Fluent Essays

in file Chapter Title- Urban Renewal, Favelas, and Guanabara Bay- ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABILITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO.pdf For this assignment, please write a half to 1-full page, single-space and 11 to 12 font in Times New Roman , a critical analysis summation on the piece assigned in relation to some of the key thematics for this week: emerging global cultures, clashing of cultures, gentrification, decolonization, state of alterity (otherness), moral relativity, alienation of the other, counter-violence, state-sanctioned violence, globalization, modernity, post-colonial democracy, white (body) patriarchal supremacy, colonization, colonialism, western imperialism, western hegemony, manifest destiny, counter-hegemony, identity politics, self-hate, genocide, ecocide and ethnocide. In other words, deconstruct, deconstruct, deconstruct. There is no right or wrong answer, all I ask is to think critically about the reading and find relevancy in it and most significantly your positionality in the world. If you can not relate, state why. Chapter Title: Urban Renewal, Favelas, and Guanabara Bay: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABILITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO Chapter Author(s): BRIAN J. GODFREY Book Title: Urban Sustainability Book Subtitle: A Global Perspective Book Editor(s): IGOR VOJNOVIC Published by: Michigan State University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/j.ctt130hjhm.19 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Michigan State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Urban Sustainability This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/j.ctt130hjhm.19 ■ BRIAN J. GODFREY Urban Renewal, Favelas, and Guanabara Bay E N V I R O N M E N T A L J U S T I C E A N D S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y I N R I O D E J A N E I R O Famous for its dramatic landscapes and cultural contrasts, Rio de Janeiro evokes images of towering mountains, luxuriant tropical vegetation, white beaches and scenic lagoons, and exu- berant carnival celebrations with a pulsating samba beat. The city’s panorama exhilarates visitors landing by plane, although the time-honored arrival by sea remains even more aweinspiring, as vessels sail past Sugarloaf Mountain to behold the breathtaking tableau of Guanabara Bay. The need to preserve the city’s beautiful natural setting led the United Nations to inscribe “Rio de Janeiro, Carioca Landscapes between the Mountain and the Sea” as a world heritage site in 2012. Amid these spectacular surroundings, travelers may note unsightly trash and wastewater in the bay or on nearby beaches. Sightseers also notice the ramshackle shantytowns, known as favelas, set on the city’s hills or wetlands. While picturesque from a distance, at close range these informal settlements bring to mind poverty, crime, and violence, as popularized by such films as City of God and reinforced by the news media. Rio’s stunning views, so enthralling at first sight, ultimately display a metropolis divided by wealth and poverty (fig.1). For all its exceptional scenery, Rio de Janeiro highlights ecological problems of rapid urbaniza- tion common in developing countries. For centuries visitors have rhapsodized about the city’s great bay, but it has long served as a dumping ground. Literally meaning “breast of the sea” in the native Tupí-Guaraní language, Guanabara Bay shrank from 180 square miles (466 square kilome- ters) in 1500 to 154 square miles (399 square kilometers) in 2000—a decrease of 15 percent—due to shoreline expansion. Shaped like an oval, the bay narrows to 1.1 miles (1.8 kilometers) at its entrance, then broadens to about 15 miles (24 kilometers) at its widest east-west spot; its north- south distance is approximately 18.6 miles (30 kilometers).1 This enclosure shelters the port from Atlantic storms, but also inhibits the ocean’s natural flushing action in the bay, particularly in the context of mounting landfill, pollution, and sedimentation. As the city’s original raison d’être and This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 360 ■ B R I A N J . G O D F R E Y continuing economic hub, Guanabara Bay’s margins are highly urbanized and contain most of the metropolitan population, industries, oil refineries, two major airports, the seaport and naval base, and the main campus of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (fig. 2). When a Portuguese expedition visited the bay in January 1502, the explorers named it Rio de Janeiro. According to tradition, the mariners mistook Guanabara Bay’s entrance for the mouth of a great river, although a rival interpretation suggests that they recognized a drowned river valley, or “ria.” Certainly the bay once had been a river in prehistoric times. During the Holocene period, when the sea level was some 425 feet (130 meters) lower than at present, a river system developed in Guanabara Valley, only to be flooded by rising oceans about 12,000 years ago as the last ice age ended. This submerged Guanabara paleoriver forms the central trough where the bay reaches its greatest depths of some 164 feet (50 meters). Otherwise, depths on the irregular bottom of this drowned river valley vary from