Fluent Essays

Two parts Assignment to provide critique to a article. from either of the two topics  1)  You’re fired! Gender disparities in CEO dismissal.  OR 2)  The role of firm size and knowledge intensity in the performance effects of collective turnover Research Assignment - choose one topic from researchpaper.pdf file Week Five: Research Paper – List of potential research topics To complete the Article Research Paper due in Week 5, please select a topic from the list provided below or from the chapter readings.  Managers’ challenges and opportunities in applying OB concepts.  The three levels of analysis in this text’s OB model.  Developing managers’ interpersonal skills also helps organizations attract and keep high- performing employees.  Motivation and work performance  Leader behavior and power and work performance  Interpersonal communication and work performance  Group structure and processes and work performance  Attitude development and perception and work performance  Change processes and work performance  Conflict and negotiation and work performance  Work design and work performance  Positive organizational scholarship  Workplace discrimination undermines diversity effectiveness.  Stereotypes function in organizational settings.  Key biographical characteristics and organizational behavior (OB).  The relevance of intellectual and physical abilities to OB.  How organizations manage diversity effectively.  The relationship between age and job performance  Race and ethnicity on employment outcomes such as hiring decisions, performance evaluations, pay, and workplace discrimination.  The components of an attitude.  Relationship between attitudes and behavior.  Major Job attitudes.  Approaches for measuring job satisfaction.  Main causes of job satisfaction.  Employee responses to dissatisfaction.  Differentiate between emotions and moods.  Sources of emotions and moods.  The impact emotional labor has on employees  Emotional intelligence.  Strategies for emotion regulation.  Personality, the way it is measured, and the factors that shape it.  Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) personality framework and the Big Five model  The concepts of core self-evaluation (CSE), self-monitoring, and proactive personality contribute to the understanding of personality.  Personality predicts behavior.  Terminal and instrumental values.  Person-job fit and person-organization fit.  Hofstede’s five value dimensions and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) framework.  Factors that influence perception.  Attribution theory.  Link between perception and decision making.  Rational model of decision making with bounded rationality and intuition.  How individual differences and organizational constraints affect decision making.  The three-stage model of creativity.  Key elements of motivation.  Early theories of motivation.  Self-determination theory and goal-setting theory.  Self-efficacy theory, reinforcement theory, equity theory, and expectancy theory.  Employee job engagement for managers.  Job characteristics model (JCM) and changing the work environment.  Variable-pay programs and employee motivation.  Intrinsic motivational benefits of employee recognition programs.  Punctuated-equilibrium model of group development.  Norms and individual’s behavior.  Status and size and group performance.  Issues of cohesiveness and diversity and group effectiveness.  Strengths and weaknesses of group decision making.  Continued popularity of teams in organizations.  Team arrangements.  Characteristics of effective teams.  How organizations can create team players.  Functions and process of communication.  Downward, upward, and lateral communication through small-group networks and the grapevine.  Oral, written, and nonverbal communication.  Automatic and controlled processing of persuasive messages.  Common barriers to effective communication.  How to overcome the potential problems of cross-cultural communication.  Trait theories of leadership.  The central tenets and main limitations of behavioral theories.  Contingency theories of leadership.  Contemporary theories of leadership and their relationship to foundational theories.  Roles of leaders in creating ethical organizations.  How leaders can have a positive impact on their organizations through building trust and mentoring.  Challenges to our understanding of leadership. Research Paper: This is a graduate course and students will be expected to research and write papers summarizing in their own words what they have found on current topics from the weekly readings. Research is a theoretical review of relevant literature and application of findings in the literature to a topic related to a specific industry, field, or business problem. The research must be conducted using peer-reviewed trade or academic journals. While Blogs, Wikipedia, encyclopedias, course textbooks, popular magazines, newspaper articles, online websites, etc. are helpful for providing background information, these resources are NOT suitable resources for this research assignment. Please Note: The UC Library staff are very helpful with assisting students in using the UC Online Library journal database. Please contact them if you have issues. In addition, the instructor has provided additional resources, including a research tutorial, in the “Course Resources” folder in the “Content” area of the course. Assignment Requirements: i. Choose a research topic from the chapter readings or from the list provided by your professor. ii. Research/find a minimum at least four (4), preferably five (5) or more, different peer- reviewed articles on your topic from the University of the Cumberlands Library online business database. The article(s) must be relevant and from a peer-reviewed source. While you may use relevant articles from any time frame, current/published within the last five (5) years are preferred. Using literature that is irrelevant or unrelated to the chosen topic will result in a point reduction. iii. Write a four (4) to five (5) page double spaced paper in APA format discussing the findings on your specific topic in your own words. Note - paper length does not include cover page, abstract, or references page(s). iv. Structure your paper as follows: a. Cover page b. Overview describing the importance of the research topic to current business and professional practice in your own words. c. Purpose of Research should reflect the potential benefit of the topic to the current business and professional practice and the larger body of research. d. Review of the Literature summarized in your own words. Note that this should not be a “copy and paste” of literature content, nor should this section be substantially filled with direct quotes from the article. A literature review is a summary of the major points and findings of each of the selected articles (with appropriate citations). Direct quotations should be used sparingly. Normally, this will be the largest section of your paper (this is not a requirement; just a general observation). e. Practical Application of the literature. Describe how your findings from the relevant research literature can shape, inform, and improve current business and professional practice related to your chosen topic. f. Conclusion in your own words g. References formatted according to APA style requirements Grading Criteria:  Content Knowledge & Structure (25 points): All of the requested components are completed as assigned; content is on topic and related to organizational behavior, critical thinking is clearly demonstrated (few, if any, direct quotations from the source in the paper); scholarly research is demonstrated; topics and concepts gained from the assigned reading and/or from research is evident.  Critical Thinking (15 points): Demonstrates substantial critical thinking about topics and solid interpretation of materials and reflection.  Clarity & Effective Communication (15 points): Communication is clear, concise, and well presented; scholarly writing is demonstrated; grammar, sentence structure, writing in third person, and word choice is used correctly.  Integration of Knowledge & Articles (15 points): Articles used are current and relevant (preferably published within last five (5) years and MUST be from peer-reviewed journal article publications. At least four (4) peer-reviewed journal articles are examined and analyzed in the paper.  