic: Share a personal connection that identifies specific knowledge and theories from this course. Demonstrate a connection to your current work environment. If you are not employed, demonstrate a connection to your desired work environment.  You should NOT, provide an overview of the assignments assigned in the course. The assignment asks that you reflect how the knowledge and skills obtained through meeting course objectives were applied or could be applied in the workplace.  Instructions: Please download the Practical Connections template (MS Word), which is already in APA 7 format, using size 12 Times New Roman font, 1-inch margins, TOC, Headings and Reference page. Provide at least a 500 word or 2 page double spaced not including the Title page, TOC or Reference page, reflection. If supporting evidence from outside resources is used those must be properly cited. If you insert images or tables in your report make sure you label them appropriately according to APA. Once completed name your file: YourName_Practical_Connections.docx and submit to the appropriate assignment folder. Practical Connections 1 Practical Connections Your Name School of Computer and Information Sciences, University of the Cumberlands ISOL634 Physical Security Dr. Ronald P. Sperano Current Date Table of Contents Course Reflection and Connection (Note: H1 required) 3 Improvement Recommendation(s) (Note: H1 required) 3 Improvement 1 (Note: H2 required) 3 Improvement n (Note: H2 optional) 3 References 4 Note: Your paper starts here with the first paragraph indented. Begin with a brief description of how you will approach this assignment. Course Reflection and Connection (Note: H1 required) Note: Share a personal connection that identifies specific knowledge and theories from this course. Demonstrate a connection to your current work environment. If you are not employed, demonstrate a connection to your desired work environment. You should NOT, provide an overview of the assignments assigned in the course. The assignment asks that you reflect how the knowledge and skills obtained through meeting course objectives were applied or could be applied in the workplace. Provide at least a 500 word or 2-page double spaced not including the Title page, TOC or Reference page, reflection. Improvement Recommendation(s) (Note: H1 required) Note: Based on what you have learned describe improvement(s) you would recommend to your Management. Please use Heading 2s correctly. Improvement 1 (Note: H2 required) Type text here Improvement n (Note: H2 optional) Type text here References There are no sources in the current document. See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239746349 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): A Review and Modern Bibliography Article  in  Property Management · December 2005 DOI: 10.1108/02637470510631483 CITATIONS 456 READS 27,012 3 authors, including: Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: Night-time economy crime precipitators View project Sustainable Development / Public health View project Paul Cozens Curtin University 61 PUBLICATIONS   2,113 CITATIONS    SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Paul Cozens on 24 January 2014. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239746349_Crime_Prevention_through_Environmental_Design_CPTED_A_Review_and_Modern_Bibliography?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_2&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239746349_Crime_Prevention_through_Environmental_Design_CPTED_A_Review_and_Modern_Bibliography?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_3&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/project/Night-time-economy-crime-precipitators?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_9&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/project/Sustainable-Development-Public-health?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_9&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_1&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul-Cozens?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_4&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul-Cozens?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_5&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Curtin_University?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul-Cozens?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_7&_esc=publicationCoverPdf https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul-Cozens?enrichId=rgreq-1c8f0fecd01a4e26f961eaeb3f74d89e-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzOTc0NjM0OTtBUzoxMDE1NzM2ODY0NjQ1MThAMTQwMTIyODQ2MjU3MA\%3D\%3D&el=1_x_10&_esc=publicationCoverPdf Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED): a review and modern bibliography Paul Michael Cozens Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Perth, Australia Greg Saville University of New Haven, New Haven, Connecticut, USA, and David Hillier University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd, UK Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to critically review the core findings from recently published place-based crime prevention research. The paper aims to critically evaluate the available evidence on the contribution of crime prevention through environmental design as a crime prevention strategy. Design/methodology/approach – Large-scale evaluations of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) are reviewed with a view to clarifying current knowledge on the evidence of crime prevention through environmental design. Findings – The review concludes that there is a growing body of research that supports the assertion that crime prevention through environmental design is effective in reducing both crime and fear of crime in the community. Research limitations/implications – Although the paper may not review all the evaluations of CPTED, it nonetheless provides a detailed compilation and overview of the most significant research in the area, including an extensive and modern bibliography on the subject. Research implications will be the subject of a forthcoming paper. Practical implications – CPTED is an increasingly fashionable approach and is being implemented on a global scale. Additionally, individual components such as territoriality, surveillance, maintenance, access control, activity support and target-hardening are being widely deployed. However, the evidence currently available is inconclusive and much criticised, which effectively prevents widespread intervention and investment by central government. The paper details the difficulties associated with demonstrating the effectiveness