about 56 feet (17 meters) at the entrance, to less than 10 feet (3 meters) away from the navigation channels. The bay’s average depth has been variously estimated between 19 feet (5.7 meters) and 25 feet (7.6 meters), but it is much less in the shallow northwestern parts. Officials have warned that half of the bay is “only about a foot and a half deep and runs the risk of drying up” (fig. 3).2 Such dire projections contrast with an unspoiled state upon European arrival five centuries ago, when the bay and nearby lagoons and mangrove forests teemed with fish and wildlife, includ- ing dolphins, whales, birds, and shellfish. Tupí-Guaraní groups, locally called Tupinambás or Tamoios, clustered in agricultural villages around Guanabara Bay. The Portuguese founded São Figure 1. Rio’s classic postcard of Sugarloaf Mountain at the entrance to Guanabara Bay, taken from Corcovado Mountain above the city, obscures the marked socioeconomic disparities evident from below. C O U R T E S Y O F B R IA N J . G O D F R E Y This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms U R B A N R E N E WA L , FAV E L A S , A N D G U A N A B A R A B AY ■ 361 C O U R T E S Y O F B R IA N J . G O D F R E Y ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^__ ___ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^̂ ^ ^^^ ^̂ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^̂^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^̂ ^ ^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^̂ ^ 60 12 MILES 0 9.7 19.4 KM. RIO DE JANEIRO NITERÓI Centro ATLANTIC OCEAN SÃO GONÇALO ITABORAÍ MAGÉ DUQUE DE CAXIAS BELFORD ROXO GU AN AB AR A BA Y Paquetá Island SÃO JOÃO DE MERITÍ GUAPIMIRIM ZONA NORTE ZONA SUL Int’l Airport Ipanema Corcavodo Mtn. Mangueira Sugarloaf Providência Rocinha Pavão Copacabana BARRA DA TIJUCA N Complexo da Maré Ilha do Fundão Figure 2. Metropolitan Rio de Janeiro. Sebastião do Rio de Janeiro in 1565, which began a long process of urbanization—along with deforestation, wildlife extinction, wastewater contamination, and tropical disease. By 1850, when Herman Melville visited and praised “the Bay of all Rivers—the Bay of all Delights—the Bay of all Beauties,” overexploitation of the whale population, which once found an ideal breeding ground here, had already ended a local industry in whale meat and oil that had flourished for two centuries.3 Environmental degradation mounted as Rio grew into a megacity: hillside ero- sion, sedimentation, and landfill steadily encroached on the bay’s shorelines, while pollution by industry, shipping, oil spills, and untreated sewage rendered its once-pristine beaches unsafe for swimming. Rio’s mountains, historic hills, and national forests were declared national landmarks in 1973, but Guanabara Bay remained without such protection.4 State agencies now monitor the bay, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) advocate its restoration, but political obstacles, economic realities, and the task’s daunting scale stifle progress. During the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio’s “Earth Summit,” signatories of an Alternative Treaty famously proposed “that Guanabara Bay and its surrounding environments be declared a World Heritage Site.”5 This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 362 ■ B R I A N J . G O D F R E Y In that spirit, this chapter examines Rio de Janeiro’s urban sustainability with regard to the interactions of urban renewal programs, favela communities, and Guanabara Bay. As popularized by the Earth Summit’s “Agenda 21” program, sustainability has been widely regarded as equita- bly meeting “the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”6 Despite the concept’s ambiguities and contradictions, sustainability has the virtue of linking environmental quality to human welfare. While mainstream environmentalism has at times been criticized for downplaying issues of social justice, sustainable development attempts to reconcile, at least in principle, the “three Es” of environment, economy, and equity. Thus arise concerns for environmental justice, as defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): “The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.”7 As in other cities, the problems of Rio’s favelas underscore how unsustainable urban growth results from environmental injustice—spatial (dis)placement, inadequate housing, landslides and other environmental hazards, and lack of such urban services as potable water, electricity, and sewage treatment.8 Indeed, since favela residents are overwhelmingly poor and people of color, their communities reflect deprivations of both race and class. Robert Bullard’s appraisal of the U.S. Figure 3. Downtown Rio de Janeiro with the Rio-Niterói Bridge (8.25 miles or 13.2 kilometers long) in the background; despite modern shoreline consolidation, sixty-five islands still dot Guanabara Bay. C O U R T E S Y O F B R IA N J . G O D F R E Y This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms U R B A N R E N E WA L , FAV E L A S , A N D G U A N A B A R A B AY ■ 363 applies equally well to Brazil: “institutional racism and discriminatory land-use policies and prac- tices of government—at all levels—influence the creation and perpetuation of racially separate and unequal residential areas for