Presentation & Writing Mechanics (30 points): Cover page, headings, in-text citations, page citations (page number citations required for specific information such as dates, years, list of items from article, names, numbers, statistics, and other specific information), and references are properly formatted. Please Note: Plagiarism will not be tolerated. The paper must be written in your own words. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206319880957 Journal of Management Vol. 47 No. 4, April 2021 993 –1023 DOI: 10.1177/0149206319880957 © The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions 993 The Role of Firm Size and Knowledge Intensity in the Performance Effects of Collective Turnover Kim De Meulenaere Sophie De Winne KU Leuven Elise Marescaux IESEG School of Management LEM-CNRS 9221 Stijn Vanormelingen KU Leuven As employees are among firms’ most important resources and labor markets are facing serious labor shortages, firm-level collective turnover is one of the most important challenges facing organizations. Context-emergent turnover theory provides a theoretical framework for the per- formance implications of collective turnover and argues that context, and in particular, firm size, plays a crucial role in the collective turnover–performance relationship. Yet, the moderat- ing role of firm size remains undertheorized, empirically understudied, and thus, unclear. Based on the resource-based view of the firm, we develop a theoretical framework for two competing perspectives (a negative and a positive one) on the role of firm size and put forward the firm’s knowledge intensity as a crucial additional moderator. The main premise is that whereas firm size determines what resources firms have to successfully cope with turnover, knowledge inten- sity determines the resources firms need to do so. We propose a three-way interaction, suggest- ing that firm size reinforces the harmful effect of turnover in highly knowledge-intensive firms and buffers it in firms with low levels of knowledge intensity. Using a unique multi-industry and longitudinal administrative data set of 6,913 Belgian firms (2012–2016), we find support for Acknowledgments: This research was supported by the Research Foundation–Flanders, Grant Numbers G.0661.10N (Research Project), G.0697.16N (Research Project), and 12Z7519N (Postdoctoral Research Fellowship). We are deeply grateful to the editor, David Allen, and the anonymous reviewers of Journal of Management for taking the time to provide highly valuable comments and suggestions to improve our manuscript. We also thank Prof. Dewael- heyns for providing us valuable information on accounting differences between large and small firms. Supplemental material for this article is available with the manuscript on the JOM website. Corresponding author: Kim De Meulenaere, KU Leuven, Korte Nieuwstraat 33, 2000 Antwerpen, 2000, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected] 880957 JOMXXX10.1177/0149206319880957Journal of ManagementDe Meulenaere et al. / Collective Turnover, Firm Size, and Knowledge Intensity research-article2019 https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/journals-permissions mailto:[email protected] http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177\%2F0149206319880957&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2019-10-22 994 Journal of Management / April 2021 these assumptions. This study highlights the importance of the context in which firms have to deal with turnover, and it spurs researchers to go beyond studying turnover in narrow study contexts, to take into account the interplay among different but intertwined organizational con- tingencies, and to acknowledge both the quantitative (how many employees leave) and qualita- tive components (who leaves) of turnover. Keywords: collective turnover; context-emergent turnover theory; firm size; knowledge inten- sity; firm performance Firm-level collective turnover, or “the aggregate levels of departures that occur within . . . organizations” (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011: 353), creates major challenges for the function- ing of firms. Coping effectively with employee departures is ever more important for firms’ success and survival in this era in which labor markets are confronted with labor shortages (Hancock, Allen, Bosco, McDaniel, & Pierce, 2013). As a result, the number of empirical studies on the consequences of collective turnover for firm performance has grown consider- ably (for recent overviews, see Hancock et al., 2013; Hancock, Allen, & Soelberg, 2017; Heavey, Holwerda, & Hausknecht, 2013; Park & Shaw, 2013). These studies generally con- clude that high collective turnover is detrimental. It can cause multiple disruptions for firms’ operations due to the depletion of human capital, the loss of social capital, the difficulties facing firm members with newcomer socialization, and the high costs of replacements (Hancock et al., 2017; Hom, Lee, Shaw, & Hausknecht, 2017). Yet, as supported by the wide variety in effect sizes in empirical research, similar col- lective turnover rates are not equally harmful to all firms (Allen, Hancock, Vardaman, & Mckee, 2014; Hancock et al., 2013; Hom et al., 2017). This is also the basic premise of context-emergent turnover theory (CETT), stating that contextual factors may be at play (Hausknecht & Holwerda, 2013; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013). Turnover scholars have repeat- edly mentioned firm size as one of the key organizational contingencies, as it determines the resources firms have available to manage the disruptions caused by turnover (Hancock et al., 2017; Hausknecht, Trevor, & Howard, 2009). However, its actual role remains unclear as two competing, yet undertheorized, perspectives can be considered. Accordingly, the limited empirical literature has reported evidence for a negative moderation (Hancock et al., 2013), a positive one (Park & Shaw, 2013), and even no moderation at all (Hancock et al., 2017). With the present study, we want to unravel the role of firm size. We therefore rely on a resource-based perspective and argue that a distinction should be made between the resources firms have and need to successfully deal with turnover. Firm size relates to the amount and type of resources (i.e., human, financial, social, and organizational) that firms have and that they can deploy to deal efficiently with the disruptions caused by turnover. However, the nature of the turnover disruptions and, thus, the resources needed to manage them depend on firms’ knowledge intensity, that is, the extent to which firms rely deeply upon an extensive body of complex human resources (i.e., knowledge) for realizing their core value-creation activities (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). It reflects the quality of the human resources lost with turnover, the complexity of employee interactions within a firm, and the depth and intricate- ness of the products or services provided by the firm (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Dess De Meulenaere et al. / Collective Turnover, Firm Size, and Knowledge Intensity 995 & Shaw, 2001). Consequently, it determines the specific implications of turnover for the firm’s human and social capital and its operations (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013) and therefore the resources needed to cope with them. Thus, to fully understand the role of firm size, we put forward knowledge intensity as a crucial additional moderator. Throughout this article, we first provide theoretical grounding for two competing perspec- tives on the role of firm size, a positive and a negative one, that have thus far been addressed only in a limited and intuitive way (e.g., Hancock et al., 2013, 2017; Hausknecht et al., 2009; Shaw, Park, & Kim, 2013). The positive perspective implies that larger firms can buffer the negative turnover effects because they have more human, financial, and organizational resources to realize quick and effective replacements (Hancock et al., 2013; Park & Shaw, 2013). The negative perspective argues that larger firms lack a high-quality and dense struc- ture of social resources, which thwarts the socialization and adaptation of the altered work- force (Hausknecht et al., 2009). We then argue that firm size can have both a buffering and reinforcing influence on the harmful performance effects of collective turnover, depending on the firm’s knowledge intensity. It determines whether resources for quick and effective replacements or for successful socialization and adaptation are most relevant to cope suc- cessfully