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250 word annotated bibliography The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law Should (Try To) Do about It Heather A. Harrison Dinniss Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 19, Fall 2018, pp. 43-50 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: For additional information about this article [ Access provided at 26 Apr 2021 18:42 GMT from ProQuest Information & Learning ] https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2018.0006 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/709949 https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2018.0006 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/709949 f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 43 The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law Should (Try To) Do about It Heather A. Harrison Dinniss The specter of cyber terrorism is one that has been both bandied and se-riously debated since at least the late 1990s. Certainly, by the end of 2017, it looked as if the era of hackers accessing and manipulating critical infrastructure for political purposes, the most likely mecha- nism for conducting a cyber-terrorist act, had truly arrived. Electrical blackouts had been caused in successive years in Ukraine,1 North Korean hackers had breached an American energy utility,2 and Russian hack- ers had penetrated not only a nuclear power plant but had obtained hands-on access to an American energy utility’s control sys- tems.3 More disturbingly in an escalation of these types of cyber-attacks, reports emerged of an advanced attack against a petrochemi- cal company with a plant in Saudi Arabia, apparently designed to sabotage the firm’s operations and trigger a lethal explosion.4 Similar (non-cyber related) explosions at petrochemical plants in China and Mexico resulted in the deaths of several employees, injured hundreds, and forced evacuations of surrounding communities. While all of the investigators involved in the matter believe the attack was most likely intended to cause a fatal explosion, they have all been tight- lipped about any suspected perpetrator of the attacks and even the company affected. The fact of the compromise of the widely used Schneider Triconex safety controllers raises uncomfortable speculation about who was behind the attack and for what purpose. It is no secret that terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State (IS or its Arabic acronym Daesh) have made great strides in utilizing information and commu- nication technologies (ICTs) for encrypted communications, recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising. However, to date, no ter- rorist group appears to have utilized these technologies to directly launch an attack. In April 2015, it appeared that this pat- tern had changed. TV5Monde, a French television network, was attacked, shutting down broadcasting across eleven of the net- work’s channels and hijacking their associ- ated websites and social media accounts. A group calling itself the “Cyber Caliphate,” an IS-associated group, claimed responsi- bility for the attack and made clear links to the terrorist attacks that had shaken France three months previously as well as the Char- lie Hebdo killings.5 For a country already shaken by these kinetic terrorist attacks, the message was clearly intimidatory: “The CyberCaliphate continues its cyberjihad against the enemies of Islamic State.” So- cial media profile pictures were replaced by pictures of a masked Islamist fighter. Posts imploring soldiers to save their families were Heather a. Harrison Dinniss is a senior lecturer at the International law centre of the swedish national Defence college. she is the author of Cyber War and Laws of War (cambridge university Press, 2012), which analyses the status and use of computer network attacks in international law and examines their treatment under the laws of armed conflict. Heather has previously taught at the london school of economics & Political science (lse); the school of oriental and african studies (soas), university of london; and Victoria university of wellington (nZ). 44 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s accompanied by documents said to be iden- tity cards belonging to relatives of French soldiers taking part in anti-ISIS operations.6 French officials proclaimed terrorism and the Paris prosecutor’s office opened a terror- ism investigation into the attack.7 Only it wasn’t. Subsequent forensic investigations led to an advanced persistent threat team dubbed APT28 or “Fancy Bear,” widely alleged to be, or sponsored by, Russian military intel- ligence; despite investigation, the reason for the attacks remains unclear.8 These incidents illustrate some of the many difficulties that the international legal community is faced with in formulating a response to cyber ter- rorism. First is the lack of an agreed definition of what acts or conduct might be included in the term cyber terrorism. While domestic terrorism legislation generally contains very wide definitions of terrorist behavior,9 inter- national law has no such general definition. Second, the international community has little to no agreement on what to do with acts committed by elements of the state that would amount to terrorism if committed by private individuals or organized groups. Definitions The international legal response to terror- ism generally has had a difficult gestation. While states have attempted to agree on comprehensive treaties and reforms since the 1930s,10 entrenched disagreements have instead resulted in a patchwork of sectoral treaties dealing with different types of ter- rorist acts and specific threats (e.g., the hi- jacking of aircraft, hostage taking), regional treaties (e.g., the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism), and UN Security Council decisions. The coverage is far from comprehensive even in relation to kinetic threats and