people of color and whites.” Environmental justice, he goes on, would ensure “equal protection of environmental, health, employment, housing, transportation, and civil rights laws.”9 By juxtaposing the degradation of Guanabara Bay and the infrastructural problems of the port, industry, and favelas nearby, this chapter analyzes the coevolution of Rio’s most pressing sustainability issues in both ecological and socioeconomic terms. Urban Metabolism, Environmental Justice, and Rio’s Favelas As ecological communities, cities can be viewed as organisms that require a variety of inputs to survive and thrive, resulting in outputs of unwanted waste products. Urban centers need materials and resources to sustain inhabitants, to maintain the built environment, and to operate machines, transportation, and other moving parts. As Herbert Girardet reminds us, a city’s sustainability can be gauged by the efficiency and renewability of its metabolism—“the flow of resources and products through the urban system for the benefit of urban populations.” On one hand, natural ecosystems feature circular metabolisms in which local outputs become inputs (and viceversa) in largely self-contained chains of mutual benefit. Unfortunately, modern cities favor linear metabolisms, as resources are directed “through the urban system without much concern about their origin or about the destination of wastes, resulting in the discharge of vast amounts of waste products incompatible with natural systems.” Hence urban ecologists like Girardet emphasize the importance of closing the open-ended resource loops of modern cities through recycling and reusing materials, rather than dumping unwanted “externalities” in landfills, incinerators, and waterways.10 Water is of particular importance. Since citydwellers require potable water for drinking, cook- ing, and sanitation, metropolises cannot grow without systems to provide fresh water and then to discharge domestic and industrial wastewater. Metabolic infrastructures must collect, treat, and dispose of wastes before they expose residents to pathogens resulting in such diseases as cholera, typhoid, and dysentery, which historically plagued London, New York, and other early industrial metropolises. At present, such waterborne diseases still threaten poor communities in Mexico City, São Paulo, Lagos, and other rapidly growing cities of the developing world, where much of the urban population lacks sewerage. Of course, sewage treatment and safe disposal of sludge is essential for economic growth as well as public health.11 In Brazil, sewage systems reached only 50 percent of the urban population in 2004—and even then most of the discharged sewage remained untreated—although 85 percent benefited from public water provision. The half of the urban population with sewerage generally coincides with what has been called the “organized city” of relatively affluent populations, paved streets, high-rise buildings, and urban services. The other half without access to sewage systems tends to be low-income and to reside in either peripheral areas of legal subdivisions with many unpaved streets and few services, or in self-constructed favelas of uncertain legal title as well as a lack of basic infrastructures. Foreigners tend to view favelas as synonymous with “slums,” but in Brazil- ian parlance they diff er from deteriorated inner cities and peri-urban residential subdivisions This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 364 ■ B R I A N J . G O D F R E Y by appearance and location. Typically, favelas arise on steep hillsides, low-lying wetlands, along railroad lines or highways, or on other undesirable sites.12 Officially 18.7 percent of Rio’s population lived in 513 favelas in 2000, but these figures were conservative. In 2002 Rio’s planning agency found 39.4 percent of the city’s dwelling units (839,855 houses or apartments) “irregular” and without legal title, although clearly not all were favelas.13 Legislation of 1937 recognized favelas as “groups of two or more irregular shacks, constructed of improvised materials.” Since 1950, the Brazilian census has considered favelas to be groups of 50 or more dwellings of a “rustic appearance” without land title, full or partial absence of public ser- vices, and lack of street paving, numbers, and signage.14 The initial rudimentary shacks often give way in time to improved dwellings, if the favela is secure from landslides, flooding, and eviction. Indeed, Brazilian elites and policymakers have tried alternatively to ignore, eradicate, or upgrade and integrate favelas, while their residents or favelados have continued to provide cheap labor and services for the urban economy. Despite policy changes, favelados continue to be viewed in largely negative ways by society at large. Janice Perlman once famously argued that such views reflected dominant ideologies, which steadfastly ignored evidence that favelados were not passive and marginal but rather were “in fact integrated into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own interests.”15 Follow-up interviews based on the original 1968–1969 study, more than three decades later (1999–2003), found a transformation from “the myth of marginality” among aspiring recent migrants to “the reality of marginality” among