of CPTED. Originality/value – The paper concludes that although empirical proof has not been definitively demonstrated, there is a large and growing body of research, which supports the assertion that crime prevention through environmental design is a pragmatic and effective crime prevention tool. This review provides an extensive bibliography of contemporary crime prevention through environmental design and a follow-up paper will discuss the future research priorities for it. Keywords Crimes, Crime research, Burglary, Surveillance, Urban areas Paper type Literature review Introduction Crime and the fear of crime are pervasive and endemic concerns in modern post-industrial society and criminal justice systems are clearly failing to tackle both issues. The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister www.emeraldinsight.com/0263-7472.htm PM 23,5 328 Received January 2005 Revised April 2005 Property Management Vol. 23 No. 5, 2005 pp. 328-356 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0263-7472 DOI 10.1108/02637470510631483 www.emeraldinsight.com/0263-7472.htm Brantingham and Brantingham (1991) have argued that there are four dimensions to any crime namely, the law, the offender, the target and the location. Place-based crime prevention strategies focus upon the crime site – the spatial aspects of a target and the specific location of crime. Crucially, Herbert and Hyde (1985) note that if the spatial distribution of offences and offenders were random, then environmental criminology would be of little interest to either scholars or commentators on either criminal or social policy. Indeed, crime is not randomly distributed and “hot spots” of crime have been acknowledged since the mid-nineteenth century (Guerry, 1833; Fletcher, 1849; Mayhew, 1862) as the Industrial Revolution produced a new and previously unconsidered scale of urbanisation. The study of “hot spots” has received increasing attention in recent years (i.e. Nasar and Fisher, 1993; Lupton, 1999). As a place-based crime prevention strategy, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) emerged as an independent theory and is now increasingly fashionable and is being implemented worldwide (Cisneros, 1995). Empirical research, which attempts to measure the component parts of the built and social environment, to make purposeful modifications to it and evaluate the effectiveness of such interventions, is fraught with difficulty. Indeed, Schneider and Kitchen (2002, p. 158) comment that in practice, “it would be as difficult as untangling a spider’s web to evaluate the effectiveness of specific place-based crime prevention measures”. Gill and Turbin (1999, p. 180) concur “policymakers and practitioners want quick decisions about whether a measure has been ‘effective’ or has reduced crime, while academics stress the need to do things properly, which takes time”. In stating that, this paper will briefly discuss CPTED and present the key arguments for the application of the component parts of CPTED and more comprehensive CPTED programmes. This review also provides an extensive bibliography on the subject of CPTED. What is CPTED? CPTED is an acronym for crime prevention through environmental design which asserts that “the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life” (Crowe, 2000, p. 46). It is based on studies executed from the mid-twentieth century onwards (Lynch, 1960; Jacobs, 1961; Angel, 1968; Jeffery, 1971; Newman, 1973; Gardiner, 1978; Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Poyner, 1983; Coleman, 1985). A range of theoretical criticisms of CPTED have been expressed (e.g. see Adams, 1973; Hillier, 1973; Kaplan, 1973; Bottoms, 1974; Mawby, 1977; Mayhew, 1979; Booth, 1981; Poyner, 1983) and are discussed elsewhere (see Cozens et al., 2001a). However, ongoing refinement, of what is now known as first-generation CPTED, by researchers, practitioners and policy makers, has arguably responded to criticism to craft a more robust and rigorous approach referred to as second generation CPTED (Saville and Cleveland, 1997). This refinement extends beyond mere physical design to include social factors. Second generation CPTED uses risk assessments, socio-economic and demographic profiling (Saville, 1996; Plaster Carter, 2002) as well as active community participation (Sarkissian and Perglut, 1994; Sarkissian and Walsh, 1994; Saville, 1995; Sarkissian et al., 1997; Plaster Carter, 2002). Such developments in CPTED (e.g. Taylor et al., 1980; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Poyner, 1986; Sarkissian and Walsh, 1994; Saville, 1995; Crowe, 2000; Zelinka and Brennan, 2001) and Situational Crime Prevention[1] in Britain (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Clarke, 1992, 1995, 1997) have popularised, refined and advanced the design-affects-crime debate. CPTED 329 Following Newman (1973), Moffat (1983) proposed that there are six broad characteristics to first-generation CPTED concepts; territoriality, surveillance (informal and formal), access control, image/maintenance, activity programme support and target hardening (see Figure 1). By optimising opportunities for surveillance, clearly defining boundaries (and defining preferred use within such spaces) and creating and maintaining a positive “image”, urban design and management can discourage offending. This is explained by the fact that offenders are potentially more visible to “law-abiding” others, and therefore, perceive themselves to be more at risk of observation and subsequent apprehension. Additionally, a well-maintained and appropriately used environment can signify that a sense of “ownership” and proprietary concern exists within the community. Some researchers (e.g., Fisher and Nasar, 1992) have introduced a threefold grouping of physical features; prospect (for the user), refuge (for the potential offender) and escape (for the user and potential offender) into CPTED theory and Taylor and Harrell (1996, p. 9) conclude; “research confirms that fear [of crime] is higher in locations that offer good refuge for the potential offender but low prospect and escape for the user”. Research supporting CPTED component parts Since CPTED is a complex strategy that will include a range of interventions and behavioural responses from various user groups, the research examined will be presented and analysed under six broad headings (not always mutually exclusive), Figure 1. First-generation CPTED – the key concepts PM 23,5 330 namely; territoriality, surveillance, access control, activity support, image/management, and target hardening. CPTED studies using multiple interventions are also examined. Territoriality