with collective turnover and, therefore, whether the positive or the negative per- spective of firm size prevails. We thus propose a three-way interaction, suggesting that firm size buffers the harmful effect of turnover in firms with a low level of knowledge intensity and reinforces it in highly knowledge-intensive firms. Using a unique multi-industry and longitudinal administrative data set of 6,913 Belgian firms (2012–2016), we find support for these assumptions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while most turnover studies have controlled for the number of employees, we show that firm size has a more fundamental meaning as a moderator in the collective turnover–performance relationship. Understanding the role of firm size is essential as (a) it is one of the most crucial contextual features of the firm that shapes the basic context in which organizations have to deal with turnover (Hancock et al., 2013; Park & Shaw, 2013), and (b) firm-level moderators in the collective turnover– performance relationship have been largely neglected, though considered highly important, in previous studies (Brymer & Sirmon, 2018; Shaw, 2011). Further in support of CETT, we show that the quantity of turnover alone cannot explain its consequences (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013) but that the quality (in terms of the knowledge intensity of the workforce and, thus, of the departing employees) needs to be taken into account. As such, this study shows that the interplay of contextual moderators is essential to understanding the implications of collective turnover, which goes beyond the tradition of examining separate effects of individual mod- erators (Hausknecht & Holwerda, 2013). Theory and Hypotheses The Effect of Firm-Level Collective Turnover on Firm Performance Throughout the years, an increasing number of studies on the performance consequences of firm-level collective turnover has been published (e.g., Call, Nyberg, Ployhart, & Weekley, 2015; Guthrie, 2001; Hale, Ployhart, & Shepherd, 2016; Kacmar, Andrews, Van Rooy, Steilberg, & Cerrone, 2006; Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005). To conclude on the main pattern of findings, several authors executed reviews and meta-analyses (Hancock 996 Journal of Management / April 2021 et al., 2013, 2017; Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Heavey et al., 2013; Park & Shaw, 2013; Shaw, 2011). They predominantly document a negative effect. In line with CETT, they estab- lish that the key mechanisms through which this relationship holds go beyond the simple loss of human capital that may well explain the effects of an individual exit (Hausknecht & Holwerda, 2013; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013). Specifically, collective turnover also induces the depletion of social capital and the disruption of organizational processes caused by the depar- ture of employees (Hancock et al., 2013; Heavey et al., 2013; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). We briefly discuss these mechanisms next. First, human capital refers to the variety of the set of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that individual firm members have acquired through their work experience, training, and education (G. Becker, 1975; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). Employees’ human capital can add significantly to organizations’ competitive advantage, particularly if it is difficult to imitate and to transfer to other firms (Barney, 1991; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013; Shaw et al., 2013). From a human capital perspective, turnover can therefore be detrimental to workforce productivity by causing the loss of highly valuable human capital (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Hancock et al., 2013; Heavey et al., 2013; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013; Shaw, 2011; Shaw et al., 2013). Second, turnover may also cause the loss of valuable social or relational capital—that is, the capital embedded in employees’ social relationships developed over time, in which human capital resources, such as knowledge and expertise, are shared and integrated (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Hancock et al., 2013; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013; Shaw, Duffy, et al., 2005). These social relationships can be built both within a firm through close collaborations between employees on the work floor (i.e., internal social capital) and across the boundaries of the firm between firm members and external agents, such as clients, experts, partners, and professional networks (i.e., external social capital; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). A number of benefits have been associated with the accumulation of social capital in organizations, such as increased knowledge sharing and learning (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016), enhanced intellectual capital, fostered communica- tion efficiency, employee trust and commitment (Leana & Van Buren, 1999), and improved investments by employees in their coworkers (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013), all of which con- tribute to workforce performance (Dess & Shaw, 2001). As turnover harms current social relationships with employees who exit the firm—that is, “when employees leave a unit, all of their contributions leave, including their relationships with other employees” (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013: 117)—it undermines these benefits at the expense of workforce performance (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Hancock et al., 2013; Shaw, Duffy, et al., 2005). Finally, turnover may also cause operational disruptions that complicate the functioning of the workforce (Heavey et al., 2013). Turnover can disrupt organizational operations directly—for example, by increasing the volume of unfinished work or by creating a flux in the coordination, knowledge exchange, and socialization of employees—simply because the work needs to be performed by fewer employees or because replacement employees cannot operate efficiently as they may have little experience (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013; Summers, Humphrey, & Ferris, 2012). Turnover can also disrupt firm procedures indirectly because the increased time (and money) spent on redirecting incumbent firm members and on hiring, training, and socializing replacement workers implies that less attention is diverted to the key activities that contribute to the De Meulenaere et al. / Collective Turnover, Firm Size, and Knowledge Intensity 997 productivity of the firm (Allen, Bryan, & Vardaman, 2010; Hausknecht et al., 2009; Heavey et al., 2013; Messersmith, Lee, Guthrie, & Ji, 2014; Watrous, Huffman, & Pritchard, 2006). In sum, because high collective turnover rates engender human and social capital deple- tions and operational disruptions, they are considered detrimental to firm performance. However, as put forward by CETT, the extent to which collective turnover has negative consequences for firm performance depends on the organizational context (Brymer & Sirmon, 2018; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013). In this study, we propose firm size as a key orga- nizational contextual moderator. Firm Size To delineate the potential moderating role of firm size, we systematically and theoretically derive two opposing hypotheses using the resource-based theory of the firm. This theory defines resources as (in)tangible assets controlled by the organization, which can be deployed to improve the firm’s efficiency and effectiveness and to achieve a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Guthrie, 2001; Shaw et al., 2013). We argue that large and small firms have different amounts and types of human, social, financial, and organizational resources (Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale, & Lepak, 2014; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013), which can either help or hinder firms in successfully alleviating collective turnover repercussions. Positive role of firm size. On the one hand, we can hypothesize that because larger firms have more resources, they have a competitive advantage over smaller firms when they are faced with turnover as they can withstand the loss of human capital and its associated dis- ruptions better (Barney, 1991; Hancock et al., 2013; Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015; Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). First, to