has left unresolved, inter alia, the issues relating to state involvement in terrorist acts (as well as by national libera- tion movements). The sectoral treaties were adopted on an ad hoc basis in response to specific ter- rorist threats that were of particular con- cern to the international community at the time. Neither the sectoral (or regional treaties) adopt definitions of terrorism per se, typically requiring states to criminalize and prosecute certain tactics adopted by ter- rorists, establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over those offenses, and prosecute or extra- dite those suspected of committing them.11 They are supplemented by a number of binding United Nations Security Council resolutions imposing obligations on states in relation to terrorism-related offenses (for example, terrorist financing). While many of these instruments are broad enough to incorporate cyber terrorism, only two of the sectoral treaties mention it specifically.12 As Professor Ben Saul, an expert in inter- national and counter-terrorism law, notes, the sectoral treaties are squarely aimed at physical attacks on protected targets or by prohibited means.13 For the remainder, the question of whether these treaties can be ap- plied to cyber activities will depend on an expansive interpretation of their terms, such as whether malware falls within the defini- tion of a device. For example, it is an of- fense to place “by any means whatsoever” a “device or substance” on an aircraft, ship, or fixed platform where it is likely to endanger its safety.14 Similarly, the Terrorist Bomb- ings Convention 1997 makes it an offense The international community has little to no agreement on what to do with acts committed by elements of the State that would amount to terrorism if committed by private individuals or organized groups. f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 45 t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t to deploy an “explosive or other lethal de- vice” in a public place, government facility, on public transport, or in an infrastructure facility with the intent to cause death or seri- ous injury or extensive destruction resulting in major economic loss.15 If one takes the example of the August 2017 cyber-attack against the Saudi petrochemical plant out- lined above, there appears to be little doubt that the intention was to cause an explosion. The question of whether it would amount to a terrorist bombing under the Convention turns on whether the malware used (dubbed Triton by investigators after the Tritonex Safety controllers it was designed to dis- rupt) can be considered a lethal device. The Convention defines “other lethal device” as one “designed or capable of causing death, serious injury or substantial material dam- age through the release, dissemination or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins, radiation or other similar sub- stances.” It will be entirely open to a court to determine whether the code, apparently designed to cause death or serious injury, can fall within that definition through the use of the petrochemicals already present at the plant. Despite the difficulties of interpretation, it is clear that the current sectoral frame- work already covers some present-day cyber- attack scenarios. For example, the sectoral treaties designed to protect civil aviation may be readily applied to cyber-attacks. Proof-of-concept cyber-attacks were car- ried out by US Department of Homeland Security experts against an aircraft in 2016 and individual researchers in 2015, and have been warned against by cybersecurity experts for many years.16 Cyber-attacks against nuclear facilities may also fall foul of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism 2005. The Convention makes it an offence to use or damage a nuclear facility in a manner that releases or risks the release of radioactive material, or threatens to do so, where the intent is to cause death or seri- ous injury, to inflict substantial damage to property or the environment, or to compel a particular course of action. While to date the reported cyber-attacks against nuclear reactor facilities have involved only periph- eral systems rather than critical ones, there is no sign that hackers will not continue to at- tempt to breach the more difficult to access critical systems to use for political leverage.17 Beyond the sectoral framework, the international community’s most recent attempt to develop a comprehensive defini- tion of terrorism has been under negotia- tion since 2000. Designed to complement the sectoral treaties prohibiting terrorism, the definition of terrorism contained in the UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is broad enough to include cyber activities that are intended, by their nature or context, to “intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”18 The Conven- tion makes it an offense in which a person “unlawfully and intentionally” and “by any means” causes death or serious bodily injury to any person, serious damage to property, or damage to property resulting, or likely to result, in major economic loss.” The defi- nition explicitly includes private property within the scope of the offense (as opposed to state-owned or governmental property). While to date the reported cyber-attacks against nuclear reactor facilities have involved only peripheral systems rather than critical ones, there is no sign that hackers will not continue to attempt to breach the more difficult to access critical systems to use for political leverage. 