Territoriality is a design concept directed at reinforcing notions of proprietary concern and a “sense of ownership” in legitimate users of space thereby reducing opportunities for offending by discouraging illegitimate users. In first-generation CPTED it is the primary umbrella concept upon which all the others are based. Different forms include symbolic barriers (e.g. signage) and real barriers (e.g. fences or design that clearly defines and delineates between private, semi-private and public spaces). Access control and surveillance will also contribute towards promoting territoriality by promoting legitimate users’ informal social control. CPTED emphasises crime prevention techniques that exploit the opportunities in the environment “both to naturally and routinely facilitate access control and surveillance, and to reinforce positive behaviour in the use of the environment” (Crowe, 2000, p. 37). These strategies are not independent of one another, and they act in concert to use physical attributes to separate public, public-private and private space, to define ownership (e.g. fences, pavement treatments, signs, landscaping and artwork) and define acceptable patterns of usage, in addition to promoting opportunities for surveillance. A study by Brown and Bentley (1993) showed how some burglars used territoriality to evaluate risk and territoriality was also supported by the findings from a study of fear of crime (Perkins and Taylor, 1996). Eliminating any unassigned spaces and ensuring all spaces have a clearly defined and designated purpose, are routinely cared-for and monitored is also a component of territoriality. Research on territoriality has shown it to be most effective at the local level (Brown and Altman, 1983; Taylor, 1988; Ratcliffe, 2003) although it is fraught with difficulties associated with definition, interpretation and measurement. Indeed, Merry (1981) observes how territoriality varies between cultures, neighbourhoods and individual groups. Although still controversial, enhanced levels of territoriality have been linked to reduced levels of recorded crime and fear of crime (e.g. Taylor et al., 1985; Brown, 1987; Brown and Perkins, 1992; Perkins et al., 1992; Perkins and Taylor, 1996; Brown, 2001; Ratcliffe, 2003). Surveillance Physical design has the capacity to promote informal or natural surveillance opportunities for residents and their agents and surveillance is part of capable guardianship (Painter and Tilley, 1999). If offenders perceive that they can be observed (even if they are not), they may be less likely to offend, given the increased potential for intervention, apprehension and prosecution. Different types include natural (e.g. residents’ self-surveillance opportunities as facilitated by windows) formal or organised (e.g. police patrols) and mechanical surveillance strategies (e.g. street lighting and CCTV). Surveillance – informal/natural. Angel (1968) predicted that certain critical levels of street activity and population density were linked to crime. A critical crime “zone of intensity” was therefore one that could support low numbers of people but in sufficient densities to contain both victims and offenders. Loukaitou-Sideris (1999) has proposed CPTED 331 that a second level population density exists; where the density is sufficiently high to mask a range of less serious offences such as pick pocketing and petty theft. In a review of studies relating to residential burglary, Sorenson (2003) observes how burglars avoid targets that are readily overlooked by neighbours and/or passers-by. Properties with low levels of lighting at night, high walls/fences, or thick trees or shrubbery can provide concealment opportunities for burglars particularly when close to points of access such as windows and doors (Weisel, 2002). The intervisibility and enhanced surveillance opportunities provided by terraced housing, for example, have been noted by a number of researchers (Newman, 1975; Pascoe, 1993; Steventon, 1996; Hillier and Shu, 2000a; Cozens et al., 2001b) and the UK Government, explicitly in the DETR Bulletin No. 32 – The Layout of Residential Roads and Footpaths (DETR, 1998). Research being conducted at University College London, at the Space Syntax Laboratory claims “linear integrated spaces with some through movement and strong intervisibility of good numbers of entrances . . . are the safest spaces” (Hillier and Shu, 2000b, p. 4). However, the existence of natural surveillance opportunities within the built environment does not necessarily mean that surveillance is routinely taking place, or that any direct action by citizens (e.g. challenging, reporting or direct intervention) is guaranteed (Barr and Pease, 1992). Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the development of second generation CPTED, which now seeks to engender positive social activities and diversity to encourage neighbours to take ownership of space and take advantage of natural surveillance. Surveillance – formal/organised. Formal (or organised) surveillance is also provided by local stakeholders (shop keepers, security guards). Four studies of increased formal guardianship at parking lots and garages have demonstrated reductions in car-related crime (Poyner, 1991; Laycock and Austin, 1992; Poyner, 1994; Barclay et al., 1996) while one study found no such reduction (Hesseling, 1995). Poyner (1991) notes that strategies to control access may reduce thefts of vehicles, but may do little to impact on theft from vehicles, raising the issue that what guards actually do may be as important as their physical presence. In the retail industry, in stores with two, as opposed to one member of staff on duty, fewer robberies were reported in a number of studies (Hunter and Jeffery, 1992). Even though a study by La Vigne (1991) found no such relationship, a major study by Figlio points to a strong effect (National Association of Convenience Stores, 1991). That study examined 340 retail stores in America and found that robberies declined in stores that changed from employing one to two staff. Where police evaluated a city regulation requiring two staff to be on duty, robberies declined immediately after the regulation was introduced (Clifton, 1987) and for several years afterward (Bellamy, 1996). CCTV and silent alarms did not reduce robberies in a study of 55 stores (Crow and Erickson, 1984), although interactive CCTV did reduce robberies in their first year of introduction (National Association of Convenience Stores, 1991). Retail store redesign to enhance surveillance yielded significant reductions in shoplifting in one store (Farrington et al., 1993). Security