the extent that firm size is conceptualized as the number of employees (Hancock et al., 2013), larger firms have a greater absolute pool of human resources (HR). While one could argue that similar turnover rates cause comparable human capital losses for both large and small firms, the abundancy of human capital makes larger firms more resilient to the departures of employees. The more employees, the more likely several workers will perform the same job (Barron, Black, & Loewenstein, 1989), implying that multiple employees possess similar gen- eral and firm-specific human capital. For the same turnover rate, larger firms will thus experi- ence fewer operational disruptions because they will have fewer difficulties in replacing the lost human capital in the short run, for example, by others taking over the extra work. Second, larger firms generally have more financial resources and more potential to attract further monetary means (Mitchell, 1994); for example, they can more easily raise capital and secure loans because they face better institutional regulations (Audia & Greve, 2006; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990). Accordingly, studies have found that this provides large firms with a larger absolute pool of financial slack resources, or the monetary means that firms either have available (e.g., excess liquidity) or can accrue in the short run (e.g., through loans) (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004). Such a flexible form of slack creates a finan- cial buffer that may help firms to deal quickly and efficiently with such organizational phe- nomena as turnover (Audia & Greve, 2006; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002; Josefy et al., 2015; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988).1 More specifically, it enables them to man- age operational disruptions caused by turnover—for example, by outsourcing specific tasks 998 Journal of Management / April 2021 to flexible, temporary workers—and/or to invest additionally in the recruitment of well- qualified replacement employees who can quickly take over the work of leaving employees (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Kozlowski & Bell, 2013; Park & Shaw, 2013). To achieve quick and effective replacements, larger firms can additionally draw from their stronger employer brand as the great amount of financial resources enables them to offer more attractive working conditions (e.g., higher wages, employee benefits, and formal devel- opment opportunities) than can smaller firms (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Cosic, 2018; O’Connell & Byrne, 2010). This gives them more prestige (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), power (Boone, Carroll, & van Witteloostuijn, 2004), and legitimacy in the labor market to attract high-quality replacement employees quickly, compensating for the human resource losses incurred (Williamson, Cable, & Aldrich, 2002). Third, larger firms also benefit from more organizational resources, residing in the pro- cesses, systems, routines, practices, and structures of the organization (Greene, Brush, & Brown, 1997). Compared to small firms, large firms can draw from a larger pool of HR-related knowledge and expertise (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Josefy et al., 2015). As a result, they make more use of sophisticated and formal HR practices and policies than smaller firms (Guthrie, 2001; Jackson & Schuler, 1995). These practices typically reflect a wide range of formalized routines, rules, and procedures, which can help organizations deal with turnover in a systematic and efficient way (Barber, Wesson, Roberson, & Taylor, 1999). For example, it enables them to create routines on who takes up the work when employees leave the firm (Mowday, 1984), to develop procedures for maintaining the knowledge that departing employees have developed (Call et al., 2015), to set up a continuous recruitment process, and to standardize the training of newcomers (Allen, 2006). Organizational resources also reside into well-developed internal labor markets (Guthrie, 2001; Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984; Williamson et al., 2002). This implies a strong division of labor in which employees are responsible for a specialized task with clear boundaries (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Carley, 1992), which differs substantially from smaller firms, where employees generally have broader responsibilities over multiple tasks (Meijaard, Brand, & Mosselman, 2005). This gives larger firms a competitive advantage over smaller firms when employees leave because it is less harmful to lose employees when they have a single respon- sibility and/or perform a single task, and it is easier to recruit new hires for specific tasks. Moreover, internal labor markets can supply (temporary) internal replacements, implying that the work of the exiting employees can be covered and potential operational disruptions are limited (Groothuis, 1994; Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984). In sum, the larger pool of human, financial, and organizational resources may help large organizations to cope more successfully with collective firm-level turnover, in particular by coping with operational disruptions and by enabling quick and effective replacements for the departing employees: Hypothesis 1a: The negative relationship between collective firm-level turnover and firm perfor- mance is weaker for large firms than for small firms. Negative role of firm size. Whereas a larger pool of human, financial, and organizational resources may help larger firms dealing with turnover consequences, the structure and qual- ity of their social and organizational resources may impose barriers and disadvantages for De Meulenaere et al. / Collective Turnover, Firm Size, and Knowledge Intensity 999 employees’ socialization and adaptation when firm members exit the organization. In this view, large firms have a competitive disadvantage as compared to smaller firms. First, large and small firms differ in terms of the structure of their social resources, more specifically in the pattern of their internal social networks (Josefy et al., 2015). As larger firms have more employees and working units, social relationships among employees and units become more complex (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Josefy et al., 2015). As a result, it is more difficult to create a dense social network in a large firm, that is, a network with a large relative number of relationships compared to the number of possible ones (Scott, 2000). This high complexity and low density of internal social resources hampers information sharing within the workforce, implying that employees are less aware of each other’s roles and responsibili- ties in large firms (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001). This complicates the socialization of newcomers and the quick and easy adaptation of the remaining employees to the altered working situation and the associated operational disrup- tions after turnover (Fang, Duffy, & Shaw, 2011; Shaw, Gupta, et al., 2005). Second, the quality of the social resources decreases with firm size. Research emphasizes that as firm size increases, relationships between employees become less genuine and more superficial, firm members interact and participate less, and they become less satisfied and committed to the firm and their coworkers (Hausknecht et al., 2009; Josefy et al., 2015; Scott, 2000; Shaw, Gupta, et al., 2005). This might negatively influence the amount of trust present in the relationships (i.e., the relational dimension of social resources; Granovetter, 1984) and the shared values, interpretations, and systems of meaning that provide sense and facilitate knowledge transfer and learning (i.e., the cognitive dimension of social resources; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), thereby hindering or complicating the socialization and adapta- tion of “old” and potential new firm members after turnover (Hausknecht et al., 2009; Park & Shaw, 2013). Third, the organizational resources in large firms are characterized by a hierarchical structure of work and a bureaucratic management approach, reflected in formal norms and rules (Josefy et al., 2015; Meijaard et al., 2005). As mentioned earlier, such resources can provide benefits—for example, they can lead to organizational routines for dealing system- atically with employee turnover. Yet, the bureaucracy and formalization