46 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s Of particular relevance in relation to the most widely anticipated cyber-attacks, damage to infrastructure facilities including communication, telecommunication sys- tems, and information networks is specifi- cally contemplated. Both the special intent required and the damage level contemplated by the Convention (death, serious injury or damage, major economic loss) elevates the type of cyber activities that would be cov- ered by the offense above regular cyber- crime or hacktivism. What, then, of the TV5Monde attack? Leaving aside the ques- tion of attribution and state involvement for the meantime, is this an activity that would correctly be regarded as terrorism under the Convention? The financial cost of the attack was €5 million ($5.6 million) in the first year, followed by over €3 mil- lion ($3.4 million) every following year for new protection.19 This appears to fulfill the criteria of major economic loss; TV5Monde Director General Yves Bigot has also noted that the attack came close to closing the station for good because of lost contracts. Had the attack been as it appeared, an at- tack by the IS-affiliated CyberCaliphate, accompanied by clear references to the pre- vious terror attacks carried out by IS and directly referencing France’s involvement in the conflict in Syria, the criterion of in- timidating the population or compelling a government to abstain from an act would also have been fulfilled. As noted previously, one of the posts to TV5Monde’s Facebook page during the attack purported to show the identity cards and CVs of relatives of French soldiers involved in anti-ISIS opera- tions, along with threats against the troops and their families: “Soldiers of France, stay away from the Islamic State! You have the chance to save your families, take advantage of it.”20 Thus the TV5Monde attack, as it first appeared, would have fallen within the scope of the Draft Convention had it been in force.21 However, as noted above, subse- quent forensic investigation has shown that IS was not behind the attack. Investigators have linked the attack to APT28, otherwise known as Fancy Bear, believed to be Rus- sian military intelligence. With the actor being the state armed forces, the calculation changes dramatically. State Involvement One of the major obstacles in the negotia- tion and implementation of terrorist regu- lation has been the intractable problem of how to deal with terroristic acts committed by state actors (as well as national liberation movements). With regard to the state actors, it should be noted that the Draft Conven- tion currently excludes the acts of state and non-state armed forces in the context of an armed conflict governed by international humanitarian law. This is less of a concern as both treaty and customary international humanitarian law already prohibit attacks whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population in both in- ternational and non-international armed conflicts.22 Most relevant for attacks such as the TV- 5Monde example (and others attributed to military-linked threat teams) is that Article 20(3) of the Draft Convention specifically excludes “the activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law.” Note that this includes peacetime ac- tivities of the military forces. Instances such as the TV5Monde attack are clearly gov- erned by international law in that they con- stitute interference in the domestic affairs of another state, violate state sovereignty, and may involve other internationally wrong- ful acts that will incur the responsibility of the state under international law. But f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 47 t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t under the current Draft Convention, the perpetrators of the acts are precluded from individual criminal responsibility for their actions under international law. A similar carve out for military forces engaged in offi- cial duties (including in peacetime) exists in some of the sectoral treaties—for example, the nuclear treaty discussed above. Interest- ingly, the carve out does not include actions taken by other civilian intelligence agencies, which would also include cyber activities. The 2010 Stuxnet malware launched at the Iranian Natanz uranium enrichment facility caused significant damage to the centrifuges at that facility, although there are no reports of the release of radioactive material. It is generally considered to be the work of the US National Security Agency (NSA) under the US Department of Defense and Israel’s Unit 8200, both of which may be consid- ered military intelligence agencies. The Perception Problem and Why New International Laws (Probably) Won’t Help As noted above the international commu- nity has been working toward a comprehen- sive terrorism regulation since the 1930s and on drafting the current treaty for the past eighteen years. Negotiations have stalled for a variety of reasons, most notably the lack of agreement about the role of state actors and, until relatively recently, an agreed defini- tion.23 In its place, the sectoral treaties have addressed various types of terrorist activities, usually in response to a terrorist incident or incidents that have captured the attention of the international community. However, to date, there have not been any incidents of terrorist groups using ICTs to directly carry out their attacks. In the past, some have questioned whether the groups involved have the expertise or the inclination to carry out acts of cyber terror.24 The extent of cyber ability shown by some groups such as IS, the expressed desire of those groups to launch cyber-attacks, and the leaking of sophisti- cated cyber weaponry (developed by state actors and later reused in other attacks) indi- cates that now it is probably simply a matter of time before it happens. It must be ac- knowledged that this view is not universally held. The fact that the most pressing cyber incidents are carried out by state actors who are exempted from individual criminal re- sponsibility for their actions by virtue of the various terrorism treaties is unlikely to spur states to draft a separate sectoral treaty gov- erning acts of cyber terror (which is likely to have to include the same exclusions). As noted, the Draft Comprehensive Cy- ber Treaty