guards have long been used to reduce crime and have been shown to prevent bank robberies (Hannan, 1982) along with the use of protective screens (Grandjean, 1990). In Victoria, Australia, a range of security devices (screens, guards and cameras) reduced bank robberies (Clarke et al., 1991) although patrols by the mobile security guards known as the Guardian Angels at railway stations did not PM 23,5 332 reduce crime in America (Kenney, 1986) or on the London Underground, England (Webb and Laycock, 1992). An increase in ticket collectors at a Canadian ferry terminal reduced fare evasion by an estimated 20 per cent (Deschamps et al., 1992) while a Dutch initiative using over 1,000 unemployed young people to monitor ticket use resulted in significant reductions in cases of recorded assaults and harassment (Van Andel, 1986). However, neither of these studies used control groups as a baseline comparison against which to measure existing trends, or to include other independent factors that may be acting to reduce crime in the wider community. Surveillance – mechanical (CCTV). Evaluating the effectiveness of CCTV is also problematic and despite the rapid growth in the deployment of CCTV, particularly in British cities Armitage (2002, p. 1) argues, “there is very little substantive research evidence . . .that CCTV works”. However, some studies report positive findings. Poyner (1988) reviewed the effectiveness of the installation of CCTV on buses and found reductions in vandalism on the targeted buses and the diffusion of benefits to the entire fleet. Webb and Laycock (1992) found CCTV installation at London Underground stations reduced robberies compared with a control group and similarly CCTV at parking lots has been found to reduce car-related crime (Poyner, 1991; Tilley, 1993). Brown (1995) reported on three evaluations of CCTV in Britain, which resulted in reductions in burglaries, car thefts and theft from vehicles. Some studies also revealed that CCTV can significantly reduce levels of fear of crime within the community (Chatterton and Frenz, 1994; Sarno, 1996; Mahalingham, 1996). Eck (1997) reviewed one empirical CCTV study of 15 housing complexes for the elderly in England (Chatterton and Frenz, 1994) and reported significant reductions in burglary. Skinns (1998) evaluated CCTV in Doncaster (UK) and found vehicle crime reduced while other property crimes were not. Armitage et al. (1999) discovered CCTV significantly decreased all recorded property crime (burglary, car crime, criminal damage, handling stolen goods and fraud) in Burnley (UK). CCTV may deter criminal offences (e.g. vehicle crime or burglary) due to a perceived increase in the risk of detection (that may outweigh the perceived potential benefits). However, in alcohol-related crime (such as public disorder) where “rationality” is often absent, the deterrent effect of CCTV may be nullified. More recently, in a Home Office study, Welsh and Farrington (2002) systematically reviewed the crime prevention impact of CCTV in 18 evaluations. The evaluation incorporated meta-analytic techniques (the arithmetic extraction of net success (Pawson and Tilley, 1997)) and used before-and-after measures of crime for both experimental and control areas. Overall, a 5 per cent reduction in recorded crime was reported and half of the studies, (all in the UK) revealed a fall in recorded crime. CCTV was found to have a significant crime reduction effect on recorded vehicle crime (from eight studies) but no effect on violent crime (from five studies). This anomaly may be partially explained by the link between violent crime and alcohol/drug abuse. In terms of the city centre and public housing areas there was little evidence of crime reduction and in four public transport studies, two found reductions, one found no effect and one found an increase in recorded crime. In car parks, however, there was evidence of a significant (41 per cent) reduction in vehicle crime in experimental areas compared with control areas (although other strategies, such as lighting and signage, were also present in all the five studies of car parks). The studies of city centre and CPTED 333 public transport measured a much wider range of crimes and Welsh and Farrington (2002) raise the question as to whether the package of interventions, focused on a specific crime type (car-related) is what made the CCTV-led schemes in car parks apparently so effective. Armitage (2000, p. 5) summarises this review (Welsh and Farrington, 2002) suggesting, “CCTV appears to have no effect on violent crime, a significant effect on vehicle crimes and it is most effective when used in car parks”. Armitage, 2002 observes how the effects of CCTV on crime can begin before the cameras become operational (Brown, 1995) by virtue of publicity campaigns. She also highlights the fact that the preventative potential of CCTV has a life cycle such that, unless routine management and publicity is maintained, any initial reductions in crime will evaporate (Webb and Laycock, 1992; Brown, 1995; Tilley, 1993; Armitage et al., 1999). Forthcoming research by the Home Office and Department of Transport and Local Regions (DTLR) will seek to address the lack of systematic evaluation (Armitage, 2002). Wilson and Sutton (2003) review open-street CCTV in Australia and note that Pawson and Tilley’s “realistic evaluation framework” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) is widely considered as a sophisticated evaluation methodology noting that both Brown (1995) and Armitage et al. (1999) have applied it. They conclude that the effectiveness of CCTV “remains to be established in what locations and under what conditions” (Wilson and Sutton, 2003, p. 6) but warn against jettisoning the strategy, implying there is potential for CCTV as a crime reduction tool. Moreover, in consideration of the extensive range of different CCTV systems and the variable and unscientific monitoring and management strategies that are in operation, the problems associated with measuring and comparing studies on the effectiveness of CCTV is exacerbated still further. Surveillance – mechanical (lighting). After dark, surveillance opportunities are affected by lighting conditions and much research has been conducted on this subject (for a review see Cozens et al., 2003). In America in the 1960s many cities began major street lighting programmes to reduce crime and initial results found that such improvements produced substantial reductions in recorded crime (Berla, 1995; Wheeler, 1967; Wright et al., 1974; Tyrpak, 1975; Hartley, 1974). These projects resulted in the decision by the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency to fund a review of these “positive” results (Tien et al., 1979). Of 103 studies, only 15 were considered sufficiently rigorous for evaluation and the review of these studies found that the results were inconclusive, and that other indicators of crime should be used in addition to recorded crime data. Farrington and Welsh (2002) argue that this review should have stimulated more studies but was mistakenly interpreted as demonstrating that lighting had no obvious effect on levels of crime and funding for research on this topic in the USA evaporated. In the UK, lighting studies in Hammersmith and Fulham (Painter, 1991a) and the North West of England (Painter, 1991b) reported reductions in crime and disorder. A Home Office funded study (Atkins et al., 1991) conducted in Wandsworth found no effect on crime, as did a review by Ramsay (1991) although it did suggest improved street lighting could reduce the fear of crime. Other studies in Cardiff (Herbert and Moore, 1991), Hull (Davidson and Goodey, 1991), Leeds (Burden and Murphy, 1991) and Strathclyde (Ditton et al., 1993) produced inconclusive findings using “before” and “after” comparisons but failed to provide a control area (Painter and Farrington, 1997). Bainbridge and Painter (1993) studied improved lighting in Birmingham’s inner city, which despite the collection and analysis of some additional social survey data, also PM 23,5 334 proved inconclusive. Methodological inadequacies have raised serious doubts about the validity of many of these exploratory studies (Painter and Farrington, 1997). A study by Painter and Farrington (1997), which used experimental and control areas, showed reductions in crime and an increase in pedestrian street use. They concluded “in the experimental area, there was a substantial and significant decrease in the incidence of all categories of crime after the improved street lighting” (Painter and Farrington, 1997, p. 221). The most recent review of lighting and crime research re-examined a number of studies conducted in the UK and the USA (Farrington and Welsh, 2002). This systematic review (which excluded several poorly designed lighting evaluations) found that improved street lighting reduced recorded crime overall by 7 per cent in the eight American studies and by 30 per cent in the five UK studies, and reductions in recorded crime were also demonstrated during the day – suggesting that street lighting is likely to have an effect by increasing community pride and informal social control rather than by simply improving surveillance opportunities (Farrington and Welsh, 2002). Across all the studies the crime reduction effect was 20 per cent. The UK studies included Poyner (1991), Shaftoe (1994), Poyner and Webb (1997), Painter and Farrington (1997, 2001a) and Painter and Farrington (1999). Studies have also revealed that the financial benefits (based upon government estimates of the financial costs of various crimes) of improved street lighting schemes far outweighed their initial costs (Painter and Farrington, 2001b). In the context of recent research, Pease (1998, p. 2) argues the case is proven and states “our aim should now be to use context-appropriate lighting schemes as part of a full repertoire of crime reduction tactics”. In summary, natural surveillance (e.g. residents’ self-surveillance opportunities as facilitated by windows) formal surveillance (e.g. police patrols) and mechanical surveillance strategies (e.g. street lighting and CCTV) have all proven effective in reducing both crime and the fear of crime. Access control Access control is a CPTED concept focused on reducing opportunities for crime by denying access to potential targets and creating a heightened perception of risk in offenders. Access control can include informal/natural (e.g. spatial definition), formal/organised (e.g. security personnel) and mechanical (e.g. locks and … Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 8 Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Your Name School of Computer and Information Sciences, University of the Cumberlands ISOL634 Physical Security Instructor Name: Current Date Table of Contents Introduction 4 What Could Happen? 4 Threat 1 from Outside: Meteorological factors 4 Threat 2 from Outside: Industrial catastrophes 4 Threat 3 from Outside: floods 5 Threat 1 from Inside: Emergence of fire 5 Threat 2 from Inside: Harmful carbon monoxide 5 Threat 3 from Inside: Injuries from falling 5 Frequency of Potential Threats 6 Frequency of Threat 1 from Outside: Meteorological factors 6 Frequency of Threat 2 from Outside: Industrial catastrophe 6 Frequency of Threat 3 from Outside: Flood 6 Frequency of Threat 1 from Inside: Emergence of fire 6 Frequency of Threat 2 from Inside: Harmful carbon monoxide 6 Frequency of Threat 3 from Inside: Injuries from falling 6 How Effective are the Layers of Protection 7 Effectiveness of Layer 1 against Threats from Outside 7 Effectiveness of Layer 2 against Threats from Outside 7 Effectiveness of Layer 3 against Threats from Outside 7 Effectiveness of Layer 1 against Threats from Inside 8 Effectiveness of Layer 2 against Threats from Inside 8 Effectiveness of Layer 3 against Threats from Inside 8 How Tolerable are the Mitigation Layers 9 Outside Layers of Protection Tolerability 9 Inside Layers of Protection Tolerability 9 References 10 Introduction LOPA is a threat evaluation and risk assessment approach. For the evaluation, LOPA uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. Its objective is to guarantee that built design has adequate protections while not being overprotected, allowing resources to be used for more productive uses. It entails a number of procedures, including identifying hazards, assessing the chance of occurrence, and determining the consequences (Pawolocki. n.d). What Could Happen? Threat identification and risk analysis assist in evaluating and understanding potential threats and risk throughout time so that persons, workers, and the environment are safeguarded, and risk is kept to an acceptable level. (Baybutt, 2017) This step assesses what could go wrong, the consequences, and the frequency with which it could occur. Risk and its tolerance are determined by a variety of factors and are unique to each firm. Different methodologies can be used to identify threats, ranging from less detailed to more specific, less certain to more certain, and less costly to more costly. For the purposes of this paper, a simple qualitative risk analysis such as HAZOP was used. Threat 1 from Outside: Meteorological factors Excessive values of meteorological phenomena, such as precipitation, extreme air and groundwater