also makes large firms more rigid and impersonal (Groothuis, 1994; Meijaard et al., 2005). This may damage firms’ success in managing the adaptation and socialization needs triggered by turnover (Hausknecht et al., 2009). Specifically, decisions (e.g., related to the redistribution of tasks or to the hiring of new employees) are made more slowly as they need to travel through dif- ferent layers in the hierarchy and follow strict procedural guidelines (Audia & Greve, 2006; Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Josefy et al., 2015; Shaw, Gupta, et al., 2005). Moreover, the greater mental and physical distance between managers and employees (Meijaard et al., 2005) limits managers’ personal support and guidance toward employees, which further complicates employees’ adaptation to the altered working situation and the socialization (e.g., training, mentoring) of new employees. In smaller firms, the level of bureaucracy is lower and the distance between managers and employees is smaller (Hayton, 2003), which allows for a more flexible and informal management approach (Groothuis, 1994; Meijaard et al., 2005). For example, it allows managers to open up to and effectively deal with employee initiatives and suggestions related to the reorganization of work after turnover (Cardon & Stevens, 2004). 1000 Journal of Management / April 2021 In sum, while—as argued earlier—large firms have relatively more access to human, financial, and organizational resources, the quality and structure of their social and organiza- tional resources may also aggravate operational disruptions and hamper firms in dealing with the socialization and adaptation needs brought on by turnover. As such, we hypothesize the following: Hypothesis 1b: The negative relationship between collective firm-level turnover and firm perfor- mance is stronger for large firms than for small firms. Firm-Level Knowledge Intensity We argue that a firm’s knowledge intensity determines whether the positive or negative perspective prevails. Firm-level knowledge intensity is the extent to which an extensive body of complex knowledge is needed for realizing the output of the firm (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Firms with high and low levels of knowledge intensity thus differ in the type of human and social resources they rely upon (Datta et al., 2005; Dess & Shaw, 2001; Messersmith et al., 2014) and lose when confronted with high turnover (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013). We argue that this influences whether quick and effective replacements (Hypothesis 1a) or effi- cient adaptation and socialization processes (Hypothesis 1b) are more important for firms when dealing with turnover. First, higher firm-level knowledge intensity implies more work of an intellectual nature. Therefore, highly knowledge-intensive firms (e.g., universities and legal and accounting firms) rely to a large extent on a vast pool of complex knowledge and skills embedded in an intellectually skilled workforce (Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2012; Starbuck, 1992; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). In other words, intellectual human capital constitutes the key ingredient for organizational success (Alvesson, 2000; Campbell et al., 2012; Starbuck, 1992). This human capital is typically tacit and nonstandardized, and research has empha- sized that the human capital in highly knowledge-intensive firms can incite a competitive advantage only when it is shared intensely by employees with other firm members and when it is integrated into the firm’s memory (Alvesson, 2000; Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Shalley, Gilson, & Blum, 2009; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This makes social resources, or the social interactions and relationships within the workforce, essential as they leverage the human resources to achieve higher performance (Dess & Shaw, 2001; Hitt et al., 2001; Käpylä, Laihonen, Lönnqvist, & Carlucci, 2011; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). The so-called bundles of human resources created by combining different intellectual inputs are difficult to imitate and, so, generate competitive advantage for knowledge-intensive firms (Barney, 1991; Von Nordenflycht, 2010; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, when faced with turnover, firms do not merely lose highly valuable knowledge but also experience a gap in their social resources, causing disruptions in the knowledge-sharing and knowledge-generating activities of the workforce (Dess & Shaw, 2001). To guarantee the continuity of the knowledge-based activities, it is crucial that the remaining employees adapt efficiently to the altered … 560 https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206318810415 Journal of Management Vol. 46 No. 4, April 2020 560 –582 DOI: 10.1177/0149206318810415 © The Author(s) 2018 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions You’re Fired! Gender Disparities in CEO Dismissal Vishal K. Gupta Sandra C. Mortal The University of Alabama Sabatino Silveri University of Memphis Minxing Sun Clemson University Daniel B. Turban University of Missouri CEO dismissals attract considerable attention, presumably because of the visibility, publicity, and intrigue that often surrounds the decision to fire the CEO. With the goal of advancing schol- arly understanding of CEO dismissals, we examine whether CEO gender influences the likeli- hood of dismissal. We theorize and find that ceteris paribus, female CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed than male CEOs. Perhaps even more importantly, we find a CEO gender by firm performance interaction such that male CEOs are less likely to be dismissed when firm performance is high (compared to when it is low), whereas female CEOs have a similar level of dismissal likelihood regardless of firm performance. Notably, our results are robust to multiple analytical techniques and various econometric specifications, bringing greater credence to the validity of our findings. Implications and directions for future research are also discussed. Keywords: CEO dismissal; gender; firm performance Acknowledgments: Previous versions of this research were presented at the Southern Management Association Conference and discussed at the Indian Institute of Management at Shillong, where we benefited from good feed- back and constructive comments. Conversations with Alka Gupta, Junsoo Lee, and Steven Michael were useful in the development of ideas discussed here. Erik Markin and Joshua White provided editorial assistance at different stages during the writing of this article. We are very grateful for the helpful insights and suggestions from action editor Karen Schnatterly and three anonymous reviewers, all of whom played an important role in strengthening this manuscript. Of course, all omissions and errors remain our own. Corresponding author: Vishal K. Gupta, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 810415 JOMXXX10.1177/0149206318810415Journal of ManagementGupta et al. research-article2018 https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/journals-permissions mailto:[email protected] https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206318810415 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177\%2F0149206318810415&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-11-05 Gupta et al. / Gender and CEO Dismissal 561 The increasing presence of women in chief executive roles motivates considerable interest in understanding what happens to women after they reach the CEO position (Oliver, Krause, Busenbark, & Kalm, 2018; Zhang & Qu, 2016). Some scholars suggest that women receive preferential treatment compared to men for having reached previously inaccessible leader- ship roles (“female leadership advantage” logic; Underdahl, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). Others contend that women continue to be disadvantaged even after they attain the highest position in the organizational hierarchy (Glass & Cook, 2016). Specifically, using the metaphor of the “glass cliff,” researchers argue that women in leadership positions face more perils and risks compared to their male counterparts (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). The bias against women in leadership roles is believed to be rooted in widespread stereotypical beliefs that associate the characteristics needed for success as a leader with men but not with women (“think manager– think