continuing residents faced with few prospects of social mobility. Although objective living standards, urban services, and education had improved among those interviewed in three selected favelas, previously upbeat attitudes had soured: the inability to move into affluent neighborhoods and to achieve better jobs frustrated favelados, while pervasive fear of gang violence heightened their pessimism. Other scholars also have noted ominous trends in urban segregation, income inequality, rates of violent crime, and social and racial polarization under neoliberalism since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985.16 This attitudinal downturn among favelados also reflects environmental injustice, including a dearth of vital urban services among low-income communities. Such ecological lapses highlight the city’s social geography of north-south polarization, which contrasts the industrial working- class districts (both peripheral subdivisions and favelas) concentrated around Guanabara Bay with the affluent districts near the scenic Atlantic beaches. Densely inhabited and highly segregated by socioeconomic status and race, the city of Rio reached a population of 6.1 million in 2006—over half the 11.5 million residents in the metropolitan region, comprised of twenty municipalities cov- ering 1,809 square miles (4,686 square kilometers). The city’s Southern Zone (Zona Sul), centered on such beachfront communities as Copacabana and Ipanema, includes 27 favelas, according to 2000 data. The rapidly growing Western Zone (Zona Oeste) encompasses Barra da Tijuca and other wealthy beachfront districts, along with such struggling communities as the City of God and 262 other favelas. Central Rio includes the downtown business district, diverse residential districts, and 61 hillside favelas. The city’s Northern Zone (Zona Norte) and suburbs of the Flumi- nense Lowlands (Baixada Fluminense) encompass a vast urban region with the port, shipyards, oil refineries, chemical plants and other industries, and 354 favelas.17 At a metropolitan scale, human development indices (HDI)—including education, health, This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms U R B A N R E N E WA L , FAV E L A S , A N D G U A N A B A R A B AY ■ 365 income, and housing—are highest in populous Rio and Niterói, which now have relatively low rates of demographic growth. These cities rank second and first in HDI, respectively, among the state’s ninety-two municipalities. Table 1 compares the seven municípios encircling Guanabara Bay: while not encompassing the bay’s entire watershed, they comprise three-quarters of the met- ropolitan population. Beyond the core cities of Rio and Niterói, the others are poorer, off er fewer urban services, and generally have lower quality of life. Much of the peripheral urban populations remain unconnected to the public water supply and sewerage systems. City residents without sewage connections in 2000 officially ranged from 43 percent in Duque de Caxias, 60 percent in São Gonçalo, to even higher proportions elsewhere. Even in relatively well-served Rio de Janeiro, 22 percent of the urban population lacked sewerage, while in Niterói the figure rose to 27 percent.18 Community groups argue that official figures understate such problems: Currently about 12 percent of households in Rio de Janeiro do not have running water, over 30 percent do not have sewage connections, and official electricity connections reach only 70 percent of the population. In favelas—which make up the bulk of the households without these urban services—residents use illegal connections (gatos) to water and electricity, and sewage is often dumped straight into rivers, drainage ditches, and lagoons.19 After this metropolitan overview, we shift to the environmental history of Rio de Janeiro’s urbanization with a focus on evolving perceptions and policies. Basically, I argue that elite ideolo- gies have shifted successively from the favelas’ assumed disease, filth, and moral depravity in the Table 1. Population and human development in Greater Rio de Janeiro, 1996–2006 MUNI CIPALITIES ON GUANABARA BAY AREA POPULATION PUBLIC WATER PUBLIC SEWERAGE STATE HDI (MI2 / KM2) % URBAN TOTAL % ANNUAL CHANGE 2000* 2000* RANK** 2000 2006 1996–2006 Duque de Caxias 180 / 465 99.6 854,509 1.9 69.5 56.6 52/92 Guapimirim 139 / 361 67.4 45,251 3.9 49.0 25.6 63/92 Itaboraí 164 / 424 94.5 222,722 3.9 23.8 28.9 67/92 Magé 149 / 386 94.2 236,748 2.9 47.5 31.1 57/92 Niterói 50 / 129 100 476,561 0.6 78.3 73.0 1/92 Rio de Janeiro 456 / 1,182 100 6,134,892 1.0 97.8 78.0 2/92 São Gonçalo 96 / 249 100 972,854 1.7 80.4 40.3 23/92 7 municipalities on bay (total) 1,234 / 3,196 99.6 8,943,537 1.3 — — — 20 municipalities, Rio de Janiero metro region (total) 1,809 / 4,686 99.3 11,460,463 1.4 — — 15/33 Sources: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografi a e Estatística, http://www.ibge.gov.br/; Fundação CIDE—Centro de Informações e Dados do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro em Dados, http://200.156.34.70/cide/index.php; Instituto da Baía de Guanabara, http://www.portalbaiadeguanabara.com.br/; United Nations Development Program, Brazil, Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano do Brasil—2003, http://www.pnud.org.br/home/. * Percent of urban