temperatures, air pressure, drought, icing, hall, lightning, blizzard, tornado, and ice on the river, can pose serious dangers Threat 2 from Outside: Industrial catastrophes Industrial accidents caused by humans can be extremely dangerous. Explosions and chemical leaks would be examples. An explosion induced by deflagration, detonation, or pressure impact might cause damage to the facility. Chemical plants or fuel storage facilities are likely to be the source of those incidents Threat 3 from Outside: floods Flooding can occur for a variety of causes. Tsunamis, flash floods caused by heavy rainfall, high groundwater, floods caused by river channel shifts, and water construction collapse are all potential hazards. Winds and storms can change the level of seawater and rivers. Corrosion caused by saltwater is another danger (Decker & Brikman, 2020). Threat 1 from Inside: Emergence of fire Candles, unsupervised irons, stovetops, and ovens are all potential sources of fire. Kitchens, such as unattended cooking, are the most typical places where fires occur. Electrical fires are common in bedrooms due to defective wiring, lighting, cords, heaters, and electric blankets. Fires can start in living rooms, heating equipment, chimneys, fireplaces, and space heaters. Threat 2 from Inside: Harmful carbon monoxide Carbon monoxide can cause a variety of health problems ranging from minor ones like headaches, dizziness, and vomiting to more serious ones like death. Carbon monoxide is difficult to detect through smell, eyesight, or sound. Threat 3 from Inside: Injuries from falling Falls can result in injuries owing to slick stairwells and floors, wet floors and surfaces, and scattering debris Falls account for more than 40\% of all home injuries with more than one-third of those resulting in death. The elderly and children are the most vulnerable to falls. Frequency of Potential Threats There are various steps in the LOPA assessment. The consequence is determined first, followed by risk tolerance requirements, alternative scenarios, and the frequency of triggering events (Dowell, 2018) Frequency of Threat 1 from Outside: Meteorological factors The frequency of metrological events is evaluated as Unlikely based on a scale that occurs every 100 years with major risk. Frequency of Threat 2 from Outside: Industrial catastrophe Industry incidents are estimated to be Unlikely based on the scale that one occurs every 1000 years with severe risk Frequency of Threat 3 from Outside: Flood Since I live in Florida, a threat such as a flood is regarded Probable based on the scale that the consequence occurs every 10 years with high risk. Frequency of Threat 1 from Inside: Emergence of fire Based on the scale that one occurs every year, the frequency of risks from fires is considered to be Highly Probable. The repercussions of a fire are considered serious dangers. Frequency of Threat 2 from Inside: Harmful carbon monoxide Because instances occur throughout the year, the frequency of Carbon Monoxide Poisoning is predicted to be Highly Probable, and the risk consequence is estimated to be severe. Frequency of Threat 3 from Inside: Injuries from falling The frequency of threats from within due to falls is evaluated to be Highly Probable since they occur several times per year, and the repercussions are estimated to be serious because the result might be death. How Effective are the Layers of Protection? According to (Garzia, et al. 2018) to be effective, the layers of security must be self-contained. Protective layers are thought of as a distinct set of elements that are linked to the process and design. Process, process design, alarm, automatic action, emergency reaction, emergency procedure, community emergency response, and others are examples of layers of protection. Effectiveness of Layer 1 against Threats from Outside Extreme weather occurrences could result in frozen pipes, pipe explosions, and more damage. Some of the precautions to take in the event of a snowstorm include clearing the snow with a broom, removing 2 to 3 inches of snow, and allowing snow to melt via gutters by cleaning them. Insulation can be used to protect pipes. Effectiveness of Layer 2 against Threats from Outside Checking installations on a regular basis is one way to protect against industry incidents, and work management should identify all potential hazards and take measures to control them, such as component design, component production, installation, process control, regular inspection, repairs, and replacements. Workers should be educated and monitored. Static and dynamic forces, corrosion, temperature fluctuations, pressure changes, and other factors should all be considered while designing different elements. Effectiveness of Layer 3 against Threats from Outside Flood protection layers range from simple, free solutions to more expensive, comprehensive systems. Raising the house on stilts to raise the flood level, installing foundation vents or sum pumps, preferably with a battery backup in case of a power loss are all options for house upgrades. Coatings and sealants should be applied to walls, entrances, and windows to prevent water from entering via cracks. Outlets and switches should be placed high enough to avoid damage in the event of a flood. Effectiveness of Layer 1 against Threats from Inside Watching the stove and oven, keeping objects away from the stove, shutting off equipment when not in use, and having a fire extinguisher nearby are all good precautions to take. Any broken wall outlets in bedrooms and living rooms should be replaced. Lighting cords, extension cords, and charges should all be checked on a regular basis and replaced as needed. Many devices should not be plugged into an outlet at the same time. Space heaters should be put in a safe location, away from anything that could catch fire. Every room should have smoke alarms fitted. Effectiveness of Layer 2 against Threats from Inside Installing a CO detector is one way to defend against carbon monoxide (CO). If CO levels rise to a dangerous level, the detector will sound an alarm. Installing HVAC systems, appliances that use coal, oil, or gas, and checking a house, especially older ones, can all help prevent carbon monoxide leakage. Effectiveness of Layer 3 against Threats from Inside Affixed flooring, sufficient lighting, and safety gates for dogs and small children are all effective ways to reduce the risk of falling. Any moist surfaces should be cleansed and dried as soon as possible. Debris, ice, and snow should not be allowed to accumulate on outside stairs. To make surfaces less slippery, mats should be attached and surfaces taped. Slick