male” effect; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Schein, 2001). With the goal of further advancing this line of inquiry, and providing a strong test of the greater precariousness of women’s leadership position vis-à-vis men (Ryan & Haslam, 2007), we investigate whether female CEOs face differential dismissal risk compared to male CEOs. CEO dismissal refers to the forced departure of the chief executive from the firm (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). Three decades ago, Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin defined CEO dismissal as “a situation in which the CEO’s departure is ad-hoc (e.g., not part of mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will” (1988: 255), a definition that continues to resonate with researchers in this area. While CEOs depart from their firms for many reasons, dismissal—sometimes also referred to as forced turnover (Farrell & Whidbee, 2002) and involuntary exit (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993)—has long been considered the most theoretically interesting form of CEO departure (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Scholars posit, with considerable supporting evidence, that firm performance is the primary metric by which CEOs are assessed and, thus, an important predictor of CEO dismissal (Hilger, Mankel, & Richter, 2013). Consequently, researchers generally view CEO dismissal as “one of the main corporate governance instruments” (Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2014: 66), so that the threat of dismissal is considered a powerful tool to pressure managers to lead their firms better and pursue value-enhancing policies (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Unexpected departures of CEOs from public corporations receive considerable media scrutiny (Li, Lu, Makino, & Lau, 2017). The growing number of women in the C-suite, coupled with the current zeitgeist of gender equality in society (Sandberg, 2013), motivates interest in possible gender differences in CEO dismissal. Contemporary media articles con- tend that female CEOs face greater threat of dismissal compared to male CEOs because the former get blamed disproportionately more for the problems and issues facing the company (Leung, 2014; Reingold, 2016). A recent PwC investigation noted that among CEOs leaving office in large public corporations between 2003 and 2013, 38\% of women were forced out compared to only 27\% of men (Favaro, Karlsson, & Nielson, 2014). While these reports sug- gest gender biases in CEO dismissal, it is worth remembering that media accounts are “not held to high methodological and peer review standards that academic work is subject to” (R. B. Adams, 2016: 373) and, thus, do not advance ongoing discussions about challenges faced by female leaders in a rigorous fashion (Ryan, Haslam, Morgenroth, Rink, Stoker, & Peters, 2016). The CEO position is the highest corporate leadership role (Zhang & Qu, 2016), and CEO dismissals are often clouded in controversy and confusion, so that systematic research 562 Journal of Management / April 2020 is needed to examine whether there are gender differences in CEO dismissals. In particular, it is important to know, using rigorous statistical tools, whether CEO dismissals actually show significant gender bias, which may inadvertently perpetuate social stereotypes suggest- ing that men, but not women, have the attributes required for successful leadership. On the basis of 641 dismissals from 2000 to 2014, we investigate whether female CEOs are more likely to be dismissed than male CEOs and whether firm performance is differen- tially related to dismissal for male and female CEOs. As such, we examine and illuminate the gendered nature of CEO dismissal, an important issue that is a matter of scholarly inter- est and also has substantial practical implications for sound corporate governance (Hilger et al., 2013). Our research extends prior work that examines whether female, compared to male, executives face greater challenges and threats (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). Rigorous scholarship on possible gender bias at the apex of the organizational hierarchy can provide valuable insights into the similarities and differences in career derailment between high- potential men and women (Krishnan, 2009; J. B. Leslie & Van Velsor, 1996). More broadly, we examine the provocative claim that the rise of women to top executive positions in large corporations suggests that gender is no longer a relevant factor in one’s career trajectory (Elsesser, 2016), presumably because gender bias is adequately addressed by corporate policies and procedures that seek to level the playing field for men and women (Barrett & Morris, 1993; Landy, 2008). Theory and Hypotheses Considerable evidence indicates that gender-role stereotypes, socially shared expectations about the characteristics and behaviors of men and women (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), have limited the ascension of women to the highest level in organizations (Heilman, 2001). Gender stereotypes typically associate men with agentic characteristics, which capture achievement- oriented tendencies (e.g., aggressive), whereas women are associated with communal attri- butes, which entail concern for the welfare of others (e.g., caring; Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016). Because leadership roles are often described in masculine (agentic) terms (Schein, 2001), and women are viewed as deficient in such qualities (Heilman, 1983), gender stereo- types constrain women’s advancement to leadership positions (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). Despite substantial barriers, some women have ascended into top leadership ranks in the corporate world, including at very prominent firms such as GM (Mary Barra), Pepsico (Indra Nooyi), and IBM (Virginia Rometty). Unfortunately, however, there is limited understanding of whether men and women have different experiences when they occupy similar leadership roles. Ryan and Haslam (2005) introduced the idea of the glass cliff to highlight that women who break through the “glass ceiling” will find themselves in perilous situations as they will be promoted to higher risk leadership positions and, thus, face more difficulties once they are in leadership positions. The glass cliff metaphor captures the precariousness of such posi- tions due to invisible dangers of falling from the heights of corporate leadership (Ryan, Haslam, & Kulich, 2010). Evidence is mixed, however, regarding whether women are more likely to be promoted to risky top leadership positions, with some studies finding supporting results (e.g., Cook & Glass, 2014a; Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011), while others do not (S. M. Adams, Gupta, & Leeth, 2009; Cook & Glass, 2014b). However, the equally Gupta et al. / Gender and CEO Dismissal 563 important question of whether men and women are treated differently in comparable leader- ship positions has largely gone unanswered. As Oliver et al. observed, “Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post-promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear” (2018: 113). This is a notable omission because from an equal opportunity perspective, what happens to women in leadership positions is at least as critical as the conditions under which they made it to these positions (Zhang & Qu, 2016). Thus, we examine the important research question of whether women who reach the CEO position are treated differently than men in such positions. Two well-regarded conceptual frameworks—token theory (Kanter, 1977) and role con- gruity logic (Eagly & Karau, 2002)—cast light on the potential challenges that female lead- ers, but not male leaders, face after they make it to coveted leadership positions like the CEO role. Token theory, sometimes labeled “critical mass theory” (Bratton, 2005), suggests that numerical minorities (such as female CEOs) often experience enhanced visibility and atten- tion, exaggerated stereotypes, and heightened monitoring and scrutiny (E. B. King, Hebl, George, & Matusik, 2010). Furthermore, role congruity theory suggests that cultural stereo- types associating leadership with masculinity can undermine evaluations of women’s com- petence and ability to lead (Kark & Eagly, 2010). Taken together, token theory and role congruity theory suggest that female leaders are more likely to be the target of others’ unfa- vorable perceptions about their ability and competence. Consistent