population. **The United National Human Development Index combines various quality-of-life indicators, including education, health, income, and housing. Municipalities are ranked according to the ninety-two jurisdictions in Rio de Janeiro state (x/92); the metropolitan region is ranked according to the thirty-three such areas studied in Brazil (x/33). This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 366 ■ B R I A N J . G O D F R E Y nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sanitary city, to their supposed social marginalization, behavioral deviance, economic dependence, and general pathology in the mid-twentieth-century “modernist city,” and more recently to the environmental problems, geohazards, and violent threats they purportedly pose to the contemporary sustainable city. Biases against favelas have been reconfigured according to the pressing problems of each historic era: policies have evolved, but favelas have consistently been diagnosed in negative terms that reinforced stereotypes and stigmatized residents. The following brief historical geography examines the emergence of Rio’s contemporary ecological problems with regard to long-term issues of social equity, spatial segrega- tion, and environmental justice. The Sanitary City: Urban Reforms to “Civilize” Rio (1808–1920) Concern with pollution, sanitation, and tropical disease first arose in colonial Rio de Janeiro. Despite a splendid natural harbor, the irregular site and uneven topography—composed of coastal inlets, low-lying marshes and lagoons, and steep hills—constrained urban expansion, while the humid tropical climate and uneven terrain created problems of stagnant water, ideal for the prolif- eration of mosquitoes and other insect vectors of disease. As early as 1613 a yellow fever epidemic caused high mortality rates, especially among slaves. Soon thereafter, the filling of central lagoons and construction of drainage ditches began to modify the city’s natural landscape. Despite such early eff orts, ecological problems steadily mounted along with urban growth.20 The 1763 transfer of the viceregal capital from Salvador da Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, which featured a convenient port of entry to the inland gold and diamond mines of Minas Gerais, reflected the city’s increasing size and status. As Preston James once noted: “Gold made Rio de Janeiro, as surely as sugar made São Salvador and Recife and, as later, coff ee made São Paulo.”21 The royal family’s sudden arrival in 1808, after fleeing Lisbon to escape the Napoleonic invasions, overnight made Rio the capital of Portugal’s vast overseas empire. Under this central- ized power, one historian notes, “Rio’s landscape began a process of monumental change that would extend well into the twentieth century.”22 Finding a city of narrow and irregular streets, unhealthy swamps, crowded housing, and few urban amenities, Dom João VI ordered the building of roads, botanical gardens, parade grounds at Campo Santana, and other parks, monuments, and buildings. Powered by slave labor, royal projects also included filling swamps, leveling low hills, and shoreline landfills. The influx of some 10,000 Portuguese with the court, coupled with liber- alization of foreign trade, dramatically accelerated urbanization. The Bragança royal family and leading aristocrats began an exodus of the wealthy from the city center: the monarch set up court at Quinta da Boa Vista on the city’s outskirts, returning to the Imperial Palace downtown only for ceremonial functions, while nobles built luxurious hillside estates (fig. 4).23 Rio’s population more than doubled from about 50,000 in 1808 to 112,000 by 1821, when a Portuguese constitutionalist revolt forced King João VI’s return to Lisbon. He left his heir, Dom Pedro I, to govern Brazil. As imperial capital, main port, and cultural center of an independent Brazil after 1822, Rio de Janeiro overshadowed the country’s other nineteenth-century cities. Rio boasted a population of 274,972 in 1872, compared with 31,385 in São Paulo. Spurred by the rural-urban migration resulting from railroad expansion and abolition of slavery in 1888, the city’s This content downloaded from ������������130.65.109.155 on Tue, 01 Jun 2021 07:43:48 UTC������������� All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms U R B A N R E N E WA L , FAV E L A S , A N D G U A N A B A R A B AY ■ 367 growth continued unabated after the Republic’s proclamation in 1889. As Rio’s population grew by nearly 7 percent annually from 1872 to 1900 (table 2), infrastructural deficiencies mounted in the provision of fresh water, sewerage, and transportation. One-quarter of the city’s population crowded into central tenements called cortiços (literally, “beehives”), which raised concerns for public health. For example, a smallpox epidemic killed 4,160 people in 1849, and recurring epidemics of yellow fever, malaria, typhoid, and cholera led to periodic international quarantines that damaged commerce. Sanitation was abysmal. Dirty water was disposed by throwing it from windows into the street, often with little more than a shouted warning to passersby: “Agua Vai!” Fecal material was stored in barrels and dumped by slaves known as “tigers” for the brown streaks Figure 4. Rio de …