surfaces in the bathroom should be covered with rugs. How Tolerable are the Mitigation Layers? The goal of LOPA is to identify ways for minimizing the effects of particular risks. Its worth noting that, in order to be effective, counter-threat measures must be self-contained. Against determine if a threat is tolerable, risk ratings are compared to risk tolerance (Premkumar, 2020). Outside Layers of Protection Tolerability Risks are weighed against the risk tolerance standards of the organization. Additional security and control layers are recommended if the risk is determined to be too high. And each inside-outside mitigation layers are considered tolerable Inside Layers of Protection Tolerability Furthermore, each of the planned interior layers of protection is deemed bearable. LOPA was carried out by determining the possibility of all recognized dangers and expressing their severity qualitatively. LOPA investigated a variety of scenarios and triggering events. Emergency response, physical security, control systems, and process design are all part of a layer of protection. References Baybutt, P. (2017). Overcoming challenges in using layers of protection analysis (LOPA) to determine safety integrity levels (SILs). Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 48, 32-40. Dowell III, A. M. (2018). Layer of protection analysis for determining safety integrity level. Isa Transactions, 37(3), 155-165. Garzia, F., Lombardi, M., Fargnoli, M., & Ramalingam, S. (2018, October). PSA-LOPA-A Novel Method for Physical Security Risk Analysis based on Layers of Protection Analysis. In 2018 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST) (pp. 1-5). IEEE. Pawolocki, F. J. Layer of protection analysis as auxiliary technique in process safety incident investigations. Process Safety Progress, e12286. Premkumar, S. (n.d.). Layer of Protection Analysis - Introduction. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://www.citationmachine.net/apa/cite-a-website/custom 6 Assignment 2: Physical Security Assessment Assignment 2: Physical Security Assessment Your Name School of Computer and Information Sciences, University of the Cumberlands ISOL634 Physical Security Instructor Name Current Date Table of Contents Basic Threats 4 Theft 4 Violence 4 Natural Disaster 4 Heading 4 Layers of Protection 4 Access Controls 4 Security Force 4 Alarm Systems 4 Lighting 5 Communications 5 Levels of Security 5 Minimum 5 Low-level 5 Medium 5 High-level 5 Maximum 5 Conclusion 5 Most Likely Threat 5 Neutralization of Threat 5 References 7 Overview. In recent days, years each and every day presents various security threats whose economic impacts may be detrimental if they befall an organization, company, city-states, or even critical government agencies. Dues to increased incidences of security threats, there is a dire need to establish strategies and put in place preventive measures to help reduce if not eliminating such occurrences (Regulski, 2016). As provided by several recent security-related research, many of the areas that have faced a lot of security threats include technology-based industries where the cyber-criminals take advantage of the presence of sophisticated technology to hold hostage importance business functions. Based on the question, physical security assessment can be described as planned and organized strategies used to evaluate the effectiveness of existing or anticipated security maintenance approaches so as to determine the exact current security status of a region, state, organization, or even a country (Regulski, 2016). Its main entail evaluating the king of tools, equipment, and technologies available to combat any threats in the event of their occurrence. As a resident of Austin of the cities in Texas, it can affirm that the region has been experiencing few security glitches here and there, and this means that there is a critical need to ascertain the security current security status of the regions via intensive physical security assessment as may be indicated below. Basic Threats. Basic threats in Austin regions can be attributed to the normal or frequents acts emanating from civilians who may be engaged in activities that destroy the regions resources such as water supply systems or even lead to unduly fire outbreaks. . Theft. In Austin, theft cases are often associated with stealing private cars while the owners are out for business deals. Recent data has anti-theft technologies that have been configured in several parts of the regions to help curb the increasing menace of robbery incidences (Regulski, 2016). Violence. Like many other regions of the united states, Austin also has many cases of violence, particularly among the youths who use drugs and gender-based violence as a result of impacts of covid 19. According to the Austin police department, in 2020 alone, over 32 murders with 535 rape cases were recorded. There is also gun violence which needs to be addressed with Immediate effect (Regulski, 2016). Natural Disaster. Flooding and hailstones have been reported years back in Austin. Also, twine tornadoes along with drought are among the natural disasters in the region. Layers of Protection. Well-trained security forces have been with advanced technologies are among the critical layers deployed to curb insecurity issues. Technologies such as surveillance cameras and alarms have been put in place to track theft and gun violence activities with the region. Access Controls. Advanced and sophisticated biometric security control technologies have been installed in various critical offices within the regions. This helped to allow particular people to have access to vital city resources and perhaps keep off unauthorized personnel (Landucci, Khakzad, & Reniers, 2020). Security Force. Austin region has extensively trained security personnel who take control of security issues. The security forces have been established with a good chain of command that allows each individual to participate in promoting peace and upholding high standards of moral values. Alarm Systems. Many of the residents and even Austin regions at large use Abode, SimpliSafe, and Ring alarm systems to keep their security tight. These alarm systems offer reliable alerts that could be used to prevent any further impacts in case there is a threat (Landucci, Khakzad, & Reniers, 2020). Lighting. There are extensive t lighting systems in all streets with automated abilities. They are providing lighting during the night and allow security forces to conduct 24/7 patrols (Landucci, Khakzad, & Reniers, 2020). Communications. Austin region has well developed and equipped communication network. This provides a good