with this, investor reac- tion to announcements of female CEO appointments is significantly more unfavorable than of male CEO appointments, presumably because female CEOs are perceived as less compe- tent than male CEOs (Lee & James, 2007). Additionally, research, using an experimental design, finds that firms having an initial public offering are perceived as less likely to suc- ceed when a woman, rather than a man, is at the helm, which then lowers investments directed at female-led firms compared to male-led firms (Bigelow, Lundmark, Parks, & Wuebker, 2014). However, the greater salience of female CEOs may also provide them with certain bene- fits (L. M. Leslie, Manchester, & Dahm, 2017). Some scholars contend that there is a “female advantage” for women who make it to the top leadership positions (Yukl & Chavez, 2002). Gender stereotypes describe women as more skilled at inclusiveness, interpersonal relations, power sharing, and nurturing others—characteristics considered essential for leadership in modern organizations—and as a consequence, women should be superior leaders (Grant, 1988; Loden, 1985). In this vein, Rosette and Tost argue that “because a feminized approach to managing others is increasingly viewed as a strength” (2010: 222), female leaders are seen as more valuable for the firm than male leaders. Furthermore, other scholars argue that because women surmount more barriers than men on their way up, women who make it to the CEO position may be “particularly gifted and/or especially good at learning and/or deal- ing with adversity” (Gupta, Mortal, & Guo, 2018: 2039). For these reasons, some scholars suggest a “female leadership advantage” exists for women who make it to the CEO position (Eagly, 2007), a sentiment that also resonates well with the popular press and the mass media (Folkman, 2012). The literatures reviewed above offer competing predictions for men and women in CEO positions. Empirical research also paints a mixed picture. Some studies find that female CEOs have a lower likelihood of departing from the firm than male CEOs (Elsaid & Ursel, 2018), whereas other evidence suggests that female CEOs have shorter median tenure than 564 Journal of Management / April 2020 male CEOs (Glass & Cook, 2016). Importantly, however, none of these studies distinguished between dismissals and voluntary exits, thus failing to offer a direct test of whether there are gender differences in CEO dismissal. From the perspective of token theory and role congru- ity theory, female CEOs are seen as having attributes inconsistent with leadership roles, which causes female CEOs to be scrutinized more critically and evaluated more negatively than male CEOs. The growing literature on the glass cliff phenomena also recognizes that “women managers tend to receive greater scrutiny and criticism than men, and they tend to be evaluated less favorably, even when performing exactly the same leadership roles as men” (Ryan & Haslam, 2007: 550). However, from the “female advantage” perspective, female CEOs are seen as more competent than male CEOs, which might be associated with lower levels of dismissal. We theorize, however, that the heightened scrutiny of female CEOs increases the salience of social expectations about what men and women usually do or ideally should do (Rudman & Glick, 2001), which generates less favorable evaluation of women’s leadership compared to men’s. Furthermore, the perceived cultural mismatch between women and demands of leadership roles is “likely to be the most extreme at the highest levels of leadership” (Eagly & Karau, 2002: 577), such that women “often seem inappropriate or presumptuous” when they occupy senior leadership positions (Wynen, Beeck, & Ruebens, 2015: 379). In effect, we expect the lack of fit between the feminine stereotype and the CEO role causes female managers to be scrutinized more heavily and criticized more often. Consequently, all else being equal, we expect women will seem less able and competent than men to effectively lead the firm, even when they already occupy the CEO position. Thus, based on the conceptual logic articulated above, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of dismissal will be higher for female CEOs than for male CEOs. Much of the work on CEO dismissal is grounded in agency theory (Crossland & Chen, 2013), which posits that when firms do not perform well, an effective internal governance practice is to sanction the CEO (Kato & Long, 2006). For researchers working in this vein (e.g., Murphy, 1999), poor firm performance is an ipso facto case of poor CEO performance. Consistent with this idea, firm financial performance is considered the primary predictor of CEO dismissal (Hubbard, Christensen, & Graffin, 2017). As Fredrickson et al. note, the “most obvious answer” to the question of why CEOs get dismissed, and “one for which there is [considerable] empirical support” (1988: 255), is that the firm is not performing well and is not expected to perform well in the future. While much research in this area focuses on the role of the performance of the firm itself (Hilger et al., 2013), some scholars argue that the board’s expectation about future performance—based on comparisons with industry and market performance—is a critical factor in CEO dismissal (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). Although it is unsurprising that poor firm performance is considered a key determinant of CEO dismissal (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), some research suggests that CEOs get fired even when firm performance is good (Martin & Combs, 2011). Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011), for example, find that approximately half the dismissed CEOs in their sample were forced out when the firm was performing well. When a firm is performing poorly, implying that the CEO is not leading the firm properly, there may be a normative expectation that the board should take action and dismiss the CEO so that a new leader can take the firm in a different direction (Hilger et al., 2013). Indeed, the behavioral theory of the firm proposes, with Gupta et al. / Gender and CEO Dismissal 565 considerable supporting evidence, that when firm performance is below expectations, based on the firm’s prior performance and/or competitors’ performance, organizational changes are likely (Argote & Greve, 2007). Thus, when firms are performing poorly, we expect that an appropriate action is to dismiss the CEO, and in making such a decision, the board demon- strates its vigilance in exercising its statutory monitoring function. However, when the firm is performing well, there is considerable ambiguity about the CEO’s leadership of the firm and no clear script for the board to follow. In such situations we expect that gender-role ste- reotypes will influence dismissal decisions. Considerable evidence indicates that stereotypes have greater influence in more ambiguous situations (Heilman, 1997; Heilman & Haynes, 2008). Therefore, we expect gender-role ste- reotypes, and biases associated with female leaders, to have more influence when firms are performing well because of the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity in connecting CEOs’ deci- sions and actions with specific firm outcomes (Auster & Prasad, 2016). Because of their token status and role incongruity (discussed earlier), female CEOs are more likely to be perceived as having less ability and competence than male CEOs. Indeed, Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) observed that CEOs in well-performing firms were more likely to be dismissed when they are perceived as deficient in ability or competence. By extension, we argue that because of ambi- guity and vagueness in determining the CEO’s contributions to firm performance, CEO gen- der will influence the extent to which the CEO is given credit for good firm performance. We contend that when the firm is performing well, female CEOs are less likely than male CEOs to be considered good stewards of the firm and therefore are more likely to be dismissed. In summary, we expect that CEO gender will affect performance-dismissal sensitivity, such that dismissal will be more sensitive to performance—both absolute and relative—for male CEOs compared to female CEOs. More specifically, we expect no gender differences in dismissal for poorly performing firms, as we expect boards to feel pressured to take action regardless of CEO gender. However, we expect that as firm performance improves, the prob- ability of dismissal for male