is broad enough to cover cyber ac- tivities; however, it is still under negotiation. One of the major obstacles in the negotiation and implementation of terrorist regulation has been the intractable problem of how to deal with terroristic acts committed by state actors. Instances such as the TV5Monde attack are clearly governed by international law in that they constitute interference in the domestic affairs of another state, violate state sovereignty, and may involve other internationally wrongful acts that will incur the responsibility of the state under international law. But under the current Draft Convention, the perpetrators of the acts are precluded from individual criminal responsibility for their actions under international law. 48 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s It is unlikely that states, understanding that the text is broad enough to cover cyber in- cidents and having the majority of their terror-related focus on more conventional threats, will press for a separate cyber ter- rorism treaty. In the meantime, states are adopting domestic legislation that criminal- izes the underlying cyber activities or adding terrorism as an aggravating factor on existing crimes. In contrast with its kinetic counter- part, the tools used by cyber criminals and cyber terrorists may be identical, the only difference being the ideology and political motivations behind the attacks of the latter rather than the personal or financial aspects of the criminal element. The international legal response to cyber terrorism is left in somewhat of a quandary. In the absence of a serious cyber terror in- cident to focus the political will of states, those wishing to provide an international framework for cyber terror regulation must resort to soft law measures and work with other like-minded actors to provide guide- lines for future action. Such measures could include a mutually agreed definition of cy- ber terrorism, advice to the UN Sixth Com- mittee Working Group on terrorism (tasked with bringing the Draft Comprehensive Convention to completion) to ensure that it continues to encompass the threat of cy- ber terrorism without being overly broad, guidelines for drafting of domestic legisla- tion, and mutual legal assistance governing cyber terrorism, and perhaps even provide draft elements of a Security Council resolu- tion on the topic. For the rest, all that is left is to stand ready . . . and wait. Notes 1 . Andy Greenberg, “Crash Override Took Down Ukraine’s Power Grid Last December,” Wired, December 6, 2017, https: / /www .wired .com /story /crash -override -malware / . 2 . While the level of penetration of this hack into the (unnamed) energy company is disputed, it is uncontested that North Korea was effec- tively laying the groundwork required for any subsequent use of cyber capabilities against US energy utilities . Chris Bing, “Hackers Linked to North Korea Targeted U .S . ICS Com- panies, Breached Energy Firm,” Cyberscoop, October 10, 2017, https: / /www .cyberscoop .com /north -korea -ics -hacking -dhs -ics -cert /; Andrea Mitchell and Ken Dilanian, “Experts: North Korea Targeted U .S . Electric Power Companies,” NBC News, October 11, 2017, https: / /www .nbcnews .com /news /north -ko rea /experts -north -korea -targeted -u -s -elec tric -power -companies -n808996 . 3 . Andy Greenburg, “How Power Grid Hacks Work and When You Should Panic,” Wired, October 13, 2017, https: / /www .wired .com /story /hack ing -a -power -grid -in -three -not -so -easy -steps / . 4 . Nicole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A Cy- berattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly In contrast with its kinetic counterpart, the tools used by cyber criminals and cyber terrorists may be identical, the only difference being the ideology and political motivations behind the attacks of the latter rather than the personal or financial aspects of the criminal element. The international legal response to cyber terrorism is left in somewhat of a quandary. In the absence of a serious cyber terror incident to focus the political will of states, those wishing to provide an international framework for cyber terror regulation must resort to soft law measures and work with other like-minded actors to provide guidelines for future action. f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 49 t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t Goal . Experts Fear Another Try,” The New York Times, March 15, 2018, https: / /www .ny times .com /2018 /03 /15 /technology /saudi -ara bia -hacks -cyberattacks .html . 5 . The hackers had accused the French president, François Hollande, of having committed “an unforgivable mistake” by getting involved in “a war that serves no purpose.” They continued, “That’s why the French received the gifts of Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January.” In December 2014, a spate of attacks including a stabbing and two vehicle rammings had oc- curred in the cities of Joué -Lès -Tours, Dijon and Nantes . The following month, further attacks at the Charlie Hebdo offices and Hypercacher supermarket in Paris resulted in the killing of seventeen people and the three gunmen . For a timeline and summary of attacks in France, see “Timeline: Attacks in France,” BBC News, July 26, 2016, http: / /www .bbc .com /news /world -europe -33288542 . 6 . Mary Dejevsky, “Why We Needn’t Fear the Isis Hackers,” The Guardian, April 9, 2015, https: / /www .theguardian .com /commentis free /2015 /apr /09 /isis -hackers -tv5 -monde -cy ber . 7 . Angelique Chrisafis and Samuel Gibbs, “French Media Groups to Hold Emergency Meet- ing after Isis Cyber -Attack,” The Guardian, April 9, 2015, https: / /www .theguardian .com /world /2015 /apr /09 /french -tv -network -tv 5monde -hijacked -by -pro -isis -hackers . 8 . Although Russia is currently allied to the Syr- ian regime in the non -international armed conflict, in April 2015 France’s involvement in the conflict was limited to airstrikes in Iraq solely against ISIS targets . Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria did not begin until September 2015 . Syria requested Russia’s assistance at the same time against ISIS targets as well as other rebel groups involved in the conflict . Intelligence analysts speculate that the at- tack was most likely an attempt to test forms of cyber weaponry as part of an increasingly aggressive posture . Gordon Corera, “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed by ‘Rus- sian Hackers,’” BBC News, October 10, 2016, http: / /www .bbc .com /news /technology -37 590375 . 9 . For example, the United Kingdom . 10 . See, generally, Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) . 11 . Ibid ., chapter 3 . 12 . Protocol Supplemental to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air- craft (10 September 2010) ICAO Doc 9959; Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (adopted September 10, 2010, not yet entered into force), ICAO Doc 9960 . 13 . Ben Saul and Kathleen Heath, “Cyber Terror- ism,” in Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace, ed . Nikolaos K . Tsa- gourias and Russell Buchan (Cheltenham: Ed- ward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 147 –67, 152 . 14 . Respectively, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, art 1(c); Convention for the Sup- pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art 3(d); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Con- tinental Shelf, art 2(1)(d); cited in Saul and Heath, “Cyber Terrorism,” 154 . 15 . International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (adopted December 15, 1997, entered into force May 23, 2001), Art 2(1). 16 . Calvin Biesecker, “DHS Led Team Dem- onstrates That Commercial Aircraft Can Be Remotely Hacked,” Defense Daily, Novem- ber 8, 2017, http: / /www .defensedaily .com /dhs -led -team -demonstrates -commercial -air craft -can -remotely -hacked /?fullview=1 ; Kim Zetter, “Feds Say That Banned Researcher Commandeered a Plane,” Wired, May 15, 2015 https: / /www .wired .com /2015 /05 /feds -say -banned -researcher -commandeered -plane / . (citing example of on -board hacking of an entertainment system allowing access to the thrust controllers of the plane) . 17 . Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Are Targeting Nu- clear Facilities, Homeland Security Dept . and F .B .I . Say,” The New York Times, July 6, 2017, https: / /www .nytimes .com /2017 /07 /06 /tech nology /nuclear -plant -hack -report .html ; Sean Lyngaas, “Hacking Nuclear Systems Is the Ul- 50 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s timate Cyber Threat . Are We Prepared?” The Verge, last modified January 23, 2018, https: / / www .theverge .com /2018 /1 /23 /16920062 /hacking -nuclear -systems -cyberattack . 18 . UN Draft Convention Art 2 . UN General Assembly, letter dated 3 August 2005 from the Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc . A /59 /894, Appendix II, Augustust 12, 2005 . 19 . Corera, “France’s 5TV .” 20 . Chrisafis and Gibbs, “French Media Groups .” 21 . There is a legitimate question to be asked re- garding whether the attack can be said to be carried out by a non -state armed force in the context of an armed conflict governed by IHL, and thus removed from the scope of the Draft Convention by its Art 20(2); however, that is beyond the scope of the present article . 22 . Jean -Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald - Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005), Rule 2 . Specific treaty ob- ligations may found in Art 33, Geneva Con- vention VI; Art 51(2) Additional Protocol I; Art 4(2)(d) and 13(2) Additional Protocol II . Terrorism offenses have been included in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribu- nal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribu- nal for Lebanon . 23 . Saul and Heath, “Cyber Terrorism,” 162 . 24 . See, for example, Peter W . Singer, “The Cy- ber Terror Bogeyman,” Brookings Institution, last modified November 1, 2012, https: / /www .brookings .edu /articles /the -cyber -terror -bo geyman / . Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without …
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The greatest obstacle From a similar but larger point of view 4 In order to get the entire family to come back for another session I would suggest coming in on a day the restaurant is not open When seeking to identify a patient’s health condition After viewing the you tube videos on prayer Your paper must be at least two pages in length (not counting the title and reference pages) The word assimilate is negative to me. I believe everyone should learn about a country that they are going to live in. It doesnt mean that they have to believe that everything in America is better than where they came from. It means that they care enough Data collection Single Subject Chris is a social worker in a geriatric case management program located in a midsize Northeastern town. She has an MSW and is part of a team of case managers that likes to continuously improve on its practice. The team is currently using an I would start off with Linda on repeating her options for the child and going over what she is feeling with each option.  I would want to find out what she is afraid of.  I would avoid asking her any “why” questions because I want her to be in the here an Summarize the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psychological research (Comp 2.1) 25.0\% Summarization of the advantages and disadvantages of using an Internet site as means of collecting data for psych Identify the type of research used in a chosen study Compose a 1 Optics effect relationship becomes more difficult—as the researcher cannot enact total control of another person even in an experimental environment. Social workers serve clients in highly complex real-world environments. 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