linkage among security agencies, police departments, and emergency response units. In case there are any criminal activities, the different workforce can effectively communicate and collaborate towards calming the situation (Landucci, Khakzad, & Reniers, 2020, p. xx). Levels of Security. Minimum. Minimum security level will entail steps that are taken to ensure lawbreakers are kept off the premise by using agreeable operations that ensure there is guaranteed physical security. There are set policies and medium restrictions on a few offenses where criminal cases are handled with medium-ranked security officers and fined before released (Landucci, Khakzad, & Reniers, 2020). . Low-level. Security officers deployed to conduct physical patrol provides a low level of physical security assessment due to their unreliability, significantly when they get compromised by criminals via fraudulent activities. This means they must be supplemented with other technologies to help curb the menace associated with insecurity (Falcon & Winkle, 2021). Medium. Car theft alarms are more effective and reliable in controlling stealing activities. This is because they provide instant and quick alerts whenever there are theft cases. High-level. Access control systems such as biometric fingerprint security systems are more effective in identifying and permitting access of only authorized personnel to vital resources, thus reducing the chances of misuse of technologies detrimental to human life (Falcon & Winkle, 2021). Maximum. Alarm systems, especially fire alarm systems, provide a maximum security level because they relay alerts that prevent the excessive destruction of valuable resources whenever there are fire outbreaks within various parts of the Austin region (Bowen, 2020). Conclusion. Physical security assessment in autumn -Texas is a critical component as this will provide more insights about the regions security status and, at the same time, offer the opportunity for the formulation and implementation of new approaches that will solve existing challenges (Bowen, 2020). Most Likely Threat. The most likely threat is theft that targets cars. This is because of increased criminal activities resulting from the idleness of youths and the continued use of drugs and substances (Bowen, 2020). Neutralization of Threat. Deployment of high-security cameras with the ability to capture both sound and picture at a far distance along with the use of highly sensitive alarms to send signals whenever there are such threats can be the best approaches to use in this case. References Bowen, K. (2020, December 23). Austin ranked in the top 10 safest large cities in United States. Retrieved from https://www.fox7austin.com/news/austin-ranked-in-top-10-safest-large-cities-in-united-states Falcon, R., & Winkle, K. (2021, July 1). APD says suspect in custody after mail theft, stolen APD car, SWAT situation. Retrieved from https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/shelter-in-place-residents-of-south-austin-neighborhood-warned-as-swat-responds-to-incident/ Landucci, G., Khakzad, N., & Reniers, G. (2020). Physical security risk assessment tools and applications. Physical Security in the Process Industry, 71-123. doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-64054-3.00004-4 Regulski, E. (2016, July 10). The 5 most horrific tragedies and natural disasters in Austin history. Retrieved from https://www.onlyinyourstate.com/texas/austin/tragic-austin/ Running head: PHYSICAL SECURITY 1 Physical Security Students Name Institutional Affiliation Date This study source was downloaded by 100000802453703 from CourseHero.com on 07-14-2021 19:50:49 GMT -05:00 https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ Th is stu dy re so ur ce w as sh ar ed v ia C ou rs eH er o. co m https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ PHYSICAL SECURITY 2 Locks keep honest people honest It Is an ancient proverb that was used in the departments of security. This proverb was used to imply that it kept candid people honest once a lock is installed as they could not break-in. However, locks could not prevent villains from breaking in (Morgner et al,2020). This proverb also was applied in the law firms. A tally banishing guns keeps candid and compliant natives of a country from purchasing the firearms, but villains still carry guns illegitimately. However, locks have been found not to provide enough security since there are easy ways of bypassing locks using inexpensive tools. These lock picking tools are easily found. Some are found on the internet and are usually accompanied by tutorials of how to pick locks ( Dong et al.,2020). People also impression whereby a permanent key is developed, leading to easy access in places where locks are installed, breaking in and stealing, and leaving no evidence behind. Total security is where the safety of an individual or individuals is guaranteed. In the world today, total security is still miles away from being achieved. Security firms are continuously inventing new methods and more complex to enhance the safety of individuals (Dong et al.,2020). However, emerging technologies are continuously finding ways of accessing these locks and making these methods public. They are accessed by every individual and thus put individuals security and safety at risk since criminals can easily hack into these locks. Therefore total security is a goal that is yet to be achieved. This study source was downloaded by 100000802453703 from CourseHero.com on 07-14-2021 19:50:49 GMT -05:00 https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ Th is stu dy re so ur ce w as sh ar ed v ia C ou rs eH er o. co m https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ PHYSICAL SECURITY 3 References Morgner, P., Mai, C., Koschate-Fischer, N., Freiling, F., & Benenson, Z. (2020, May). Security update labels: Establishing economic incentives for security patching of IoT consumer products. In 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (pp. 429-446). IEEE. Dong, X., Zaoyu, W., Hua, M., Jing, X., Debo, Y., Fanjin, W., & Wei, B. (2018, December). ETSB: Energy Trading System Based on Blockchain. In International Conference on Security with Intelligent Computing and Big-data Services (pp. 673-684). Springer, Cham. This study source was downloaded by 100000802453703 from CourseHero.com on 07-14-2021 19:50:49 GMT -05:00 https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ Th is stu dy re so ur ce w as sh ar ed v ia C ou rs eH er o. co m Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) https://www.coursehero.com/file/72748259/locks-keep-honest-people-honestdocx/ http://www.tcpdf.org