CEOs decreases but does not protect female CEOs from dis- missal. Thus, we hypothesize: Hypothesis 2: CEO gender will moderate the performance-dismissal relationship, such that perfor- mance will be more strongly related to dismissal for male versus female CEOs. More specifi- cally, we expect that male and female CEOs are equally likely to be fired in underperforming firms, but female CEOs are more likely to be fired than male CEOs in well-performing firms. Method Sample Large public firms in the United States compose the sample for this study. We start with the ExecuComp database, which contains information on top executives for large firms. We obtain board variable data from BoardEx, which has consistent coverage starting in 2000. Accounting information is from the Compustat Industrial Annual files, and stock return information is from the monthly CRSP tapes. Our final sample comprises 21,772 firm-year observations spanning 2,390 unique firms from 2000 to 2014. CEOs who have been in office less than 1 year are not included in our sample because dismissal is highly unlikely within the 1st year. 566 Journal of Management / April 2020 Variables Our dependent variable, CEO Dismissal, equals 1 if the CEO is fired and 0 if there is no turnover.1 Identifying CEO dismissals is difficult because firms rarely explicitly state that the departing CEO is being fired (Dedman & Lin, 2002; Shen & Cannella, 2002). Therefore, we follow Parrino (1997) to identify CEO dismissal by combining content analysis of public news reports with information about CEO age and continued affiliation with the firm. Although this approach is labor intensive, it has been employed in recent studies because it is considered quite effective in capturing CEO dismissal (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015; Zhang, 2008). On the basis of a Factiva news search of press reports, we classify CEO departure as a dismissal when it is reported that the CEO is fired or forced out (which is quite uncommon) or resigns or leaves as a result of policy differences or pressure (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).2 Furthermore, exits for CEOs below the age of 60 are classified as dismissal if either the press does not report the reason as death, poor health, or acceptance of another position or the press notes that the CEO is retiring but does not announce the retirement at least 6 months in advance (Parrino, 1997). If news reports explain the departure as due to reasons unrelated to the firm’s activities, it is not classified as a dismissal. This method identified 641 dismissals from a total of 2,416 departures in the sample (there were 1,769 voluntary departures and 6 that could not be classified). Although coding of press reports is the most prevalent method to code CEO dismissal (Gao, Harford, & Li, 2012; Hubbard et al., 2017), on the basis of an anonymous reviewer’s comment, we conducted robustness tests using the Peters and Wagner (2014) age-based indi- cator for CEO dismissal. We code all CEO departures below the age of 56 as dismissals and the rest as voluntary exits (Peters & Wagner, 2014). The press- and age-based measures of CEO dismissal are strongly correlated (r = .75, p < .01), and both measures yielded similar support for our hypothesized relations. Because of concerns about using only age as an indi- cator of departure (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), and to be consistent with much of the prior research in this area (Hilger et al., 2013), we report results using the press-based measure. Our main predictor variables are Female, an indicator variable for the CEO being female, and prior firm performance. We present all analyses with only market-adjusted returns (Ret Mkt Adj, which is the difference between the firm’s return and the market’s return over the year preceding the departure date), as standard economic theory suggests that exogenous market performance gets filtered out in evaluating firm performance attributed to the CEO. Notably, results are quite similar with alternative measures of performance: raw returns (Ret 1 Year: the firm’s stock return during the year preceding the departure date) and industry- adjusted returns (Ret Ind Adj: the difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s return during the year preceding the departure date).3 These performance measures capture both absolute performance (Ret 1 Year) and relative performance (Ret Mkt Adj and Ret Ind Adj). As reported in the Supplementary Analyses section, results are robust to employing self-relative performance (which captures historical aspiration level; Harris & Bromiley, 2007) and accounting-based firm performance measures instead. We classify each firm’s industry according to the 12-industry classification in Fama and French (1997), and we obtain industry returns from Ken French’s data library.4 We include several control variables to capture the various factors that can influence the likelihood of CEO dismissal.5 First, we control for Firm Size, measured as the natural log of a firm’s total assets for the year prior to the departure date, to account for greater expectations Gupta et al. / Gender and CEO Dismissal 567 of CEOs at bigger firms (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Second, we control for eight specific CEO attributes that could influence the likelihood of dismissal (Hubbard et al., 2017): CEO Duality (indicator variable for CEO also being chair of the board), CEO Ownership (the shares owned by the CEO scaled by total shares outstanding), CEO Origin (dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO comes from inside the firm and 0 otherwise; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010), CEO Social Status (the number of other boards of listed firms the CEO serves on rela- tive to board size of focal firm; Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2016), CEO Age,6 CEO Functional Experience (dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has finance experi- ence and 0 otherwise; Gomulya & Boeker, 2014), Other-CEO Candidates (dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm also has a separate person in the COO or president position and 0 otherwise; Zhang, 2006), and CEO Ability (dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO obtained a degree from a top 20 SAT school; T. King, Srivastav, & Williams, 2016). Third, we control for three specific board characteristics since the board hires and fires the CEO (Hilger et al., 2013): Board Size (the number of directors on the board), Independent Directors (the propor- tion of board members who are not executives of the firm), and Female Directors (the pro- portion of female board members excluding the CEO). In all, we include 12 covariates, plus firm performance, as controls in the reported regressions. All continuous variables are win- sorized at the 1\% and 99\% levels. Estimation We use a probit model to test the two hypotheses: (1) CEO dismissal is more likely for female CEOs than for male CEOs, and (2) dismissal among female CEOs is less influenced by firm performance relative to male CEOs. A probit model is appropriate here because the dependent variable, CEO Dismissal, is binary. Our results are robust to using a logit model, as we report in the Supplementary Analyses section. We cluster standard errors at the firm level, although as we discuss later, our results are robust to clustering at the industry or CEO level. Our analyses use both industry and year fixed-effects. STATA version 14 was used for all analyses. Recent popular and academic discussions suggest that firms with female CEOs will dif- fer systematically from firms where the CEO position remains a “male bastion” (Ryan et al., 2016: 447). If correct, this could mean that the results from the full sample probit model discussed above are affected by selection bias. To alleviate self-selection concerns, we fol- low prior research (e.g., Bugeja, Matolcsy, & Spiropoulos, 2012; Geiler & Renneboog, 2015) in generating a propensity-matched sample of male- and female-led firms to test our predictions. These results, which also validate our predictions, are presented in alternative analyses below. Results Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics and correlations for our variables. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and for male- and female-led firms separately. Table 2 presents correlation coefficients for the sample as a whole. There are 21,772 firm-year observations in total, of which 617 are female-led and …